AI Case Brief
Generate an AI-powered case brief with:
đź“‹Key Facts
⚖️Legal Issues
đź“šCourt Holding
đź’ˇReasoning
🎯Significance
Estimated cost: $0.001 - $0.003 per brief
Full Opinion
PRELIMINARY PRINT
Volume 600 U. S. Part 1
Pages 447–476
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
THE SUPREME COURT
June 29, 2023
Page Proof Pending Publication
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
OCTOBER TERM, 2022 447
Syllabus
GROFF v. DeJOY, POSTMASTER GENERAL
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the third circuit
No. 22–174. Argued April 18, 2023—Decided June 29, 2023
Petitioner Gerald Groff is an Evangelical Christian who believes for reli-
gious reasons that Sunday should be devoted to worship and rest. In
2012, Groff took a mail delivery job with the United States Postal Serv-
ice. Groff's position generally did not involve Sunday work, but that
changed after USPS agreed to begin facilitating Sunday deliveries for
Amazon. To avoid the requirement to work Sundays on a rotating
basis, Groff transferred to a rural USPS station that did not make Sun-
day deliveries. After Amazon deliveries began at that station as well,
Groff remained unwilling to work Sundays, and USPS redistributed
Groff's Sunday deliveries to other USPS staff. Groff received “pro-
gressive discipline” for failing to work on Sundays, and he eventually
resigned.
Groff sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, asserting
Page Proof Pending Publication
that USPS could have accommodated his Sunday Sabbath practice
“without undue hardship on the conduct of [USPS's] business.” 42
U. S. C. § 2000e( j). The District Court granted summary judgment to
USPS. The Third Circuit affrmed based on this Court's decision in
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63, which it construed
to mean “that requiring an employer `to bear more than a de minimis
cost' to provide a religious accommodation is an undue hardship.” 35
F. 4th 162, 174, n. 18 (quoting 432 U. S., at 84). The Third Circuit found
the de minimis cost standard met here, concluding that exempting Groff
from Sunday work had “imposed on his coworkers, disrupted the work-
place and workfow, and diminished employee morale.” 35 F. 4th, at
175.
Held: Title VII requires an employer that denies a religious accommoda-
tion to show that the burden of granting an accommodation would result
in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular
business. Pp. 456–473.
(a) This case presents the Court's frst opportunity in nearly 50 years
to explain the contours of Hardison. The background of that decision
helps to explain the Court's disposition of this case. Pp. 456–467.
(1) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it unlawful for
covered employers “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individ-
ual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
448 GROFF v. DeJOY
Syllabus
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges [of] employment,
because of such individual's . . . religion.” § 2000e–2(a)(1). As origi-
nally enacted, Title VII did not spell out what it meant by discrimina-
tion “because of . . . religion.” Subsequent regulations issued by the
EEOC obligated employers “to make reasonable accommodations to the
religious needs of employees” whenever doing so would not create
“undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.” 29 CFR
§ 1605.1 (1968). In 1970, however, the Sixth Circuit held that Title VII
did not require an employer “to accede to or accommodate” a Sabbath
religious practice because to do so “would raise grave” Establishment
Clause questions. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F. 2d 324, 334.
This Court affrmed Dewey by an evenly divided vote. See 402 U. S.
689. Congress responded by amending Title VII in 1972 to track the
EEOC's regulatory language and to clarify that employers must “rea-
sonably accommodate . . . an employee's or prospective employee's reli-
gious observance or practice” unless the employer is “unable” to do so
“without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.”
§ 2000e( j). Pp. 456–458.
(2) Hardison concerned an employment dispute that arose prior to
the 1972 amendments to Title VII. In 1967, Trans World Airlines hired
Larry Hardison to work in a department that operated “24 hours per
Page Proof Pending Publication
day, 365 days per year” and played an “essential role” for TWA by pro-
viding parts needed to repair and maintain aircraft. Hardison, 432
U. S., at 66. Hardison later underwent a religious conversion and began
missing work to observe the Sabbath. Initial conficts with Hardison's
work schedule were resolved, but conficts resurfaced when he trans-
ferred to another position in which he lacked the seniority to avoid work
during his Sabbath. Attempts at accommodation failed, and TWA dis-
charged Hardison for insubordination.
Hardison sued TWA and his union, and the Eighth Circuit sided with
Hardison. The Eighth Circuit found that reasonable accommodations
were available to TWA, and rejected the defendants' Establishment
Clause arguments. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F. 2d
33, 42–44. This Court granted certiorari. TWA's petition for certio-
rari asked this Court to decide whether the 1972 amendment of Title
VII violated the Establishment Clause as applied by the Eighth Circuit,
particularly insofar as that decision had approved an accommodation
that allegedly overrode seniority rights granted by the relevant collec-
tive bargaining agreement. At the time, some thought that the Court's
now-abrogated decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602—which
adopted a test under which any law whose “principal or primary effect”
“was to advance religion” was unconstitutional, id., at 612–613—posed
a serious problem for the 1972 amendment of Title VII. Ultimately,
Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 449
Syllabus
however, constitutional concerns played no on-stage role in the Court's
decision in Hardison. Instead, the Court's opinion stated that “the
principal issue on which TWA and the union came to this Court” was
whether Title VII “require[s] an employer and a union who have agreed
on a seniority system to deprive senior employees of their seniority
rights in order to accommodate a junior employee's religious prac-
tices.” Hardison, 432 U. S., at 83, and n. 14. The Court held that Title
VII imposed no such requirement. Ibid. This conclusion, the Court
found, was “supported by the fact that seniority systems are afforded
special treatment under Title VII itself.” Id., at 81. Applying this
interpretation of Title VII and disagreeing with the Eighth Circuit's
evaluation of the factual record, the Court identifed no way in which
TWA, without violating seniority rights, could have feasibly accom-
modated Hardison's request for an exemption from work on his
Sabbath.
The parties had not focused on determining when increased costs
amount to “undue hardship” under Title VII separately from the senior-
ity issue. But the Court's opinion in Hardison contained this oft-
quoted sentence: “To require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost
in order to give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship.” Al-
though many lower courts later viewed this line as the authoritative
Page Proof Pending Publication
interpretation of the statutory term “undue hardship,” the context ren-
ders that reading doubtful. In responding to Justice Marshall's dissent,
the Court described the governing standard quite differently, stating
three times that an accommodation is not required when it entails “sub-
stantial” “costs” or “expenditures.” Id., at 83, n. 14. Pp. 459–465.
(3) Even though Hardison's reference to “de minimis” was under-
cut by conficting language and was feeting in comparison to its discus-
sion of the “principal issue” of seniority rights, lower courts have
latched on to “de minimis” as the governing standard. To be sure,
many courts have understood that the protection for religious adherents
is greater than “more than . . . de minimis” might suggest when read
in isolation. But diverse religious groups tell the Court that the “de
minimis” standard has been used to deny even minor accommodations.
The EEOC has also accepted Hardison as prescribing a “more than a
de minimis cost” test, 29 CFR § 1605.2(e)(1), though it has tried to
soften its impact, cautioning against extending the phrase to cover such
things as the “administrative costs” involved in reworking schedules,
the “infrequent” or temporary “payment of premium wages for a substi-
tute,” and “voluntary substitutes and swaps” when they are not con-
trary to a “bona fde seniority system.” §§ 1605.2(e)(1), (2). Yet some
courts have rejected even the EEOC's gloss on “de minimis,” rejecting
accommodations the EEOC's guidelines consider to be ordinarily re-
450 GROFF v. DeJOY
Syllabus
quired. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that Hardison
does not compel courts to read the “more than de minimis” standard
“literally” or in a manner that undermines Hardison's references to
“substantial” cost. Tr. of Oral Arg. 107. Pp. 465–467.
(b) The Court holds that showing “more than a de minimis cost,” as
that phrase is used in common parlance, does not suffce to establish
“undue hardship” under Title VII. Hardison cannot be reduced to that
one phrase. In describing an employer's “undue hardship” defense,
Hardison referred repeatedly to “substantial” burdens, and that formu-
lation better explains the decision. The Court understands Hardison
to mean that “undue hardship” is shown when a burden is substantial in
the overall context of an employer's business. This fact-specifc inquiry
comports with both Hardison and the meaning of “undue hardship” in
ordinary speech. Pp. 468–473.
(1) To determine what an employer must prove to defend a denial
of a religious accommodation under Title VII, the Court begins with
Title VII's text. The statutory term, “hardship,” refers to, at a mini-
mum, “something hard to bear” and suggests something more severe
than a mere burden. If Title VII said only that an employer need not
be made to suffer a “hardship,” an employer could not escape liability
Page Proof Pending Publication
simply by showing that an accommodation would impose some sort of
additional costs. Adding the modifer “undue” means that the requisite
burden or adversity must rise to an “excessive” or “unjustifable” level.
Understood in this way, “undue hardship” means something very differ-
ent from a burden that is merely more than de minimis, i. e., “very
small or trifing.” The ordinary meaning of “undue hardship” thus
points toward a standard closer to Hardison's references to “substantial
additional costs” or “substantial expenditures.” 432 U. S., at 83, n. 14.
Further, the Court's reading of the statutory term comports with pre-
1972 EEOC decisions, so nothing in that history plausibly suggests that
“undue hardship” in Title VII should be read to mean anything less than
its meaning in ordinary use. Cf. George v. McDonough, 596 U. S.
–––, –––. And no support exists in other factors discussed by the par-
ties for reducing Hardison to its “more than a de minimis cost” line.
Pp. 468–470.
(2) The parties agree that the “de minimis” test is not right, but
they differ in the alternative language they propose. The Court thinks
it is enough to say that what an employer must show is that the burden
of granting an accommodation would result in substantial increased
costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business. Hardison,
432 U. S., at 83, n. 14. Courts must apply the test to take into account
all relevant factors in the case at hand, including the particular accom-
Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 451
Syllabus
modations at issue and their practical impact in light of the nature, size,
and operating cost of an employer. P. 470–471.
(3) The Court declines to adopt the elaborations of the applicable
standard that the parties suggest, either to incorporate Americans with
Disabilities Act case law or opine that the EEOC's construction of Har-
dison has been basically correct. A good deal of the EEOC's guidance
in this area is sensible and will, in all likelihood, be unaffected by the
Court's clarifying decision. But it would not be prudent to ratify in
toto a body of EEOC interpretation that has not had the beneft of the
clarifcation the Court adopts today. What is most important is that
“undue hardship” in Title VII means what it says, and courts should
resolve whether a hardship would be substantial in the context of an
employer's business in the commonsense manner that it would use in
applying any such test. P. 471.
(4) The Court also clarifes several recurring issues. First, as the
parties agree, Title VII requires an assessment of a possible accommo-
dation's effect on “the conduct of the employer's business.” § 2000e( j).
Impacts on co-workers are relevant only to the extent those impacts go
on to affect the conduct of the business. A court must analyze whether
that further logical step is shown. Further, a hardship that is attribut-
able to employee animosity to a particular religion, to religion in gen-
Page Proof Pending Publication
eral, or to the very notion of accommodating religious practice, cannot
be considered “undue.” Bias or hostility to a religious practice or ac-
commodation cannot supply a defense.
Second, Title VII requires that an employer “reasonably accommo-
date” an employee's practice of religion, not merely that it assess the
reasonableness of a particular possible accommodation or accommoda-
tions. Faced with an accommodation request like Groff's, an employer
must do more than conclude that forcing other employees to work over-
time would constitute an undue hardship. Consideration of other op-
tions would also be necessary. Pp. 471–473.
(c) Having clarifed the Title VII undue-hardship standard, the Court
leaves the context-specifc application of that clarifed standard in this
case to the lower courts in the frst instance. P. 473.
35 F. 4th 162, vacated and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Sotomayor, J.,
fled a concurring opinion, in which Jackson, J., joined, post, p. 474.
Aaron M. Streett argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were J. Mark Little, Christopher E. Tutun-
jian, Kelly J. Shackelford, Jeffrey C. Mateer, Hiram S.
452 GROFF v. DeJOY
Counsel
Sasser III, David J. Hacker, Stephanie N. Taub, Alan J.
Reinach, Jonathon Cherne, Randall Luke Wenger, and
Jeremy L. Samek.
Solicitor General Prelogar argued the cause for respond-
ent. With her on the brief were Principal Deputy Assist-
ant Attorney General Boynton, Deputy Solicitor General
Fletcher, Aimee W. Brown, and Charles W. Scarborough.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of West
Virginia et al. by Patrick Morrisey, Attorney General of West Virginia,
Lindsay S. See, Solicitor General, Michael R. Williams, Senior Deputy
Solicitor General, and Grant A. Newman, Assistant Solicitor General, and
by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows:
Steve Marshall of Alabama, Treg Taylor of Alaska, Tim Griffn of Arkan-
sas, Ashley Moody of Florida, Chris Carr of Georgia, RaĂşl Labrador of
Idaho, Brenna Bird of Iowa, Kris Kobach of Kansas, Daniel Cameron of
Kentucky, Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, Austin
Knudsen of Montana, Michael T. Hilgers of Nebraska, John M. Formella
of New Hampshire, Dave Yost of Ohio, Gentner Drummond of Oklahoma,
Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Jonathan Skrmetti of Tennessee, Ken
Page Proof Pending Publication
Paxton of Texas, Sean D. Reyes of Utah, and Jason Miyares of Virginia;
for Airline Employees for Health Freedom by John C. Sullivan and Kris-
tina M. Williams; for the Alabama Center for Law and Liberty et al. by
Matthew J. Clark; for the American Constitutional Rights Union by John
J. Park, Jr.; for the American Hindu Coalition by Matthew T. Martens; for
Americans for Fair Treatment by David Osborne; for the Becket Fund for
Religious Liberty by Mark L. Rienzi; for the CatholicVote.org Education
Fund by Antony B. Kolenc; for the Christian Legal Society et al. by
Thomas C. Berg and Kimberlee Wood Colby; for the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints et al. by Alexander Dushku and R. Shawn
Gunnarson; for Citizens United et al. by Gary M. Lawkowski, Michael
Boos, and Daniel H. Jorjani; for the Council on American-Islamic Rela-
tions by John S. Friend, Lena F. Masri, and Justin Sadowsky; for Former
EEOC General Counsel et al. by Rachel N. Morrison; for the General
Conference of Seventh-day Adventists by Gene C. Schaerr, H. Christopher
Bartolomucci, Hannah C. Smith, Kathryn E. Tarbert, Todd R. McFar-
land, and Christopher E. Mills; for Liberty Counsel by Mathew D. Staver,
Anita L. Staver, Horatio G. Mihet, and Roger K. Gannam; for the Louis D.
Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under Law by Thomas R. McCarthy,
Kenneth L. Marcus, Alyza D. Lewin, L. Rachel Lerman, and Arthur
Traldi; for the Muslim Public Affairs Council by Joshua C. McDaniel; for
the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs (COLA) et al.
by Nathan Lewin and Dennis Rapps; for Religious Liberty Scholars et al.
Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 453
Opinion of the Court
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires employ-
ers to accommodate the religious practice of their employees
by John A. Meiser and Douglas Laycock; for the Seventh-day Adventist
Church in Canada et al. by Nicholas R. Reaves; for the Sikh Coalition
et al. by Jonathan Z. Morris, Scott P. Dixler, and Jeremy B. Rosen; for
the Thomas More Society et al. by Thomas Brejcha, Stephen M. Cramp-
ton, Howard Slugh, and B. Tyler Brooks; for the Union of Orthodox Jew-
ish Congregations of America by Eric Rassbach and Nathan J. Diament;
for U. S. Sen. Ted Cruz et al. by Sarah E. Child; for Joseph B. Holland,
Jr., by Robert P. George, Kent J. George, and Jeffrey A. Kimble; for John
Kluge by John J. Bursch, Rory T. Gray, and Michael J. Cork; for Robert
P. Roesser by Bruce N. Cameron and Raymond J. LaJeunesse, Jr.; for
Asma T. Uddin et al. by Steven T. Collis, pro se; and for 400 Physicians
et al. by Erin Elizabeth Mersino and Richard Thompson.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of
Washington et al. by Robert W. Ferguson, Attorney General of Washing-
ton, Noah G. Purcell, Solicitor General, Karl David Smith, Deputy Solici-
tor General, and Brian J. Baker and Nicholas Ulrich, Assistant Attorneys
Page Proof Pending Publication
General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions
as follows: Rob Bonta of California, Phil Weiser of Colorado, William
Tong of Connecticut, Kathleen Jennings of Delaware, Anne E. Lopez of
Hawaii, Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Anthony G. Brown of Maryland, Andrea
Joy Campbell of Massachusetts, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, and Charity
R. Clark of Vermont; for Airlines for America by Anton Metlitsky, Robert
A. Siegel, and Patricia N. Vercelli; for the American Federation of Labor
and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Harold C. Becker, Matthew
Ginsburg, and Andrew Lyubarsky; for the American Postal Workers
Union, AFL–CIO, by Michael T. Anderson; for Americans United for Sep-
aration of Church and State et al. by Joshua Matz, Carmen Iguina Gon-
zález, Gregory R. Nevins, Alex J. Luchenitser, Bradley Girard, and Karen
L. Loewy; for the Freedom from Religion Foundation by Elizabeth Cavell
and Patrick Elliott; for the Local Government Legal Center et al. by F. An-
drew Hessick, Richard A. Simpson, Amanda Karras, and Erich Eiselt; and
for the National Rural Letter Carriers' Association et al. by Jacob Karabell,
Michael Gan, Mark Gisler, Jean-Marc Favreau, and Keith E. Secular.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for Founders' First Freedom, Inc.,
by Walter E. Carson and Michael D. Peabody; for the National Lawyers
Association by Michael L. Foreman; for the Robertson Center for Consti-
tutional Law by Michael Francisco and Bradley J. Lingo; for the Zionist
Organization of America by Susan B. Tuchman; and for Jeffrey Podell
et al. by Clifford A. Rieders.
454 GROFF v. DeJOY
Opinion of the Court
unless doing so would impose an “undue hardship on the con-
duct of the employer's business.” 78 Stat. 253, as amended,
42 U. S. C. § 2000e( j). Based on a line in this Court's deci-
sion in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63,
84 (1977), many lower courts, including the Third Circuit
below, have interpreted “undue hardship” to mean any effort
or cost that is “more than . . . de minimis.” In this case,
however, both parties—the plaintiff-petitioner, Gerald Groff,
and the defendant-respondent, the Postmaster General, rep-
resented by the Solicitor General—agree that the de mini-
mis reading of Hardison is a mistake. With the beneft of
thorough briefng and oral argument, we today clarify what
Title VII requires.
I
Gerald Groff is an Evangelical Christian who believes for
religious reasons that Sunday should be devoted to worship
and rest, not “secular labor” and the “transport[ation]” of
Page Proof Pending Publication
worldly “goods.” App. 294. In 2012, Groff began his em-
ployment with the United States Postal Service (USPS),
which has more than 600,000 employees. He became a
Rural Carrier Associate, a job that required him to assist
regular carriers in the delivery of mail. When he took the
position, it generally did not involve Sunday work. But
within a few years, that changed. In 2013, USPS entered
into an agreement with Amazon to begin facilitating Sunday
deliveries, and in 2016, USPS signed a memorandum of un-
derstanding with the relevant union (the National Rural Let-
ter Carriers' Association) that set out how Sunday and holi-
day parcel delivery would be handled. During a 2-month
peak season, each post offce would use its own staff to de-
liver packages. At all other times, Sunday and holiday de-
liveries would be carried out by employees (including Rural
Carrier Associates like Groff) working from a “regional
hub.” For Quarryville, Pennsylvania, where Groff was orig-
inally stationed, the regional hub was the Lancaster Annex.
Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 455
Opinion of the Court
The memorandum specifes the order in which USPS em-
ployees are to be called on for Sunday work outside the peak
season. First in line are each hub's “Assistant Rural Carri-
ers”—part-time employees who are assigned to the hub and
cover only Sundays and holidays. Second are any volun-
teers from the geographic area, who are assigned on a rotat-
ing basis. And third are all other carriers, who are com-
pelled to do the work on a rotating basis. Groff fell into this
third category, and after the memorandum of understanding
was adopted, he was told that he would be required to work
on Sunday. He then sought and received a transfer to Holt-
wood, a small rural USPS station that had only seven em-
ployees and that, at the time, did not make Sunday deliver-
ies. But in March 2017, Amazon deliveries began there as
well.
With Groff unwilling to work on Sundays, USPS made
other arrangements. During the peak season, Sunday deliv-
eries that would have otherwise been performed by Groff
Page Proof Pending Publication
were carried out by the rest of the Holtwood staff, including
the postmaster, whose job ordinarily does not involve deliv-
ering mail. During other months, Groff's Sunday assign-
ments were redistributed to other carriers assigned to the
regional hub.1 Throughout this time, Groff continued to re-
ceive “progressive discipline” for failing to work on Sundays.
35 F. 4th 162, 166 (CA3 2022). Finally, in January 2019, he
resigned.2
1
Other employees complained about the consequences of Groff's ab-
sences. While the parties dispute some of the details, it appears uncon-
tested that at least one employee fled a grievance asserting a confict with
his contractual rights. After disputing any confict with contract rights,
USPS eventually settled that claim, with the settlement reaffrming
USPS's commitment to the memorandum of understanding. App. 118,
125–126.
2
Groff represents that his resignation was in light of expected termina-
tion, and the District Court found “a genuine issue of material fact” fore-
closed summary judgment as to whether Groff suffered an adverse em-
456 GROFF v. DeJOY
Opinion of the Court
A few months later, Groff sued under Title VII, asserting
that USPS could have accommodated his Sunday Sabbath
practice “without undue hardship on the conduct of [USPS's]
business. ” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e( j). The District Court
granted summary judgment to USPS, 2021 WL 1264030 (ED
Pa., Apr. 6, 2021), and the Third Circuit affrmed. The panel
majority felt that it was “bound by [the] ruling” in Hardison,
which it construed to mean “that requiring an employer `to
bear more than a de minimis cost' to provide a religious ac-
commodation is an undue hardship.” 35 F. 4th, at 174, n. 18
(quoting 432 U. S., at 84). Under Circuit precedent, the
panel observed, this was “not a diffcult threshold to pass,”
35 F. 4th, at 174 (internal quotation marks omitted), and it
held that this low standard was met in this case. Exempt-
ing Groff from Sunday work, the panel found, had “imposed
on his coworkers, disrupted the workplace and workfow, and
diminished employee morale.” Id., at 175. Judge Hardi-
man dissented, concluding that adverse “effects on USPS
Page Proof Pending Publication
employees in Lancaster or Holtwood” did not alone suffce to
show the needed hardship “on the employer's business.”
Id., at 177 (emphasis in original).
We granted Groff's ensuing petition for a writ of certiorari.
598 U. S. ––– (2023).
II
Because this case presents our frst opportunity in nearly
50 years to explain the contours of Hardison, we begin by
recounting the legal backdrop to that case, including the
development of the Title VII provision barring religious
discrimination and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's (EEOC's) regulations and guidance regarding
that prohibition. We then summarize how the Hardison
case progressed to fnal decision, and fnally, we discuss
ployment action. 2021 WL 1264030, *8 (ED Pa., Apr. 6, 2021). The
Government does not dispute the point in this Court.
Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 457
Opinion of the Court
how courts and the EEOC have understood its signifcance.
This background helps to explain the clarifcations we offer
today.
A
Since its passage, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
has made it unlawful for covered employers “to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges [of] employment, be-
cause of such individual's . . . religion.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–
2(a)(1) (1964 ed.). As originally enacted, Title VII did not
spell out what it meant by discrimination “because of . . .
religion,” but shortly after the statute's passage, the EEOC
interpreted that provision to mean that employers were
sometimes required to “accommodate” the “reasonable reli-
gious needs of employees.” 29 CFR § 1605.1(a)(2) (1967).
After some tinkering, the EEOC settled on a formulation
Page Proof Pending Publication
that obligated employers “to make reasonable accommoda-
tions to the religious needs of employees” whenever that
would not work an “undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer's business.” 29 CFR § 1605.1 (1968).
Between 1968 and 1972, the EEOC elaborated on its un-
derstanding of “undue hardship” in a “long line of decisions”
addressing a variety of policies. Hardison, 432 U. S., at 85
(Marshall, J., dissenting); see Brief for General Conference of
Seventh-day Adventists as Amicus Curiae 10–22 (collecting
decisions). Those decisions addressed many accommodation
issues that still arise frequently today, including the wearing
of religious garb3 and time off from work to attend to reli-
gious obligations.4
3
See, e. g., EEOC Dec. No. 71–779, 1970 WL 3550, *2 (Dec. 21, 1970) (no
undue hardship in permitting nurse to wear religious headscarf).
4
See EEOC Dec. No. 71–463, 1970 WL 3544, *1–*2 (Nov. 13, 1970) (no
“undue hardship” or “unreasonable burde[n]” for employer to train co-
worker to cover 2-week religious absence); EEOC Dec. No. 70–580, 1970
458 GROFF v. DeJOY
Opinion of the Court
EEOC decisions did not settle the question of undue hard-
ship. In 1970, the Sixth Circuit held (in a Sabbath case) that
Title VII as then written did not require an employer “to
accede to or accommodate” religious practice because that
“would raise grave” Establishment Clause questions.
Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F. 2d 324, 334. This
Court granted certiorari, 400 U. S. 1008, but then affrmed
by an evenly divided vote, 402 U. S. 689 (1971).
Responding to Dewey and another decision rejecting any
duty to accommodate an employee's observance of the Sab-
bath, Congress amended Title VII in 1972. Hardison, 432
U. S., at 73–74; id., at 88– 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Tracking the EEOC's regulatory language, Congress pro-
vided that “[t]he term `religion' includes all aspects of reli-
gious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an
employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably ac-
commodate to an employee's or prospective employee's reli-
gious observance or practice without undue hardship on the
Page Proof Pending Publication
conduct of the employer's business.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e( j)
(1970 ed., Supp. II).
WL 3513, *1–*2 (Mar. 2, 1970) (manufacturing employer asked to accommo-
date sundown-to-sundown Sabbath observance did not carry “burden . . .
to demonstrate undue hardship” where it did not address “whether an-
other employee could be trained to substitute for the Charging Party dur-
ing Sabbath days, or whether already qualifed personnel ha[d] been in-
vited to work a double shift”); EEOC Dec. No. 70–670, 1970 WL 3518,
*2 (Mar. 30, 1970) (no “undue `hardship' ” in having other employees take
on a few more on-call Saturdays per year); see also EEOC Dec. No. 70–
110, 1969 WL 2908, *1–*2 (Aug. 27, 1969) (employer could not deny em-
ployee all Sunday “overtime opportunities” on basis of employee's re-
ligious inability to work Saturday, where others not working the full
weekend had been accommodated, notwithstanding employer's claim of
“considerable expense”); EEOC Dec. No. 70–99, 1969 WL 2905, *1
(Aug. 27, 1969) (no obligation to accommodate seasonal employee unavail-
able for Saturday work, where employer showed both “no available pool
of qualifed employees” to substitute and a “practical impossibility of
obtaining and training an employee” to cover one day a week for six
weeks).
Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 459
Opinion of the Court
B
The Hardison case concerned a dispute that arose during
the interval between the issuance of the EEOC's “undue
hardship” regulation and the 1972 amendment to Title VII.
In 1967, Larry Hardison was hired as a clerk at the Stores
Department in the Kansas City base of Trans World Airlines
(TWA). The Stores Department was responsible for provid-
ing parts needed to repair and maintain aircraft. Hardison
v. Trans World Airlines, 375 F. Supp. 877, 889 (WD Mo.
1974). It played an “essential role” and operated “24 hours
per day, 365 days per year.” Hardison, 432 U. S., at 66.
After taking this job, Hardison underwent a religious con-
version. He began to observe the Sabbath by absenting
himself from work from sunset on Friday to sunset on Satur-
day, and this conficted with his work schedule. The prob-
lem was solved for a time when Hardison, who worked in
Building 1, switched to the night shift, but it resurfaced
Page Proof Pending Publication
when he sought and obtained a transfer to the day shift in
Building 2 so that he could spend evenings with his wife.
375 F. Supp., at 889. In that new building, he did not have
enough seniority to avoid work during his Sabbath. At-
tempts at accommodation failed, and he was eventually “dis-
charged on grounds of insubordination.” 432 U. S., at 69.
Hardison sued TWA and his union, the International Asso-
ciation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM).5 The
Eighth Circuit found that reasonable accommodations were
available, and it rejected the defendants' Establishment
Clause arguments. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
527 F. 2d 33, 42–44 (1975).
Both TWA and IAM then fled petitions for certiorari, with
TWA's lead petition asking this Court to decide whether the
1972 amendment of Title VII violated the Establishment
Clause as applied in the decision below, particularly insofar
5
“Labor organization[s]” themselves were and are bound by Title VII's
nondiscrimination rules. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–2(c) (1964 ed.).
460 GROFF v. DeJOY
Opinion of the Court
as that decision had approved an accommodation that alleg-
edly overrode seniority rights granted by the relevant collec-
tive bargaining agreement.6 The Court granted both peti-
tions. 429 U. S. 958 (1976).
When the Court took that action, all counsel had good rea-
son to expect that the Establishment Clause would fgure
prominently in the Court's analysis. As noted above, in
June 1971, the Court, by an equally divided vote, had af-
frmed the Sixth Circuit's decision in Dewey, which had heav-
ily relied on Establishment Clause avoidance to reject the
interpretation of Title VII set out in the EEOC's reasonable-
accommodation guidelines. Just over three weeks later, the
Court had handed down its (now abrogated) 7 decision in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), which adopted a
test under which any law whose “principal or primary effect”
“was to advance religion” was unconstitutional. Id., at 612–
613. Because it could be argued that granting a special ac-
commodation to a religious practice had just such a purpose
Page Proof Pending Publication
and effect, some thought that Lemon posed a serious prob-
lem for the 1972 amendment of Title VII. And shortly be-
fore review was granted in Hardison, the Court had an-
nounced that the Justices were evenly divided in a case that
challenged the 1972 amendment as a violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause. Parker Seal Co. v. Cummins, 429 U. S. 65
(1976) (per curiam).
Against this backdrop, both TWA and IAM challenged the
constitutionality of requiring any accommodation for reli-
gious practice. The Summary of Argument in TWA's brief
began with this categorical assertion: “The religious accom-
modation requirement of Title VII violates the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment.” Brief for Petitioner
TWA, O. T. 1976, No. 75–1126, p. 19. Applying the three-
part Lemon test, TWA argued that any such accommodation
6
See Pet. for Cert. in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, O. T.
1975, No. 75–1126, pp. 2–3, 17–22.
7
See Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist., 597 U. S. –––, ––– (2022).
Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 461
Opinion of the Court
has the primary purpose and effect of advancing religion and
entails “pervasive” government “entanglement . . . in reli-
gious issues.” Brief for Petitioner TWA, No. 75–1126, at 20.
The union's brief made a similar argument, Brief for Peti-
tioner IAM, O. T. 1976, No. 75–1126, pp. 21–24, 50–72, but
stressed the special status of seniority rights under Title
VII, id., at 24–36.
Despite the prominence of the Establishment Clause in the
briefs submitted by the parties and their amici,8 constitu-
tional concerns played no on-stage role in the Court's opin-
ion, which focused instead on seniority rights.9 The opinion
8
See, e. g., Brief for Chrysler Corporation as Amicus Curiae 6–20 (ar-
guing an Establishment Clause violation), and Brief for State of Michigan
as Amicus Curiae 20–25 (arguing no confict with the Establishment
Clause), in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, O. T. 1976, No. 75–
1126 etc.
9
The background summarized above and the patent clash between the
ordinary meaning of “undue hardship” and “more than . . . de minimis” led
Page Proof Pending Publication
some to interpret the decision to rest on Establishment Clause concerns.
Justice Marshall observed in his Hardison dissent that the majority opin-
ion “ha[d] the singular advantage of making consideration of petitioners'
constitutional challenge unnecessary.” 432 U. S., at 89. A few courts as-
sumed that Hardison actually was an Establishment Clause decision.
See, e. g., Gibson v. Missouri Pacifc R. Co., 620 F. Supp. 85, 88–89 (ED
Ark. 1985) (concluding that requiring an employer to “incur greater than
de minimis costs” related to accommodating a Sabbath “would therefore
violate the establishment clause”); see also Massachusetts Bay Transp.
Auth. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 450 Mass. 327,
340–341, and n. 15, 879 N. E. 2d 36, 46–48, and n. 15 (2008) (construing state
law narrowly on premise that Hardison might state outer constitutional
bounds). Some constitutional scholars also suggested that Hardison must
have been based on constitutional avoidance. See, e. g., P. Karlan & G.
Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation,
46 Duke L. J. 1, 6–7 (1996); M. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An
Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 685, 704
(1992); cf. Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 952 F. 3d 821, 829 (CA6
2020) (Thapar, J., concurring). In doing so, some have pointed to Hardi-
son's passing reference to a need to avoid “unequal treatment of employ-
ees on the basis of their religion.” 432 U. S., at 84. But the Court later
clarifed that “Title VII does not demand mere neutrality with regard to
462 GROFF v. DeJOY
Opinion of the Court
stated that “the principal issue on which TWA and the union
came to this Court” was whether Title VII “require[s] an
employer and a union who have agreed on a seniority system
to deprive senior employees of their seniority rights in order
to accommodate a junior employee's religious practices.”
432 U. S., at 83, and n. 14. The Court held that Title VII
imposed no such requirement. Ibid. This conclusion, the
Court found, was “supported by the fact that seniority sys-
tems are afforded special treatment under Title VII itself.”
Id., at 81. It noted that Title VII expressly provides special
protection for “ `bona fde seniority . . . system[s],' ” id., at 81–
82 (quoting 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–2(h)), and it cited precedent
reading the statute “ `to make clear that the routine applica-
tion of a bona fde seniority system [is] not . . . unlawful
under Title VII,' ” 432 U. S., at 82 (quoting Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U. S. 324, 352 (1977)). Invoking these au-
thorities, the Court found that the statute did not require
an accommodation that involuntarily deprived employees of
Page Proof Pending Publication
seniority rights. 432 U. S., at 80.10
Applying this interpretation of Title VII and disagreeing
with the Eighth Circuit's evaluation of the factual record,
the Court identifed no way in which TWA, without violating
seniority rights, could have feasibly accommodated Hardi-
son's request for an exemption from work on his Sabbath.
The Court found that not enough co-workers were willing to
take Hardison's shift voluntarily, that compelling them to do
so would have violated their seniority rights, and that leav-
ing the Stores Department short-handed would have ad-
versely affected its “essential” mission. Id., at 68, 80.
religious practices” but instead “gives them favored treatment” in order
to ensure religious persons' full participation in the workforce. EEOC v.
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U. S. 768, 775 (2015).
10
We do not understand Groff to challenge the continued vitality of Har-
dison's core holding on its “principal issue” (bracketing his disputes that
the memorandum of understanding set forth a seniority system). 432
U. S., at 83, and n. 14.
Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 463
Opinion of the Court
The Court also rejected two other options offered in Jus-
tice Marshall's dissent: (1) paying other workers overtime
wages to induce them to work on Saturdays and making up
for that increased cost by requiring Hardison to work over-
time for regular wages at other times and (2) forcing TWA
to pay overtime for Saturday work for three months, after
which, the dissent thought, Hardison could transfer back to
the night shift in Building 1. The Court dismissed both of
these options as not “feasible,” id., at 83, n. 14, but it pro-
vided no explanation for its evaluation of the frst. In dis-
sent, Justice Marshall suggested one possible reason: that
the collective bargaining agreement might have disallowed
Hardison's working overtime for regular wages. Id., at 95
(dissenting opinion). But the majority did not embrace
that explanation.
As for the second, the Court disputed the dissent's conclu-
sion that Hardison, if he moved back to Building 1, would
have had enough seniority to choose to work the night shift.
Page Proof Pending Publication
Id., at 83, n. 14. That latter disagreement was key. The
dissent thought that Hardison could have resumed the night
shift in Building 1 after just three months, and it therefore
calculated what it would have cost TWA to pay other work-
ers' overtime wages on Saturdays for that fnite period of
time. According to that calculation, TWA's added expense
for three months would have been $150 (about $1,250 in 2022
dollars).11 Id., at 92, n. 6. But the Court doubted that Har-
dison could have regained the seniority rights he had en-
joyed in Building 1 prior to his transfer, and if that were
true, TWA would have been required to pay other workers
overtime for Saturday work indefnitely. Even under Jus-
tice Marshall's math, that would have worked out to $600 per
year at the time, or roughly $5,000 per year today.
11
The dissent appears to have drawn its estimate from Hardison's daily
rate at the time of termination ($3.37/hour) and deposition testimony on
typical overtime rates and shift lengths. See App. in No. 75–1126 etc.,
pp. 40, 126.
464 GROFF v. DeJOY
Opinion of the Court
In the briefs and at argument, little space was devoted to
the question of determining when increased costs amount to
an “undue hardship” under the statute, but a single, but oft-
quoted, sentence in the opinion of the Court, if taken liter-
ally, suggested that even a pittance might be too much for
an employer to be forced to endure. The line read as fol-
lows: “To require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost
in order to give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hard-
ship.” Id., at 84.
Although this line would later be viewed by many lower
courts as the authoritative interpretation of the statutory
term “undue hardship,” it is doubtful that it was meant to
take on that large role. In responding to Justice Marshall's
dissent, the Court described the governing standard quite
differently, stating three times that an accommodation is not
required when it entails “substantial” “costs” or “expendi-
tures.” Id., at 83, n. 14. This formulation suggests that an
Page Proof Pending Publication
employer may be required to bear costs and make expendi-
tures that are not “substantial.” Of course, there is a big
difference between costs and expenditures that are not “sub-
stantial” and those that are “de minimis,” which is to say, so
“very small or trifing” that they are not even worth notic-
ing. Black's Law Dictionary 388 (5th ed. 1979).
The Court's response to Justice Marshall's estimate of the
extra costs that TWA would have been required to foot is
also telling. The majority did not argue that Justice Mar-
shall's math produced considerably “more than a de minimis
cost” (as it certainly did). Instead, the Court responded
that Justice Marshall's calculation involved assumptions that
were not “feasible under the circumstances” and would have
produced a different confict with “the seniority rights of
other employees.” 432 U. S., at 83, n. 14; see Brief for
United States 29, n. 4 (noting that Hardison “specifcally re-
jected” the dissent's calculations and that it is “wrong to as-
sert” that Hardison held that a $150 cost was an undue
hardship).
Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 465
Opinion of the Court
Ultimately, then, it is not clear that any of the possible
accommodations would have actually solved Hardison's prob-
lem without transgressing seniority rights. The Hardison
Court was very clear that those rights were off-limits. Its
guidance on “undue hardship” in situations not involving se-
niority rights is much less clear.
C
Even though Hardison's reference to “de minimis” was
undercut by conficting language and was feeting in compari-
son to its discussion of the “principal issue” of seniority
rights, lower courts have latched on to “de minimis” as the
governing standard.
To be sure, as the Solicitor General notes, some lower
courts have understood that the protection for religious ad-
herents is greater than “more than . . . de minimis” might
suggest when read in isolation. But a bevy of diverse reli-
Page Proof Pending Publication
gious organizations has told this Court that the de minimis
test has blessed the denial of even minor accommodation in
many cases, making it harder for members of minority faiths
to enter the job market. See, e. g., Brief for the Sikh Coali-
tion et al. as Amici Curiae 15, 19–20 (“the de minimis stand-
ard eliminates any meaningful mandate to accommodate Sikh
practices in the workplace” and “emboldens employers to
deny reasonable accommodation requests”); Brief for Council
on American-Islamic Relations as Amicus Curiae 3 (Muslim
women wearing religiously mandated attire “have lost em-
ployment opportunities” and have been excluded from “criti-
cal public institutions like public schools, law enforcement
agencies, and youth rehabilitation centers”); Brief for Union
of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America as Amicus
Curiae 14–15 (because the “de minimis cost” test “can be
satisfed in nearly any circumstance,” “Orthodox Jews once
again [are] left at the mercy of their employers' good
graces”); Brief for Seventh-day Adventist Church in Canada
et al. as Amici Curiae 8 ( joint brief of Sabbatarian faiths
466 GROFF v. DeJOY
Opinion of the Court
arguing that Sabbath accommodation under the de minimis
standard is lef t to “ their employers' and coworkers'
goodwill”).
The EEOC has also accepted Hardison as prescribing a
“ `more than a de minimis cost' ” test, 29 CFR § 1605.2(e)(1)
(2022), but has tried in some ways to soften its impact. It
has specifcally cautioned (as has the Solicitor General in this
case) against extending the phrase to cover such things as
the “administrative costs” involved in reworking schedules,
the “infrequent” or temporary “payment of premium wages
for a substitute,” and “voluntary substitutes and swaps”
when they are not contrary to a “bona fde seniority system.”
§§ 1605.2(e)(1), (2).
Nevertheless, some courts have rejected even the EEOC's
gloss on “de minimis.” 12 And in other cases, courts have
rejected accommodations that the EEOC's guidelines con-
sider to be ordinarily required, such as the relaxation of
Page Proof Pending Publication
dress codes and coverage for occasional absences.13
12
For example, two years ago, the Seventh Circuit told the EEOC that
it would be an undue hardship on Wal-Mart (the Nation's largest private
employer, with annual profts of over $11 billion) to be required to facili-
tate voluntary shift-trading to accommodate a prospective assistant man-
ager's observance of the Sabbath. EEOC v. Walmart Stores East, L. P.,
992 F. 3d 656, 659–660 (2021). See Walmart Inc., Wall Street Journal
Markets (June 4, 2023).
13
See, e. g., Wagner v. Saint Joseph's/Candler Health System, Inc., 2022
WL 905551, *4–*5 (SD Ga., Mar. 28, 2022) (Orthodox Jew fred for taking
off for High Holy Days); Camara v. Epps Air Serv., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 3d
1314, 1322, 1331–1332 (ND Ga., 2017) (Muslim woman who wore a hijab
fred because the sight of her might harm the business in light of “negative
stereotypes and perceptions about Muslims”); El-Amin v. First Transit,
Inc., 2005 WL 1118175, *7–*8 (SD Ohio, May 11, 2005) (Muslim employee
terminated where religious services conficted with “two hours” of train-
ing a week during a month of daily training); EEOC v. Sambo's of Ga.,
Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, 91 (ND Ga., 1981) (hiring a Sikh man as a restaurant
manager would be an undue hardship because his beard would have con-
ficted with “customer preference”).
Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 467
Opinion of the Court
Members of this Court have warned that, if the de mini-
mis rule represents the holding of Hardison, the decision
might have to be reconsidered. Small v. Memphis Light,
Gas & Water, 593 U. S. ––– (2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari); Patterson v. Walgreen Co., 589
U. S. ––– (2020) (Alito, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
Four years ago, the Solicitor General—joined on its brief by
the EEOC—likewise took that view. Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae in Patterson v. Walgreen Co., O. T.
2019, No. 18–349, p. 20 (“Contrary to Hardison, therefore, an
`undue hardship' is not best interpreted to mean `more than
a de minimis cost' ”).
Today, the Solicitor General disavows its prior position
that Hardison should be overruled—but only on the under-
standing that Hardison does not compel courts to read the
“more than de minimis” standard “literally” or in a manner
that undermines Hardison's references to “substantial”
cost.14 Tr. of Oral Arg. 107. With the beneft of compre-
Page Proof Pending Publication
hensive briefng and oral argument, we agree.15
14
At the certiorari stage, the Government argued against review by
noting that Government employees receive “at least as much protection
for religious-accommodation claims [under the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act (RFRA)] as [under] any interpretation of Title VII.” Brief in
Opposition 9. Courts have not always agreed on how RFRA's cause of
action—which does not rely on employment status—interacts with Title
VII's cause of action, and the Third Circuit has treated Title VII as exclu-
sively governing at least some employment-related claims brought by Gov-
ernment employees. Compare Francis v. Mineta, 505 F. 3d 266, 271 (CA3
2007), with Tagore v. United States, 735 F. 3d 324, 330–331 (CA5 2013)
(federal employee's RFRA claim could proceed even though de minimis
standard foreclosed Title VII claim). Because Groff did not bring a
RFRA claim, we need not resolve today whether the Government is cor-
rect that RFRA claims arising out of federal employment are not displaced
by Title VII.
15
In addition to suggesting that Hardison be revisited, some Justices
have questioned whether Hardison (which addresses the pre-1972 EEOC
Guidelines) binds courts interpreting the current version of Title VII. See
468 GROFF v. DeJOY
Opinion of the Court
III
We hold that showing “more than a de minimis cost,” as
that phrase is used in common parlance, does not suffce to
establish “undue hardship” under Title VII. Hardison can-
not be reduced to that one phrase. In describing an employ-
er's “undue hardship” defense, Hardison referred repeatedly
to “substantial” burdens, and that formulation better ex-
plains the decision. We therefore, like the parties, under-
stand Hardison to mean that “undue hardship” is shown
when a burden is substantial in the overall context of an
employer's business. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 61–62 (argument
of Solicitor General). This fact-specifc inquiry comports
with both Hardison and the meaning of “undue hardship” in
ordinary speech.
A
As we have explained, we do not write on a blank slate in
determining what an employer must prove to defend a denial
Page Proof Pending Publication
of a religious accommodation, but we think it reasonable to
begin with Title VII's text. After all, as we have stressed
over and over again in recent years, statutory interpretation
must “begi[n] with,” and ultimately heed, what a statute ac-
tually says. National Assn. of Mfrs. v. Department of De-
fense, 583 U. S. 109, 127 (2018) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, 598 U. S. 69, 74 (2023);
Intel Corp. Investment Policy Comm. v. Sulyma, 589 U. S.
–––, ––– – –––, ––– (2020). Here, the key statutory term is
“undue hardship.” In common parlance, a “hardship” is, at
a minimum, “something hard to bear.” Random House Dic-
tionary of the English Language 646 (1966) (Random House).
Other defnitions go further. See, e. g., Webster's Third
Abercrombie, 575 U. S., at 787, n. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). As explained below, because we—like the Solicitor Gen-
eral—construe Hardison as consistent with the ordinary meaning of
“undue hardship,” we need not reconcile any divergence between Hardi-
son and the statutory text.
Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 469
Opinion of the Court
New International Dictionary 1033 (1971) (Webster's Third)
(“something that causes or entails suffering or privation”);
American Heritage Dictionary 601 (1969) (American Heri-
tage) (“[e]xtreme privation; adversity; suffering”); Black's
Law Dictionary, at 646 (“privation, suffering, adversity”).
But under any defnition, a hardship is more severe than a
mere burden. So even if Title VII said only that an em-
ployer need not be made to suffer a “hardship,” an employer
could not escape liability simply by showing that an accom-
modation would impose some sort of additional costs. Those
costs would have to rise to the level of hardship, and adding
the modifer “undue” means that the requisite burden, priva-
tion, or adversity must rise to an “excessive” or “unjustif-
able” level. Random House 1547; see, e. g., Webster's Third
2492 (“inappropriate,” “unsuited,” or “exceeding or violating
propriety or ftness”); American Heritage 1398 (“excessive”).
The Government agrees, noting that “ `undue hardship
Page Proof Pending Publication
means something greater than hardship.' ” Brief for United
States 30; see id., at 39 (arguing that “accommodations
should be assessed while `keep[ing] in mind both words in
the key phrase of the actual statutory text: “undue” and
“hardship” ' ” (quoting Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners,
LLC, 721 F. 3d 444, 456 (CA7 2013))).
When “undue hardship” is understood in this way, it means
something very different from a burden that is merely more
than de minimis, i. e., something that is “very small or tri-
fing.” Black's Law Dictionary, at 388. So considering or-
dinary meaning while taking Hardison as a given, we are
pointed toward something closer to Hardison's references to
“substantial additional costs” or “substantial expenditures.”
432 U. S., at 83, n. 14.
Similarly, while we do not rely on the pre-1972 EEOC deci-
sions described above to defne the term, we do observe that
these decisions often found that accommodations that en-
tailed substantial costs were required. See supra, at 457,
nn. 3–4. Nothing in this history plausibly suggests that
470 GROFF v. DeJOY
Opinion of the Court
“undue hardship” in Title VII should be read to mean any-
thing less than its meaning in ordinary use. Cf. George v.
McDonough, 596 U. S. –––, ––– (2022) (a “robust regulatory
backdrop” can “fl[l] in the details” of a statutory scheme's
use of a specifc term).
In short, no factor discussed by the parties—the ordinary
meaning of “undue hardship,” the EEOC guidelines that
Hardison concluded that the 1972 amendment “ `ratifed,' ”
432 U. S., at 76, n. 11 (internal quotation marks omitted), the
use of that term by the EEOC prior to those amendments,
and the common use of that term in other statutes—supports
reducing Hardison to its “more than a de minimis cost” line.
See Brief for United States 39 (arguing that “the Court could
emphasize that Hardison's language does not displace the
statutory standard”).
B
In this case, both parties agree that the “de minimis” test
Page Proof Pending Publication
is not right, but they differ slightly in the alternative lan-
guage they prefer. Groff likes the phrase “signifcant diff-
culty or expense.” Brief for Petitioner 15; Reply Brief 2.
The Government, disavowing its prior position that Title
VII's text requires overruling Hardison, points us to Hardi-
son's repeated references to “substantial expenditures” or
“substantial additional costs.” Brief for United States 28–
29 (citing 432 U. S., at 83–84, and n. 14); see Brief for United
States 39. We think it is enough to say that an employer
must show that the burden of granting an accommodation
would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the
conduct of its particular business. Hardison, 432 U. S., at
83, n. 14.
What matters more than a favored synonym for “undue
hardship” (which is the actual text) is that courts must apply
the test in a manner that takes into account all relevant fac-
tors in the case at hand, including the particular accommoda-
tions at issue and their practical impact in light of the nature,
Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 471
Opinion of the Court
“size and operating cost of [an] employer.” Brief for United
States 40 (internal quotation marks omitted).
C
The main difference between the parties lies in the further
steps they would ask us to take in elaborating upon their
standards. Groff would not simply borrow the phrase “sig-
nifcant diffculty or expense” from the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act (ADA) but would have us instruct lower courts
to “draw upon decades of ADA caselaw.” Reply Brief 13.
The Government, on the other hand, requests that we opine
that the EEOC's construction of Hardison has been basically
correct. Brief for United States 39.
Both of these suggestions go too far. We have no reserva-
tions in saying that a good deal of the EEOC's guidance in
this area is sensible and will, in all likelihood, be unaffected
by our clarifying decision today. After all, as a public advo-
Page Proof Pending Publication
cate for employee rights, much of the EEOC's guidance has
focused on what should be accommodated. Accordingly, to-
day's clarifcation may prompt little, if any, change in the
agency's guidance explaining why no undue hardship is im-
posed by temporary costs, voluntary shift swapping, occa-
sional shift swapping, or administrative costs. See 29 CFR
§ 1605.2(d). But it would not be prudent to ratify in toto a
body of EEOC interpretation that has not had the beneft of
the clarifcation we adopt today. What is most important is
that “undue hardship” in Title VII means what it says, and
courts should resolve whether a hardship would be substan-
tial in the context of an employer's business in the common-
sense manner that it would use in applying any such test.
D
The erroneous de minimis interpretation of Hardison may
have had the effect of leading courts to pay insuffcient atten-
tion to what the actual text of Title VII means with regard
472 GROFF v. DeJOY
Opinion of the Court
to several recurring issues. Since we are now brushing
away that mistaken view of Hardison's holding, clarifcation
of some of those issues—in line with the parties' agreement
in this case—is in order.
First, on the second question presented, both parties agree
that the language of Title VII requires an assessment of a
possible accommodation's effect on “the conduct of the em-
ployer's business.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e( j); see 35 F. 4th, at
177–178 (Hardiman, J., dissenting). As the Solicitor General
put it, not all “impacts on coworkers . . . are relevant,” but
only “coworker impacts” that go on to “affec[t] the conduct
of the business.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 102–104. So an accom-
modation's effect on co-workers may have ramifcations for
the conduct of the employer's business, but a court cannot
stop its analysis without examining whether that further log-
ical step is shown in a particular case.
On this point, the Solicitor General took pains to clarify
Page Proof Pending Publication
that some evidence that occasionally is used to show
“impacts” on co-workers is “off the table” for consideration.
Id., at 102. Specifcally, a co-worker's dislike of “religious
practice and expression in the workplace” or “the mere fact
[of] an accommodation” is not “cognizable to factor into
the undue hardship inquiry.” Id., at 89–90. To the extent
that this was not previously clear, we agree. An employer
who fails to provide an accommodation has a defense only
if the hardship is “undue,” and a hardship that is attributa-
ble to employee animosity to a particular religion, to religion
in general, or to the very notion of accommodating religious
practice cannot be considered “undue.” If bias or hostil-
ity to a religious practice or a religious accommodation pro-
vided a defense to a reasonable accommodation claim, Title
VII would be at war with itself. See id., at 89 (argument
of Solicitor General) (such an approach would be “giving
effect to religious hostility”); contra, EEOC v. Sambo's
of Georgia, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, 89 (ND Ga. 1981) (con-
Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 473
Opinion of the Court
sidering as hardship “[a]dverse customer reaction” from “a
simple aversion to, or discomfort in dealing with, bearded
people”).
Second, as the Solicitor General's authorities underscore,
Title VII requires that an employer reasonably accommodate
an employee's practice of religion, not merely that it assess
the reasonableness of a particular possible accommodation or
accommodations. See Adeyeye, 721 F. 3d, at 455; see also
Brief for United States 30, 33, 39. This distinction matters.
Faced with an accommodation request like Groff's, it would
not be enough for an employer to conclude that forcing other
employees to work overtime would constitute an undue hard-
ship. Consideration of other options, such as voluntary shift
swapping, would also be necessary.
IV
Having clarifed the Title VII undue-hardship standard,
Page Proof Pending Publication
we think it appropriate to leave the context-specifc applica-
tion of that clarifed standard to the lower courts in the frst
instance. The Third Circuit assumed that Hardison pre-
scribed a “more than a de minimis cost” test, 35 F. 4th, at
175, and this may have led the court to dismiss a number of
possible accommodations, including those involving the cost
of incentive pay, or the administrative costs of coordination
with other nearby stations with a broader set of employees.
Without foreclosing the possibility that USPS will prevail,
we think it appropriate to leave it to the lower courts to
apply our clarifed context-specifc standard, and to decide
whether any further factual development is needed.
* * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
474 GROFF v. DeJOY
Sotomayor, J., concurring
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Jackson joins,
concurring.
As both parties here agree, the phrase “more than a de
minimis cost” from Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
432 U. S. 63, 84 (1977), was loose language. An employer
violates Title VII if it fails “to reasonably accommodate” an
employee's religious observance or practice, unless the em-
ployer demonstrates that accommodation would result in
“undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.”
42 U. S. C. § 2000e( j). The statutory standard is “undue
hardship,” not trivial cost.
Hardison, however, cannot be reduced to its “de minimis”
language. Instead, that case must be understood in light of
its facts and the Court's reasoning. The Hardison Court
concluded that the plaintiff's proposed accommodation would
have imposed an undue hardship on the conduct of the em-
ployer's business because the accommodation would have re-
Page Proof Pending Publication
quired the employer either to deprive other employees of
their seniority rights under a collective-bargaining agree-
ment, or to incur substantial additional costs in the form of
lost effciency or higher wages. 432 U. S., at 79–81, 83–84,
and n. 14. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion has interpreted Title VII's undue-hardship standard in
this way for seven consecutive Presidential administrations,
from President Reagan to President Biden. See 29 CFR
§ 1605.2(e) (2022) (citing Hardison, 432 U. S., at 80, 84).
Petitioner Gerald Groff asks this Court to overrule Hardi-
son and to replace it with a “signifcant diffculty or expense”
standard. Brief for Petitioner 17–38. The Court does not
do so. That is a wise choice because stare decisis has “en-
hanced force” in statutory cases. Kimble v. Marvel Enter-
tainment, LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 456 (2015). Congress is free
to revise this Court's statutory interpretations. The
Court's respect for Congress's decision not to intervene pro-
motes the separation of powers by requiring interested par-
ties to resort to the legislative rather than the judicial proc-
Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 475
Sotomayor, J., concurring
ess to achieve their policy goals. This justifcation for
statutory stare decisis is especially strong here because
“Congress has spurned multiple opportunities to reverse
[Hardison]—openings as frequent and clear as this Court
ever sees.” Id., at 456–457.1 Moreover, in the decades
since Hardison was decided, Congress has revised Title VII
multiple times in response to other decisions of this Court,2
yet never in response to Hardison. See Kimble, 576 U. S.,
at 457.
Groff also asks the Court to decide that Title VII requires
the United States Postal Service to show “undue hardship
to [its] business,” not to Groff's co-workers. Brief for Peti-
tioner 42 (emphasis added); see 35 F. 4th 162, 176 (CA3 2022)
(Hardiman, J., dissenting). The Court, however, recognizes
that Title VII requires “undue hardship on the conduct of
the employer's business.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e( j) (emphasis
added). Because the “conduct of [a] business” plainly in-
cludes the management and performance of the business's
Page Proof Pending Publication
employees, undue hardship on the conduct of a business may
include undue hardship on the business's employees. See,
e. g., Hardison, 432 U. S., at 79–81 (deprivation of employees'
bargained-for seniority rights constitutes undue hardship).
There is no basis in the text of the statute, let alone in eco-
1
See, e. g., H. R. 1440, 117th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4(a)(4) (2021); H. R. 5331,
116th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4(a)(4) (2019); S. 3686, 112th Cong., 2d Sess.,
§ 4(a)(3) (2012); S. 4046, 111th Cong., 2d Sess., § 4(a)(3) (2010); S. 3628, 110th
Cong., 2d Sess., § 2(a)(1)(B) (2008); H. R. 1431, 110th Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 2(a)(4) (2007); H. R. 1445, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(a)(4) (2005); S. 677,
109th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(a)(4) (2005); S. 893, 108th Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 2(a)(4) (2003); S. 2572, 107th Cong., 2d Sess., § 2(a)(4) (2002); H. R. 4237,
106th Cong., 2d Sess., § 2(a)(4) (2000); S. 1668, 106th Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 2(a)(4) (1999); H. R. 2948, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(a)(4) (1997); S. 1124,
105th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(a)(4) (1997); S. 92, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(a)(3)
(1997); H. R. 4117, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., § 2(a)(3) (1996).
2
See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1071 (overruling Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U. S. 642 (1989)); Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
of 2009, 123 Stat. 5 (overruling Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
550 U. S. 618 (2007)).
476 GROFF v. DeJOY
Sotomayor, J., concurring
nomics or common sense, to conclude otherwise. Indeed, for
many businesses, labor is more important to the conduct of
the business than any other factor.
To be sure, some effects on co-workers will not constitute
“undue hardship” under Title VII. For example, animus to-
ward a protected group is not a cognizable “hardship” under
any antidiscrimination statute. Cf. ante, at 472. In addi-
tion, some hardships, such as the labor costs of coordinating
voluntary shift swaps, are not “undue” because they are too
insubstantial. See 29 CFR §§ 1605.2(d)(1)(i), (e)(1). Never-
theless, if there is an undue hardship on “the conduct of the
employer's business,” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e( j), then such hard-
ship is suffcient, even if it consists of hardship on employees.
With these observations, I join the opinion of the Court.
Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
Page Proof Pending Publication
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None