Jones v. Hendrix

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             Volume 599 U. S. Part 1
                             Pages 465–532




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   THE SUPREME COURT
                               June 22, 2023


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                   REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
                           reporter of decisions




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                        OCTOBER TERM, 2022                              465

                                 Syllabus


               JONES v. HENDRIX, WARDEN

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
                 the eighth circuit
    No. 21–857. Argued November 1, 2022—Decided June 22, 2023
In 2000, the District Court for the Western District of Missouri sentenced
  petitioner Marcus DeAngelo Jones after he was convicted on two counts
  of unlawful possession of a frearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U. S. C.
  § 922(g)(1), and one count of making false statements to acquire a fre-
  arm. The Eighth Circuit affrmed Jones' convictions and sentence.
  Jones then fled a motion pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2255, which resulted
  in the vacatur of one of his concurrent § 922(g) sentences. Many years
  later, this Court held in Rehaif v. United States, 588 U. S. –––, that a
  defendant's knowledge of the status that disqualifes him from owning a
  frearm is an element of a § 922(g) conviction. Rehaif 's holding abro-
  gated contrary Eighth Circuit precedent applied by the courts in Jones'
  trial and direct appeal. Seeking to collaterally attack his remaining
  § 922(g) conviction based on Rehaif 's statutory holding, Jones fled a
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  petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2241 in the dis-
  trict of his imprisonment, the Eastern District of Arkansas. The Dis-
  trict Court dismissed Jones' habeas petition for lack of subject-matter
  jurisdiction, and the Eighth Circuit affrmed.
Held: Section 2255(e) does not allow a prisoner asserting an intervening
 change in interpretation of a criminal statute to circumvent the Antiter-
 rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996's (AEDPA) restrictions
 on second or successive § 2255 motions by fling a § 2241 habeas petition.
 Pp. 471–492.
    (a) Congress created § 2255 as a remedial vehicle by which federal
 prisoners could collaterally attack their sentences by motion in the sen-
 tencing court, rather than by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
 § 2241 in the district of confnement. The “sole purpose” of § 2255 was
 to address the “serious administrative problems” created by district
 courts collaterally reviewing one another's proceedings without access
 to needed evidence and “aggravated” by the concentration of federal
 prisoners in certain judicial districts that therefore faced “an inordinate
 number of habeas corpus actions.” United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S.
 205, 212–214, 219. To make this change effective, Congress generally
 barred federal prisoners “authorized” to fle a § 2255 motion from fling
 a petition under § 2241. But—in a provision of § 2255(e) now known as
 the saving clause—Congress preserved access to § 2241 in cases where
466                       JONES v. HENDRIX

                                 Syllabus

 “the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality
 of [a prisoner's] detention.”
    Congress later enacted AEDPA, which, as relevant here, barred sec-
 ond or successive § 2255 motions unless based on either “newly discov-
 ered evidence,” § 2255(h)(1), or “a new rule of constitutional law,”
 § 2255(h)(2). Some courts faced with AEDPA's second-or-successive re-
 strictions held that § 2255 was “inadequate and ineffective” under the
 saving clause when AEDPA's restrictions barred a prisoner from seek-
 ing relief based on a new interpretation of a criminal statute that circuit
 precedent had foreclosed at the time of the prisoner's trial, appeal, and
 frst § 2255 motion.
    Section 2255(e)'s saving clause does not authorize that end-run around
 AEDPA. The clause preserves recourse to § 2241 in cases where un-
 usual circumstances make it impossible or impracticable to seek relief
 in the sentencing court, as well as for challenges to detention other than
 collateral attacks on a sentence. But § 2255(h) specifes the two limited
 conditions in which federal prisoners may bring second or successive
 collateral attacks on their sentences. The inability of a prisoner with a
 statutory claim to satisfy § 2255(h) does not mean that the prisoner may
 bring the claim in a § 2241 petition. Pp. 471–480.
    (b) Jones and the United States each advance unpersuasive theories
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 of when and why § 2255(h)'s exclusion of statutory claims sometimes
 renders § 2255 inadequate or ineffective for purposes of the saving
 clause. Pp. 480–492.
      (1) Jones argues that § 2255 is necessarily “inadequate or ineffec-
 tive to test” a prisoner's claim if the § 2255 court fails to apply the cor-
 rect substantive law. But the saving clause is concerned with the ade-
 quacy or effectiveness of the remedial vehicle (“the remedy by motion”),
 not any court's asserted errors of law. Next, Jones argues that courts
 of equity would afford relief from “inadequate” legal remedies in a broad
 range of circumstances; to the extent relevant to § 2255(e), this proves
 at most that a variety of practical obstacles might trigger the saving
 clause, cf. Hayman, 342 U. S., at 215, n. 23, not that the clause offers an
 exemption from AEDPA's limits on second or successive collateral at-
 tacks. Jones further argues that the saving clause's use of the present
 tense (“is inadequate or ineffective”) means that § 2241 is available
 whenever a prisoner is presently unable to fle a § 2255 motion. That
 argument would nullify AEDPA's limits on collateral relief.
    Jones suggests that denying him the chance to raise his Rehaif claim
 in a § 2241 petition would violate the Suspension Clause, U. S. Const.,
 Art. I, § 9, cl. 2. This argument fails because it would extend the writ
 of habeas corpus far beyond its scope when the Constitution was drafted
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                                Syllabus

 and ratifed. Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591
 U. S. –––, –––. When the Suspension Clause was adopted, Jones' Rehaif
 claim would not have been cognizable in habeas at all. At the founding,
 a sentence after conviction “by a court of competent jurisdiction” was
 “ `in itsel f sufficient cause' ” for a prisoner's continued detention.
 Brown v. Davenport, 596 U. S. –––, ––– (quoting Ex parte Watkins, 3
 Pet. 193, 202). Of particular relevance here, a habeas court had no
 power to “look beyond the judgment” to “re-examine the charges on
 which it was rendered” for substantive errors of law—even “if . . . the
 [sentencing] court ha[d] misconstrued the law, and ha[d] pronounced an
 offence to be punishable criminally, which [was] not so.” Id., at 202,
 209. While Jones argues that pre-founding practice was otherwise, he
 fails to identify a single clear case of habeas being used to relitigate a
 conviction after trial by a court of general criminal jurisdiction.
    The principles of Ex parte Watkins guided this Court's understanding
 of the habeas writ throughout the 19th century and well into the 20th.
 See Brown, 596 U. S., at –––, n. 1 (collecting cases). It was not until
 1974, in Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, that the Court held for
 the frst time that a substantive error of statutory law could be a cogni-
 zable ground for a collateral attack on a federal court's criminal judg-
 ment. See id., at 342–347. The Suspension Clause neither constitu-
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 tionalizes that innovation nor requires its extension to a second or
 successive collateral attack.
    Jones' remaining constitutional arguments are no more persuasive.
 He argues that denying him a new opportunity for collateral review of
 his Rehaif claim threatens Congress' exclusive power to defne crimes,
 but a court does not usurp legislative power simply by misinterpreting
 the law in a given case. Next, Jones points to Fiore v. White, 531 U. S.
 225 (per curiam), which applied the rule that due process requires that
 the prosecution prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable
 doubt. But due process does not guarantee a direct appeal, McKane v.
 Durston, 153 U. S. 684, 687, let alone the opportunity to have legal issues
 redetermined in successive collateral attacks. Finally, the Eighth
 Amendment's constraint on the kinds of punishments governments may
 infict creates no independent entitlement to a second round of postcon-
 viction review. Pp. 480–488.
      (2) The Government asks the Court to adopt a novel interpretation
 of § 2255(e)'s saving clause based on an elaborate argument. Starting
 from the premise that the words “inadequate or ineffective” imply refer-
 ence to a “benchmark” of adequacy and effectiveness, the Government
 equates that benchmark with the types of claims cognizable in federal
 habeas petitions by state prisoners under the general habeas statutes.
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                                 Syllabus

  The Government ultimately concludes that § 2255(h) renders § 2255 “in-
  adequate or ineffective to test” a federal prisoner's statutory claim in
  cases where the prisoner has already fled one § 2255 motion and the
  claim otherwise satisfes pre-AEDPA habeas principles, which generally
  will require “a `colorable showing of factual innocence.' ” McCleskey v.
  Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 495 (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U. S. 436,
  454 (plurality opinion)).
     The Court sees no indication that the saving clause adopts the Gov-
  ernment's state-prisoner-habeas benchmark. In any event, that bench-
  mark has uncertain relevance to the question presented here because
  federal habeas relief does not lie for errors of state law. The Govern-
  ment's theory ultimately rests instead on its assertion that § 2255(h) is
  simply not clear enough to support the inference that Congress entirely
  closed the door on pure statutory claims not brought in a federal prison-
  er's initial § 2255 motion. That assertion is unpersuasive.
     The Government asserts that the Court must require “the clearest
  command” before construing AEDPA to “close [the] courthouse doors”
  on “a strong equitable claim” for relief. Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S.
  631, 646, 649 (internal quotation marks omitted). But AEDPA's restric-
  tions embody Congress' policy judgment regarding the appropriate bal-
  ance between fnality and error correction. The Court declines to adopt
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  a presumption against fnality. Further, the Court typically has found
  clear-statement rules appropriate when a statute implicates historically
  or constitutionally grounded norms that the Court would not expect
  Congress to unsettle lightly. See, e. g., Alabama Assn. of Realtors v.
  Department of Health and Human Servs., 594 U. S. –––, ––– (per cu-
  riam). As far as history and the Constitution are concerned, “there is
  nothing incongruous about a system in which this kind of error—the
  application of a since-rejected statutory interpretation—cannot be rem-
  edied after fnal judgment,” George v. McDonough, 596 U. S. –––, –––,
  and thus nothing fundamentally surprising about Congress declining to
  make such errors remediable in a second or successive collateral attack.
  Pp. 488–492.
8 F. 4th 683, affrmed.

  Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Soto-
mayor and Kagan, JJ., fled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 492. Jack-
son, J., fled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 494.

  Daniel R. Ortiz argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs was Jeremy B. Lowery.
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                          Opinion of the Court

  Deputy Solicitor General Feigin argued the cause for re-
spondent. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General
Prelogar, Assistant Attorney General Polite, Sopan Joshi,
and John M. Pellettieri.
  Morgan L. Ratner, by invitation of the Court, 597 U. S.
–––, argued the cause and fled a brief as amicus curiae in
support of the judgment below. With her on the brief was
Judson O. Littleton.*

  Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
   This case concerns the interplay between two statutes: 28
U. S. C. § 2241, the general habeas corpus statute, and § 2255,
which provides an alternative postconviction remedy for fed-
eral prisoners. Since 1948, Congress has provided that a
federal prisoner who collaterally attacks his sentence ordi-
narily must proceed by a motion in the sentencing court
under § 2255, rather than by a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus under § 2241. To that end, § 2255(e) bars a federal
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prisoner from proceeding under § 2241 “unless . . . the
[§ 2255] remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test
the legality of his detention.”
   Separately, since the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), second or successive § 2255
motions are barred unless they rely on either “newly discov-
ered evidence,” § 2255(h)(1), or “a new rule of constitutional
law,” § 2255(h)(2). A federal prisoner may not, therefore,
fle a second or successive § 2255 motion based solely on a

   *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the National Asso-
ciation of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. by Jeffrey L. Fisher, Kendall
Turner, David D. Cole, and Jennesa Calvo-Friedman; and for the Na-
tional Association of Federal Defenders by Shelley Fite, Davina T. Chen,
Devi M. Rao, Keith M. Donoghue, Joanna Munson Perales, Andrew L.
Adler, Janice Bergmann, Joshua B. Carpenter, Brianna Mircheff, and
Paresh Patel.
   Kent S. Scheidegger and Kymberlee C. Stapleton fled a brief of amicus
curiae urging affrmance for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation.
   Gregory Silbert fled a brief of amici curiae for Habeas Scholars.
470                   JONES v. HENDRIX

                       Opinion of the Court

more favorable interpretation of statutory law adopted after
his conviction became fnal and his initial § 2255 motion was
resolved.
  The question presented is whether that limitation on sec-
ond or successive motions makes § 2255 “inadequate or inef-
fective” such that the prisoner may proceed with his statu-
tory claim under § 2241. We hold that it does not.

                                I
   In 2000, the U. S. District Court for the Western District
of Missouri convicted petitioner Marcus DeAngelo Jones of
two counts of unlawful possession of a frearm by a felon,
in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1), and one count of mak-
ing false statements to acquire a frearm, in violation of
§ 922(a)(6). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit af-
frmed his convictions and sentence of 327 months' imprison-
ment. See United States v. Jones, 266 F. 3d 804 (2001).
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After losing his appeal, Jones fled a timely § 2255 motion to
vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, which resulted in
the vacatur of one of his concurrent § 922(g) sentences but
no other relief. See United States v. Jones, 403 F. 3d 604
(CA8 2005); United States v. Jones, 185 Fed. Appx. 541 (CA8
2006) (per curiam).
   Years later, in Rehaif v. United States, 588 U. S. ––– (2019),
this Court held that a defendant's knowledge of the status
that disqualifes him from owning a frearm is an element of
a § 922(g) conviction. In doing so, it abrogated the Eighth
Circuit's contrary precedent, which the Western District of
Missouri and the Eighth Circuit had applied in Jones' trial
and direct appeal. See Jones, 266 F. 3d, at 810, n. 5.
   After Rehaif, Jones hoped to leverage its holding into a
new collateral attack on his remaining § 922(g) conviction.
But Rehaif 's statutory holding satisfed neither of § 2255(h)'s
gateway conditions for a second or successive § 2255 motion:
It was neither “newly discovered evidence,” § 2255(h)(1), nor
“a new rule of constitutional law,” § 2255(h)(2) (emphasis
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                      Opinion of the Court

added). Unable to fle a new § 2255 motion in his sentencing
court, Jones instead looked to § 2255(e)'s “saving clause,”
which provides that a federal prisoner may fle a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 if—and only if—§ 2255's
“remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his detention.” Invoking this clause, Jones peti-
tioned the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas, the district where he was imprisoned, for a writ
of habeas corpus under § 2241.
   The District Court dismissed Jones' habeas petition for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the Eighth Circuit
affrmed. 8 F. 4th 683 (2021). The Eighth Circuit rejected
Jones' argument that the saving clause permits recourse to
§ 2241 to present a § 2255(h)-barred claim based on an inter-
vening decision of statutory interpretation, as well as his
argument that foreclosing relief on his Rehaif claim would
violate the Suspension Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
In doing so, the Eighth Circuit deepened a split among the
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Courts of Appeals about whether prisoners in Jones' circum-
stances may resort to § 2241 via the saving clause.
   We granted certiorari. 596 U. S. ––– (2022). The Solici-
tor General then noticed her intent to defend the Eighth Cir-
cuit's judgment but not its rationale. We appointed Morgan
Ratner as amicus curiae to argue in support of the Eighth
Circuit's reasoning. 597 U. S. ––– (2022). She has ably dis-
charged her responsibilities.

                                II
   Consistent with the Eighth Circuit's reasoning, we hold
that § 2255(e)'s saving clause does not permit a prisoner as-
serting an intervening change in statutory interpretation to
circumvent AEDPA's restrictions on second or successive
§ 2255 motions by fling a § 2241 petition. We begin by con-
sidering the role of the saving clause in § 2255 prior to AED-
PA's enactment. We then consider the impact of AEDPA on
the statutory scheme.
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                        Opinion of the Court

                               A
  In relevant part, § 2255 provides:
       “(a) A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court
    established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be
    released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed
    in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
    States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to im-
    pose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess
    of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise sub-
    ject to collateral attack, may move the court which im-
    posed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the
    sentence.
          .          .           .          .           .
        “(e) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in be-
      half of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief
      by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be enter-
      tained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply
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      for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him,
      or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also
      appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or inef-
      fective to test the legality of his detention.”
   In understanding this statutory text, “a page of history is
worth a volume of logic.” New York Trust Co. v. Eisner,
256 U. S. 345, 349 (1921). Section 2255 is an outgrowth of
the historic habeas corpus powers of the federal courts as
applied to the special case of federal prisoners. The First
Judiciary Act authorized the federal courts “to grant writs
of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause
of commitment,” with a proviso that such writs could “ex-
tend to prisoners in gaol” only “where they [were] in custody,
under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or
[were] committed for trial before some court of the same, or
[were] necessary to be brought into court to testify.” Act of
Sept. 24, 1789, § 14, 1 Stat. 82. In 1867, Congress expanded
the federal courts' habeas powers to cover “all cases where
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                          Opinion of the Court

any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in viola-
tion of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United
States.” Ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385. For most of our Nation's his-
tory, a federal prisoner “claiming the right to be released,”
§ 2255(a), in a collateral attack on his sentence would have
relied on these Acts and their successors.
   That changed with the 1948 recodifcation and reorganiza-
tion of the Judiciary Code. See generally 62 Stat. 869. In
enacting the present Title 28 of the United States Code, Con-
gress largely recodifed the federal courts' pre-existing ha-
beas authority in §§ 2241 and 2243, which, respectively, con-
fer the power to grant the writ and direct the issuing court
to “dispose of the matter as law and justice require.” Id.,
at 964–965. At the same time, however, Congress created
§ 2255 as a separate remedial vehicle specifcally designed for
federal prisoners' collateral attacks on their sentences.1 Id.,
at 967–968.
   The “sole purpose” of this innovation, as this Court ac-
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knowledged a few years later, “was to minimize the diff-
culties encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording
the same rights in another and more convenient forum.”
United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, 219 (1952); see also
Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, 343 (1974) (“[Section]
2255 was intended to afford federal prisoners a remedy iden-
tical in scope to federal habeas corpus”); accord, United
States v. Addonizio, 442 U. S. 178, 185 (1979); Hill v. United
States, 368 U. S. 424, 427 (1962). Experience had shown that
processing federal prisoners' collateral attacks on their sen-
  1
    As frst enacted, § 2255 applied to any “prisoner in custody under sen-
tence of a court of the United States.” 62 Stat. 967. In 1949, Congress
substituted “court established by Act of Congress” for “court of the United
States,” making no other changes. § 114, 63 Stat. 105 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Section 2255 was not again amended until AEDPA, and
the only post-AEDPA amendment simply added the current lettering and
numbering to what were previously undesignated paragraphs. Court Se-
curity Improvement Act of 2007, § 511, 121 Stat. 2545. For simplicity, we
use § 2255's current internal designations throughout this opinion.
474                  JONES v. HENDRIX

                      Opinion of the Court

tences through habeas proceedings—and, therefore, through
the judicial districts in which they were confned—resulted
in “serious administrative problems.” Hayman, 342 U. S.,
at 212. Most signifcantly, a federal prisoner's district of
confnement was often far removed from the records of the
sentencing court and other sources of needed evidence. Id.,
at 212–213. These diffculties were “greatly aggravated” by
the concentration of federal prisoners in a handful of judi-
cial districts, which forced those District Courts to process
“an inordinate number of habeas corpus actions.” Id., at
213–214.
   Section 2255 solved these problems by rerouting federal
prisoners' collateral attacks on their sentences to the courts
that had sentenced them. To make this change of venue ef-
fective, Congress generally barred federal prisoners “author-
ized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to” § 2255 from
applying “for a writ of habeas corpus” under § 2241.
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§ 2255(e). But, in a provision that has come to be known as
the saving clause, Congress preserved the habeas remedy in
cases where “the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffec-
tive to test the legality of [a prisoner's] detention.” Ibid.
   Traditionally, courts have treated the saving clause as cov-
ering unusual circumstances in which it is impossible or im-
practicable for a prisoner to seek relief from the sentencing
court. The clearest such circumstance is the sentencing
court's dissolution; a motion in a court that no longer exists
is obviously “inadequate or ineffective” for any purpose.
See, e. g., Witham v. United States, 355 F. 3d 501, 504–505
(CA6 2004) (fnding § 2255 inadequate or ineffective after
court-martial was dissolved); Edwards v. United States, 1987
WL 7562, *1 (EDNY, Feb. 9, 1987) (fnding § 2255 inadequate
or ineffective after District Court of the Canal Zone was
dissolved); cf. Spaulding v. Taylor, 336 F. 2d 192, 193 (CA10
1964) (fnding § 2255 inadequate or ineffective after Alaska
territorial court was dissolved and federal and state succes-
sor courts declined § 2255 and state-habeas jurisdiction, re-
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                           Opinion of the Court

spectively). The saving clause might also apply when “it is
not practicable for the prisoner to have his motion deter-
mined in the trial court because of his inability to be present
at the hearing, or for other reasons.” 2 Hayman, 342 U. S.,
at 215, n. 23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
  In addition, the saving clause ensures that § 2255(e) does
not displace § 2241 when a prisoner challenges “the legality
of his detention” without attacking the validity of his sen-
tence. To give a few examples, a prisoner might wish to
argue that he is being detained in a place or manner not
authorized by the sentence, that he has unlawfully been de-
nied parole or good-time credits, or that an administrative
sanction affecting the conditions of his detention is illegal.
See generally Samak v. Warden, FCC Coleman–Medium,
766 F. 3d 1271, 1280 (CA11 2014) (Pryor, J., concurring) (ex-
plaining that “[t]he `detention' of a prisoner encompasses
much more than a criminal `sentence' ”). The briefs before
us debate whether these types of challenges depend on the
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saving clause or proceed under § 2241 “directly.” Compare
Brief for Petitioner 31 and Brief for Respondent 37–38 with
Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 17–18. It is dif-
fcult to imagine a case in which this logical distinction would
make any practical difference. That said, were it not for the
saving clause, a literal reading of § 2255(e) might be thought

  2
    It bears mentioning that § 2255 was enacted “eight years before Presi-
dent Eisenhower signed legislation funding the Interstate Highway Sys-
tem.” Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 17. At that time, it
would not be surprising if removing a prisoner from the penitentiary,
transporting him to the sentencing court for a hearing, and taking him
back to prison again sometimes posed diffculties daunting enough to make
a § 2255 proceeding practically unavailable. Cf. Stidham v. Swope, 82
F. Supp. 931, 932–933 (ND Cal. 1949) (describing the diffculty and delay
involved in transporting a prisoner “upwards of 1,500 miles” from the fed-
eral penitentiary in Alcatraz to the sentencing court in Missouri, a journey
that “well could be two weeks” by rail). That this sort of practical inade-
quacy would be highly unusual today should not blind us to the world in
which Congress was legislating when it enacted the saving clause.
476                   JONES v. HENDRIX

                       Opinion of the Court

to bar any “application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf
of a [federal] prisoner,” § 2255(e), whether or not it chal-
lenged the “sentence . . . imposed,” § 2255(a). If nothing
else, then, the saving clause guards against the danger that
§ 2255(e) might be construed to bar manner-of-detention
challenges even though they are not within § 2255's substan-
tive scope.
                              B
   In 1996, Congress enacted AEDPA, which made signifcant
reforms to the process of federal-court postconviction review
for both state and federal prisoners. Most relevant here,
AEDPA strictly limited “second or successive” § 2255 mo-
tions to those that “contain—
        “(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and
      viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be
      suffcient to establish by clear and convincing evidence
      that no reasonable factfnder would have found the mov-
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      ant guilty of the offense; or
        “(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive
      to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that
      was previously unavailable.” § 2255(h).
   Importantly, AEDPA left the text of § 2255(e) unchanged.
But AEDPA's new second-or-successive restrictions indi-
rectly gave rise to a novel application of the saving clause.
   Mere months before AEDPA's enactment, this Court de-
cided Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137 (1995). That
case interpreted the offense of “us[ing]” a frearm “during
and in relation to any crime of violence or drug traffcking
crime,” in violation of then-existing 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1),
more narrowly than many Circuits' previous case law. See
516 U. S., at 142 (describing the Circuits' approaches).
Under this Court's § 2255 precedent, Bailey's narrowing in-
terpretation was grounds for a collateral attack by federal
prisoners who had been convicted under the Courts of Ap-
peals' broader interpretations. See Davis, 417 U. S., at 342–
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                      Opinion of the Court

347 (holding a claim of legal error based on an intervening
change in statutory interpretation cognizable under § 2255).
Many prisoners with Bailey claims, however, had already ex-
hausted their frst § 2255 motion, and Bailey's statutory hold-
ing plainly did not satisfy either of § 2255(h)'s conditions for
a second or successive motion.
   Several Courts of Appeals found a workaround for those
prisoners in the saving clause. With minor differences in
reasoning and wording, they held that § 2255 was “inade-
quate and ineffective” under the saving clause—and that
§ 2241 was therefore available—when AEDPA's second-or-
successive restrictions barred a prisoner from seeking relief
based on a newly adopted narrowing interpretation of a
criminal statute that circuit precedent had foreclosed at the
time of the prisoner's trial, appeal, and frst § 2255 motion.
This application of the saving clause took shape in In re Dor-
sainvil, 119 F. 3d 245, 251 (CA3 1997); Triestman v. United
Page Proof Pending Publication
States, 124 F. 3d 361, 378–380 (CA2 1997); and In re Daven-
port, 147 F. 3d 605, 609–611 (CA7 1998), and it was later
adopted by most of the other Circuits. See Ivy v. Pontesso,
328 F. 3d 1057, 1059–1060 (CA9 2003); Martin v. Perez, 319
F. 3d 799, 804–805 (CA6 2003); Reyes–Requena v. United
States, 243 F. 3d 893, 904 (CA5 2001); In re Jones, 226 F. 3d
328, 333–334 (CA4 2000); Wofford v. Scott, 177 F. 3d 1236,
1242–1245 (CA11 1999), overruled by McCarthan v. Director
of Goodwill Industries–Suncoast, Inc., 851 F. 3d 1076 (CA11
2017) (en banc); but see Prost v. Anderson, 636 F. 3d 578,
584–595 (CA10 2011) (Gorsuch, J.) (holding that § 2255(e) does
not permit recourse to § 2241 in these circumstances).
   We now hold that the saving clause does not authorize
such an end-run around AEDPA. In § 2255(h), Congress
enumerated two—and only two—conditions in which a sec-
ond or successive § 2255 motion may proceed. Because
§ 2255 is the ordinary vehicle for a collateral attack on a fed-
eral sentence, the straightforward negative inference from
§ 2255(h) is that a second or successive collateral attack on a
478                   JONES v. HENDRIX

                      Opinion of the Court

federal sentence is not authorized unless one of those two
conditions is satisfed. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S.
–––, ––– (2018) (“ `The expression of one thing implies the
exclusion of others' ” (quoting A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 107 (2012))). Even
more directly, § 2255(h)(2)'s authorization of a successive col-
lateral attack based on new rules “of constitutional law” im-
plies that Congress did not authorize successive collateral
attacks based on new rules of nonconstitutional law. Had
Congress wished to omit the word “constitutional,” it easily
could have done so.
   The saving clause does not undermine this strong negative
inference. Basic principles of statutory interpretation re-
quire that we construe the saving clause and § 2255(h) in har-
mony, not set them at cross-purposes. See, e. g., United
States v. Fausto, 484 U. S. 439, 453 (1988); Bend v. Hoyt, 13
Pet. 263, 272 (1839) (Story, J.). That task is not diffcult
Page Proof Pending Publication
given the distinct concerns of the two provisions. Subsec-
tion (h) presumes—as part of its background—that federal
prisoners' collateral attacks on their sentences are governed
by § 2255, and it proceeds to specify when a second or succes-
sive collateral attack is permitted. The saving clause has
nothing to say about that question. Rather, like subsection
(e) generally, it addresses the antecedent question of the re-
lationship between §§ 2241 and 2255.
   After AEDPA, as before it, the saving clause preserves
recourse to § 2241 in cases where unusual circumstances
make it impossible or impracticable to seek relief in the sen-
tencing court, as well as for challenges to detention other
than collateral attacks on a sentence. Because AEDPA did
not alter the text of § 2255(e), there is little reason to think
that it altered the pre-existing division of labor between
§§ 2241 and 2255. AEDPA's new restrictions on § 2255,
therefore, are best understood as just that—restrictions on
§ 2255—not as expansions of § 2241's applicability.
                       Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023)                     479

                           Opinion of the Court

   Any other reading would make AEDPA curiously self-
defeating. It would mean that, by expressly excluding sec-
ond or successive § 2255 motions based on nonconstitutional
legal developments, Congress accomplished nothing in terms
of actually limiting such claims. Instead, it would have
merely rerouted them from one remedial vehicle and venue
to another. Stranger still, Congress would have provided “a
superior remedy” for the very nonconstitutional claims it
chose not to include in § 2255(h). McCarthan, 851 F. 3d, at
1091. After escaping § 2255 through the saving clause, non-
constitutional claims would no longer be subject to AEDPA's
other express procedural restrictions: the 1-year limitations
period, see § 2255(f), and the requirement that a prisoner ob-
tain a certifcate of appealability before appealing an adverse
decision in the District Court, see § 2253(c)(1).3 We gener-
ally “resist attributing to Congress an intention to render
a statute so internally inconsistent.” Greenlaw v. United
Page Proof Pending Publication
States, 554 U. S. 237, 251 (2008).
   That resistance is particularly acute here, where allowing
nonconstitutional claims to proceed under § 2241 would mean
“resurrecting the very problems § 2255 was supposed to put
to rest.” Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F. 3d 695, 707 (CA6 2019)
(Thapar, J., concurring). Section 2255 owes its existence to
Congress' pragmatic judgment that the sentencing court, not
the District Court for the district of confnement, is the best
venue for a federal prisoner's collateral attack on his sen-
tence. Channeling a particular class of second or successive
attacks back into § 2241 would mean once again “[c]oncen-

  3
    It is no answer to say that the saving clause must apply sometimes
and that these procedural restrictions are inapplicable whenever it does.
Cf. Reply Brief for Petitioner 12; Reply Brief for Respondent 9–10.
Allowing second or successive nonconstitutional claims to circumvent
§ 2255(h) under the saving clause would confer favored treatment for non-
constitutional claims as a class, a result directly at odds with the manifest
tenor of § 2255(h).
480                   JONES v. HENDRIX

                      Opinion of the Court

trat[ing] `an inordinate number of habeas corpus actions'
in districts with large prison populations” and requiring
District Courts “to review each other's proceedings—often
without access to the witnesses, the sources of evidence, or
other local information that may be critical.” Id., at 707–
708 (quoting Hayman, 342 U. S., at 214). “The illogical re-
sults of applying such an interpretation . . . argue strongly
against the conclusion that Congress intended these results.”
Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Board of Equalization of S. D.,
480 U. S. 123, 133 (1987).
   Here, as often is the case, the best interpretation is the
straightforward one. Section 2255(h) specifes the two lim-
ited conditions in which Congress has permitted federal pris-
oners to bring second or successive collateral attacks on their
sentences. The inability of a prisoner with a statutory claim
to satisfy those conditions does not mean that he can bring
his claim in a habeas petition under the saving clause. It
means that he cannot bring it at all. Congress has chosen
Page Proof Pending Publication
fnality over error correction in his case.

                              III
  Resisting this reading, Jones and the United States both
argue that § 2255(h)'s exclusion of statutory claims some-
times renders § 2255 inadequate or ineffective, though they
advance different theories of when and why it does so.
Their arguments are unpersuasive.

                               A
   Jones begins with a textual interpretation of the saving
clause that, if accepted, would convert § 2255(e) into a license
for unbounded error correction. He argues that § 2255 is
necessarily “inadequate or ineffective to test” a prisoner's
claim if the § 2255 court fails to apply the correct substantive
law. This argument ignores that the saving clause is con-
cerned with the adequacy or effectiveness of the remedial
vehicle (“the remedy by motion”), not any court's asserted
                        Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023)                      481

                            Opinion of the Court

errors of law. Cf. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U. S. 372, 383 (1977)
(holding a District of Columbia-court remedy modeled on
§ 2255 not to be “ `inadequate or ineffective' ” because the
D. C. courts were “competent to decide all issues”). Even
when “circuit law is inadequate or defcient” because a Court
of Appeals' precedents have resolved a legal issue incor-
rectly, that is not a fault in “the § 2255 remedial vehicle”
itself.4 Prost, 636 F. 3d, at 590.
   Next, Jones offers a wide-ranging discussion of the concept
of “inadequacy” as a term of art in traditional equity juris-
prudence. While Jones demonstrates that courts of equity
would afford relief from “inadequate” legal remedies in a
broad range of circumstances, we fnd this excursus irrele-
vant to the question presented here. To the extent that
Congress' use of “inadequate” in the saving clause harkens
back to equity's historic use of that term (an issue we need
not address), the most Jones' evidence proves is that a vari-
ety of circumstances might make it impracticable for a pris-
Page Proof Pending Publication
oner to seek relief from the sentencing court. Cf. Hayman,

  4
    Despite occasional gestures in its direction, and despite its critical role
in persuading the Courts of Appeals to expand the saving clause, Jones'
textual arguments place relatively little emphasis on whether binding
precedent foreclosed a prisoner's statutory argument at trial, on appeal,
and in an initial § 2255 motion. See In re Davenport, 147 F. 3d 605, 610–
611 (CA7 1998) (making such foreclosure an express precondition of
saving-clause relief); see also Triestman v. United States, 124 F. 3d 361,
380 (CA2 1997) (emphasizing that the prisoner “had no [prior] effective
opportunity to raise his [Bailey] claim”); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F. 3d 245,
251 (CA3 1997) (similar). Rather, under Jones' interpretation of “test,” it
appears that § 2241 would be available to correct any asserted error of
law by a § 2255 court, even on an issue of frst impression. Untenable as
that consequence is, the erroneous-foreclosure approach fares no better.
To hold that binding precedent renders a judicial proceeding “ `inadequate
or ineffective' to test the rights of parties” would be a shock for “our entire
justice system,” in which “precedent is ubiquitous.” Wright v. Spaulding,
939 F. 3d 695, 709 (CA6 2019) (Thapar, J., concurring). Nothing in the
text or history of the saving clause suggests that it uniquely embodies
that far-reaching proposition.
482                       JONES v. HENDRIX

                          Opinion of the Court

342 U. S., at 215, n. 23. Nothing in Jones' survey of equity
jurisprudence, however, even begins to suggest that the sav-
ing clause offers an exemption from AEDPA's clear limits on
second or successive collateral attacks.
   Trying a different tack, Jones suggests that the saving
clause's use of the present tense (“is inadequate or ineffec-
tive”) means that § 2241 is available whenever a prisoner is
presently unable to fle a § 2255 motion. Even the Circuits
with an expansive view of the saving clause have uniformly
rejected this argument, and for good reason. See, e. g., In re
Jones, 226 F. 3d, at 333; In re Dorsainvil, 119 F. 3d, at 251.
Were this argument accepted, AEDPA's changes to § 2255
would be entirely futile, as § 2241 would be available any
time the second-or-successive restrictions precluded relief.
We decline to infer that Congress intended AEDPA's care-
fully crafted limits on collateral relief under § 2255 to be
mere nullities.
   As a backstop to his scattershot textual arguments, Jones
Page Proof Pending Publication
invokes the constitutional-doubt canon, arguing that denying
him the chance to raise his Rehaif claim in a § 2241 petition
raises serious constitutional questions. It does not.5
   Jones' primary constitutional argument is that denying
him any opportunity to seek postconviction relief based on
Rehaif would violate the Suspension Clause, which provides
that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it.” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 9,
cl. 2. This “Suspension Clause argument fails because it
would extend the writ of habeas corpus far beyond its scope

  5
    As Court-appointed amicus cur iae observes, Jones' use of the
constitutional-doubt canon is somewhat anomalous, in that it aims at a
different result from what a direct constitutional challenge would achieve.
If a prisoner persuaded a court that the exclusion of statutory claims from
§ 2255(h) was unconstitutional, the result would not be that he could pro-
ceed under § 2241, but simply that he could fle a second or successive
§ 2255 motion on an equal footing with §§ 2255(h)(1) and (2) claims.
                       Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023)                     483

                           Opinion of the Court

`when the Constitution was drafted and ratifed.' ” Depart-
ment of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U. S.
–––, ––– (2020) (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U. S. 723,
746 (2008)). When the Suspension Clause was adopted, and
for a long time afterward, Jones' Rehaif claim would not
have been cognizable in habeas at all.
   At the founding, a sentence after conviction “by a court of
competent jurisdiction” was “ `in itself suffcient cause' ” for
a prisoner's continued detention. Brown v. Davenport, 596
U. S. –––, ––– (2022) (quoting Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193,
202 (1830)). As Chief Justice Marshall explained in the sem-
inal case of Ex parte Watkins, the criminal judgment, “in its
nature, conclude[d] the subject on which it [was] rendered,”
“pronounce[d] the law of the case,” and “pu[t] an end to the
inquiry concerning fact.” Id., at 202–203. Of particular
relevance here, a habeas court had no power to “look beyond
the judgment” to “re-examine the charges on which it was
rendered” for substantive errors of law—even “if . . . the
Page Proof Pending Publication
[sentencing] court ha[d] misconstrued the law, and ha[d] pro-
nounced an offence to be punishable criminally, which [was]
not so.” Id., at 202, 209.
   In rebuttal, Jones argues that pre-founding practice did
allow habeas courts to “look beyond the judgment” to ensure
that the convicting court had proved every element of the
crime for which a prisoner was committed. But Jones fails
to identify a single clear case of habeas being used to reliti-
gate a conviction after trial by a court of general criminal
jurisdiction. Rather, the cases he cites mostly involve com-
mitments by justices of the peace,6 a distinction refected in
Watkins itself. See id., at 208 (discussing Ex parte Burford,

  6
    See Rex v. Brown, 8 T. R. 26, 101 Eng. Rep. 1247 (1798); Rex v. Hall,
1 Cowp. 60, 98 Eng. Rep. 967 (1774); Rex v. Hall, 3 Burr. 1636, 97 Eng.
Rep. 1022 (1765); Rex v. Collier, 1 Wils. K. B. 332, 95 Eng. Rep. 647 (1752).
The cursory report in Rex v. Catherall, 2 Str. 900, 93 Eng. Rep. 967 (1730),
is silent as to the authority under which the petitioner was convicted, and
so cannot help Jones overcome Watkins.
484                   JONES v. HENDRIX

                      Opinion of the Court

3 Cranch 448, 453 (1806), where the Court examined on ha-
beas the suffciency of a warrant of commitment by justices
of the peace while noting that no judgment of a federal court
was in question). At common law, justices of the peace were
not courts of record and did not possess general criminal
jurisdiction. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1, 16–17
(1899); see also United States v. Mills, 11 App. D. C. 500, 507
(1897). As such, their commitments were “not placed on the
same high ground with the judgments of a court of record,”
and the fact that superior courts sometimes used habeas to
examine commitments by such inferior magistrates furnishes
“no authority for inquiring into the judgments of a court of
general criminal jurisdiction.” Watkins, 3 Pet., at 209.
   Jones also appeals to Bushell's Case, Vaugh. 135, 124 Eng.
Rep. 1006 (C. P. 1670), which has long been understood as a
case about the independence of criminal juries in determin-
ing questions of fact. Clark v. United States, 289 U. S. 1,
Page Proof Pending Publication
16–17 (1933); see also Sparf v. United States, 156 U. S. 51,
90–93 (1895); 1 J. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law
of England 375 (1883) (Stephen). There, a judge fned and
imprisoned the members of a jury for acquitting William
Penn and William Mead on indictments for “assembling un-
lawfully and tumultuously,” a verdict ostensibly against the
“manifest evidence.” Vaugh., at 137, 124 Eng. Rep., at 1007.
A juror refused to pay the fne, applied to the Court of Com-
mon Pleas for a writ of habeas corpus, and obtained dis-
charge in an opinion by Chief Justice Vaughn. Jones points
to one part of Vaughn's opinion, which criticized the return
of the writ for not specifying that the jurors “kn[e]w and
believe[d] th[e] evidence to be full and manifest against the
indicted persons,” without which the jurors' verdict was “no
cause of fne or imprisonment.” Id., at 142, 124 Eng. Rep.,
at 1009. Jones asks us to read this passage as refecting a
supposed common-law rule that habeas relief was available
whenever a convicting court had not found the necessary
mens rea of a crime. That reading, however, entirely misses
                        Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023)                      485

                            Opinion of the Court

the actual basis of Vaughn's opinion, which was the judge's
absolute want of power to question the jury's determination
of the facts. See id., at 149, 124 Eng. Rep., at 1013 (“It is
absurd a jury should be fned by the Judge for going against
their evidence, when he who fneth knows not what it is . . . .
[I]f it be demanded, what is the fact? the Judge cannot an-
swer it”); see also Stephen 375 (“[T]he judges who heard the
argument . . . decided that the discretion of the jury to be-
lieve the evidence or not could not be questioned”). Thus,
Bushell's Case no more undermines Watkins than do the
justice-of-the-peace cases.
   The principles of Watkins guided this Court's understand-
ing of the habeas writ throughout the 19th century and well
into the 20th. See Brown, 596 U. S., at –––, n. 1 (collecting
cases); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 465–466
(1938). Even in Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 (1880),
which held that the constitutionality of a prisoner's statute
of conviction could be reviewed on habeas (as going to juris-
Page Proof Pending Publication
diction),7 the Court acknowledged Watkins and took pains to
reconcile its holding with the traditional rule. See 100 U. S.,
at 375–377. And, when asked to review convicting courts'
substantive errors of statutory law in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings, this Court consistently held that it could not do so.8
   7
     The Court seemingly abandoned that notion in Glasgow v. Moyer, 225
U. S. 420 (1912), which explained that “[t]he principle” that nonjurisdic-
tional errors of substantive law are not cognizable in habeas “is not the
less applicable because the law which was the foundation of the indictment
and trial is asserted to be unconstitutional . . . . [I]f a court has jurisdic-
tion of the case the writ of habeas corpus cannot be employed to re-try
the issues, whether of law, constitutional or otherwise, or of fact.” Id.,
at 429 (emphasis added).
   8
     See, e. g., Knewel v. Egan, 268 U. S. 442, 446 (1925) (“It is fundamental
that a court upon which is conferred jurisdiction to try an offense has
jurisdiction to determine whether or not that offense is charged or
proved”); In re Gregory, 219 U. S. 210, 213 (1911) (“[W]e are not concerned
with the question whether the information was suffcient or whether the
acts set forth in the agreed statement constituted a crime, that is to say,
whether the court properly applied the law, if it be found that the court
486                        JONES v. HENDRIX

                            Opinion of the Court

It was not until 1974, in Davis, that the Court broke with
that tradition, holding for the frst time that a substantive
error of statutory law could be a cognizable ground for a
collateral attack on a federal court's criminal judgment.
See 417 U. S., at 342–347.

had jurisdiction to try the issues and to render the judgment”); In re
Eckart, 166 U. S. 481, 483 (1897) (explaining that habeas would not offer
relief from “a trial and conviction upon an indictment, the facts averred in
which are asserted to be insuffcient to constitute an offence against the
statute claimed to have been violated”); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S.
651, 654 (1884) (“Whether the indictment sets forth in comprehensive
terms the offence which the statute describes and forbids . . . is in every
case a question of law . . . within [the trial court's] jurisdiction”); Ex parte
Parks, 93 U. S. 18, 20–21 (1876) (“It would be an assumption of authority
for this court, by means of the writ of habeas corpus, to review every case
in which the defendant attempts to controvert the criminality of the of-
fence charged in the indictment”).
   Ignoring this authority, Justice Jackson's dissent cites a handful of
inapposite cases to suggest that 19th-century American courts would have
Page Proof Pending Publication
treated claims such as Jones' as cognizable in habeas. See post, at 524,
n. 19, 526, 529–530, n. 25. Grant v. United States, 58 F. 694 (CA9 1893),
was a case on a writ of error, not habeas corpus. Ex parte D'Olivera, 7
F. Cas. 853 (No. 3,967) (CC Mass. 1813), was another justice-of-the-peace
case. Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 254 (No. 11,558) (CC Va. 1833),
involved detention unsupported by any “judgment” or “judicial process”
whatsoever. United States v. Bainbridge, 24 F. Cas. 946 (No. 14,497) (CC
Mass. 1816), involved a collateral attack on a sentence imposed by a naval
court martial; Justice Story's opinion turned on the validity of the petition-
er's contract of enlistment, which, in turn, went to the court martial's
jurisdiction. Id., at 949–952; see also Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 209
(1830); Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch 331, 337 (1806). Ex parte Bollman,
4 Cranch 75 (1807), relieved two alleged traitors from pretrial orders of
commitment on the ground that there was “not suffcient evidence . . . to
justify [their] commitment on the charge of treason.” Id., at 135. Matter
of Corryell, 22 Cal. 178 (1863), granted relief from a pretrial order of com-
mitment after holding that the acts of which the petitioner stood accused
did not constitute the charged crime. Id., at 180, 183. (Incidentally, this
use of habeas was not free from controversy. See, e. g., In re Hacker, 73
F. 464, 465–469 (SD Cal. 1896); “In re Kearney,” The Writ of Habeas Cor-
pus—Its Uses and Abuses, 5 Pac. Coast L. J. 549, 565–570 (1880).) Fi-
nally, In re Wahll, 42 F. 822 (D. Minn. 1890), considered but rejected a
                      Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023)                   487

                          Opinion of the Court

   The Suspension Clause does not constitutionalize that in-
novation of nearly two centuries later. Nor, a fortiori, does
it require the extension of that innovation to a second or
successive collateral attack.
   Jones' remaining constitutional arguments are no more
persuasive. He argues that denying him a new opportu-
nity for collateral review of his Rehaif claim threatens
separation-of-powers principles—specifcally, Congress' ex-
clusive power to defne crimes. Cf. United States v. Hud-
son, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812). But the authority to determine
the facts and the law in an individual case, and to render a
fnal, binding judgment based on those determinations,
stands at the core of the judicial power. See Plaut v. Spend-
thrift Farm, Inc., 514 U. S. 211, 218–219 (1995); Watkins, 3
Pet., at 202–203. A court does not usurp legislative power
simply by misinterpreting the law in a given case. See id.,
at 206 (“If its judgment was erroneous, a point which this
court does not determine, still it is a judgment”).
Page Proof Pending Publication
   Next, Jones points to Fiore v. White, 531 U. S. 225 (2001)
(per curiam), which applied the rule that due process re-
quires that the prosecution prove every element of a crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. See id., at 228–229. Whether
a due process error has occurred at trial, however, is an en-
tirely different issue from Congress' power to restrict collat-
eral review. Due process does not guarantee a direct ap-
peal, McKane v. Durston, 153 U. S. 684, 687 (1894), let alone
the opportunity to have legal issues redetermined in succes-
sive collateral attacks on a fnal sentence.
   Jones' last constitutional contention—that the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments
may entitle him to another round of collateral review—fails

similar argument for ordering pretrial release. Id., at 824–826. In sum,
like Jones' pre-founding English cases, the dissent's 19th-century Ameri-
can cases include no example in which a prisoner under sentence of a court
of general criminal jurisdiction was permitted to relitigate the elements
of his offense on habeas corpus.
488                   JONES v. HENDRIX

                      Opinion of the Court

for a similar reason. By its terms, the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause expresses a substantive constraint on
the kinds of punishments governments may “infic[t].” It
creates no freestanding entitlement to a second or successive
round of postconviction review, and thus it adds nothing to
Jones' unavailing Suspension Clause argument.

                               B
   The Government agrees with the Eighth Circuit that
Jones is not entitled to relief, but, somewhat surprisingly, it
asks us to adopt a novel, alternative interpretation of the
saving clause, which it constructs via a roundabout argu-
ment. It begins with the premise that the words “inade-
quate or ineffective” imply reference to a “benchmark” of
adequacy and effectiveness. It proceeds to identify that
benchmark as the ability to test the types of claims cogniza-
ble under the general habeas statutes—specifcally, those
Page Proof Pending Publication
governing federal habeas petitions by state prisoners. The
Government then reasons that § 2255(h)'s limitations on sec-
ond or successive motions asserting newly discovered evi-
dence or new rules of constitutional law do not trigger the
saving clause because Congress has imposed analogous limi-
tations on analogous claims by state prisoners and—by doing
so—has redefned § 2255(e)'s implicit habeas benchmark with
respect to such “factual” and “constitutional” claims. See
28 U. S. C. §§ 2244(b)(2)(A)–(B). Since, the Government as-
serts, Congress has imposed no analogous limitation on stat-
utory claims by state prisoners, it has not redefned the im-
plicit habeas benchmark with respect to statutory claims like
Jones'. And, we should be unwilling to infer that AEDPA
limited such claims without a clearer textual indication.
The Government concludes that § 2255(h) renders § 2255 “in-
adequate or ineffective to test” a federal prisoner's statutory
claim in cases where the prisoner has already fled one § 2255
motion and the claim otherwise satisfes pre-AEDPA habeas
principles, which generally will require “a `colorable showing
                       Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023)                     489

                           Opinion of the Court

of factual innocence.' ” McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467,
495 (1991) (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U. S. 436, 454
(1986) (plurality opinion)).9
  This elaborate theory is no more convincing than Jones'
arguments. Its most striking faw is the seemingly arbi-
trary linkage it posits between the saving clause and state
prisoners' statutory postconviction remedies. While it is
true that § 2255, as enacted, afforded the same rights federal
prisoners previously enjoyed under the general habeas stat-
utes, see Hayman, 342 U. S., at 219, nothing in § 2255's text,
structure, or history suggests that Congress intended any
part of it to implicitly cross-reference whatever modifcations
to state prisoners' postconviction remedies might be made in
the future. Understanding the saving clause to do so would

  9
    The Government also argues that Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333
(1974), and Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174 (1947), read together, dictate that
only an intervening decision of this Court, rather than a Court of Appeals,
Page Proof Pending Publication
can work such a change in the law as to justify an otherwise-barred § 2241
petition. But this attempt to articulate an additional limiting principle
for the Government's theory requires turning the cases inside out. In
Davis, where this Court allowed a statutory claim to proceed under § 2255,
the relevant narrowing decision came from the Ninth Circuit. See 417
U. S., at 341 (discussing United States v. Fox, 454 F. 2d 593 (CA9 1971)).
In Sunal, where two petitioners' statutory claims were barred from pro-
ceeding in habeas, it was this Court that had issued the relevant decision.
See 332 U. S., at 176 (discussing Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114
(1946)). As we have recognized, see Reed v. Farley, 512 U. S. 339, 354
(1994), the holding of Sunal rested on what we would today call the peti-
tioners' procedural default without cause: By not appealing their convic-
tions, they had forfeited the argument that ended up prevailing in Estep,
and they had shown no “exceptional circumstances which excuse[d] their
failure” to appeal. 332 U. S., at 183–184. The Sunal Court thus had no
occasion to defnitively resolve whether the petitioners' claims would have
been cognizable in habeas but for their default. And, to the extent Sunal
addressed that question in dicta, it appeared to be of two minds. See
id., at 181–183 (suggesting, in a single unelaborated sentence, that the
petitioners' “cases would be quite different” had they appealed and lost,
then spending two paragraphs emphasizing that the trial courts' “error of
law” was neither jurisdictional nor constitutional).
490                   JONES v. HENDRIX

                       Opinion of the Court

have highly counterintuitive implications: On the Govern-
ment's view, §§ 2255(h)(1) and (2) do not create an adequacy
or effectiveness problem only because of the parallel state-
prisoner provisions in § 2244(b). It seems to follow that if
Congress relaxed § 2244(b)'s second-or-successive restric-
tions for state prisoners tomorrow, and did nothing else,
§ 2255 would suddenly become “inadequate or ineffective to
test” at least some second or successive fact-based claims
that did not satisfy § 2255(h)(1) or constitutional claims that
did not satisfy § 2255(h)(2), and that those claims would then
be allowed to proceed under § 2241. We see no indication
that the spare language of the saving clause creates such a
Rube Goldberg contrivance, whereby changes to other statu-
tory provisions (which do not apply to federal prisoners at
all) could fow back into § 2255 and undermine § 2255(h).
   In any event, as the Government acknowledges, a state
prisoner could never bring a pure statutory-error claim in
Page Proof Pending Publication
federal habeas, because “ `federal habeas corpus relief does
not lie for errors of state law.' ” Estelle v. McGuire, 502
U. S. 62, 67 (1991) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U. S. 764, 780
(1990)). As a result, it is unclear what work the Govern-
ment's state-prisoner-habeas benchmark is even doing in its
answer to the question presented here.
   Rather, the narrow base on which the Government's top-
heavy theory ultimately turns out to rest is its assertion that
§ 2255(h) is simply not clear enough to support the inference
that Congress entirely closed the door on pure statutory
claims not brought in a federal prisoner's initial § 2255 mo-
tion. See Brief for Respondent 28–29, 39. That assertion
is unpersuasive for the reasons we have already explained:
§ 2255(h) specifes the two circumstances in which a second
or successive collateral attack on a federal sentence is avail-
able, and those circumstances do not include an intervening
change in statutory interpretation.
   The Government asserts that we require “the clearest
command” before construing AEDPA to “close [the] court-
                   Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023)             491

                      Opinion of the Court

house doors” on “a strong equitable claim” for relief. Hol-
land v. Florida, 560 U. S. 631, 646, 649 (2010) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). The only two cases the Government
relies on for its clear-statement rule do not sweep as broadly
as it suggests. In Holland, we applied the general pre-
sumption of equitable tolling to AEDPA's 1-year statute of
limitations for state prisoners' habeas claims. Id., at 645–
649. Afterward, in McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U. S. 383
(2013), we held that “a convincing showing of actual inno-
cence” could enable a prisoner to evade AEDPA's statute of
limitations entirely. Id., at 386.
   Undoubtedly, McQuiggin's assertion of equitable author-
ity to override clear statutory text was a bold one. But
even taking Holland and McQuiggin for all they are worth,
there is a signifcant difference between reading equitable
exceptions into a statute of limitations, on the one hand, and
demanding a clear statement before foreclosing workarounds
Page Proof Pending Publication
to AEDPA's second-or-successive restrictions, on the other.
Statutes of limitations merely govern the timeframe for
bringing a claim. AEDPA's second-or-successive restric-
tions, by contrast, “constitute a modifed res judicata rule,”
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U. S. 651, 664 (1996), and thus embody
Congress' judgment regarding the central policy question of
postconviction remedies—the appropriate balance between
fnality and error correction. Insisting on a heightened
standard of clarity in this context would effectively mean
adopting a presumption against fnality as a substantive
value. We decline to do so. “[T]he United States has an
interest in the fnality of sentences imposed by its own
courts,” Johnson v. United States, 544 U. S. 295, 309 (2005),
and how to balance that interest against error correction is
a “judgmen[t] about the proper scope of the writ” that is
“ `normally for Congress to make.' ” Felker, 518 U. S., at 664
(quoting Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U. S. 314, 323 (1996)).
   Accepting the Government's proposal to apply a clear-
statement rule would be particularly anomalous in light of
492                   JONES v. HENDRIX

              Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., dissenting

the precise question this case presents. Typically, we fnd
clear-statement rules appropriate when a statute implicates
historically or constitutionally grounded norms that we
would not expect Congress to unsettle lightly. See, e. g., Al-
abama Assn. of Realtors v. Department of Health and
Human Servs., 594 U. S. –––, ––– (2021) (per curiam) (pre-
sumption that Congress does not casually assign executive
agencies “powers of vast economic and political signifcance”
or “signifcantly alter the balance between federal and state
power” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Landgraf v.
USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 265–266 (1994) (presump-
tion against statutory retroactivity); Atascadero State Hos-
pital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 243 (1985) (presumption
against abrogation of state sovereign immunity). But, as
shown above in discussing Jones' Suspension Clause argu-
ment, there is no historical or constitutional norm of permit-
ting one convicted of a crime by a court of competent juris-
diction to collaterally attack his sentence based on an alleged
Page Proof Pending Publication
error of substantive statutory law. As far as history and
the Constitution are concerned, “there is nothing incongru-
ous about a system in which this kind of error—the applica-
tion of a since-rejected statutory interpretation—cannot be
remedied after fnal judgment.” George v. McDonough, 596
U. S. –––, ––– (2022). A fortiori, there is nothing fundamen-
tally surprising about Congress declining to make such er-
rors remediable in a second or successive collateral attack.

                              IV
  We affrm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

                                               It is so ordered.

  Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan, dissenting.
  We respectfully dissent. As Justice Jackson explains,
today's decision yields disturbing results. See post, at 516–
517 (dissenting opinion). A prisoner who is actually innocent,
                   Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023)          493

              Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., dissenting

imprisoned for conduct that Congress did not criminalize, is
forever barred by 28 U. S. C. § 2255(h) from raising that
claim, merely because he previously sought postconviction
relief. It does not matter that an intervening decision of
this Court confrms his innocence. By challenging his con-
viction once before, he forfeited his freedom.
   Though we agree with Justice Jackson that this is not
the scheme Congress designed, we see the matter as the So-
licitor General does. As all agree, Congress enacted § 2255
to “afford federal prisoners a remedy identical in scope to
federal habeas corpus.” Davis v. United States, 417 U. S.
333, 343 (1974). To ensure that equivalence, Congress built
in a saving clause, allowing recourse to habeas when the
“remedy by motion” under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffec-
tive” compared to the remedy it replaced: an “application
for a writ of habeas corpus.” § 2255(e). So, as this Court
has explained, if § 2255 bars a claim cognizable at habeas,
Page Proof Pending Publication
such that the remedies are not “commensurate,” the saving
clause kicks in, and the prisoner may “proceed in federal ha-
beas corpus.” Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 14–15
(1963); see United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, 223
(1952).
   With that understanding in mind, consider a prisoner who,
having already fled a motion for postconviction relief, dis-
covers that a new decision of this Court establishes that his
statute of conviction did not cover his conduct. He is out of
luck under § 2255, because § 2255(h) will bar his claim. But
that claim is cognizable at habeas, where we have long held
that federal prisoners can collaterally attack their convic-
tions in successive petitions if they can make a colorable
showing that they are innocent under an intervening deci-
sion of statutory construction. See Davis, 417 U. S., at 344–
347; McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 493–495 (1991). Con-
gress did not abrogate that principle in § 2255(h). Thus, we
have precisely the kind of mismatch the saving clause was
designed to address.
494                     JONES v. HENDRIX

                        Jackson, J., dissenting

  In this case, the petitioner says he is that prisoner, with
that mismatch. But the Court of Appeals never considered
that question, laboring under a mistaken view of the sav-
ing clause that, like the majority's, assigns it almost no
role. Accordingly, we would remand for the lower courts
to consider the petitioner's claim under the proper frame-
work. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7
(2005).

   Justice Jackson, dissenting.
   Today, the Court holds that an incarcerated individual who
has already fled one postconviction petition cannot fle an-
other one to assert a previously unavailable claim of statu-
tory innocence.1 The majority says that result follows from
a “straightforward” reading of 28 U. S. C. § 2255. Ante, at
477, 480. But the majority reaches this preclusion decision
by “negative inference.” Ante, at 477. And it is far from
obvious that § 2255(h)'s bar on fling second or successive
Page Proof Pending Publication
postconviction petitions (with certain notable exceptions)
prevents a prisoner who has previously sought postconvic-
tion relief from bringing a newly available legal innocence
claim in court. See Part II, infra.
   In any event, putting aside its questionable interpretation
of § 2255(h), the majority is also wrong to interpret
§ 2255(e)—known as the saving clause—as if Congress de-
signed that provision to filter potential habeas claims
through the narrowest of apertures, saving essentially only
those that a court literally would be unable to consider due
to something akin to a natural calamity. See Part I, infra.
This stingy characterization does not refect a primary aim
of § 2255(e), which was to “save” any claim that was available
prior to § 2255(h)'s enactment where Congress has not ex-

  1
    I use the terms “statutory innocence” and “legal innocence” in this
opinion interchangeably. Both refer to a situation where an individual
was convicted under a statute that, properly interpreted, did not reach
his conduct.
                       Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023)                     495

                          Jackson, J., dissenting

pressed a clear intent to foreclose it. Jones's legal innocence
claim fts that mold.
   I am also deeply troubled by the constitutional implica-
tions of the nothing-to-see-here approach that the majority
takes with respect to the incarceration of potential legal in-
nocents. See Part III, infra. Apparently, legally innocent
or not, Jones must just carry on in prison regardless, since
(as the majority reads § 2255) no path exists for him to ask a
federal judge to consider his innocence assertion. But for-
ever slamming the courtroom doors to a possibly innocent
person who has never had a meaningful opportunity to get a
new and retroactively applicable claim for release reviewed
on the merits raises serious constitutional concerns.
   Thus, in my view, all roads lead to an interpretation of
§ 2255 that is diametrically opposed to the one that the ma-
jority announces. Whether one gets there by virtue of a
proper reading of § 2255(e) or an informed understanding of
§ 2255(h), or by affording due respect to the core constitu-
Page Proof Pending Publication
tional interests at stake, Jones's successive petition alleging
legal innocence should have been considered on the merits.2
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
                                     I
   Section 2255(e) saves postconviction claims by authorizing
the fling of a habeas petition under § 2241 if the procedures
§ 2255 affords are “inadequate or ineffective to test the legal-
ity of [a prisoner's] detention.” § 2255(e). I see no reason
why the only circumstance in which § 2255's procedures qual-
ify as inadequate or ineffective for saving clause purposes is
when it is impossible or impractical for a prisoner to fle a
§ 2255 motion. Contra, ante, at 474–475. Quite to the con-
trary, the enactment history of § 2255 plainly establishes that
Congress wanted to ensure that a prisoner's claim was
  2
   I take no position as to whether Jones's legal innocence claim is actually
meritorious. This case is about whether § 2255 should be interpreted to
prevent him from bringing the claim to a court in the frst place.
496                    JONES v. HENDRIX

                       Jackson, J., dissenting

“saved” in at least one additional set of circumstances:
Where the prisoner would have been able to bring such a
claim prior to the enactment of § 2255 (or any subsequent
changes, like those made by the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)), but somehow cannot
bring that claim after a change to the statutory framework
(unless Congress has clearly expressed its intent to restrict
the scope of relief in that regard). As the majority has in-
terpreted § 2255(h), that is precisely the situation here.

                                 A
   To understand why Congress meant for Jones to be able
to invoke the saving clause and bring his statutory innocence
claim in a habeas petition fled under § 2241, a frm grasp
of the text, history, and intended operation of § 2255(e) is
required.
                              1
Page
  The savingProof
states in full:
                clause isPending
                          the latter partPublication
                                         of § 2255(e), which

         “An application for a writ of habeas corpus [o]n behalf
      of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by
      motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained
      if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for
      relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or
      that such court has denied him relief, unless it also ap-
      pears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or inef-
      fective to test the legality of his detention.” § 2255(e)
      (emphasis added); see also § 2255 (1946 ed., Supp. II)
      (§ 2255 (1948)).
Before § 2255 was enacted in 1948, federal prisoners collater-
ally attacked their convictions by fling a habeas petition.
See United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, 210–213 (1952).
Such petitions sought judicial review of the legality of the
individual's detention, and were fled in the district where
the person was incarcerated. Ibid. This led to some prob-
                   Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023)            497

                     Jackson, J., dissenting

lems: Districts that housed large federal prisons were dis-
proportionately burdened with habeas petitions. Id., at
213–214. Also, in many cases, the court deciding the peti-
tion was both unfamiliar with the underlying facts and far
away from the relevant record, evidence, and witnesses.
Ibid.
   Congress created § 2255—an entirely new process for fed-
eral prisoners to use when seeking postconviction judicial
review—to solve these practical problems. Ante, at 473–
474. Under the procedures laid out in § 2255, in lieu of fling
a traditional habeas petition, federal prisoners must fle a
§ 2255 motion. And any such motion is to be fled in the
sentencing court, not in the district of confinement.
§ 2255(a) (2018 ed.); see Hayman, 342 U. S., at 219.
   Congress crafted (what is now) § 2255(e) to ensure that the
new § 2255 procedure successfully ousted the outdated ha-
beas regime it replaced. Per the frst part of that provision,
Page Proof Pending Publication
as a general matter, § 2255 becomes the exclusive procedure
by which federal prisoners can collaterally attack their con-
victions. See § 2255(e) (providing that “[a]n application for
a writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be entertained” where,
in essence, the prisoner fails to bring an authorized § 2255
motion, or does so and is denied relief). Yet Congress also
specifed that, in a circumstance in which § 2255 is “inade-
quate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention,” an
individual could still fle a habeas petition. Ibid.
   There are multiple ways in which § 2255 might be “insuf-
fcient” or “[n]ot capable of performing the required work”
of postconviction review of federal convictions. Webster's
New International Dictionary 1254, 1271 (2d ed. 1934) (defn-
ing “inadequate” and “ineffective” in this manner); see also
Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English
Language 1239, 1255 (1942) (similar). For example, § 2255
would not be up to the task if it would be impossible or im-
practicable for a federal prisoner to fle a § 2255 petition.
Ante, at 474, 479.
498                   JONES v. HENDRIX

                      Jackson, J., dissenting

   The case before us involves another way that § 2255 can be
inadequate or ineffective—where the newly created § 2255
procedure, perhaps inadvertently, blocks a prisoner from
bringing a claim that was previously cognizable in habeas.
This is an inadequacy concerning the operation of § 2255 from
Congress's perspective, because the “sole purpose” of § 2255
“was to minimize the diffculties encountered in habeas cor-
pus hearings” while still “affording the same rights in an-
other and more convenient forum.” Hayman, 342 U. S., at
219 (emphasis added); see also Davis v. United States, 417
U. S. 333, 343 (1974) (“Th[e] history makes clear that § 2255
was intended to afford federal prisoners a remedy identical
in scope to federal habeas corpus” (emphasis added)); Sand-
ers v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 14 (1963) (“[I]t conclusively
appears from the historic context in which § 2255 was
enacted that the legislation was intended simply to provide
in the sentencing court a remedy exactly commensurate
Page Proof Pending Publication
with that which had previously been available by habeas cor-
pus” (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)).
   That much is not in dispute—the majority acknowledges
that Congress intended to maintain equivalence with the
claims available in habeas when it enacted § 2255. See ante,
473–474. Consequently, in any circumstance in which the
new § 2255 procedure actually operates to foreclose a post-
conviction claim that a prisoner could have brought pre-
viously in a habeas petition, the § 2255 process is patently
inadequate to accomplish Congress's aim of allowing prison-
ers to test the legality of their detention under § 2255 to the
same extent as they could have in the habeas regime that
§ 2255 replaced.
   Thus, the saving clause can be properly interpreted as ef-
fectuating Congress's intent in this regard. As the Govern-
ment persuasively argues, by inserting a provision that
allows prisoners to still fle habeas petitions, Congress “en-
sure[d] that Section 2255 does not disadvantage federal pris-
oners as compared to habeas.” Brief for Respondent 17; see
                   Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023)            499

                     Jackson, J., dissenting

also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U. S. 723, 776 (2008) (noting
that the purpose of § 2255 was “to strengthen, rather than
dilute, the writ's protections” and further recognizing that
the saving clause served that purpose). That is, where a
federal prisoner could have brought a particular habeas
claim prior to 1948, but could not bring such a claim in a
§ 2255 petition after that date, the saving clause kicks in to
permit that individual to resort to habeas to raise that
claim.
   This reading of § 2255(e) means that the saving clause op-
erates (at the very least, and as it was enacted in 1948) to
preserve from inadvertent extinguishment postconviction
claims that would have been previously cognizable for fed-
eral prisoners but cannot be brought by operation of § 2255.
And the fip side of that interpretation—that § 2255 is inade-
quate or ineffective if it sub silentio extinguishes previously
available habeas claims, triggering the saving clause—inexo-
rably follows. This interpretation tracks Congress's clear
Page Proof Pending Publication
claim-preservation goal. And, as an added bonus, it also has
the beneft of being in accordance with how saving clauses
usually work. See 2 J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction
§ 4830, pp. 376–377 (3d ed. 1943) (defning “saving clause” as
a provision “said to preserve from destruction certain rights,
remedies or privileges which would otherwise be destroyed
by the general enactment”); see, e. g., Andrus v. Shell Oil
Co., 446 U. S. 657, 666 (1980) (noting that Congress included
a “savings clause” in the statute at issue to “preserv[e] pre-
existing claims”); United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528,
535 (1955) (noting that the purpose of a saving clause in the
immigration context was to “manifes[t] a well-established
congressional policy not to strip [noncitizens] of advantages
gained under prior laws”).
                                2
   Fast forward to 1996: Congress reenacted the saving
clause—using identical language—when it passed AEDPA.
§ 2255(e); § 2255 (1948). Thus, because the saving clause op-
500                   JONES v. HENDRIX

                      Jackson, J., dissenting

erated in 1948 to “save” from inadvertent extinguishment
habeas claims that were available before the enactment of
§ 2255, the same was true when Congress revised those pro-
cedures in the mid-1990s, while keeping the saving clause
intact. In other words, both in 1948 and to this day, the
saving clause operates to (among other things) ensure that
§ 2255—or the AEDPA amendments—did not, through inapt
language, substantively alter the scope of available postcon-
viction relief for federal prisoners.
   This is not to say that Congress necessarily carried for-
ward all of its previous policy determinations with respect
to the availability of postconviction claims, or that it did not
change its mind at all about the appropriate dimensions of
postconviction relief. Indeed, habeas is a dynamic remedy,
and congressional enactments contribute to its evolution.
See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U. S. 651, 664 (1996); see also 2 R.
Hertz & J. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and
Page Proof Pending Publication
Procedure § 28.4[a], p. 1738 (7th ed. 2020) (Hertz & Liebman)
(“Anglo-American law . . . has imposed an evolving set of
restrictions on second and subsequent petitions”). But,
again, the saving clause—which served an important equaliz-
ing function—remained intact when Congress reenacted
§ 2255 in 1996. Thus, while Congress can certainly act to
change the scope of habeas or its statutory equivalent if it
wants to do so, in order to overcome the operation of the
saving clause (which, again, was inserted to maintain equiva-
lence in the absence of intent to make a change), Congress
has to make said change to the availability of postconviction
relief deliberately and clearly, thereby unequivocally ex-
pressing its intent to do so. See Holland v. Florida, 560
U. S. 631, 646 (2010); infra, at 518–521.
   All this means that today (as in 1948) the saving clause is
best interpreted as allowing for the fling of a habeas petition
under § 2241 where a claim that was cognizable prior to
AEDPA cannot be brought under § 2255, unless Congress has
clearly expressed its intent to foreclose that particular claim.
                       Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023)                    501

                          Jackson, J., dissenting

                                    B
   That brings us to the situation at issue here. When Con-
gress amended § 2255 by enacting AEDPA, it legislated
against a legal background in which a federal prisoner could
bring a statutory innocence claim in a § 2255 petition. The
majority does not dispute this. See ante, at 485–486. Nor
could it, because this Court made crystal clear in 1974 in
Davis that statutory innocence claims are legally cognizable
in a § 2255 motion. 417 U. S., at 343–347.3
   Moreover, prior to AEDPA's enactment, a federal prisoner
could bring such a postconviction claim of statutory inno-
cence in a successive petition. This Court had generally
restricted successive postconviction flings by the 1990s, but
a prisoner who had previously fled at least one petition could
still fle another one in order to assert innocence. That was
because any bar to the fling of a successive petition was
typically lifted if enforcing that bar would result in a “mis-
Page Proof Pending Publication
carriage of justice.” McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 494–
495 (1991); Hertz & Liebman § 28.4[g], at 1757; see Brief for
Respondent 22–24. And under our settled precedent, legal
innocence claims ft that category. See Davis, 417 U. S., at
346 (“There can be no room for doubt” that “conviction and
punishment . . . for an act that the law does not make crimi-
nal” “ `inherently results in a complete miscarriage of jus-
tice' ”); see also Bousley v. United States, 523 U. S. 614,
623–624 (1998).
   These background principles relate to the successive peti-
tion that Jones seeks to bring here as follows. If the major-
ity is right that (by virtue of § 2255(h)) prisoners like Jones

  3
   In this regard, Davis merely acknowledged what had been true since
the founding. See infra, at 523–527; Davis v. United States, 417 U. S.
333, 343–345 (1974); see also L. Litman, Legal Innocence and Federal Ha-
beas, 104 Va. L. Rev. 417, 488, n. 334 (2018) (“[A]t the time Section 2255
was enacted, federal prisoners could raise a claim, in successive petitions,
that they were mistakenly convicted or sentenced because of an error of
statutory interpretation”).
502                      JONES v. HENDRIX

                         Jackson, J., dissenting

are now unable to bring a successive § 2255 petition to make
the same kind of legal innocence claim that they could have
brought prior to AEDPA, then Congress's enactment of
§ 2255(h) has dramatically altered the legal landscape in a
manner that seems, at best, inconsistent with its original in-
tent. To repeat: The saving clause expresses a congres-
sional intent to maintain equivalence between what a pris-
oner could claim before and after § 2255(h); yet under the
majority's reading, § 2255(h)'s “second or successive” bar
would effectively operate to preclude successive legal inno-
cence claims—shrinking the universe of previously available
claims—the opposite of what Congress set out to do when it
set up § 2255.
   In my view, that is where the saving clause comes in.
Reading the saving clause to perform its normal, intended
function of “saving” previously available claims solves this
problem, because it allows prisoners who could have brought
a claim prior to the enactment of AEDPA (like Jones) to fle
Page Proof Pending Publication
a habeas petition to the extent that § 2255 now precludes
such a fling under that particular statutory mechanism.
Thus, interpreting § 2255(e)'s “inadequate and ineffective”
language to permit the fling of a habeas petition that raises
a legal innocence claim in these circumstances seems per-
fectly consistent with Congress's intent.
   This understanding of the saving clause also explains the
clause's application—or, more precisely, its inapplicability—
to the types of claims specifcally mentioned in §§ 2255(h)(1)
and (2). Congress has expressly overridden operation of the
saving clause with respect to those two provisions, because
it has clearly expressed its intent to narrow the scope of
postconviction relief where a federal prisoner brings a suc-
cessive petition raising a claim of new evidence or new
constitutional law.4 “A legislature may adopt a policy dif-
  4
    Prior to AEDPA, an individual who wished to fle a successive petition
claiming factual innocence on the basis of new evidence needed only to
                      Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023)                   503

                         Jackson, J., dissenting

ferent from that embodied in the general saving statute.”
M. Ruud, The Savings Clause—Some Problems in Construc-
tion and Drafting, 33 Texas L. Rev. 285, 299 (1955). And
here, no one questions that, with §§ 2255(h)(1) and (2), Con-
gress clearly did so. Brief for Respondent 26–28. But the
majority now reasons that, merely by omitting statutory in-
nocence claims from that authorized-flings list, Congress
should be deemed to have exhibited a narrowing intent with
respect to those claims as well. See ante, at 469–470, 480.
   I disagree. Indeed, in my view, it is precisely because the
text of §§ 2255(h)(1) and (2) speaks unequivocally to the nar-
rowing Congress wished to effect with respect to new-
evidence and new-constitutional claims that we should not
ascertain that Congress meant for the second or successive
bar to have the same effect with respect to legal innocence
claims—which, importantly, the statute does not mention.
To put it bluntly: Congress knows how to speak clearly when
Page Proof Pending Publication
it wants to disrupt the continuity of claims that are available
to prisoners before and after it enacts legislation that ad-
dresses postconviction review procedures. And rather than
providing any such clear statement as to how an interven-
ing claim of statutory innocence should be treated vis-à-vis

show that it was “more likely than not” that the jury would have acquitted
him. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S. 298, 327 (1995). But, with AEDPA, Con-
gress narrowed the scope of available relief for factual innocence claims
by requiring prisoners to make their showing by the more stringent “clear
and convincing evidence” standard. § 2255(h)(1); see also § 2244(b)(2)
(B)(ii); 141 Cong. Rec. 15040, 15042 (1995) (statement of Sen. Levin).
Similarly, before AEDPA, an intervening change of circuit precedent ar-
guably could warrant a successive petition raising a new constitutional
argument. See Davis, 417 U. S., at 339–341, 346–347; Sanders v. United
States, 373 U. S. 1, 17 (1963); United States v. Nolan, 571 F. 2d 528, 530
(CA10 1978); see also Hertz & Liebman § 28.3[c][ii], at 1709–1710, and
n. 108. Yet AEDPA permits successive petitions raising new constitu-
tional claims only when premised on retroactive Supreme Court opinions.
§§ 2255(h)(2), 2244(b)(2)(A).
504                        JONES v. HENDRIX

                           Jackson, J., dissenting

§ 2255(h)'s second or successive bar, Congress was conspicu-
ously silent.5
                              C
   The majority advances an entirely different theory of the
work that § 2255(e) does with respect to the postconviction
review scheme—a theory that I do not fnd even remotely
persuasive. Opting for the narrowest possible view of Con-
gress's intent regarding the saving clause, the majority gen-
erally claims that the saving clause only authorizes the fling
of a habeas petition if fling a § 2255 motion would be “im-
possible or impracticable.” Ante, at 477, 478. And in the
majority's telling, that circumstance only occurs, say, if the
courthouse where a § 2255 motion would have otherwise
been fled has burned to the ground or been carried away by
a mudslide. The majority's parsimonious perspective on the
meaning of “inadequate or ineffective” is fawed in many
respects.
Page Proof Pending Publication
   First and foremost, it is entirely atextual. The majority
cites exactly zero dictionary defnitions of the terms “inade-
quate” or “ineffective.” And while it does reference an ear-
lier draft of the legislation that became § 2255, ante, at 475
(quoting Hayman, 342 U. S., at 215, n. 23), it fails to mention

   5
     The text of § 2255(h) says nothing about legal innocence claims,
let alone clearly expresses an intent to narrow the scope of available post-
conviction relief for that category of claims, in contrast to what the statute
says about claims of new evidence or new constitutional rules. Congress
could have easily stated somewhere in § 2255(h) or § 2244 that “no circuit
or district judge shall be required to consider a second or successive mo-
tion premised only on statutory claims, even claims suggesting innocence,”
or that “a court of appeals shall not certify or authorize a second or succes-
sive § 2255 petition that raises a statutory claim only.” Yet nothing close
to this kind of language, or distinction, appears on the face of the statute.
Nor does an intent to foreclose statutory innocence claims appear in the
legislative history of § 2255(h), even though that history does clearly refect
a congressional intent to narrow the scope of postconviction relief for the
categories expressly mentioned in §§ 2255(h)(1) and (2) (like new evidence
claims), see, e. g., 141 Cong. Rec., at 15040, 15042 (statement of Sen. Levin).
                      Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023)                  505

                         Jackson, J., dissenting

that Congress specifcally rejected language that embraced
the majority's “impracticable only” proposition. See Hay-
man, 342 U. S., at 215, n. 23; In re Dorsainvil, 119 F. 3d 245,
250 (CA3 1997).
   Furthermore, while the majority opinion accurately re-
cites the history and purpose of § 2255, see ante, at 473–474,
it ignores the import of that history. As explained above,
when Congress enacted § 2255 in 1948, it intended to ensure
equivalence between traditional habeas and the new § 2255
mechanism for postconviction review. Supra, at 498. Ac-
cordingly, Congress inserted the saving clause to ensure that
certain pre-existing postconviction claims (say, a claim of
statutory innocence) could still be heard even if the statutory
language Congress was adopting inadvertently barred them.
Supra, at 496–499. And Congress preserved the language
of § 2255(e)—the language that performs the equalizing func-
tion—in 1996, even as it made other signifcant changes to
§ 2255. Supra, at 499–500.
Page Proof Pending Publication
   Ignoring all this, the majority grounds its analysis of
§ 2255(e) in a scattershot of lower court cases that the major-
ity claims “[t]raditionally” viewed the saving clause as solv-
ing only for practical fling problems. Ante, at 474–475. To
be sure, a handful of lower courts applied the saving clause
where the sentencing court was dissolved. Ibid. But
lower courts have also “[t]raditionally,” ante, at 474, treated
the saving clause as permitting individuals with previously
unavailable statutory innocence claims to fle habeas peti-
tions in light of § 2255(h)'s successive-petition bar. Prost v.
Anderson, 636 F. 3d 578, 605 (CA10 2011) (Seymour, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).6 The majority also

  6
   See also, e. g., Triestman v. United States, 124 F. 3d 361, 363 (CA2
1997); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F. 3d 245, 250–252 (CA3 1997); In re Jones,
226 F. 3d 328, 333–334 (CA4 2000); Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243
F. 3d 893, 904 (CA5 2011); Hill v. Masters, 836 F. 3d 591, 599–600 (CA6
2016); In re Davenport, 147 F. 3d 605, 610–611 (CA7 1998); Stephens v.
Herrera, 464 F. 3d 895, 898 (CA9 2006); Wofford v. Scott, 177 F. 3d 1236,
506                   JONES v. HENDRIX

                      Jackson, J., dissenting

fails to grapple with this Court's own opinions that suggest
a broader interpretation of the saving clause is proper. See
Swain v. Pressley, 430 U. S. 372, 381–382 (1977); Sanders, 373
U. S., at 14–15; Hayman, 342 U. S., at 223; Brief for Respond-
ent 17–18.
   It appears the majority's interpretation of § 2255(e) is pri-
marily attributable to its concern that interpreting the sav-
ing clause to permit Jones to fle a habeas petition might
authorize an “end-run” around § 2255's procedures. Ante, at
477–478, 482. I think those fears are vastly overblown.
   Properly interpreted, a § 2255 motion is only “inadequate
or ineffective” when the potential procedural bar does not
provide a prisoner with any meaningful opportunity to pres-
ent a claim. And that circumstance does not exist any time
a procedural limitation in § 2255 screens out a claim. For
example, if an individual does not raise his legal innocence
claim in a § 2255 motion in a timely fashion, see § 2255(f), he
cannot resort to the saving clause to fle a habeas petition;
Page Proof Pending Publication
that individual did have a meaningful opportunity to raise
his claim pursuant to the § 2255 process, but missed the win-
dow of opportunity. Similarly, where Congress has clearly
narrowed the scope of postconviction relief—as it has done
for claims of new evidence and new constitutional rules—
it has overridden the equivalence aim that would otherwise
render § 2255 inadequate or ineffective, such that the saving
clause does not apply. On top of this, given the congruence
purpose underlying § 2255(e), an individual can resort to ha-
beas via § 2255(e) only where the particular claim he seeks
to bring would have been cognizable under pre-AEDPA
principles.
   Thus, the majority has no good answer to interpreting the
saving clause as doing what Congress crafted it to do—
among other things, ensuring equivalence between § 2255
and the prior postconviction remedy being replaced or modi-
1245 (CA11 1999), overruled by McCarthan v. Director of Goodwill
Industries-Suncoast Inc., 851 F. 3d 1076 (CA11 2017) (en banc).
                   Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023)             507

                      Jackson, J., dissenting

fed, unless Congress clearly establishes otherwise. A suc-
cessive statutory innocence claim could have been brought
prior to the 1996 addition of § 2255(h), and Congress has not
clearly foreclosed such claims in the text of § 2255. There-
fore, the saving clause applies, and Jones should have been
permitted to raise his legal innocence claim by fling a habeas
petition under § 2241.
                               II
   The foregoing analysis assumes, as the majority does, that
the only hope of a prisoner in Jones's position is to assert his
statutory innocence claim via a habeas petition fled under
§ 2241 per the saving clause, because § 2255(h) prevents the
fling of such a successive § 2255 motion. But I would not be
so quick to assume that a successive § 2255 motion asserting
statutory innocence is impermissible due to § 2255(h). Here
is why.
   Nothing in the whole of § 2255 suggests that Congress ever
Page Proof Pending Publication
considered the scenario presented in this case—one in which
a prisoner who has already fled a postconviction motion sud-
denly gets a new claim of legal innocence (after his frst peti-
tion was fled) based on a development in Supreme Court
case law. Therefore, it is not at all clear that Congress de-
termined that such an individual is simply out of luck. Far
from making the decision that a prisoner in this circumstance
should not be permitted to raise that newly available claim
by fling another § 2255 motion—as the majority maintains—
Congress has simply never spoken to what is supposed to
happen with newly available claims of legal innocence.
   To reach today's conclusion, then, the majority draws a
“negative inference” that Congress intended for § 2255's “sec-
ond or successive” bar to preclude successive flings that con-
tain legal innocence claims. Ante, at 477. But the majori-
ty's inferential reasoning is highly problematic in at least
two respects.
   First, negative inferences drawn without proper context
can be notoriously unreliable. And, as detailed below, there
508                   JONES v. HENDRIX

                     Jackson, J., dissenting

are myriad reasons for skepticism here. Section 2255(h)'s
anti-claim-splitting purpose is one. Another is the likely
reason that legal innocence claims do not appear in the text
of the statute (spoiler alert: they were inadvertently omit-
ted). Background equitable principles and the practical con-
sequences of preventing the fling of successive petitions in
this circumstance are additional key contextual clues that
the majority seems to have missed.
   Second, I am suspicious of the majority's choice to resort
to inferential reasoning at all, given that this Court has long
held that we will not read a statute to displace access to “the
great writ” unless Congress has been clear about its inten-
tion to accomplish this result. Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85,
95, 102 (1869). The clear-statement rule is plainly applicable
here, and the majority offers the fimsiest of explanations for
its decision to deviate from its application at the threshold
of today's interpretation.
   In short, as shown below, the initial assumption that Con-
Page Proof Pending Publication
gress necessarily meant for § 2255(h) to bar Jones's succes-
sive petition asserting statutory innocence is shaky, at best.
I would have held that Jones's petition can proceed, even
without reliance on the saving clause, because § 2255(h) does
not bar it.
                               A
   The majority says that “since [AEDPA], second or succes-
sive § 2255 motions are barred unless they rely on” one of
two (and only two) circumstances: “ `newly discovered evi-
dence,' § 2255(h)(1), or `a new rule of constitutional law,'
§ 2255(h)(2).” Ante, at 469. Legal innocence claims are
barred, the majority holds, pursuant to this “straightforward
negative inference.” Ante, at 477. But there is a good rea-
son that the negative-inference canon “must be applied with
great caution.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 107 (2012). And the reason is
that “its application depends so much on context.” Ibid.
In this case, for instance, there are several strong contextual
                   Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023)             509

                      Jackson, J., dissenting

clues that substantially undercut the majority's purportedly
“straightforward” inferential reasoning.

                                1
   First of all, while the majority interprets § 2255(h) as if
Congress designed that provision to impose “fnality” with-
out regard to the claims at issue (other than the two listed
situations), see ante, at 480, as it turns out, that is not the
primary purpose of § 2255(h). Instead, § 2255(h)'s “second or
successive petition” bar was inserted into AEDPA to ensure
that all available claims a prisoner has are brought in a sin-
gle postconviction petition. In circumstances where the
prisoner seeks to assert a claim that was previously unavail-
able (i. e., a claim that could not have been raised before),
Congress permitted successive petitions.
   Explaining this fully requires me to make a preliminary
big-picture point. Section 2255 (originally and as amended
Page Proof Pending Publication
by AEDPA) is not a gauntlet of arbitrary hurdles that Con-
gress has erected to stymie prisoners who seek to obtain
judicial review of their detention. Indeed, as explained,
when Congress frst enacted § 2255, it had no intention of
shrinking the catalog of available postconviction claims.
Ante, at 473–474; see also Part I, supra. To be sure, Con-
gress has undertaken to restrict the writ's availability some-
what since § 2255 was frst enacted, but it has nevertheless
continued to appreciate the signifcance of access to postcon-
viction review of the legality of a prisoner's detention.
Hence, even after AEDPA, Congress permits all incarcer-
ated individuals—including those who have been convicted
of serious crimes and who are serving sentences that have
been imposed by courts of competent jurisdiction—to seek
collateral relief. See §§ 2254(a), 2255(a).
   Still, when it enacted AEDPA in 1996, Congress was
aware of how § 2255's postconviction processes had been op-
erating on the ground since § 2255's enactment. Thus, Con-
gress quite rationally sought to “ `balance' ” the “ `individual
510                      JONES v. HENDRIX

                         Jackson, J., dissenting

interest in justice that arises in the extraordinary case' ”
with “ `the societal interests in fnality, comity, and conserva-
tion of scarce judicial resources.' ” McQuiggin v. Perkins,
569 U. S. 383, 393 (2013) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S.
298, 324 (1995)).
   Section 2255(h) refects this balancing. “What emerges
from a review of the debates over the successive petition
restrictions is a clear sense that” Congress wanted to “pre-
ven[t] manipulation of the system through relitigation of pre-
viously presented claims or strategic withholding of claims
for later presentation,” while still creating “a mechanism
that would allow prisoners to have one full, fair chance to
present their meritorious . . . claims to the federal courts.”
B. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive
Problems in Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77
N. Y. U. L. Rev. 699, 772 (2002). As Senator Hatch said at
the time: “We have provided for protection of Federal habeas
corpus, but we do it one time and that is it—unless, of course,
Page Proof Pending Publication
they can truly come up with evidence of innocence that could
not have been presented at trial. There we allow successive
petitions.” 141 Cong. Rec. 15042 (1995). Then-Senator
Biden similarly explained that the goal of AEDPA was “es-
sentially giving one bite out of the apple to drastically reduce
the ability to have successive petitions unless there is some
egregious action that is learned about after the petition is
fled, the frst petition.” Id., at 15027.7
   Thus, Congress enacted § 2255(h) to prevent prisoners
from engaging in manipulative fling practices—such as claim
splitting, i. e., the ineffcient business of prisoners with time
on their hands doling out their existing postconviction claims
in a series of successive motions fled in court seriatim. See

  7
    See also H. R. Rep. No. 101–681, pt. 1, p. 111 (1990) (explaining that
the purpose of a predecessor bill was “to promote fnality” but also “to
ensure that habeas corpus petitioners have one fair opportunity to present
their Federal claims to the Federal courts”).
                       Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023)                    511

                          Jackson, J., dissenting

Sanders, 373 U. S., at 18 (noting that a prisoner may “delib-
erately withhol[d]” or “deliberately abando[n]” claims in a
frst postconviction petition “in the hope of being granted
two hearings rather than one”).8 And, tellingly, because
Congress was focused on that problem—not attempting to
impose “fnality” writ large—it did not bar all successive pe-
titions; to the contrary, it proceeded to identify particular
circumstances in which another collateral challenge would be
authorized. §§ 2255(h)(1)–(2).
   Additional doubts about the majority's negative inference
surface when one recognizes that the two circumstances
Congress carved out of the successive-petition bar share an
important common thread: Both situations relate to the new-
ness of the claim that the prisoner seeks to assert in a succes-
sive petition. That is, both prongs of § 2255(h) that author-
ize a successive petition do so where a petitioner brings a
claim that arose after the time in which the prisoner would
or could have fled his frst petition. Ibid. (authorizing suc-
Page Proof Pending Publication
cessive petitions raising “newly discovered evidence” or “a
new rule of constitutional law” (emphasis added)).
   In light of this key observation, the majority's assumption
that § 2255(h) bars Jones's claim is signifcantly hobbled.
Jones's statutory innocence claim is also “new”—in the sense
that it was not available to him when his frst § 2255 petition
was fled.9 And Jones's claim shares other features of the

  8
     It appears that, in enacting restrictions on successive petitions, Con-
gress was primarily worried about successive petitions fled by state pris-
oners on death row, because a petition could delay the execution of a death
sentence. See Stevenson, 77 N. Y. U. L. Rev., at 723–730. Indeed, the
law is called the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. That
concern does not apply to a situation like Jones's, since he is not serving
a death sentence, and nothing about a successive petition delays the execu-
tion of his sentence of imprisonment.
   9
     Prior to this Court's holding in Rehaif v. United States, 588 U. S. –––
(2019), well-established Circuit precedent had barred Jones's claim.
United States v. Jones, 266 F. 3d 804, 810, n. 5 (CA8 2001) (citing United
512                       JONES v. HENDRIX

                          Jackson, J., dissenting

circumstances that Congress exempted from the “second or
successive” general prohibition as well—including that it im-
plicates innocence, see § 2255(h)(1), and stems from a retroac-
tively applicable Supreme Court opinion, see § 2255(h)(2).
Nor does the fling of Jones's successive petition implicate
any anti-claim-splitting rationale, as Jones did not manipula-
tively withhold his legal innocence claim during his initial
§ 2255 proceedings. Indeed, he could not possibly have done
so, since this Court did not decide Rehaif v. United States,
588 U. S. ––– (2019), which provided the basis for his claim,
until nearly two decades after Jones fled his frst petition.
   In short, it is hard to believe that a Congress that ex-
pressly authorized “new” claims involving innocence or those
that arise from developments in Supreme Court case law
despite § 2255(h)'s successive-petition bar also meant for
§ 2255(h) to preclude Jones from bringing the claim that he
seeks to fle here.
                               2
Page Proof Pending Publication
   The majority's negative inference also rests on the bald
assumption that Congress intentionally left statutory inno-
cence out of its list of carveouts, because it wanted those
claims to be barred if brought in a successive petition.
Ante, at 480 (asserting that “Congress has chosen fnality over
error correction” with respect to statutory innocence claims
brought in successive petitions (emphasis added)). But
there is a perfectly logical alternative explanation for why

States v. Kind, 194 F. 3d 900, 906 (CA8 1999)). After Jones's conviction
became fnal, this Court decided Rehaif, which interpreted the elements
of Jones's crime of conviction more narrowly than some Courts of Appeals
had, and thereby recognized a potential basis for Jones and other similar
defendants to claim legal innocence. And because Rehaif was a Supreme
Court ruling that changed the scope of a criminal statute, it applied retro-
actively to individuals (like Jones) whose convictions had become fnal at
the time it was issued. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U. S. 348, 351–352
(2004); Bousley v. United States, 523 U. S. 614, 620–621 (1998).
                   Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023)             513

                      Jackson, J., dissenting

statutory innocence claims do not appear as express exclu-
sions in the text of § 2255(h), an explanation that is based on
another important contextual reference point: the enactment
history of the statute.
   Section 2255(h) was enacted in the same Public Law as
§ 2244(b), a provision that contains analogous second-or-
successive petition limitations for state prisoners. Indeed,
Congress “appears to have modeled § 2255(h)(2)” on those
state-prisoner provisions. Chazen v. Marske, 938 F. 3d 851,
863 (CA7 2019) (Barrett, J., concurring) (citing R. Fallon,
J. Manning, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's
The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1362 (7th
ed. 2015) (Hart & Wechsler)). Like § 2255(h), § 2244(b)—
the model provision—does not address statutory inno-
cence claims in any fashion. But that is simply because
there is no such thing as a statutory innocence claim in
the realm of federal collateral relief for state prisoners.
Page Proof Pending Publication
See Hart & Wechsler 1362; see also Estelle v. McGuire,
502 U. S. 62, 67 (1991) (“[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does
not lie for errors of state law” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
   Thus, as others have observed, when Congress crafted
§ 2255(h) based on the state-prisoner model in § 2244(b), it
seems to have “ `lost sight of the fact that' ” federally incar-
cerated individuals “ `can raise federal statutory claims in
their collateral attacks.' ” Chazen, 938 F. 3d, at 863 (quoting
Hart & Wechsler 1362; emphasis added); Chazen, 938 F. 3d,
at 863 (suggesting that the omission of legal innocence claims
from § 2255(h) was due to “congressional oversight”); Reply
Brief for Respondent 15.
   To me, this contextual revelation rocks the foundation of
the majority's negative inference. That is, it is plausible
(and perhaps even likely) that Congress did not appreciate
fully that the modeled-af ter language establishing a
successive-petition bar did not capture the full scope of avail-
514                        JONES v. HENDRIX

                          Jackson, J., dissenting

able claims for federal prisoners.10 And, of course, if Con-
gress simply overlooked statutory innocence claims when it
crafted § 2255(h), then the omitted language that the major-
ity puts so much stock in is not actually indicative of Con-
gress having “chosen fnality” with respect to statutory in-
nocence claims. Ante, at 480. Instead, the absence of any
textual reference to statutory innocence would be wholly
unremarkable.
                              3
   Given the purpose and history of § 2255(h) as I have just
described them, I fnd quite compelling the Government's ob-
servation that “[n]othing in AEDPA [actually] justifes an in-
ference that Congress silently repealed the traditional [post-
conviction] remedy for federal prisoners who have been
imprisoned for conduct that Congress did not criminalize.”
Brief for Respondent 28. I proceed here to add that nothing
outside of AEDPA—not the background legal principles that
Page Proof Pending Publication
existed at the time Congress enacted the statute, nor the
practical consequences of reading § 2255(h) in this manner—
supports that inference either.
   Take equity, for instance. When Congress craf ted
§ 2255(h), it legislated against an important background equi-
table principle pertaining to postconviction relief: Courts
should not interpret statutory provisions governing habeas
review to even “ `run the risk' ” of causing prisoners to “ `for-
   10
      The rushed and emotionally charged manner in which AEDPA came
into fruition makes Congress's lack of attention to this detail a very realis-
tic possibility. AEDPA was passed in reaction to the Oklahoma City bom-
bing, and President Clinton had “demand[ed]” its passage by the 1-year
anniversary of that event. J. Liebman, An “Effective Death Penalty”?
AEDPA and Error Detection in Capital Cases, 67 Brooklyn L. Rev. 411,
413 (2011); see also Stevenson, 77 N. Y. U. L. Rev., at 701. Both this
Court and commentators have observed that, likely as a result, AEDPA
is “shoddily crafted and poorly cohered.” L. Kovarsky, Death Ineligibility
and Habeas Corpus, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 329, 342 (2010); see also Lindh v.
Murphy, 521 U. S. 320, 336 (1997) (“[I]n a world of silk purses and pigs'
ears, [AEDPA] is not a silk purse of the art of statutory drafting”).
                       Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023)                     515

                          Jackson, J., dissenting

ever los[e] their opportunity for any federal review of their
. . . claims.' ” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U. S. 930, 945–946
(2007) (quoting Rhines v. Weber, 544 U. S. 269, 275 (2005));
see also Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U. S. 637, 645
(1998). This means that Congress was well aware that
courts consistently “rel[y] on equitable doctrines to carve out
. . . ways petitioners can bypass [otherwise applicable] proce-
dural obstacles” when a prisoner has “not had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate their federal claims.” E. Primus, Eq-
uitable Gateways: Toward Expanded Federal Habeas Corpus
Review of State-Court Criminal Convictions, 61 Ariz. L. Rev.
291, 305 (2019).11 Knowing that courts are equitable tribu-
nals that tend to operate in this fashion should have
prompted Congress to express its intention to override that
value (assuming that it actually intended to completely fore-
close new legal innocence claims). Congress did not do so;
yet the majority reads its silence to accomplish that same
extraordinarily inequitable result.12
Page Proof Pending Publication
    The practical consequences that inure from the majority's
reading also undercut substantially the negative inference
upon which the majority relies. We have consistently
warned that courts should “resis[t] an interpretation of
[AEDPA] that would `produce troublesome results' [and]
`create procedural anomalies.' ” Panetti, 551 U. S., at 946

  11
     Many of the Courts of Appeals that had read § 2255(e) as saving legal
innocence claims invoked this equitable principle. See, e. g., In re Daven-
port, 147 F. 3d, at 609; Triestman, 124 F. 3d, at 378; In re Dorsainvil, 119
F. 3d, at 251. As lower courts also recognized, the impetus to provide a
meaningful opportunity for review of a postconviction claim was especially
strong when failure to hear the claim might result in a “miscarriage of
justice.” See Reyes-Requena, 243 F. 3d, at 904; In re Dorsainvil, 119
F. 3d, at 251.
  12
     Theoretically, Jones had “an” opportunity to raise his claim. But, in
my view, it was not a meaningful one. Well-established Circuit prece-
dent barred the claim at the time of Jones's direct appeal and frst petition.
See n. 9, supra. Jones has never had any opportunity, meaningful or
otherwise, to rely on Rehaif 's authoritative construction.
516                  JONES v. HENDRIX

                     Jackson, J., dissenting

(quoting Castro v. United States, 540 U. S. 375, 380 (2003)).
The majority does not speak to this at all, but its interpreta-
tion of § 2255 produces bizarre outcomes.
   First, there is the quirky procedural anomaly that arises
due to the fact that statutory innocence claims are fully au-
thorized in the postconviction review context. This Court's
recognition that a statute covers a narrower scope of crimi-
nal conduct than was previously acknowledged falls within
the narrow subset of criminal law decisions that are fully
retroactive, meaning that a federal prisoner can rely upon
that new determination whether his case is still on direct
review or not. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U. S. 348, 351–
352 (2004); Bousley, 523 U. S., at 620–621. But reading
§ 2255(h) to bar a successive petition raising legal innocence
would mean that most prisoners who would (remarkably) be
eligible for such retroactive relief would turn out to have no
mechanism for actually requesting it. A strange practical
Page Proof Pending Publication
conundrum, to say the least.
   Inferring that § 2255(h) bars legal innocence claims when
brought in a successive petition also produces stunningly dis-
parate results that bear no relationship to Congress's pur-
ported fnality goals. Consider two individuals who have
been convicted of the same federal crime—perhaps two co-
defendants who were tried and sentenced together. Both
complete their direct appeals, but only one fles a § 2255 mo-
tion within AEDPA's statute of limitations, while the other
one decides not to or misses the deadline. If § 2255(h) bars a
successive petition raising a legal innocence claim, then when
Rehaif is handed down—altering the elements of the crime
of conviction such that both prisoners have a colorable claim
of legal innocence—only the one who did not previously fle
a § 2255 petition can raise this retroactive statutory inno-
cence claim.
   Reference to Congress's interest in “fnality” cannot ex-
plain this odd unequal treatment. Under the Court's inter-
pretation, a prisoner whose conviction became fnal 30 years
                      Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023)                 517

                        Jackson, J., dissenting

ago can assert a Rehaif claim if he never previously fled a
§ 2255 motion, whereas someone whose conviction became
fnal 2 years ago cannot if he has already had a § 2255 peti-
tion adjudicated.13
   Interpreting § 2255(h) as completely foreclosing successive
petitions bringing statutory innocence claims also places
prisoners in an untenable catch-22 that cannot be what any
rational Congress actually intended. Consider what has
happened in this very case. Per AEDPA's statute of limita-
tions, Jones had to fle his frst § 2255 petition within one
year of his conviction becoming fnal. § 2255(f). He did so,
and that petition was successful; the Eighth Circuit found
that Jones had received ineffective assistance of counsel.
United States v. Jones, 403 F. 3d 604, 605 (2005). In the
majority's view, by seeking to vindicate his Sixth Amend-
ment rights in this way, Jones has forfeited, forever and for
all time, his right to rely on any new retroactive Supreme
Court opinion that suggests he is incarcerated for noncrimi-
Page Proof Pending Publication
nal behavior. There is no indication that Congress meant
for Jones and other prisoners in his position to have to choose
between pursing an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
and a claim of legal innocence.

                            *      *      *
  Despite all this, the majority clings to its “straightfor-
ward” negative inference and interprets § 2255(h) as a bar to
a court's consideration of Jones's legal innocence claim. My
point is that, with so many contextual indicators that Con-
gress did not really mean for § 2255(h) to be read to preclude
new claims of statutory innocence, the Court should have
simply determined that Jones's petition, which asserts such
   13
      Accommodating the possibility of retroactively applicable Supreme
Court opinions, § 2255 runs the statute of limitations not just from the
date on which the conviction became fnal, but also from the date a new,
retroactively applicable right was recognized by the Supreme Court.
§ 2255(f)(3).
518                       JONES v. HENDRIX

                         Jackson, J., dissenting

a claim, was not plainly barred by § 2255(h), and could thus
proceed in a successive § 2255 petition.

                                    B
   Instead of drawing an inference about the operation of
§ 2255(h), the most “straightforward” way of determining
whether Jones's legal innocence claim is precluded by stat-
ute, ante, at 480, would have been to apply our clear-
statement rule to today's interpretation.

                                    1
   A “longstanding rule” of this Court, INS v. St. Cyr, 533
U. S. 289, 298 (2001), the clear-statement rule directs that,
before interpreting a congressional enactment as “ `clos[ing
the Court's] doors to a class of habeas petitioners,' ” the
Court must search for a “ `clear indication that such was Con-
gress' intent,' ” Panetti, 551 U. S., at 946 (quoting Castro, 540
Page Proof Pending Publication
U. S., at 381). This principle recognizes that Congress must
“speak unambiguously when it seeks to effect a result that,
although constitutional, would undermine a constitutionally
derived value.” J. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of
the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 121–122 (2001) (Manning).
And, before today, this Court has repeatedly recognized the
importance of the clear-statement rule with respect to any
analysis of an Act of Congress that potentially restricts ac-
cess to the writ of habeas corpus or its statutory equiva-
lent.14 In fact, “where a provision precluding review is
claimed to bar habeas review,” we have “required a particu-
larly clear statement.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U. S. 510, 517
(2003) (emphasis added).
  14
    See, e. g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U. S. 723, 738 (2008); McQuiggin
v. Perkins, 569 U. S. 383, 397 (2013); Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. 631,
646 (2010); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U. S. 930, 946 (2007); Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U. S. 557, 575 (2006); Demore v. Kim, 538 U. S. 510, 517
(2003); Castro v. United States, 540 U. S. 375, 381 (2003); INS v. St. Cyr,
533 U. S. 289, 298 (2001); Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85, 102 (1869).
                       Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023)                   519

                         Jackson, J., dissenting

   The clear-statement rule is plainly implicated here.
Under the state of the law at the time AEDPA was enacted,
prisoners were entitled to bring a petition to assert a new
claim of legal innocence, even a second or successive petition.
Supra, at 501–502. Congress could change that state of af-
fairs, but, under the clear-statement rule, if it intended to do
so, it needed to speak clearly to effectuate that result.
   At a more general level of analysis, the clear-statement
rule also applies to these circumstances because the inter-
pretive question in this case touches upon the venerated writ
of habeas corpus—the only writ that is expressly mentioned
in the Constitution. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2; Holland, 560 U. S., at
649. We have long recognized that the clear-statement rule
serves the core liberty interests protected by the writ of
habeas corpus. See Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall., at 103 (hold-
ing, more than 150 years ago, that the Court had jurisdiction
over a particular habeas petition and relying on the clear-
statement rule to reach that conclusion, explaining that, to
Page Proof Pending Publication
conclude otherwise, would “greatly weaken the effcacy of
the writ” and “deprive the citizen in many cases of its bene-
fts”). Likewise, in modern times, we have been especially
careful to reference clear-statement principles, and thereby
eschew statutory interpretations that would (perhaps unin-
tentionally) foreclose judicial review of postconviction claims,
even where the text of the statute might (sometimes even
strongly) suggest otherwise.15

  15
    For example, we cited the clear-statement rule when declining to read
§ 2244(b)(2), which generally prohibits second or successive habeas peti-
tions fled by state prisoners, as blocking a second-in-time habeas petition
that raised an incompetent-to-be-executed claim, even though, literally
read, the statute could have done so. Panetti, 551 U. S., at 942–943, 945–
946. Similarly, in Holland, the Court relied on the clear-statement rule
when evaluating AEDPA's 1-year statute of limitations, holding that
the unequivocal statutory limitations period can be equitably tolled, even
though the text of AEDPA did not include equitable tolling among
the enumerated exceptions. 560 U. S., at 646–649. Likewise, in Castro,
the Court used the clear-statement rule to reject the argument that
520                       JONES v. HENDRIX

                          Jackson, J., dissenting

   Furthermore, and signifcantly for present purposes, we
have already determined that the necessary “clear state-
ment” here—i. e., the signal from Congress that justifes
reading a statute as foreclosing access to venerated postcon-
viction review processes—cannot be derived from negative
inferences drawn from statutory text. In Ex parte Yerger,
for instance, we declared that interpreting a statute to “[r]e-
pea[l] by implication” habeas jurisdiction is “not favored.”
8 Wall., at 105. More recently, we warned (again) that “[i]m-
plications from statutory text or legislative history are not
suffcient to repeal habeas jurisdiction; instead, Congress
must articulate specifc and unambiguous statutory direc-
tives to effect a repeal.” St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 299 (citing
Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall., at 105). And, again, in Holland,
this Court explained that the clear-statement rule generally
prohibits a court from inferring that the “inclu[sion of] one
item . . . is to exclude other similar items” in order to read a
statute as forbidding review of a postconviction claim. 560
Page Proof Pending Publication
U. S., at 648; see also id., at 649 (“counsel[ing] hesitancy be-
fore interpreting AEDPA's statutory silence as indicating a
congressional intent to close courthouse doors”). Yet, here,
as the majority appears to admit, the only way to read
§ 2255(h) as barring Jones's statutory innocence claim is to
infer that such preclusion is what Congress intended. Ante,
at 478, 490.
   This case would have been easily resolved if we had ap-
plied the clear-statement rule at the outset, as we have al-

§ 2244(b)(3)(E)—which prohibits habeas petitioners from seeking certiorari
review of a “ `grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals
to fle a second or successive application' ”—prevented this Court from
reviewing whether the lower courts had mistakenly concluded that the
federal prisoner's petition was in fact a “second or successive” petition.
540 U. S., at 379–381. Finally, in St. Cyr, the Court utilized the clear-
statement rule to dispense with the contention that AEDPA stripped fed-
eral courts of jurisdiction to review a noncitizen's habeas petition raising
a pure question of law. 533 U. S., at 298–299, 314.
                       Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023)                    521

                          Jackson, J., dissenting

ways done in cases of this nature. Doing so would have
appropriately eliminated a reading of § 2255(h) that fore-
closes access to habeas relief by negative implication. Use
of the rule would have thus protected core constitutional
norms by “ensur[ing] Congress does not, by broad or general
language, legislate on a sensitive topic inadvertently or with-
out due deliberation.” Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line
Ltd., 545 U. S. 119, 139 (2005) (opinion of Kennedy, J.); see
also Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58,
65 (1989).
                               2
    In the last few pages of its opinion, the Court makes the
unceremonious (but still startling) announcement that the
clear-statement rule is inapplicable to today's analysis of
§ 2255(h). Ante, at 490–492.16 Try as it might, in my view,
the majority has failed to provide a single persuasive reason
for this dramatic break.
Page Proof Pending Publication
    First, the majority suggests that the clear-statement rule
is not appropriate when interpreting provisions related
to “fnality”—and seems to draw a line between AEDPA's
statute of limitations, which does get clear-statement treat-
ment, and its provisions governing successive petitions.
Ante, at 490–491. This is nonsense. Both AEDPA pro-
visions use similar language. § 2255(f) (“A 1-year period
of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section”);
§ 2255(h) (“A second or successive motion must . . . contain
. . . ”). And both procedural limitations relate to Congress's
interest in fnality. Ante, at 491; Wood v. Milyard, 566
U. S. 463, 472 (2012) (noting that AEDPA's statute of limi-
tations “lends fnality to . . . court judgments within a rea-

   16
      It appears that no one but the Court's majority even thought it possi-
ble to sidestep the clear-statement rule with respect to today's interpre-
tive exercise. Both Jones and the Government expressly invoked it.
And Court-appointed amicus did not dispute its applicability.
522                       JONES v. HENDRIX

                         Jackson, J., dissenting

sonable time” (emphasis added; internal quotation marks
omitted)).17
   Next, the majority conspicuously downplays the stakes in
this case. Not once does its opinion make direct mention of
the fact that the claim the majority says § 2255(h) silently
precludes is one that implicates core values because it in-
volves legal innocence. Instead, the majority repeatedly
describes Jones's bid for access to the postconviction review
process as bringing a mere “statutory” claim. Ante, at 470,
480, 488, 490.18 But statutory claims that suggest a person's
innocence are different in kind from more run-of-the-mill
statutory claims, such as a technical, nonprejudicial violation
of a criminal procedure rule. See United States v. Addoni-
zio, 442 U. S. 178, 186–187 (1979); Davis, 417 U. S., at 346–
347 (citing Hill v. United States, 368 U. S. 424, 428–429
(1962)). In any event, the majority does not cite a single
case that suggests that an Act of Congress that threatens to
cut off access to habeas (or its statutory equivalent) should
Page Proof Pending Publication
be treated any differently for purposes of application of the
clear-statement rule if a petitioner's claim has a statutory
basis.
   The majority's most full-throated defense of its jettisoning
of clear-statement principles lies in its attempt to cast statu-
   17
      This Court has also treated these two provisions as similarly suscep-
tible to equitable exceptions; for instance, the “miscarriage of justice”
principle that permits bypassing procedural barriers applies to both. Mc-
Quiggin, 569 U. S., at 386, 392–393; Schlup, 513 U. S., at 320.
   18
      The euphemistic manner in which the Court's opinion tiptoes around
what Jones is actually arguing is noteworthy. The majority says that, by
operation of § 2255(h), prisoners in Jones's position cannot take advantage
of “a more favorable interpretation of statutory law,” ante, at 469–470,
which it also obliquely characterizes as “an intervening change in statu-
tory interpretation,” ante, at 471, or “a newly adopted narrowing interpre-
tation of a criminal statute,” ante, at 477. In fact, the word “innocence”
only appears in the Court's opinion when recounting the Government's
arguments. Ante, at 489, 491. If the majority has spared a thought for
the appropriate standard when a petitioner is claiming legal innocence, I
could not fnd it in the Court's opinion.
                   Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023)             523

                      Jackson, J., dissenting

tory innocence claims as not “historically or constitutionally
grounded.” Ante, at 492. The frst and most obvious
problem with this effort is that the historical pedigree of a
claim is irrelevant for clear-statement purposes. The clear-
statement rule is applicable here because the statute being
interpreted involves access to the writ of habeas corpus—
a signifcant constitutional value that we would not assume
Congress would discard without careful consideration. See
Manning 121–122; see also Holland, 560 U. S., at 646–649.
And, so triggered, our clear-statement canon of construction
is not rendered inapplicable just because the particular type
of claim that a prisoner seeks to advance in the context of a
habeas or postconviction proceeding (if he is afforded one)
might not date back to the founding era. This must be why
the majority cites no precedent that splices the clear-
statement rule in this fashion.
   Looking back to the time of the founding to determine
Page Proof Pending Publication
whether the clear-statement rule applies to our interpreta-
tion of a statute passed in 1996 also makes no sense. The
clear-statement question relates to what Congress intended
with respect to the meaning of the statute at the time it was
enacted. When Congress introduced § 2255(h), it codifed or
changed the law that existed at that time (i. e., in 1996).
See, e. g., Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U. S. 473, 483 (2000) (noting
that AEDPA's certifcate-of-appealability provisions codifed
the prevailing judicial standard). Thus, when this Court has
previously applied the clear-statement rule and analyzed the
meaning of particular AEDPA provisions, the feelings of the
Framers were of no moment. Instead, we properly exam-
ined the law leading up to AEDPA's enactment, not
founding-era sources. See, e. g., Panetti, 551 U. S., at 944;
Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U. S. 320, 337 (2010) (plurality
opinion).
   Even if the majority was right with respect to its assump-
tion that founding-era practices bear on whether the clear-
statement rule applies here, historical practice plainly under-
524                        JONES v. HENDRIX

                           Jackson, J., dissenting

mines its assertion that legal innocence claims are of recent
vintage. Supreme Court Justices riding circuit in the early
19th century repeatedly considered the merits of habeas pe-
titions fled by individuals who argued they were being
wrongfully incarcerated because the laws that had been in-
voked to justify their confnement, properly construed, did
not reach their conduct.19 Moreover, and importantly, since
the mid-19th century, the statutory scheme for postconvic-
tion review has permitted petitions based not only on a “vio-
lation of the constitution” but also on a “violation of the . . .
law of the United States.” Judiciary Act of Feb. 5, 1867,
ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385; see also § 2255; W. Church, Writ of
   19
      Ex parte D'Olivera, 7 F. Cas. 853, 854 (No. 3,967) (CC Mass. 1813)
(Story, J.) (construing a 1790 statute criminalizing desertion from a mer-
chant ship by “seamen engaged in the merchants' service of the United
States” as not covering certain “foreign seamen in foreign vessels” and
granting habeas relief to such persons); United States v. Bainbridge, 24 F.
Cas. 946, 951–952 (No. 14,497) (CC Mass. 1816) (Story, J.) (considering on
Page Proof Pending Publication
the merits, but ultimately rejecting, a habeas petitioner's argument that
an enlistment law did not apply to minors enlisted without parental con-
sent); Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 254–257 (No. 11,558) (CC Va.
1833) (Marshall, C. J.) (granting habeas relief to an individual civilly im-
prisoned because the statute at issue, properly interpreted, did not apply
to the petitioner); see also, e. g., Grant v. United States, 58 F. 694, 695–697
(CA9 1893) (granting writ of error to individuals who had been convicted
following a trial, on the ground that the law at issue, “fairly interpreted,”
did not reach the petitioners' conduct because “the case does not come
within the letter of the statute,” and citing cases reaching the same conclu-
sion); In re Wahll, 42 F. 822, 825–826 (Minn. 1890) (considering, but reject-
ing on the merits, a convicted prisoner's claim that his acts did not amount
to a violation of a federal law criminalizing the mailing of obscene letters).
   The majority has plainly expended a considerable amount of effort to
distinguish all of these cases. See ante, at 485–486, and n. 8. Still, its
vigorous attempt falls short. For example, the majority tries to distin-
guish Wahll on the ground that the court “considered but rejected a simi-
lar argument for ordering pretrial release.” Ante, at 486, n. 8. But it
ignores that the Wahll court still considered the merits of the statutory
argument; the court did not dismiss the case on the ground that such
statutory arguments were not cognizable after the prisoner's conviction.
42 F., at 825–826.
                       Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023)                   525

                         Jackson, J., dissenting

Habeas Corpus § 169, p. 249 (2d ed. 1893) (“The issue raised
on the hearing of a habeas corpus may be one of law
simply”).20
   To the extent the majority's assessment of the purportedly
nascent nature of statutory innocence claims rests on its
view that, at the time of the founding, habeas relief was
rarely available when a petition was brought by a convicted
individual (as opposed to a pretrial detainee), ante, at 482–
487, there are two additional problems. For one thing, even
assuming that a detainee-versus-convict scope-of-habeas dis-
tinction existed at the dawn of our Nation, Congress has now
squarely rejected it.21 However grounded in history and
tradition the Court's own view of the scope of habeas might
be, it is obviously not shared by the Legislature that enacted
the statute we are now interpreting.

  20
     This argument that statutory claims are not cognizable in the postcon-
viction or habeas context has already been considered—and rejected—by
Page Proof Pending Publication
this Court. For example, in St. Cyr, this Court cited various 17th- and
18th-century cases to conclude that the “issuance of the writ” of habeas
corpus “encompassed detentions based on errors of law, including the erro-
neous application or interpretation of statutes.” 533 U. S., at 302. And,
in Boumediene, the Court reiterated that it is “uncontroversial . . . that
the privilege of habeas corpus entitles the prisoner to a meaningful oppor-
tunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to `the erroneous
application or interpretation' of relevant law.” 553 U. S., at 779 (quoting
St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 302; emphasis added). Not once does the majority
engage with the propositions stated in these cases. Nor does the majority
grapple with the express statutory language in both the Judiciary Act of
1867 and § 2255 authorizing claims premised on violations of the “ `law of
the United States.' ” Supra, at 524.
  21
     Section 2255 explicitly authorizes a convicted prisoner to “move the
court which imposed the sentence” for the prescribed relief, and it allows
petitions to be fled after “the date on which the judgment of conviction
becomes fnal.” §§ 2255(a), (f)(1). Also, the major procedural change ac-
complished by Congress's adoption of § 2255 in 1948 was to transfer the
fling of postconviction petitions from the district of confnement to the
sentencing court, see United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, 215–216
(1952)—a shift that only makes sense if Congress contemplated postcon-
viction challenges.
526                        JONES v. HENDRIX

                          Jackson, J., dissenting

   Second, here again, the majority evaluates the historical
pedigree of legal innocence claims based on faulty history.
It maintains that, historically, a court could review a habeas
petition fled by a convicted individual only for “jurisdic-
tional” errors (which the majority defnes narrowly). Ante,
at 482–485, 491–492; cf. Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U. S.
–––, ––– – ––– (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). But those
who have researched this contention have called it “narrative
and myth but not history.” L. Kovarsky, Habeas Myths,
Past and Present, 101 Texas L. Rev. Online 57, 79 (2022) (Ko-
varsky); see also J. Siegel, Habeas, History, and Hermeneu-
tics, 64 Ariz. L. Rev. 505, 524–532 (2022) (Siegel); Brown v.
Davenport, 596 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2022) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).22
   At the very least, this take on early habeas practice ap-
pears contradicted by United States v. Bainbridge, 24 F. Cas.
946 (No. 14,497) (CC Mass. 1816) (Story, J.). There, Justice
Story considered a statutory innocence claim on the merits
Page Proof Pending Publication
even though the individual had already pleaded guilty. Id.,
at 949, 951–952. And the postconviction/preconviction dis-
tinction also runs headlong into other precedents that have
looked back on history and do not subscribe to such a narrow
view. St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 302 (“[T]he issuance of the writ
was not limited to challenges to the jurisdiction of the custo-
dian”); Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 404 (1963) (“Nor is it true
that at common law habeas corpus was available only to in-
quire into the jurisdiction, in a narrow sense, of the commit-
  22
    The majority relies heavily on Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193 (1830), to
support its purported “jurisdictional” line. Ante, at 483–485. But Wat-
kins does not stand for the broad proposition that the majority derives.
Watkins “itself relies on contested habeas history,” and is (as scholars
have explained) distinguishable. Kovarsky 70–71. That Watkins cannot
mean what the majority says is confrmed by the numerous “19th and
early 20th century cases . . . that undeniably decided the merits of constitu-
tional claims that were not premised on the detaining authority's lack of
jurisdiction or application of an unconstitutional statute or sentence.”
Hertz & Liebman § 2.4[c], at 44.
                       Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023)                     527

                          Jackson, J., dissenting

ting court” (citing Bushell's Case, Vaughn. 135, 124 Eng. Rep.
1006 (C. P. 1670))).
   Thus, assuming, arguendo, that the historical grounding of
the particular type of claim Jones sought to bring even mat-
ters, the majority is mistaken when it contends that a statu-
tory innocence claim (including one brought in a successive
petition) is not suffciently historical to warrant application
of our clear-statement rule.

                              *      *      *
   If the majority had applied the clear-statement rule, as it
should have, to determine whether § 2255(h) precludes suc-
cessive postconviction petitions that assert statutory inno-
cence claims, today's interpretive task would have merely
involved answering one simple question: Is there an unam-
biguous sign in the text of § 2255 that Congress meant for
§ 2255(h) to strip an incarcerated individual of any opportu-
Page Proof Pending Publication
nity to raise a new claim of legal innocence in a motion
brought in federal court? No such sign exists.23 Therefore,
we could have (and should have) easily concluded that there
is no statutory impediment to Jones's § 2255 motion being
entertained by a court.
                              III
   Finally, I believe that the canon of constitutional avoidance
also does important work to guide—and constrain—the
Court's interpretation of § 2255 in this case. See Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678, 689 (2001); cf. Pressley, 430 U. S., at
381–382 (relying on the saving clause to conclude that the
District of Columbia's postconviction statute, which mirrored
§ 2255, was constitutional). The majority's bottom line,
reading “the interplay” between § 2255(h) and § 2255(e), ante,

   23
      The majority does not appear to dispute this conclusion, as it only
engages with the clear-statement rule to categorically reject its applicabil-
ity. Ante, at 490–492. The majority does not—and cannot—establish
that, if applied here, the clear-statement rule is satisfed.
528                       JONES v. HENDRIX

                          Jackson, J., dissenting

at 469, is that a person in prison for noncriminal conduct
cannot ask a federal court to review the legality of his deten-
tion if he has previously fled a § 2255 petition. This position
is stunning in a country where liberty is a constitutional
guarantee and the courts are supposed to be dispensing jus-
tice. It also raises hackles under at least two provisions of
our founding charter.
   First, the Eighth Amendment. There is a nonfrivolous
argument that the Constitution's protection against “cruel
and unusual punishment” prohibits the incarceration of inno-
cent individuals. See In re Davis, 557 U. S. 952, 953 (2009)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Triestman v. United States,
124 F. 3d 361, 377–380 (CA2 1997)); see also Herrera v. Col-
lins, 506 U. S. 390, 432, n. 2 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(“It . . . may violate the Eighth Amendment to imprison
someone who is actually innocent”); Robinson v. California,
370 U. S. 660, 667 (1962). This is not to say that the Eighth
Amendment creates a “freestanding entitlement to a second
Page Proof Pending Publication
or successive round of postconviction review.” Ante, at 20.
But here Jones seeks a single meaningful opportunity to
have a federal court consider his claim of legal innocence.
   The majority's interpretation also implicates the Suspen-
sion Clause. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2. The majority admits that, at
a minimum, the Suspension Clause protects the right of ha-
beas corpus as it existed at the time of the founding.24 See

  24
     I reject the majority's suggestion that the Suspension Clause protects
only the scope of the great writ as it existed in the founding era. Histori-
cal habeas practice provides the foor, and not the ceiling, of Suspension
Clause protection. St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 301 (“[A]t the absolute mini-
mum, the Suspension Clause protects the writ `as it existed in 1789' ”
(quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U. S. 651, 664 (1996); emphasis added)).
The habeas remedy has “a dynamic element which itself was adopted by
the framers,” W. Hurst, The Process of Constitutional Construction, in
Supreme Court and Supreme Law 61 (E. Cahn ed. 1954) (statement of
P. Freund), such that “to truly understand the scope of the writ `as it
existed in 1789' is to understand its protean dynamism, not any of its
specifc applications,” S. Vladeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124
                        Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023)                     529

                          Jackson, J., dissenting

ante, at 483. The majority also seems to acknowledge that,
in the late 18th century, an individual—even one who had
been convicted of a crime—could invoke habeas to raise a
“jurisdictional” error. Ante, at 483, 491–492. Historically,
the term “ `jurisdictional' ” when used by habeas courts
“meant something much broader then than it means now.”
Kovarsky 75; see also Siegel 524. And, importantly, a court
lacked “jurisdiction”—and thus the writ could issue—when
a person was incarcerated for noncriminal behavior.25
   Thus, it appears that, by its own lights, the majority today
renders an interpretation of § 2255 that has potentially sig-
nifcant constitutional implications.
                                     IV
  I conclude with an observation. Today's ruling follows a
recent series of troubling AEDPA interpretations.26 All of

Harv. L. Rev. 941, 991 (2011); see also P. Halliday, Habeas Corpus: From
Page        Proof
England to Empire           Pending
                    160 (2010).                 Publication
                                But resolving that debate is unnecessary
because Jones's claim implicates even the majority's crabbed view of the
Suspension Clause.
   25
      See, e. g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 376–377 (1880) (noting that
a court's “authority” to “try and imprison” an individual stems from a
particular statute and therefore a court has “no jurisdiction” if the law
does not lawfully apply to the prisoner); Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75,
136 (1807) (“[A]s the crime with which the prisoners stand charged has
not been committed, the court can only direct them to be discharged”);
Matter of Corryell, 22 Cal. 178, 181 (1863) (“The Court derives its jurisdic-
tion from the law, and its jurisdiction extends to such matters as the law
declares to be criminal, and none other, and when it undertakes to im-
prison for an offense to which no criminality is attached, it acts beyond its
jurisdiction”); Bushell's Case, Vaughn. 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C. P. 1670);
W. Church, Writ of Habeas Corpus § 236, p. 327 (2d ed. 1893) (“[T]he pris-
oner may be discharged on habeas corpus, either before or after judgment,
where the statute or ordinance under which the proceedings are inaugu-
rated against him, is unconstitutional, as this is a jurisdictional defect”).
   26
      See, e. g., Shoop v. Twyford, 596 U. S. –––, ––– (2022) (restricting the
ability of federal courts to use the All Writs Act in AEDPA cases); Shinn
v. Martinez Ramirez, 596 U. S. –––, –––, ––– – –––, ––– – ––– (2022) (holding
that, although ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel can be cause
530                       JONES v. HENDRIX

                          Jackson, J., dissenting

these opinions have now collectively managed to transform
a statute that Congress designed to provide for a rational
and orderly process of federal postconviction judicial review
into an aimless and chaotic exercise in futility. The route to
obtaining collateral relief is presently replete with imagined
artifcial barriers, arbitrary dead ends, and traps for the un-
wary. And today's turn makes the journey palpably absurd:
It begins with the Supreme Court's (rare) announcement
that a certain claim for release exists and is retroactively
available to incarcerated individuals on collateral review, and
ends with the realization that only an arbitrarily determined
sliver of eligible prisoners (those who have not had the te-
merity to fle a prior motion) are actually in a position to
even ask a court to consider whether any such relief might
be provided.
   It is quite clear that the Court's rulings in this area of the
law refect a general ethos that convicted prisoners should
not be permitted to fle § 2255 motions or obtain postconvic-
Page Proof Pending Publication
tion relief at all. But what matters is what Congress wants
with respect to the operation of the statutory provisions it
enacts. And, as I have shown, Congress's aim in crafting
§ 2255 was to permit convicted prisoners to fle postconvic-
tion motions asserting claims for collateral relief in a manner
that also curbs abusive flings. Congress did not speak—
one way or the other—as to what should happen if a prisoner

to excuse a procedural default of a trial-ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim, a federal court cannot gather evidence to establish postconviction
counsel's ineffectiveness); Brown v. Davenport, 596 U. S. –––, –––, ––– –
–––, –––, ––– (2022) (holding that a state prisoner who shows that a trial
error prejudiced him under this Court's federal-habeas harmless-error
standard must also run an AEDPA-derived gauntlet before receiving ha-
beas relief); Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U. S. –––, ––– – –––, ––– (2021) (elimi-
nating, without any party requesting it, the ability of prisoners to argue
that a new rule of criminal procedure announced by this Court should
be fully retroactive as a “watershed” rule); see id., at ––– – ––– (Kagan,
J., dissenting).
                   Cite as: 599 U. S. 465 (2023)             531

                      Jackson, J., dissenting

who has previously fled a § 2255 motion gets a new claim of
legal innocence due to an intervening change in the law.
   Given Congress's silence on this matter, in my view, there
is simply no justifcation for drawing a negative inference
that Congress meant for § 2255 to operate in a manner that
is patently inconsistent with the reasons it passed that stat-
ute, or the background principles that animated the law more
broadly at the time of the statute's enactment, or even (possi-
bly) core constitutional principles. Instead, § 2255(e) should
be read—consistent with Congress's general intent to ensure
equivalence between the claims available in habeas and those
that its new postconviction mechanism allowed—to permit
prisoners who have a new and retroactive statutory inno-
cence claim to fle a habeas petition in lieu of a § 2255 motion.
Alternatively, we should honor Congress's clear interest in
preserving a prisoner's ability to have one meaningful oppor-
tunity to have all of his claims presented to a court, by allow-
Page Proof Pending Publication
ing Jones to fle a petition asserting his new and retroactive
claim of statutory innocence, notwithstanding what might
otherwise be perceived as an ironclad bar in § 2255(h).
   In other words, as I see it, the negative inference that
the majority draws today rests on nothing—and certainly
nothing that actually derives from Congress's intent. Noth-
ing in the text of § 2255, background principles concerning
habeas relief, or AEDPA's enactment history compels (or
even supports) the conclusion that Congress intended to
completely foreclose claims like Jones's. And it is especially
perverse to read the statute to lead to that result when doing
so gives rise to legally dissonant, arbitrary, and untenable
outcomes. So, the majority's “straightforward” determina-
tion that this statute does preclude a prisoner in Jones's posi-
tion from fling a successive petition to assert a legal in-
nocence claim (which it reaches by refusing to follow the
procedural norm that would have correctly framed the issue
as a matter of congressional intent relative to clear-
532                   JONES v. HENDRIX

                     Jackson, J., dissenting

statement principles) appears to stem from the Court's own
views concerning fnality, not the will of Congress.
  Ultimately, of course, this all begs the question of how (and
whether) Congress will respond to the Court's systematic
neutering of the balanced postconviction processes that the
Legislature has established. It seems to me that today's
opinion—which unjustifably closes off all avenues for certain
defendants to secure meaningful consideration of their inno-
cence claims—creates an opening for Congress to step in and
fx this problem.




Page Proof Pending Publication
                           Reporter’s Note

  The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
Page Proof Pending Publication
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:

None