Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents questions as to the constitutional validity of certain provisions of the Railway Labor Act of May 20, 1926, c. 347, 44 Stat. 577, as amended by the Act of June 21, 1934, c. 691, 48 Stat. 1185, 45 U. S. C. §§ 151-163, and as to the nature and extent of the relief which courts are authorized by the Act to give.

Respondents are System Federation No. 40, which will be referred to as the Federation, a labor organization affiliated with the American Federation of Labor and representing shop craft employees of petitioner railway, and certain individuals who are officers and members of the System Federation. They brought the present suit in equity in the District Court for Eastern Virginia, to compel petitioner, an interstate rail carrier, to recognize and treat with respondent Federation, as the duly accredited representative of the mechanical department employees of petitioner, and to restrain petitioner from in any way interfering with, influencing or coercing its shop craft employees in their free choice of representatives, for the purpose of contracting with petitioner with respect to rules, rates of pay and working conditions, and for the purpose of considering and settling disputes between petitioner and such employees.

*539 The history of this controversy goes back to 1922, when, following the failure of a strike by petitioner’s shop employees affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, other employees organized a local union known as the “Mechanical Department Association of the Virginian Railway.” The Association thereupon entered into an agreement with petitioner, providing for rates of pay and working conditions, and for the settlement of disputes with respect to them, but no substantial grievances were ever presented to petitioner by the Association. It maintained its organization and held biennial elections of officers, but the notices of election were sent out by petitioner and all Association expenses were paid by petitioner.

In 1927 the American Federation of Labor formed a local organization, which, in 1934, demanded recognition by petitioner of its authority to represent the shop craft employees, and invoked the aid of the National Mediation Board, constituted under the Railway Labor Act as amended, to establish its authority. The Board, pursuant to agreement between the petitioner, the Federation, and the Association, and in conformity to the statute; held an election by petitioner’s shop craft employees, to choose representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining with petitioner. As the result of the election, the Board certified that-the Federation was the duly accredited representative of petitioner’s employees in the six shop crafts.

Upon this and other evidence, not now necessary to be detailed, the trial court found that the Federation was the duly authorized representative of the mechanical department employees of petitioner, except the carmen and coach cleaners; that the petitioner, in violation of § 2 of the Railway Labor Act, had failed to treat with the Federation as the duly accredited representative of petitioner’s employees; that petitioner had sought to influence its employees against any affiliation with labor organizations other than an association maintained by petitioner, and to *540 prevent its employees from exercising their right to choose their own representative; that for that purpose, following the certification by the National Mediation Board, of the Federation, as the duly authorized representative of petitioner’s mechanical department employees, petitioner had organized the Independent Shop Craft Association of its shop craft employees, and had sought to induce its employees to join the independent association, and to put it forward as the authorized representative of petitioner’s employees. 1

Upon the basis of these findings the trial court gave its decree applicable to petitioner’s mechanical department employees except the carmen and coach cleaners. It directed petitioner to “treat with” the Federation and to “exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules and working conditions, and to settle all disputes, whether arising out of the application of such agreements or otherwise, ...” It restrained petitioner from, “entering into any contract, undertaking or agreement of whatsoever kind concerning rules, rates of pay or working conditions affecting its Mechanical Department employees, . . . except . . . with *541 the Federation,” and from “interfering with, influencing or coercing” its employees with respect to their free choice of representatives “for the purpose of making and maintaining contracts” with petitioner “relating to rules, rates of pay, and working conditions or for the purpose of considering and deciding disputes between the Mechanical Department employees” and petitioner. The decree further restrained the petitioner from organizing or fostering any union of its mechanical department employees for the purpose of interfering with the Federation as the accredited representative of such employees. 11 F. Supp. 621.

On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit approved and adopted the findings of the district court and affirmed its decree. 84 F. (2d) 641. This Court granted certiorari to review the cause as one of publio importance.

Petitioner here, as below, makes two main contentions: First, with respect to the relief granted, it maintains that § 2, Ninth, of the Railway Labor Act, which provides that a carrier shall treat with those certified by the Mediation Board to be the representatives of a craft or class, imposes no legally enforcible obligation upon the carrier to negotiate with the representative so certified, and that in any case the statute imposes no obligation to treat or negotiate which can be appropriately enforced by a court of equity. Second, that § 2, Ninth, in so far as it attempts to regulate labor relations between petitioner and its “back shop” employees, is not a regulation of interstate commerce authorized by the commerce clause because, as it asserts, they are engaged solely in intrastate activities; and that so far as it imposes on the carrier any obligation to negotiate with a labor union authorized to represent its employees, and restrains it from making agreements with any* other labor organization, it is a denial of due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Other minor objections to the decree, so far as relevant to *542 our decision, will be referred to later in the course of this opinion.

The concurrent findings of fact of the two courts below are not shown to be plainly erroneous or unsupported by evidence. • We accordingly accept them as the conclusive basis for decision, Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway & S. S. Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, 558; Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 299 U. S. 3, 4, and address ourselves to the questions of law raised on the record.

First. The Obligation Imposed by the Statute. By Title III of the Transportation Act of February 28, 1920, c. 91, 41 Stat. 456, 469, Congress set up the Railroad Labor Board as a means for the peaceful settlement, by agreement or by arbitration, of labor controversies between interstate carriers and their employees. It sought “to encourage settlement without strikes, first by conference between the parties; failing that, by reference to adjustment boards of the parties’ own choosing, and if this is ineffective, by a full hearing before a National Board . . .” Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Railroad Labor Board, 261 U. S. 72, 79. The decisions of the Board were supported by no legal sanctions. The disputants were not “in any way to be forced into compliance with the statute or with the judgments pronounced by the Labor Board, except through the effect of adverse public opinion.” Pennsylvania Federation v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 267 U. S. 203, 216.

In 1926 Congress, aware of the impotence of the Board, and of the fact that its authority was generally not recognized or respected by the railroads or their employees, made a fresh start toward the peaceful settlement of labor disputes affecting railroads, by the repeal of the 1920 Act and the adoption of the Railway Labor Act. Report, Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, No. 222, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway & S. S. Clerks, supra, 563. By the new measure Congress continued its policy of encouraging the amicable adjustment of labor disputes by their voluntary submis *543 sion to arbitration before an impartial board, but it supported that policy by the imposition of legal obligations. It provided means for enforcing the award obtained by arbitration between the parties to labor disputes. § 9. In certain circumstances it prohibited any change in conditions, by the parties to an unadjusted labor dispute, for a period of thirty days, except by agreement. § 10. It recognized their right to designate representatives for the purposes of the Act “without interference, influence or coercion exercised by either party over the self-organization or designation of representatives by the other.” § 2, Third. Under the last-mentioned provision this Court held, in the Railway Clerks case, supra, that employees were free to organize and to make choice of their representatives without the “coercive interference” and “pressure” of a company union organized and maintained by the employer; and that the statute protected the freedom of choice of representatives, which was an essential of the statutory scheme, with a legal sanction which it was the duty of courts to enforce by appropriate decree.

The prohibition against such interference was continued and made more explicit by the amendment of 1934. 2 Petitioner does not challenge that part of the *544 decree which enjoins any interference by it with the free choice of representatives by its employees, and the fostering, in the circumstances of this case, of the company union. That contention is not open to it in view of our decision in the Railway Clerks case, supra, and of the unambiguous language of § 2, Third, and Fourth, of the Act, as amended.

But petitioner insists that the statute affords no legal sanction for so much of the decree as directs petitioner to “treat with” respondent Federation “and exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules and working conditions, and to settle all disputes whether arising out of the application of such agreements or otherwise.” It points out that the requirement for reasonable effort to reach an agreement is couched in the very words of § 2, First, which were taken from § 301 of the Transportation Act, and which were held to be without legal' sanction in that Act. Pennsylvania Federation v. Pennsylvania R. Co., supra, 215. It is argued that they cannot now be given greater force as reenacted in the Railway Labor Act of 1926, and continued in the 1934 amendment. But these words no longer stand alone and unaided by mandatory provision of the statute as they did when first enacted. The amendment of the Railway Labor Act added new provisions in § 2, Ninth, which makes it the duty of the Mediation Board, when any dispute arises among the carrier’s employees, “as to who are the representatives of such employees,” to investigate the dispute and to certify, as was done in this case, the name of the organization authorized to represent the employees. It commands that “Upon receipt of such certification the carrier shall treat with the representative so certified as the representative of the craft or class for the purposes of this Act.”

*545 It is, we think, not open to doubt that Congress intended that this requirement be mandatory upon the railroad employer, and that its command, in a proper case, be enforced by the courts. The policy of the Transportation Act of encouraging voluntary adjustment of labor disputes, made manifest by those provisions of the Act which clearly contemplated the moral force of public opinion as affording its ultimate sanction, was, as we have seen, abandoned by the enactment of the Railway Labor Act. Neither the purposes of the later Act, as amended, nor its provisions when read, as they must be, in the light of our decision in the Railway Clerks case, supra, lend support to the contention that its enactments, which are mandatory in form and capable of enforcement by judicial process, were intended to be without legal sanction. 3

Experience had shown, before the amendment of 1934, that when there was no dispute as to the organizations authorized to represent the employees, and when there was willingness of the employer to meet such representative for a discussion of their grievances, amicable adjustment of differences had generally followed and strikes had been avoided.* 4 On the other hand, a prolific source of dispute had been the maintenance by the railroads of company unions and the denial by railway management *546 of the authority of representatives chosen by their employees. Report of House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, No. 1944, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 1-2. 5 Section 2, Ninth, of the amended Act, was specifically aimed at this practice. It provided a means for ascertaining who are the authorized representatives of the employees through intervention and certification by the Mediation Board, and commanded the carrier to treat with the representative so certified. That the command was limited in its application to the case of intervention *547 and certification by the Mediation Board indicates not that its words are precatory, but only that Congress hit at the evil “where experience shows it to be most felt.” Keokee Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U. S. 224, 227.

Petitioner argues that the phrase “treat with” must be taken as meaning “regard” or “act towards,” so that compliance with its mandate requires the employer to meet the authorized representative of the employees only if and when he shall elect to negotiate with them. This suggestion disregards the words of the section, and ignores the plain purpose made manifest throughout the numerous provisions of the Act. Its major objective is the avoidance of industrial strife, by conference between the authorized representatives of employer and employee. The command to the employer to “treat with” the authorized representative of the employees adds nothing to the 1926 Act, unless it requires some affirmative act on the part of the employer. Compare the Railway Clerks case, supra. As we cannot assume that its addition to the statute was purposeless, we must take its meaning to be that which the words suggest, which alone would add something to the statute as *548 it was before amendment, and which alone would tend to effect the purpose of the legislation. The statute does not undertake to compel agreement between the employer and employees, but it does command those preliminary steps without which no agreement can be reached. It at least requires the employer to meet and confer with the authorized representative of its employees, to listen to their complaints, to make reasonable effort to compose differences — in short, to enter into a negotiation for the settlement of labor disputes such as is contemplated by § 2, First.

Petitioner’s insistence that the statute does not warrant so much of the decree as forbids it to enter into contracts of employment with its individual employees is based upon a misconstruction of the decree. Both the statute and the decree are aimed at securing settlement of labor disputes by inducing collective bargaining with the true representative of the employees and by preventing such bargaining with any who do not represent them. The obligation imposed on the employer by § 2, Ninth, to treat with the true representative of the employees as designated by the Mediation Board, when read in the light of the declared purposes of the Act, and of the provisions of § 2, Third and Fourth, giving to the employees the right to organize and bargain collectively through the representative of their own selection, is exclusive. It imposes the affirmative duty to treat only with the true representative, and hence the negative duty to treat with no other. We think, as the Government concedes in its brief, 6 that *549 the injunction against petitioner’s entering into any contract concerning rules, rates of pay and working conditions, except with respondent, is designed only to prevent collective bargaining with anyone purporting to represent employees, other than respondent, who has been ascertained to be their true representative. When read in its context it must be taken to prohibit the negotiation of labor contracts, generally applicable to employees in the mechanical department, with any representative other than respondent, but not as precluding such individual contracts as petitioner may elect to make directly with individual employees. The decree, thus construed, conforms, in both its affirmative and negative aspects, to the requirements of § 2.

Propriety of Relief in Equity. Petitioner contends that if the statute is interpreted as requiring the employer to negotiate with the representative of his employees, its obligation is not the appropriate subject of a decree in equity; that negotiation depends on desires and mental attitudes which are beyond judicial control, and that since equity cannot compel the parties to agree, it will not *550 compel them to take the preliminary steps which may result in agreement.

There is no want of capacity in the court to direct complete performance of the entire obligation: both the negative duties not to maintain a company union and not to negotiate with any representative of the employees other than respondent and the affirmative duty to treat with respondent. Full performance of both is commanded by the decree in terms which leave in no uncertainty the requisites of performance. In compelling compliance with either duty it does far less than has been done in compelling the discharge of a contractual or statutory obligation calling for a construction or engineering enterprise, New Orleans, M. & T. Ry. Co. v. Mississippi, 112 U. S. 12; Wheeling Traction Co. v. Board of Commissioners, 248 Fed. 205; see Gas Securities Co. v. Antero & Lost Park Reservoir Co., 259 Fed. 423, 433; Board of Commissioners v. A. V. Wills & Sons, 236 Fed. 362, 380; Jones v. Parker, 163 Mass. 564; 40 N. E. 1044, or in granting specific performance of a contract for the joint use of a railroad bridge and terminals, Joy v. St. Louis, 138 U. S. 1; Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 163 U. S. 564; cf. Prospect Park & Coney Island R. Co. v. Coney Island & Brooklyn R. Co., 144 N. Y. 152; 39 N. E. 17. Whether an obligation has been discharged, and whether action taken or omitted is in good faith or reasonable, are everyday subjects of inquiry by courts in framing and enforcing their decrees.

It is true that a court of equity may refuse to give any relief when it is apparent that that which it can give will not be effective or of benefit to the plaintiff. Equity will not decree the execution of a partnership agreement since it cannot compel the parties to remain partners, see Hyer v. Richmond Traction Co., 168 U. S. 471, 482, or compel one to enter into performance of a contract of personal service which it cannot adequately control, Marble Com *551 pany v. Ripley, 10 Wall. 339, 358; Karrick v. Hannaman, 168 U. S. 328, 336; Tobey v. Bristol, Fed. Cas. No. 14,065; Weeks v. Pratt, 43 F. (2d) 53, 57; Railway Labor Act, § 2, Tenth. But the extent to which equity will go to give relief where there is no adequate remedy at law is not a matter of fixed rule. It rests rather in the sound discretion of the court. Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall. 557, 565; Joy v. St. Louis, supra, 47; Morrison v. Work, 266 U. S. 481, 490; Curran v. Holyoke Water Power Co., 116 Mass. 90, 92. Whether the decree will prove so useless as to lead a court to refuse to give it, is a matter of judgment to be exercised with reference to the special circumstances of each case rather than to' general rules which at most are but guides to the exercise of discretion. It is a familiar rule that a court may exercise its equity powers, or equivalent mandamus powers, United States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U. S. 352, 359, to compel courts, boards, or officers to act in a matter with respect to which they may have jurisdiction or authority, although the court will not assume to control or guide the exercise of their authority. Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Humboldt S. S. Co., 224 U. S. 474; Louisville Cement Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 246 U. S. 638; see Work v. United States ex rel. Rives, 267 U. S. 175, 184; Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U. S. 206, 218.

In considering the propriety of the equitable relief granted here, we cannot ignore the judgment of Congress, deliberately expressed in legislation, that where the obstruction of the company union is removed, the meeting of employers and employees at the conference table is a powerful aid to industrial peace. Moreover, the resources of the Railway Labor Act are not exhausted if negotiation fails in the first instance to result in agreement. If disputes concerning changes in rates of pay, rules or working conditions, are “not adjusted by the parties in conference,” either party may invoke the mediation services of the *552 Mediation Board, § 5, First, or the parties may agree to seek the benefits of the arbitration provision of § 7. With the coercive influence of the company union ended,.and in view of the interest of both parties in avoiding a strike, we cannot assume that negotiation, as required by the decree, will not result in agreement, or lead to successful mediation or arbitration, or that the attempt to secure one or another through the relief which the district court gave is not worth the effort.

More is involved than the settlement of a private controversy without appreciable consequences to the public. The peaceable settlement of labor controversies, especially where they may seriously impair the ability of an interstate rail carrier to perform its service to the public, is a matter of public concern. That is testified to by the history of the legislation now before us, the reports of committees of Congress having the proposed legislation in charge, and by our common knowledge. Courts of equity may, and frequently do, go much farther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go when only private interests are involved. Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 TJ. S. 176, 185; Central Kentucky Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission, 290 U. S. 264, 270-273; Harrisonville v. W. S. Dickey Clay Co., 289 U. S. 334, 338; Beasley v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 191 U. S. 492, 497; Joy v. St. Louis, supra, 47; Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Marshall, 136 U. S. 393, 405-406; Conger v. New York, W. S. & B. R. Co., 120 N. Y. 29, 32, 33; 23 N. E. 983. The fact that Congress has indicated its purpose to make negotiation obligatory is in itself a declaration of public interest and policy which should be persuasive in inducing courts to give relief. It is for similar reasons that courts, which traditionally have refused to compel performance of a contract to submit to arbitration, Tobey v. Bristol, supra, enforce statutes commanding performance of arbitration agreements. Red Cross *553 Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109, 119, 121; Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U. S. 263, 278.

The decree is authorized by the statute and was granted in an appropriate exercise of the equity powers of the court.

Second. Constitutionality of § 2 of the Railway Labor Act. (A) Validity Under the Commerce Clause. The power of Congress over interstate commerce extends to such regulations of the relations of rail carriers to their employees as are reasonably calculated to prevent the interruption of interstate commerce by strikes and their attendant disorders. Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 347-348. The Railway Labor Act, § 2, declares that its purposes, among others, are “To avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein,” and “to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules or working conditions.” The provisions of the Act and its history, to which reference has been made, establish that such are its purposes, and that the latter is in aid of the former. What has been said indicates clearly that its provisions are aimed at the settlement of industrial disputes by the promotion of collective bargaining between employers and the authorized representative of their employees, and by mediation and arbitration when such bargaining does not result in agreement. It was for Congress to make the choice of the means by which its objective of securing the uninterrupted service of interstate railroads was to be secured, and its judgment, supported as it is by our long experience with industrial disputes, and the history of railroad labor relations, to which we have referred, is not open to review here. 7 The means chosen are appro *554 priate to the end sought and hence are within the congressional power. See Railway Clerks case, supra, 570; Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S. 330, 369.

But petitioner insists that the Act as applied to its “back shop” employees is not within the commerce power since their duties have no direct relationship to interstate transportation. Of the 824 employees in the six shop crafts eligible to vote for a choice of representatives, 322 work in petitioner’s “back shops” at Princeton, West Virginia. They are there engaged in making classified repairs, which consist of heavy repairs *555 on locomotives and cars withdrawn from service for that purpose for long periods (an average of 105 days for locomotives and 109 days for cars). The repair work is *556 upon the equipment used by petitioner in its transportation service, 97 % of which is interstate. At times a continuous stream of engines and cars passes through the “back shops” for such repairs. ' When not engaged in repair work, the back shop employees perform “store order work,” the manufacture of material such as rivets and repair parts, to be placed in railroad stores for use at the Princeton shop and other points on the line.

The activities in which these employees are engaged have such a relation to the other confessedly interstate activities of the petitioner that they are to be regarded as a part of them. All taken together fall within the power of Congress over interstate commerce. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 221 U. S. 612, 619; cf. Pedersen v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 229 U. S. 146, 151. Both courts below have found that interruption by strikes of the back shop employees, if more than temporary, would seriously cripple petitioner’s interstate transportation. The relation of the back shop to transportation is such that a strike of petitioner’s employees there, quite apart from the likelihood of its spreading to the operating department, would subject petitioner to the danger, substantial, though possibly indefinable in its extent, of interruption of the transportation service. The cause is not remote from the effect. The relation between them is not tenuous. The effect on commerce cannot be regarded as negligible. See United States v. Railway Employees’ Department of the American Federation of Labor, 290 Fed. 978, 981, holding participation of back shop employees in the nation-wide railroad shopmen’s strike of 1922 to constitute an interference with interstate commerce. As the regulation here in question is shown to be an appropriate means of avoiding that danger, it is within the power of Congress.

*557 It is no answer, as petitioner suggests, that it could close its back shops and turn over the repair work to independent contractors. Whether the railroad should do its repair work in its own shops, or in those of another, is a question of railroad management. It is petitioner’s determination to make its own repairs which has brought its relations with shop employees within the purview of the Railway Labor Act. It is the nature of the work done and its relation to interstate transportation which afford adequate basis for the exercise of the regulatory power of Congress.

The Employers’ Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463, 498, which mentioned railroad repair shops as a subject beyond the power to regulate commerce, are not controlling here. Whatever else may be said of that pronouncement, it is obvious that the commerce power is as much dependent upon the type of regulation as its subject matter. It is enough for present purposes that experience has shown that the failure to settle, by peaceful means, the grievances of railroad employees with respect to rates of pay, rules or working conditions, is far more likely to hinder interstate commerce than the failure to compensate workers who have suffered injury in the course of their employment.

(B) Validity of § # of the Railway Labor Act Under the Fifth Amendment. The provisions of the Railway Labor Act applied in this ease, as construed by the court below, and as we construe them, do not require petitioner to enter into any agreement with its employees, and they do not prohibit its entering into such contract of employment as it chooses, with its individual employees. They prohibit only such use of the company union as, despite the objections repeated here, was enjoined in the Railway Clerks case, supra, and they impose on petitioner only the affirmative duty of “treating with” the authorized representatives of its employees for the purpose of negotiating a labor dispute.

*558 Even though Congress, in the choice of means to effect a permissible regulation of commerce, must conform to due process, Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., supra, 347; Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. United States, 284 U. S. 80, 97; see Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 589, it is evident that where, as here, the means chosen are appropriate to the permissible end, there is little scope for the operation of the due process clause. The railroad can complain only of the infringement of its own constitutional immunity, not that of its employees. Erie R. Co. v. Williams, 233 U. S. 685, 697; Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U. S. 571, 576; Rail & River Coal Co. v. Yaple, 236 U. S. 338, 349; cf. Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210, 214. And the Fifth Amendment, like the Fourteenth, see West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, decided this day, ante, p. 379, is not a guarantee of untrammeled freedom of action and of contract. In the exercise of its power to regulate commerce, Congress can subject both to restraints not shown to be unreasonable. Such are the restraints of the safety appliance act, Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U. S. 1; of the act imposing a wage scale on rail carriers, Wilson v. New, supra; of the Railroad Employers’ Liability Act, Second Employers’ Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1; of the act fixing maximum hours of service for railroad employees whose duties control or affect the movement of trains, Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, supra; of the act prohibiting the prepayment of seamen’s wages, Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U. S. 169.

Each of the limited duties imposed upon petitioner by the statute and the decree do not differ in their purpose and nature from those imposed under the earlier statute and enforced in the Railway Clerks case, supra. The quality of the action compelled, is reasonableness, and therefore the lawfulness of the compulsion, must be *559 judged in the light of the conditions which have occasioned the exercise of governmental power. If the compulsory settlement of some differences, by arbitration, may be within the limits of due process, see Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U. S. 151, it seems plain that the command of the statute to negotiate for the settlement of labor disputes, given in the appropriate exercise of the commerce power, cannot be said to be so arbitrary or unreasonable as to infringe due process.

Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, have no present application. The provisions of the Railway Labor Act invoked here neither compel the employer to enter into any agreement, nor preclude it from entering into any contract with individual employees. They do not “interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the carrier to select its employees or to discharge them.” See the Railway Clerks case, supra, 571.

There remains to be considered petitioner’s contentions that the certificate of the National Mediation Board is invalid and that the injunction granted is prohibited by the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, of March 23, 1932, c. 90, 47 Stat. 70; 29 U. S. C. §§ 101-115.

Validity of the Certificate of the National Mediation Board. In each craft of petitioner’s mechanical department a majority of those voting cast ballots for the Federation. In the case of the blacksmiths the Federation failed to receive a majority of the ballots of those eligible to vote, although a majority of the craft participated in the election. In the case of the carmen and coach cleaners, a majority of the employees eligible to vote did not participate in the election. There has been no appeal from the ruling of the district court that the designation of the Federation as the repr