United States v. Reingold

Corey Reingold pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Jack B. Wein-stein, Judge) to one count of distributing child pornography. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). The United States now appeals from that part of the June 21, 2011 judgment of conviction as sentenced Rein-gold to 30 months’ incarceration. The government contends that the district court erred in refusing to impose the minimum five-year prison term mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1) on the ground that applying such a punishment to this immature 19-year-old defendant would violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. See U.S. Const, amend. VIII. The government further disputes the district court’s Sentencing Guidelines calculations. The district court explained its sentencing decisions both on the record and in a 401-page opinion accompanied by 55 pages of appendices. See United States v. C.R., 792 F.Supp.2d 343 (E.D.N.Y.2011).2 Having carefully reviewed that opinion, the applicable law, and the record as a whole, we conclude that the district court erred in both respects identified by the government. We therefore remand the case to the district court with directions that it vacate the sentence and resentence the defendant consistent with this opinion.

I. Background

A. Events Leading to Reingold’s Prosecution

On November 16, 2008, an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), investigating child pornography in an undercover capacity, accessed a computer program called “GigaTribe,” which allows users to download material onto their computers and then to place some in folders designated for sharing with others. For *207GigaTribe users to access each other’s designated sharing folders, they must be on the same “closed network of buddies,” which is accomplished by invitation.' Id. at 352 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Ladeau, No. 09-CR-40021-FDS, 2010 WL 1427523, at *1 (D.Mass. Apr. 7, 2010) (describing operation of GigaTribe)).

When the undercover agent accessed Gi-gaTribe on November 16, he observed child pornography in the mini-profile of a person with the username “Boysuek0416.” The agent also noted that this user’s full profile contained the terms “Boy Love KDV PJK BCP,” which the agent identified as child pornography search terms. The agent invited the user to share files, and after the user agreed, the agent downloaded ten videos and one still image of child pornography from the user’s designated share folder. See United States v. Ladeau, 2010 WL 1427523, at *1 (“A user can also join the networks of other Giga-Tribe users, but only with the permission of the user who created the network.”). He then proceeded to trace the user’s Internet Protocol address to a residence at 3-14 Beach 147th Street in Queens, New York, which turned out to be the home of Jamie and Brian McLeod, the mother and stepfather of defendant Corey Reingold.

On January 15, 2009, FBI agents executed a search warrant at the McLeod home and seized two computers used exclusively by Reingold, each of which contained child pornography. Reingold, who was present at the time of the search, admitted that he was “Boysuck0416”; that he had opened a GigaTribe account in November 2008 and used it and another file sharing program, LimeWire, to download “a ton” of child pornography onto the seized computers; and that he had shared child pornography files in designated folders with between 10 and 20 other Giga-Tribe users. Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”) ¶ 9; see United States v. C.R., 792 F.Supp.2d at 353. Subsequent forensic analysis would confirm that the seized Reingold computer linked to GigaTribe contained more than 100 video files and at least 208 digital images of child pornography, while the seized computer linked to LimeWire contained 10 videos of child pornography.

B. Reingold’s Admissions to Sexual Conduct with Minors

As part of initial plea negotiations with federal prosecutors, Reingold agreed to take a polygraph examination -with the understanding that he would be allowed to plead guilty to simple possession of child pornography, see 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B),3 if he could truthfully state that he had not had any sexual contact with minors. Even before the polygraph examination, however, Reingold admitted to federal authorities that he had engaged his minor half-sister in sexual activities on three occasions over a course of three years. Specifically, Reingold stated that (1) when he was 15 and his sister eight, he had the child manually stimulate his penis; (2) when Reingold was 16 and his sister nine, he again had the girl manually stimulate his penis while he rubbed his hand over her vagina through her underwear; and (3) when Reingold was 18 and his sister 11, he had the girl manually stimulate his penis while he rubbed her vagina both over and beneath her underwear. Reingold subsequently admitted that during this third sexual encounter, he also coached the child to perform oral sex on *208him and, in turn, performed oral sex on her.4

C. Plea and Sentencing

1. Entry and Acceptance of Reingold’s Guilty Plea

On March 18, 2009, Reingold was indicted by a grand jury sitting in the Eastern District of New York on four counts of distributing child pornography based on the GigaTribe “sharing” of four specified video files to the undercover agent on November 17, 2008, see 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (b)(1); and one count of possessing child pornography, see id. § 2252(a)(4)(B), (b)(2). On September 16, 2009, Reingold pleaded guilty before a magistrate judge to the first distribution count.

Before formally accepting Reingold’s guilty plea and in anticipation of sentencing, the district court conducted hearings between September 2009 and May 2011 where it heard from “a dozen expert witnesses in the fields of child sexual abuse; online child pornography; risk assessment; treatment of sex offenders; and neuropsy-chology and adolescent brain development.” United States v. C.R., 792 F.Supp.2d at 349. Together with prosecutors, defense counsel, and two of his law clerks, the district judge also traveled to Massachusetts and personally toured FMC Devens, the Bureau of Prisons facility that offers inmates sex offender treatment. See id. at 520-24.

On May 10, 2011, the initial sentencing date, the district court declined to accept Reingold’s guilty plea before the magistrate judge, questioning whether the undercover agent’s retrieval of child pornography from Reingold’s designated shared folder on GigaTribe was enough to make the defendant guilty of distribution under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). Although the government and defense counsel both urged acceptance of the plea,5 the district court adjourned the case to May 16, 2011, to allow it to consider the matter further.

On May 16, 2011, the district court accepted Reingold’s guilty plea. On the record, it explained that its acceptance was “based on the allocution and all other information now known to me.” May 16, 2011 Sentencing Tr. 5:21-22. In its published opinion filed the same day, however, the district court expressed continued reservations as to whether the defendant had adequately admitted knowing and intentional distribution of child pornography as proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). See United States v. C.R., 792 F.Supp.2d at 353-55 (construing statute to require proof of both “active intent[ ]” to transfer child pornography to another person and “active participation” in delivery of such pornography).6 In the end, however, the district *209court accepted the guilty plea, explaining that the statute’s distribution element might be construed to reach Reingold’s conduct; that “a jury could reasonably find that [Reingold] was not truthful when he testified that he did not intend to distribute his files to another individual”; that a court can accept a guilty plea even when a defendant maintains his innocence, “as long as there is a strong factual basis for the plea”; and that the record showed Reingold to have thoroughly considered his decision to plead guilty with the support of close relatives and able counsel, and to have demonstrated a wish to accept responsibility for his conduct. Id. at 356-57 (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970)).7

2. Reingold’s Sentencing

In its PSR to the district court, the Probation Department advised that Rein-gold’s crime of conviction was subject to a mandatory minimum prison sentence of five years pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1).. Further, based on Sentencing Guidelines calculations yielding a total offense level of 35 and a criminal history category of I, the PSR reported that Rein-gold’s recommended sentencing range was 168 to 210 months’ imprisonment.8

The district court viewed the case quite differently. Rejecting the Probation Department’s application of various enhancements to Reingold’s Guidelines calculation, the district court concluded that the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range in Reingold’s case was 63 to 78 months’ imprisonment.9 The district court further determined that Reingold should not be sentenced even within that reduced Guidelines range because such a term of imprisonment was greater than necessary to achieve the objectives of 18 U.S.C. *210§ 3553(a). Insofar as Congress had statutorily mandated a prison sentence of at least five years for any defendant guilty of distributing child pornography, the district court concluded that such a sentence would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in Reingold’s case given his particular immaturity and the relative passivity of his crime. See United States v. C.R., 792 F.Supp.2d at 509-10. Accordingly, the district court sentenced Reingold to 30 months’ imprisonment, five years’ supervised release, and a $100 special assessment. It recommended that Reingold serve his term in the FMC Devens Sex Offender Treatment Program and allowed him to self-surrender.10

II. Discussion

A. Eighth Amendment Challenge to Five-Year Mandatory Minimum

The government argues that the district court was legally obligated to sentence Reingold to the minimum five-year prison term mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1) for any distribution of child pornography. It submits that the district court erred as a matter of law in holding that the application of that mandated minimum sentence to Reingold would violate the Eighth Amendment. We review de novo a district court’s “[e]onclusions of law, including those involving constitutional questions,” United States v. Fell, 531 F.3d 197, 209 (2d Cir.2008), and here conclude that the district court erred in holding the mandatory minimum sentence unconstitutional.

B. Standards Applicable to Eighth Amendment Analysis

The Eighth Amendment states that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const, amend. VIII. In identifying cruel and unusual punishments, the Supreme Court has not limited itself to “historical conceptions” of impermissible sanctions, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2021, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), but has looked to “ ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,’ ” Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958) (plurality opinion)). A punishment will be deemed “cruel and unusual” not only when it is “inherently barbaric,” but also when it is “disproportionate to the crime.” Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. at 2021; see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997-98, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (tracing history of proportionality principle).11

1. General Principles of Constitutional Proportionality

This appeal focuses on the proportionality aspect of Eighth Amendment jurispru-*211denee. The Supreme Court first interpreted the Eighth Amendment to prohibit “ ‘greatly disproportioned’ ” sentences in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910) (quoting O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 340, 12 S.Ct. 693, 36 L.Ed. 450 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting)). Since then, the Court has emphasized that constitutional proportionality is a “narrow” principle in that it “does not require strict proportionality,” and it “forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. at 997, 1001, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983)); accord Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. at 2021.

A number of principles inform this narrow view of the constitutional mandate of proportionality: (1) the “substantial deference” generally owed by reviewing courts “to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes”; (2) a recognition that the Eighth Amendment does not mandate “any one penological theory” and that “competing theories of mandatory and discretionary sentencing have been in varying degrees of ascendancy or decline since the beginning of the Republic”; (3) respect for the “marked divergences both in underlying theories of sentencing and in the length of prescribed prison terms” that “are the inevitable, often beneficial, result of the federal structure”; and (4) prudential understanding that proportionality review “should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent,” that the “most prominent objective factor is the type of punishment imposed,” and that while the Supreme Court has frequently referenced “the objective line between capital punishment and imprisonment for a term of years,” it has itself acknowledged a “lack [of] clear objective standards to distinguish between sentences for different terms of years.” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. at 998-1001, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2. Reviewing the Proportionality of a Punishment in a Particular Case

The Supreme Court’s proportionality cases fall into two classifications. “The first involves challenges to the length of term-of-years sentences given all the circumstances in a particular case.” Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. at 2021 (emphasis added). In making a case-particular assessment of proportionality, the Court has employed a two-step analysis, first “comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence.” Id. at 2022. Given the principles already discussed, the Court has observed that it will be “ ‘the rare ease in which this threshold comparison ... leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.’ ” Id. (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. at 1005, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (first alteration in Graham omitted)). Should such an inference arise, however, the second step of the analysis requires a court to “compare the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.” Id. Only “[i]f this comparative analysis ‘validate^] an initial judgment that [the] sentence is grossly disproportionate’ ” will the sentence be deemed “cruel and unusual.” Id. (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. at 1005, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (alterations in original)).

In this case-particular review, the Supreme Court has thus far identified a term-of-years sentence as grossly disproportionate on only one occasion. In Solem *212v. Helm, a South Dakota court sentenced a defendant with a prior record of six nonviolent felony convictions to a non-mandatory term of life imprisonment without parole for passing a bad check in the amount of $100. See 463 U.S. at 279, 281-82, 103 S.Ct. 3001. The Supreme Court drew a threshold inference of gross disproportion-ality from the fact that the crime of conviction was “one of the most passive felonies a person could commit,” involving “neither violence nor threat of violence to any person,” id. at 296, 103 S.Ct. 3001 (internal quotation marks omitted), while the punishment was “the most severe” non-capital sentence “that the State could have imposed on any criminal for any crime,” id. at 297, 103 S.Ct. 3001. That inference of disproportionality was then validated by the fact that “Helm was treated more severely than he would have been in any other State.” Id. at 300, 103 S.Ct. 3001.

Since Solem, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected proportionality challenges to prison sentences in particular cases. In Harmelin v. Michigan, the Court upheld a statutorily mandated term of life imprisonment without parole in the Michigan case of a recidivist defendant convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine. See 601 U.S. at 1009, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Declining to draw a threshold inference of gross dispro-portionality, Justice Kennedy observed that Harmelin’s crime was distinguishable from the “relatively minor, nonviolent crime at issue in Solem,” because the “[possession, use, and distribution of illegal drugs represent one of the greatest problems affecting the health and welfare of our population.” Id. at 1002, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (internal quotation marks omitted) (recognizing range of criminal activity associated with drug possession). In such circumstances, “the Michigan Legislature could with reason conclude that the threat posed to the individual and society by possession of this large an amount of cocaine — in terms of violence, crime, and social displacement — is momentous enough to warrant the deterrence and retribution of a life sentence without parole.” Id. at 1003, 111 S.Ct. 2680.

Thereafter, in Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003), the Supreme Court rejected a proportionality challenge to a prison sentence of 25 years to life imposed pursuant to California’s Three Strikes Law on a recidivist felon convicted of stealing $1,200 worth of golf clubs, see id. at 16-18, 123 S.Ct. 1179 (plurality) (referencing Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 667(e)(2)(A)). Declining to draw an inference of gross dispropor-tionality, the Court plurality reasoned that defendant’s grand theft felony was not one of the most passive crimes a person could commit, that the California legislature “made a judgment that protecting the public safety requires incapacitating criminals who have already been convicted of at least one serious or violent crime[, and that njothing in the Eighth Amendment prohibits California from making that choice.” Id. at 25, 28, 123 S.Ct. 1179; see Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) (rejecting prisoner’s Eighth Amendment habeas challenge to sentence of 25 years to life under California’s Three Strikes law for stealing approximately $150 worth of videotapes).

As these cases make plain, at the same time that the Eighth Amendment prohibits grossly disproportionate sentences, it is rare that a sentence falling within a legislatively prescribed term of years will be deemed grossly disproportionate. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. at 1001, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that “outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences are *213exceedingly rare” (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original)); accord United States v. Polk, 546 F.3d 74, 76 (1st Cir.2008) (observing that “instances of gross disproportionality” are “hen’s-teeth rare”).

3. Ensuring Proportionality Through Categorical Rules

“The second classification of [proportionality] cases has used categorical rules to define Eighth Amendment standards.” Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. at 2022. Until Graham, such categorical pronouncements were made with respect to a single punishment — the death penalty — and fell into “two subsets, one considering the nature of the offense” for which death was ordered, “the other considering the characteristics of the offender” sentenced to death. Id. Thus, the Supreme Court has categorically prohibited death sentences for “nonhomicide crimes against individuals,” id., such as rape, see Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. at 413, 128 S.Ct. 2641, or felony murder where'the defendant participated in the felony but did not kill or intend to kill anyone, see Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982). The Court has also categorically prohibited death sentences for juvenile defendants, see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), and persons who are mentally retarded, see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002).

In identifying types of crimes or types of defendants for whom capital punishment is categorically disproportionate, the Supreme Court has prescribed a two-step analysis. It “first considers objective in-dicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice to determine whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue.” Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. at 2022 (internal quotation marks omitted). But because “[c]ommunity consensus, while entitled to great weight, is not itself determinative of whether a punishment is cruel and unusual,” it then proceeds to a second step. Id. at 2026 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[GJuided by the standards elaborated by controlling precedents and by the Court’s own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s text, history, meaning, and purpose, the Court must determine in the exercise of its own independent judgment whether the punishment in question violates the Constitution.” Id. at 2022 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this inquiry, a court properly considers “the culpability of the [class of] offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in question.” Id. at 2026. It “also considers whether the challenged sentencing practice serves legitimate penological goals.” Id.

In Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court for the first time applied this analysis to pronounce a categorical rule for a non-capital sentencing practice: the imposition of life imprisonment without parole on juvenile offenders for nonhomicide crimes. The Court concluded that just as the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits capital punishment for juvenile offenders, so too does it categorically prohibit life without parole for those same offenders when they stand convicted of nonhomicide crimes. See 130 S.Ct. at 2030. In reaching this conclusion, the Court identified a kinship between sentences of death and of life imprisonment without parole that warranted certain categorical rules to ensure proportionality. See id. at 2027, 2033 (observing that although “[t]he State does not execute the offender sentenced to life without parole,” *214“Graham’s sentence guarantees he will die in prison”). Nevertheless, the Court did not construe the Eighth Amendment to require that juvenile defendants be released at some time during their natural life. See id. at 2030 (“A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a non-homicide crime.”). It required only that juveniles be given “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Id.

Last term, the Court pronounced another categorical rule for a sentence of life without parole, barring its mandatory application to juvenile offenders convicted of homicide crimes. See Miller v. Alabama, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). Here, the Supreme Court identified no categorical constitutional requirement that juveniles sentenced to life imprisonment for murder be afforded some opportunity for release. It ruled only that life without parole for such juvenile offenders could not be mandatory and had to reflect an individualized sentencing determination. See id. at 2460.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court not only reiterated the analogy Graham drew between a death sentence and life without parole, but also clarified that the kinship between these two harshest possible sentences explained Graham’s pronouncement of a categorical rule “in a way unprecedented for a term of imprisonment.” Id. at 2466. Relying on that kinship, and on precedent categorically barring both capital punishment for juveniles and mandatory capital punishment for adults, Miller held that the Eighth Amendment’s “principle of proportionality” categorically prohibited mandatory life without parole for juveniles. Id. at 2475. Thus, “a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.” Id.

C. Proportionality Review of the Mandatory Five-Year Minimum Sentence as Applied to Reingold

1. The District Court’s Mistaken Reliance on “Categorical Rule” Analysis To Assess the Proportionality of a Mandatory Five-Year Sentence in This Particular Case

The district court appears to have construed Graham to invite categorical rule analysis of any term-of-years sentence, including the mandatory five-year sentence at issue here. See United States v. C.R., 792 F.Supp.2d at 507. This misconstrues Graham.

First, as Miller recognized, Graham’s “unprecedented” imposition of a categorical ban outside the context of capital sentencing derives from the Court’s recognition that life without parole for juveniles was “akin to the death penalty.” Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. at 2466. Nothing in Gmham or Miller suggests that a five-year prison term is the sort of inherently harsh sentence that — like the death penalty or its deferred equivalent, life imprisonment without parole — requires categorical rules to ensure constitutional proportionality as applied to particular felony crimes or classes of defendants. Certainly, a five-year sentence does not deprive a defendant of all hope of release, the only categorical limitation the Supreme Court thought constitutionally necessary for mandatory life sentences imposed on juvenile defendants imprisoned for nonhomi-cide crimes. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. at 2030. Much less does a five-year sentence equate to one of “the law’s most serious punishments” so as to raise the constitutional concerns identified in Miller v. Alabama about the mandatory application of life without parole to all juveniles. 132 S.Ct. at 2467, 2471; see also Harmelin *215v. Michigan, 501 U.S. at 995, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (“[A] sentence which is not otherwise cruel and unusual” does not “become[ ] so simply because it is mandatory.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, a mandatory minimum five-year sentence is not the sort of sentencing practice that the Supreme Court has ever signaled requires categorical rules to ensure constitutional proportionality.

Second, insofar as the district court purported to identify a consensus against five-year prison terms for juveniles convicted of child pornography crimes, we are by no means persuaded by its analysis. We need not discuss the point, however, because any such consensus is not relevant here. Reingold was already 19 when he committed the crime of conviction. In short, he was an adult, not a juvenile. The district court tries to blur the distinction between juvenile and adult offenders by finding that, “at the time of the crime,” Reingold was “a developmentally immature young adult.” United States v. C.R., 792 F.Supp.2d at 506.12 Even if we accept this assessment, however, it hardly supports categorical rule analysis in this case. Nowhere does the record reveal any consensus about how immature adults should be sentenced for child pornography crimes. Moreover, immaturity, unlike age, is a subjective criterion, ill suited to the pronouncement of categorical rules. See generally Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. at 1000, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasizing that proportionality review “should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Supreme Court recognized as much when, in “[djrawing the line at 18 years of age” for death eligibility in Roper v. Simmons, it acknowledged that “[t]he qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18.” 543 U.S. at 574, 125 S.Ct. 1183. Nevertheless, “a line must be drawn” to pronounce a categorical rule, and because “[t]he age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood,” the Court used that age to distinguish the class of offenders that categorically could not be sentenced to death from others to whom no such categorical prohibition would apply. Id. This is not to suggest that an adult defendant’s immaturity is irrelevant to sentencing. To the contrary, that circumstance is appropriately considered by a judge in making a case-specific choice of sentence within a statutorily prescribed range. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3661. We here conclude only that the district court could not substitute the defendant’s relative immaturity for the actual age of minority in applying categorical-rule analysis to the mandated five