DiMaio v. Com.

State Court (South Eastern Reporter)11/3/2006
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Full Opinion

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and
Agee, JJ., and Carrico, S.J.

JEREMY DION DIMAIO
                 OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR.
v. Record No. 052556                November 3, 2006

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

             FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

     In this appeal, we consider whether the Commonwealth

presented sufficient evidence of value to support convictions

for computer fraud in violation of Code § 18.2-152.3 and

larceny in violation of Code § 18.2-111.

     Jeremy Dion DiMaio was convicted in a bench trial of

computer fraud in violation of Code § 18.2-152.3; computer

trespass in violation of Code § 18.2-152.4(A); embezzlement in

violation of Code § 18.2-111; 1 and attempted extortion in

violation of Code §§ 18.2-59 and -26.   His convictions were

affirmed by the Court of Appeals in DiMaio v. Commonwealth, 46

Va. App. 755, 621 S.E.2d 696 (2005).    We awarded DiMaio an

appeal limited to the issues whether the Commonwealth

established the value necessary for convictions of computer

fraud and larceny.

     Applying well-established principles of appellate review,

we will consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences

fairly deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, the prevailing party below.    Rose v.

Commonwealth, 270 Va. 3, 6, 613 S.E.2d 454, 455 (2005);

Correll v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 3, 6, 607 S.E.2d 119, 120

(2005); Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 384, 386, 585

S.E.2d 538, 539 (2003); Phan v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 506,

508, 521 S.E.2d 282, 282 (1999).    When a defendant contests

the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, this Court must

give the judgment of the circuit court sitting without a jury

the same weight as a jury verdict.    Commonwealth v. Duncan,

267 Va. 377, 384, 593 S.E.2d 210, 214 (2004); McCain v.

Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 492, 545 S.E.2d 541, 547 (2001);

Tarpley v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 251, 256, 542 S.E.2d 761, 763

(2001); Hickson v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 383, 387, 520 S.E.2d

643, 645 (1999).   Upon review of the evidence, this Court will

affirm the circuit court's judgment unless it is plainly wrong

or without evidence to support it.   Code § 8.01-680; Duncan,

267 Va. at 384, 593 S.E.2d at 214; Jackson v. Commonwealth,

267 Va. 178, 204, 590 S.E.2d 520, 535 (2004); McCain, 261 Va.

at 492-93, 545 S.E.2d at 547; Tarpley, 261 Va. at 256, 542

S.E.2d at 763; Phan, 258 Va. at 511, 521 S.E.2d at 284.

     Jeremy Dion DiMaio was employed as the director of human

resources for S&M Brands, Inc., trading as Bailey's


     1
       Pursuant to Code § 18.2-111, embezzlement referred to in
this statute is "deemed larceny."

                                2
Cigarettes.   William W. Snell served as vice-president and

chief financial officer of S&M Brands.

     In July 2003, S&M Brands made a loan of $6,500 to DiMaio,

memorialized in a written loan agreement signed by DiMaio and

Stephen Bailey, president of S&M Brands.   DiMaio agreed that

repayment for the loan, both principal and interest, would be

by fixed deduction from his payroll checks commencing in

January 2004.

     DiMaio informed S&M Brands on April 7, 2004, that he

planned to resign as director of human resources effective

April 23, 2004.   After DiMaio had submitted his letter of

resignation, Bailey learned that DiMaio had contacted an

employee in the company's payroll department and directed her

to refrain from deducting loan payments from his payroll

checks and that she had complied with his request.

     DiMaio was required, pursuant to the terms of the loan

agreement, to repay the balance due on the loan within five

days from the date of resignation or termination of his

employment from S&M Brands.   Bailey agreed to extend the

period of repayment provided DiMaio gave S&M Brands the

proceeds from his final payroll check and return a check that

had been issued to DiMaio for his unused vacation time.     Even

though DiMaio had agreed to this arrangement, he refused to

comply.   When Bailey learned that DiMaio had failed to honor


                                3
this agreement, he fired DiMaio and asked him to leave the

company's premises immediately.

     Bailey appointed Snell to serve as the interim human

resources director after DiMaio's termination.   When Snell

assumed the position, he discovered that certain files that

had been located on the computer that S&M Brands had issued to

DiMaio were missing.   S&M Brands' entire human resource

directory, including business forms and templates, had been

removed from the computer.    Approximately 829 personnel files

were missing.    Additionally, signed covenants not to compete

that S&M Brands had executed with its employees had been

physically removed from S&M Brands' premises.

     Snell contacted DiMaio and inquired about the missing

computer data.    DiMaio responded that he had transferred the

computer documents to an off-site server and that he would be

"willing to provide the files to the company under the right

circumstances."   "[DiMaio] told me that the documents were not

on the computer, and they were not on the server, which has

designated password protection for confidential documents in

the [human resources] area.   I asked him where they were, and

he told me that they were on a secure third-party server on

the Internet.    And that he had placed them there.   I didn't

have to worry because he had them in a secure location.    I

asked him how I was going to get a hold of them, and he said


                                  4
that he would be willing to provide the files to the company

under the right circumstances.   And he expressed some interest

in establishing an agreement between himself and the company

that would return the files in exchange for forgiveness of the

debt that he had personally with S&M Brands."

     DiMaio encountered Michael Mills, S&M's information

technology director, at a social event.   DiMaio told Mills:

"[D]on't bother looking for the files, because they're not

there."

     Subsequently, police officers executed a search warrant

at DiMaio's home.   The police officers conducted a search of

DiMaio's computer and located data that DiMaio had taken from

S&M Brands.   The police officers also found original covenants

not to compete, hidden in DiMaio's kitchen, that DiMaio had

also taken from S&M Brands.   The covenants not to compete were

original documents that S&M Brands had executed with its

employees.

     Snell, who had experience in evaluating companies and

properties, qualified as an expert witness, without objection,

and was permitted to render opinions regarding the market

value of the 829 personnel files that DiMaio had taken.    He

testified that the fair market value of the files exceeded

$10,000.   Snell also testified, over DiMaio's objection that

is not the basis of an assignment of error in this appeal,


                                 5
that the value of the personnel files that DiMaio took "would

be tens of thousands of dollars or worse . . . that the value

of the documents of the company could be much greater."

     Everett W. Gee, III, "in-house counsel" for S&M Brands,

testified, without objection, that the fair market value of

just the computer files that DiMaio took "would run you

somewhere at $3,790 . . . for a HR software package that would

cover a sliver of the forms that we had."   Gee also testified,

without objection, that the value of the covenants not to

compete exceeded $5,000.   He explained that he had researched

the jurisprudence in ten states where S&M Brands has employees

and that the covenants not to compete were created to comply

with the employment laws of those states.   He testified as

follows:

     "The document itself, as a lawyer, I sell documents
     such [as] this inasmuch as I [bill] and collect it,
     $5,000 or $6,000 or $7,000 in time to draft a
     noncompete, a confidential information agreement
     which I have done, and over the years it has been
     many.
           "But if you were talking about a sale of our
     business, if I was a potential purchaser of S&M
     Brands, I would want to ensure that when I was
     purchasing the company in this stock sale and asset
     sale, that there was some reasonable and covenant
     protection, so if I buy S&M Brands and all of a
     sudden S&M Brands employees don't go, you know, to
     the wind, because each particular sales rep that we
     have, the value to the company is extremely
     significant, on average, a little over a $100,000 a
     month."




                                6
Gee also stated that he could receive "$5,000 to $6,000 just

for the form" if he sold the form to a willing buyer.

     DiMaio argues that the Commonwealth failed to establish

the value of the computer records and, therefore, as a matter

of law, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction

of computer fraud. 2   We disagree.

     Proof that property has some value is sufficient to

sustain a conviction of petit larceny, but when the value of

the items stolen determines the grade of the offense, the

value must be alleged, and the Commonwealth must prove, beyond

a reasonable doubt, the value satisfies the statutory

requirement for felony larceny.       Robinson v. Commonwealth, 258

Va. 3, 5, 516 S.E.2d 475, 476 (1999); Parker v. Commonwealth,

254 Va. 118, 120-21, 489 S.E.2d 482, 483 (1997); Walls v.

Commonwealth, 248 Va. 480, 481, 450 S.E.2d 363, 364 (1994);

Knight v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 85, 88, 300 S.E.2d 600, 601

(1983); Dunn v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 704, 705, 284 S.E.2d

792, 792 (1981); Wright v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 132, 139, 82

S.E.2d 603, 607 (1954).    We have stated that "[t]he test is


     2
       Code § 18.2-152.3 states in relevant part:
          "Any person who uses a computer or computer
     network, without authority and:
          "1. Obtains property or services by false
     pretenses;
          "2. Embezzles or commits larceny; or
          "3.Converts the property of another; is guilty of
the crime of computer fraud."

                                  7
market value, and particularly retail value."    Robinson, 258

Va. at 5, 516 S.E.2d at 476.

     The Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to

establish that the value of the computer records that DiMaio

took exceeded $200.00.    For example, Snell testified, without

objection, that the fair market value of the 829 personnel

files that DiMaio took had a fair market value in excess of

$10,000. 3   Gee testified, without objection, that the files had

a value far in excess of $3,790.

     DiMaio, relying upon a headnote appended to our decision

in Lund v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 688, 232 S.E.2d 745 (1977),

argues that the Commonwealth failed to establish that the

value of the computer files exceeded $200.    We disagree.

     Initially, we note that headnotes are not authoritative

statements of the law of this Commonwealth.    Headnotes are the

"abstract of the points decided in each case" required by Code

§ 17.1-322.    However, the authoritative statements of case law

are contained in the text of opinions issued by this Court.

Additionally, our decision in Lund v. Commonwealth is not

pertinent to the resolution of this appeal.    The defendant in

Lund was indicted for violation of statutes that related to

     3
       In Walls v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 480, 482-83, 450
S.E.2d 363, 364-65 (1994), we discussed the admissibility of
opinion testimony to establish value in a larceny prosecution.



                                 8
larceny by false pretense.   In Lund, we emphasized that the

defendant was charged with certain crimes related to the use

of a computer and the unauthorized use of the computer, but at

that time, those acts did not constitute the crime of larceny.

217 Va. at 692, 232 S.E.2d at 748.    Additionally, we held that

the Commonwealth failed to establish the value of the items

that were purportedly taken.     Id. at 692-93, 232 S.E.2d at

748-49.   In the appeal before this Court, unlike the situation

in Lund, the Commonwealth established fair market value of the

items taken through the testimony of Gee and Snell, and the

current penal statutes prohibit the use of a computer in the

commission of a felony.

     DiMaio also argues that the Commonwealth failed to

establish the value of the covenants not to compete and,

therefore, his conviction for larceny cannot be sustained.      We

disagree.   As we previously stated, Gee testified, without

objection, that he had created a specialized form that

complied with the laws of ten states when he drafted the

covenants not to compete and that the market value of the form

was between $5,000 and $7,000.    DiMaio did not object to this

testimony, and the admissibility of this testimony is not

challenged in this appeal.   This evidence of value is



The litigants in this appeal do not raise any issues regarding
the admissibility of the testimony of Snell and Gee.

                                  9
sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement for the crime

of larceny. 4

     For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the

convictions.

                                                      Affirmed.




     4
       We do not consider DiMaio's argument that "in-house
counsel" and the president of S&M Brands should not have been
permitted to testify regarding the fair market value of the
property DiMaio took. DiMaio did not object to the admission
of such testimony, and he does not challenge the circuit
court's reliance on such testimony with an assignment of
error.

                              10


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