AI Case Brief
Generate an AI-powered case brief with:
đź“‹Key Facts
⚖️Legal Issues
đź“šCourt Holding
đź’ˇReasoning
🎯Significance
Estimated cost: $0.001 - $0.003 per brief
Full Opinion
PRELIMINARY PRINT
Volume 601 U. S. Part 1
Pages 100–123
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
THE SUPREME COURT
March 4, 2024
Page Proof Pending Publication
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
100 OCTOBER TERM, 2023
Syllabus
TRUMP v. ANDERSON et al.
certiorari to the supreme court of colorado
No. 23–719. Argued February 8, 2024—Decided March 4, 2024
Six Colorado voters (respondents here) fled a petition in Colorado state
court against former President Donald J. Trump and Colorado Secretary
of State Jena Griswold, contending that Section 3 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution prohibits former President Trump, who
seeks the Presidential nomination of the Republican Party in this year's
election, from becoming President again. Section 3 provides:
“No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any offce, civil or
military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having
previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an offcer of
the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an
executive or judicial offcer of any State, to support the Constitution
of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But
Page Proof Pending Publication
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.”
According to the respondents, Section 3 applies to the former President
because after taking the Presidential oath in 2017, he intentionally in-
cited the breaching of the Capitol on January 6, 2021, in order to retain
power. The respondents claim that the former President is therefore
not a qualifed candidate under Colorado law and may not be placed on
the Presidential primary ballot. The state District Court found that
former President Trump had “engaged in insurrection” within the
meaning of Section 3, but nonetheless denied the respondents' petition.
It concluded that the Presidency, which Section 3 does not mention by
name, is not an “offce . . . under the United States” and the President
is not an “offcer of the United States” within the meaning of that provi-
sion. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 184a–284a. A divided Colorado Su-
preme Court reversed the District Court's operative holding that Sec-
tion 3 did not apply to the former President, and otherwise affrmed.
It accordingly ordered Secretary Griswold not to list former President
Trump on the Presidential primary ballot or count any write-in votes
cast for him. See Anderson v. Griswold, 543 P. 3d 283.
Held: Because the Constitution makes Congress, rather than the States,
responsible for enforcing Section 3 against federal offceholders and can-
didates, the Colorado Supreme Court erred in ordering former Presi-
dent Trump excluded from Colorado's 2024 Presidential primary ballot.
Cite as: 601 U. S. 100 (2024) 101
Syllabus
(a) Ratifed after the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment “ex-
pand[ed] federal power at the expense of state autonomy” and thus “fun-
damentally altered the balance of state and federal power struck by
the Constitution.” Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44, 59.
Section 3 was designed to help ensure an enduring Union by preventing
former Confederates from returning to power. Because Section 3
works by imposing on certain individuals a preventive and severe
penalty—disqualifcation from holding a wide array of offces—rather
than by granting rights to all, it is necessary, as Chief Justice Chase
concluded and the Colorado Supreme Court recognized, to “ `ascertain[ ]
what particular individuals are embraced' ” by the provision. 543
P. 3d, at 316 (quoting Griffn's Case, 11 F. Cas. 7, 26 (No. 5,815) (CC
Va. 1869) (Chase, Circuit Justice)). “To accomplish this ascertainment
and ensure effective results, proceedings, evidence, decisions, and en-
forcements of decisions, more or less formal, are indispensable.” Id.,
at 26.
The Constitution empowers Congress to prescribe how those determi-
nations should be made. The relevant provision is Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which enables Congress, subject to judicial re-
view, to pass “appropriate legislation” to “enforce” the Fourteenth
Amendment. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 536. That
Page Proof Pending Publication
power is critical when it comes to Section 3. Indeed, shortly after rati-
fcation, hundreds of men were holding offce in violation of Section 3,
prompting Congress to pass Section 5 enforcement legislation. See En-
forcement Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 143–144.
(b) States have sovereign power over the qualifcations and elections
of their own offcers, see Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U. S. 548, 570–571.
But States lack the constitutional authority to enforce Section 3 with
respect to federal offces, especially the Presidency. Because federal
offcers “ `owe their existence and functions to the united voice of the
whole, not of a portion, of the people,' ” powers over their election and
qualifcations must be specifcally “delegated to, rather than reserved
by, the States.” U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779,
803–804 (quoting 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States § 627, p. 435 (3d ed. 1858)).
Not even the respondents contend that the Constitution authorizes
the States to somehow remove sitting federal offceholders who may be
violating Section 3. And the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
speaks only to enforcement by Congress, does not affrmatively delegate
to the States the power to enforce Section 3 against candidates for
federal offce. Moreover, because its substantive provisions “embody
signifcant limitations on state authority,” Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U. S. 445, 456, it would be incongruous to read this particular Amend-
ment as silently granting the States that power. The only other plausi-
102 TRUMP v. ANDERSON
Syllabus
ble constitutional sources of such a delegation are the Elections and
Electors Clauses, which authorize States to conduct and regulate con-
gressional and Presidential elections, respectively. See Art. I, § 4, cl. 1;
Art. II, § 1, cl. 2. But there is little reason to think that these Clauses
implicitly authorize the States to enforce Section 3 against federal of-
fceholders and candidates. Granting the States that authority would
invert the Fourteenth Amendment's rebalancing of federal and state
power.
The text of Section 3 reinforces these conclusions. Its fnal sentence
empowers Congress to “remove” any Section 3 “disability” by a two-
thirds vote of each House. Congress may exercise that amnesty power
at any time, and historically, Congress sometimes removed Section 3
disabilities postelection to ensure that some of the people's chosen candi-
dates could take offce. But if States were free to enforce Section 3 by
barring candidates from running in the frst place, Congress would be
forced to exercise its disability removal power before voting begins. It
is implausible to suppose that the Constitution affrmatively delegated
to the States the authority to impose such a burden on congressional
power with respect to candidates for federal offce. Cf. McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 436.
Nor have the respondents identifed any tradition of state enforce-
Page Proof Pending Publication
ment of Section 3 against federal offceholders or candidates in the years
following ratifcation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, it is Con-
gress that has long given effect to Section 3 with respect to would-be or
existing federal offceholders. And while Section 5 limits congressional
legislation enforcing Section 3 by requiring Congress to “tailor its legis-
lative scheme to remedying or preventing” the specifc individual con-
duct that Section 3 prohibits, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Ex-
pense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U. S. 627, 639, state enforcement
might be argued to sweep more broadly. It is implausible that the Con-
stitution grants the States freer rein than Congress to decide how Sec-
tion 3 should be enforced with respect to federal offces.
Finally, state enforcement with respect to the Presidency would raise
heightened concerns. “[I]n the context of a Presidential election, state-
imposed restrictions implicate a uniquely important national interest.”
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 794–795 (footnote omitted). Con-
ficting state-by-state resolution of the question whether Section 3 bars
a particular candidate for President could result not just from differing
views of the merits, but also from variations in state law governing
the proceedings that are necessary to make Section 3 disqualifcation
determinations. The “patchwork” that would likely result from state
enforcement would “sever the direct link that the Framers found so
critical between the National Government and the people of the United
States” as a whole. U. S. Term Limits, 514 U. S., at 822. Nothing in
Cite as: 601 U. S. 100 (2024) 103
Syllabus
the Constitution requires that the Nation endure the chaos that could
result.
543 P. 3d 283, reversed.
Jonathan F. Mitchell argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were Scott E. Gessler, David A. War-
rington, Gary M. Lawkowski, and Harmeet Dhillon. Jay
Alan Sekulow, Jordan A. Sekulow, Stuart J. Roth, Andrew
J. Ekonomou, Jane Serene Raskin, Walter M. Weber, Cecilia
Noland-Heil, Michael W. Melito, and Benjamin P. Sisney
fled briefs for respondent Colorado Republican State Cen-
tral Committee urging reversal.
Jason Murray argued the cause for respondent Anderson
et al. With him on the brief were Donald Sherman, Nikhel
Sus, Jonathan Maier, Martha Tierney, Mario Nicolais,
Sean Grimsley, Eric Olson, and Isabel Broer. Shannon
Wells Stevenson, Solicitor General of Colorado, argued the
cause for respondent Griswold. With her on the brief were
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Natalie Hanlon Leh,
Page Proof Pending Publication
Deputy Attorney General, Dayna Zolle Hauser, Michael
Kotlarczyk, Michael McMaster, Joseph Michaels, LeeAnn
Morrill, and Helen Norton.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Indi-
ana et al. by Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, James A.
Barta, Solicitor General, and Melinda R. Holmes, Deputy Attorney General,
by Patrick Morrisey, Attorney General of West Virginia, Michael R. Wil-
liams, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, and David E. Gilbert, Deputy
Attorney General, by Rusty D. Crandell, Linley Wilson, and Sam M. Hayes,
and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Steve
Marshall of Alabama, Tim Griffn of Arkansas, Ashley Moody of Florida,
Christopher M. Carr of Georgia, RaĂşl Labrador of Idaho, Brenna Bird of
Iowa, Russell Coleman of Kentucky, Liz Murrill of Louisiana, Lynn Fitch
of Mississippi, Andrew Bailey of Missouri, Austin Knudsen of Montana,
Michael T. Hilgers of Nebraska, John M. Formella of New Hampshire,
Drew H. Wrigley of North Dakota, David A. Yost of Ohio, Gentner Drum-
mond of Oklahoma, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Marty Jackley of
South Dakota, Jonathan Skrmetti of Tennessee, Ken Paxton of Texas,
Sean D. Reyes of Utah, Jason Miyares of Virginia, and Bridget Hill of
Wyoming; for the State of Kansas by Kris W. Kobach, Attorney General,
and Anthony J. Powell, Solicitor General; for Chuck Gray, Secretary of
104 TRUMP v. ANDERSON
Per Curiam
Per Curiam.
A group of Colorado voters contends that Section 3 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits former
President Donald J. Trump, who seeks the Presidential nomi-
State of Wyoming, by Judd E. Stone II, Ari Cuenin, and Gene P. Hamil-
ton; for America's Future et al. by William J. Olson, Jeremiah L. Morgan,
Robert J. Olson, Patrick McSweeney, J. Mark Brewer, and John I. Harris
III; for Christian Family Coalition (CFC) Florida, Inc., by Dennis Gross-
man; for the Claremont Institute's Center for Constitutional Juris-
prudence by John Yoo; for Former Attorney General Edwin Meese III
et al. by Gene C. Schaerr, Kenneth A. Klukowski, Michael Boos, and
Daniel H. Jorjani; for Former U. S. Attorney Robert S. Brewer, Jr.
et al. by R. Trent Shores; for the James Madison Center for Free Speech
by James Bopp, Jr.; for Judicial Watch, Inc., et al. by T. Russell Nobile,
Robert D. Popper, and H. Christopher Coates; for the Kansas Republi-
can Party et al. by Craig L. Uhrich; for the Landmark Legal Founda-
tion by Michael J. O'Neill, Matthew C. Forys, and Richard P. Hutchison;
for the Public Interest Legal Foundation et al. by J. Christian Adams
and Kaylan Phillips; for the Republican National Committee et al.
Page Proof Pending Publication
by Patrick N. Strawbridge, Gilbert C. Dickey, Christopher O. Murray,
and Julian R. Ellis, Jr.; for Sen. Ted Cruz et al. by R. Trent McCotter
and Gene P. Hamilton; for Sen. Steve Daines et al. by Noel J. Francisco,
John M. Gore, E. Stewart Crosland, and Hashim M. Mooppan; for
Jack Coben by Larry E. Coben; for William Jones by Stephen Yag-
man; for Larry Kidd by Larry J. Obhof, Jr., and Mark D. Wagoner,
Jr.; for Kurt T. Lash by Christopher E. Mills; for James T. Lindgren
by Benjamin M. Flowers; for Pearl O. Madrial by Harold Emmett Lucas;
for Terpsehore “Tore” Maras et al. by Warner Mendenhall; for Peter
Meijer by Charles R. Spies; for Vivek Ramaswamy by Jonathan Lien-
hard, Phillip M. Gordon, and Edward Wenger; for Seth Barrett Tillman
by Josh Blackman, C. Thomas Ludden, Robert W. Ray, R. Scott Reisch,
and Jessica L. Hays; for Devin Watkins et al. by Devin Watkins,
pro se; for Gavin M. Wax et al. by Edward Andrew Paltzik and Serge
Krimnus; and for 102 Colorado Registered Electors by J. Gregory
Troutman.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for Common Cause
by Gregory L. Diskant, Jonah M. Knobler, and Kathay Feng; for the Con-
stitutional Accountability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra and Brianne J.
Gorod; for Former Colorado Secretary of State Mary Estill Buchanan by Mi-
chael A. Caplan; for Former Republican Governors by Jeffrey A. Mandell,
Cite as: 601 U. S. 100 (2024) 105
Per Curiam
nation of the Republican Party in this year's election, from
becoming President again. The Colorado Supreme Court
agreed with that contention. It ordered the Colorado secre-
Douglas M. Poland, and Rachel E. Snyder; for Former Republican Mem-
bers of Congress by Faith E. Gay; for Retired State Supreme Court Jus-
tices by Ronald A. Fein, John C. Bonifaz, Ben T. Clements, Courtney
Hostetler, and Charles N. Nauen; for the San Francisco Taxpayers Associ-
ation et al. by Paul D. Scott; for Floyd Abrams et al. by Steven A. Hirsch;
for Carol Anderson et al. by Erica Grossman and John Holland; for Josh
Autry, pro se; for Jeremy Bates, pro se; for David P. Cullenberg et al. by
Robert A. Stein; for David M. Driesen et al. by David M. Driesen, pro se;
for G. Antaeus B. Edelsohn by Joan D. B. Edelsohn; for Sherrilyn A. Ifll,
pro se; for J. Michael Luttig et al. by Richard D. Bernstein and Nancy A.
Temple; for Brian J. Martin by Wallace K. Lightsey; for Kermit Roosevelt
by Robert S. Peck; for Ilya Somin by Gerson H. Smoger; and for David B.
Tatge, pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for Michigan Secretary of State Joce-
lyn Benson by Ann M. Sherman, Solicitor General, Heather S. Meingast,
Division Chief, and Erik A. Grill, Assistant Attorney General; for the
Page Proof Pending Publication
Secretaries of State of Missouri et al. by Barbara A. Smith, Jesus A.
Osete, and Robert M. Thompson; for American Historians by Jonathan B.
Miller, Joshua A. Rosenthal, and Michael Adame; for the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York by Susan J. Kohlmann, Benjamin D.
Alter, Marcy L. Kahn, Stephen L. Kass, and Jerry H. Goldfeder; for the
Brennan Center for Justice et al. by Michelle S. Kallen, Wendy R. Weiser,
Thomas P. Wolf, Eliza M. Sweren-Becker, Paul M. Smith, Adav Noti,
Kevin P. Hancock, Benjamin L. Berwick, and Cameron O. Kistler; for the
Capitol Police Offcers Present at the U. S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, by
Damon Hewitt, Jon M. Greenbaum, Marc P. Epstein, William J. Blech-
man, Elizabeth B. Honkonen, Lauren M. Blas, Lee R. Crain, and Mark
J. Cherry; for Children's Rights Legal Scholars et al. by Julia A. Olson,
Mathew W. dos Santos, Philip L. Gregory, and Catherine Smith, pro se;
for Condemned USA by George T. Pallas; for Experts in Democracy by
John Vail; for the League for Sportsmen et al. by Earl N. “Trey” Mayfeld
III; for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., by Anuja
D. Thatte, Burt M. Rublin, Janai S. Nelson, and Samuel Spital; for Profes-
sors and Legal Scholars by Mari Newman; for U. S. Term Limits by David
H. Thompson and Brian W. Barnes; for Akhil Reed Amar et al. by Vikram
David Amar, pro se; for Ryan Binkley et al. by Erick G. Kaardal; for
David Boyle, pro se; for Orville Vernon Burton et al. by Michael J. Kasper;
106 TRUMP v. ANDERSON
Per Curiam
tary of state to exclude the former President from the Re-
publican primary ballot in the State and to disregard any
write-in votes that Colorado voters might cast for him.
Former President Trump challenges that decision on sev-
eral grounds. Because the Constitution makes Congress,
rather than the States, responsible for enforcing Section 3
against federal offceholders and candidates, we reverse.
I
Last September, about six months before the March 5,
2024, Colorado primary election, four Republican and two
unaffliated Colorado voters fled a petition against former
President Trump and Colorado Secretary of State Jena Gris-
wold in Colorado state court. These voters—whom we refer
to as the respondents—contend that after former President
Trump's defeat in the 2020 Presidential election, he dis-
rupted the peaceful transfer of power by intentionally organ-
izing and inciting the crowd that breached the Capitol as
Page Proof Pending Publication
Congress met to certify the election results on January 6,
2021. One consequence of those actions, the respondents
maintain, is that former President Trump is constitutionally
ineligible to serve as President again.
Their theory turns on Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Section 3 provides:
“No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Con-
gress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold
any offce, civil or military, under the United States, or
under any State, who, having previously taken an oath,
as a member of Congress, or as an offcer of the United
States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an
executive or judicial offcer of any State, to support the
for Edward B. Foley et al. by Michael B. Kimberly; for Mark A. Graber
by Nelson Boyle; for Edward J. Larson, by J. Carl Cecere and Edward J.
Larson, pro se; for Jordan L. Michelson by Anthony Robert Zelle; for
Derek T. Muller by Heather Gebelin Hacker; for David E. Weisberg,
pro se; and for Michael T. Worley by Burt M. Rublin.
Cite as: 601 U. S. 100 (2024) 107
Per Curiam
Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid
or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may
by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.”
According to the respondents, Section 3 applies to the for-
mer President because after taking the Presidential oath in
2017, he intentionally incited the breaching of the Capitol on
January 6 in order to retain power. They claim that he is
therefore not a qualifed candidate, and that as a result, the
Colorado secretary of state may not place him on the pri-
mary ballot. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 1–1–113(1), 1–4–1101(1),
1–4–1201, 1–4–1203(2)(a), 1–4–1204 (2023).
After a fve-day trial, the state District Court found that
former President Trump had “engaged in insurrection”
within the meaning of Section 3, but nonetheless denied the
respondents' petition. The court held that Section 3 did not
Page Proof Pending Publication
apply because the Presidency, which Section 3 does not men-
tion by name, is not an “offce . . . under the United States”
and the President is not an “offcer of the United States”
within the meaning of that provision. See App. to Pet. for
Cert. 184a–284a.
In December, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed in
part and affrmed in part by a 4 to 3 vote. Reversing the
District Court's operative holding, the majority concluded
that for purposes of Section 3, the Presidency is an offce
under the United States and the President is an offcer of
the United States. The court otherwise affrmed, holding
(1) that the Colorado Election Code permitted the respond-
ents' challenge based on Section 3; (2) that Congress need
not pass implementing legislation for disqualifcations under
Section 3 to attach; (3) that the political question doctrine
did not preclude judicial review of former President Trump's
eligibility; (4) that the District Court did not abuse its discre-
tion in admitting into evidence portions of a congressional
Report on the events of January 6; (5) that the District Court
108 TRUMP v. ANDERSON
Per Curiam
did not err in concluding that those events constituted an
“insurrection” and that former President Trump “engaged
in” that insurrection; and (6) that former President Trump's
speech to the crowd that breached the Capitol on Janu-
ary 6 was not protected by the First Amendment. See An-
derson v. Griswold, 543 P. 3d 283 (2023).
The Colorado Supreme Court accordingly ordered Secre-
tary Griswold not to “list President Trump's name on the
2024 presidential primary ballot” or “count any write-in
votes cast for him.” Id., at 342. Chief Justice Boatright
and Justices Samour and Berkenkotter each fled dissenting
opinions. Id., at 342, 346, 361.
Under the terms of the opinion of the Colorado Supreme
Court, its ruling was automatically stayed pending this
Court's review. See id., at 342. We granted former Presi-
dent Trump's petition for certiorari, which raised a single
question: “Did the Colorado Supreme Court err in ordering
Page Proof Pending Publication
President Trump excluded from the 2024 presidential pri-
mary ballot?” See 601 U. S. ––– (2024). Concluding that it
did, we now reverse.
II
A
Proposed by Congress in 1866 and ratifed by the States
in 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment “expand[ed] federal
power at the expense of state autonomy” and thus “funda-
mentally altered the balance of state and federal power
struck by the Constitution.” Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U. S. 44, 59 (1996); see also Ex parte Virginia,
100 U. S. 339, 345 (1880). Section 1 of the Amendment, for
instance, bars the States from “depriv[ing] any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” or
“deny[ing] to any person . . . the equal protection of the
laws.” And Section 5 confers on Congress “power to en-
force” those prohibitions, along with the other provisions of
the Amendment, “by appropriate legislation.”
Cite as: 601 U. S. 100 (2024) 109
Per Curiam
Section 3 of the Amendment likewise restricts state auton-
omy, but through different means. It was designed to help
ensure an enduring Union by preventing former Confeder-
ates from returning to power in the aftermath of the Civil
War. See, e. g., Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2544
(1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens, warning that without ap-
propriate constitutional reforms “yelling secessionists and
hissing copperheads” would take seats in the House); id., at
2768 (statement of Sen. Howard, lamenting prospect of a
“State Legislature . . . made up entirely of disloyal elements”
absent a disqualifcation provision). Section 3 aimed to pre-
vent such a resurgence by barring from offce “those who,
having once taken an oath to support the Constitution of
the United States, afterward went into rebellion against the
Government of the United States.” Cong. Globe, 41st
Cong., 1st Sess., 626 (1869) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
Section 3 works by imposing on certain individuals a pre-
Page Proof Pending Publication
ventive and severe penalty—disqualifcation from holding a
wide array of offces—rather than by granting rights to all.
It is therefore necessary, as Chief Justice Chase concluded
and the Colorado Supreme Court itself recognized, to “ `as-
certain[ ] what particular individuals are embraced' ” by the
provision. 543 P. 3d, at 316 (quoting Griffn's Case, 11
F. Cas. 7, 26 (No. 5,815) (CC Va. 1869) (Chase, Circuit Jus-
tice)). Chase went on to explain that “[t]o accomplish this
ascertainment and ensure effective results, proceedings, evi-
dence, decisions, and enforcements of decisions, more or less
formal, are indispensable.” Id., at 26. For its part, the Col-
orado Supreme Court also concluded that there must be
some kind of “determination” that Section 3 applies to a par-
ticular person “before the disqualifcation holds meaning.”
543 P. 3d, at 316.
The Constitution empowers Congress to prescribe how
those determinations should be made. The relevant provi-
sion is Section 5, which enables Congress, subject of course
to judicial review, to pass “appropriate legislation” to “en-
110 TRUMP v. ANDERSON
Per Curiam
force” the Fourteenth Amendment. See City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 536 (1997). Or as Senator Howard put
it at the time the Amendment was framed, Section 5 “casts
upon Congress the responsibility of seeing to it, for the fu-
ture, that all the sections of the amendment are carried out
in good faith.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2768.
Congress's Section 5 power is critical when it comes to
Section 3. Indeed, during a debate on enforcement legisla-
tion less than a year after ratifcation, Sen. Trumbull noted
that “notwithstanding [Section 3] . . . hundreds of men [were]
holding offce” in violation of its terms. Cong. Globe, 41st
Cong., 1st Sess., at 626. The Constitution, Trumbull noted,
“provide[d] no means for enforcing” the disqualifcation, ne-
cessitating a “bill to give effect to the fundamental law em-
braced in the Constitution.” Ibid. The enforcement mech-
anism Trumbull championed was later enacted as part of the
Enforcement Act of 1870, “pursuant to the power conferred
by § 5 of the [Fourteenth] Amendment.” General Building
Page Proof Pending Publication
Contractors Assn., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U. S. 375, 385
(1982); see 16 Stat. 143–144.
B
This case raises the question whether the States, in addi-
tion to Congress, may also enforce Section 3. We conclude
that States may disqualify persons holding or attempting to
hold state offce. But States have no power under the Con-
stitution to enforce Section 3 with respect to federal offces,
especially the Presidency.
“In our federal system, the National Government pos-
sesses only limited powers; the States and the people retain
the remainder.” Bond v. United States, 572 U. S. 844, 854
(2014). Among those retained powers is the power of a
State to “order the processes of its own governance. ”
Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 752 (1999). In particular, the
States enjoy sovereign “power to prescribe the qualifcations
of their own offcers” and “the manner of their election . . .
Cite as: 601 U. S. 100 (2024) 111
Per Curiam
free from external interference, except so far as plainly pro-
vided by the Constitution of the United States.” Taylor v.
Beckham, 178 U. S. 548, 570–571 (1900). Although the Four-
teenth Amendment restricts state power, nothing in it
plainly withdraws from the States this traditional authority.
And after ratifcation of the Fourteenth Amendment, States
used this authority to disqualify state offcers in accordance
with state statutes. See, e. g., Worthy v. Barrett, 63 N. C.
199, 200, 204 (1869) (elected county sheriff); State ex rel.
Sandlin v. Watkins, 21 La. 631, 631– 633 (1869) (state
judge).
Such power over governance, however, does not extend to
federal offceholders and candidates. Because federal off-
cers “ `owe their existence and functions to the united voice
of the whole, not of a portion, of the people,' ” powers over
their election and qualifcations must be specifcally “dele-
gated to, rather than reserved by, the States.” U. S. Term
Page Proof Pending Publication
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779, 803–804 (1995) (quot-
ing 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States § 627, p. 435 (3d ed. 1858)). But nothing in
the Constitution delegates to the States any power to en-
force Section 3 against federal offceholders and candidates.
As an initial matter, not even the respondents contend that
the Constitution authorizes States to somehow remove sit-
ting federal offceholders who may be violating Section 3.
Such a power would fout the principle that “the Constitution
guarantees `the entire independence of the General Govern-
ment from any control by the respective States.' ” Trump
v. Vance, 591 U. S. 786, 800 (2020) (quoting Farmers and Me-
chanics Sav. Bank of Minneapolis v. Minnesota, 232 U. S.
516, 521 (1914)). Indeed, consistent with that principle,
States lack even the lesser powers to issue writs of manda-
mus against federal offcials or to grant habeas corpus relief
to persons in federal custody. See McClung v. Silliman, 6
Wheat. 598, 603–605 (1821); Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397, 405–
410 (1872).
112 TRUMP v. ANDERSON
Per Curiam
The respondents nonetheless maintain that States may en-
force Section 3 against candidates for federal offce. But
the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, on its face, does not
affrmatively delegate such a power to the States. The
terms of the Amendment speak only to enforcement by
Congress, which enjoys power to enforce the Amendment
through legislation pursuant to Section 5.
This can hardly come as a surprise, given that the substan-
tive provisions of the Amendment “embody signifcant limi-
tations on state authority.” Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S.
445, 456 (1976). Under the Amendment, States cannot
abridge privileges or immunities, deprive persons of life, lib-
erty, or property without due process, deny equal protection,
or deny male inhabitants the right to vote (without thereby
suffering reduced representation in the House). See Amdt.
14, §§ 1, 2. On the other hand, the Fourteenth Amendment
grants new power to Congress to enforce the provisions of
the Amendment against the States. It would be incongru-
Page Proof Pending Publication
ous to read this particular Amendment as granting the
States the power—silently no less—to disqualify a candidate
for federal offce.
The only other plausible constitutional sources of such a
delegation are the Elections and Electors Clauses, which au-
thorize States to conduct and regulate congressional and
Presidential elections, respectively. See Art. I, § 4, cl. 1;
Art. II, § 1, cl. 2.1 But there is little reason to think that
these Clauses implicitly authorize the States to enforce Sec-
tion 3 against federal offceholders and candidates. Grant-
ing the States that authority would invert the Fourteenth
Amendment's rebalancing of federal and state power.
1
The Elections Clause directs, in relevant part, that “[t]he Times, Places
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall
be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.” Art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
The Electors Clause similarly provides that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in
such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Elec-
tors,” who in turn elect the President. Art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
Cite as: 601 U. S. 100 (2024) 113
Per Curiam
The text of Section 3 reinforces these conclusions. Its
fnal sentence empowers Congress to “remove” any Section
3 “disability” by a two-thirds vote of each House. The text
imposes no limits on that power, and Congress may exercise
it any time, as the respondents concede. See Brief for Re-
spondents 50. In fact, historically, Congress sometimes ex-
ercised this amnesty power postelection to ensure that some
of the people's chosen candidates could take offce.2 But if
States were free to enforce Section 3 by barring candidates
from running in the frst place, Congress would be forced to
exercise its disability removal power before voting begins if
it wished for its decision to have any effect on the current
election cycle. Perhaps a State may burden congressional
authority in such a way when it exercises its “exclusive” sov-
ereign power over its own state offces. Taylor, 178 U. S., at
571. But it is implausible to suppose that the Constitution
affrmatively delegated to the States the authority to impose
such a burden on congressional power with respect to candi-
Page Proof Pending Publication
dates for federal offce. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316, 436 (1819) (“States have no power . . . to retard,
impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of
the constitutional laws enacted by Congress”).
Nor have the respondents identifed any tradition of state
enforcement of Section 3 against federal offceholders or can-
didates in the years following ratifcation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 Such a lack of historical precedent is gener-
2
Shortly after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratifed, for instance,
Congress enacted a private bill to remove the Section 3 disability of Nel-
son Tift of Georgia, who had recently been elected to represent the State
in Congress. See ch. 393, 15 Stat. 427. Tift took his seat in Congress
immediately thereafter. See Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 4499–4500
(1868). Congress similarly acted postelection to remove the disabilities
of persons elected to state and local offces. See Cong. Globe, 40th Cong.,
3d Sess., 29–30, 120–121 (1868); ch. 5, 15 Stat. 435–436.
3
We are aware of just one example of state enforcement against a
would-be federal offcer. In 1868, the Governor of Georgia refused to
commission John Christy, who had won the most votes in a congressional
114 TRUMP v. ANDERSON
Per Curiam
ally a “ `telling indication' ” of a “ `severe constitutional prob-
lem' ” with the asserted power. United States v. Texas, 599
U. S. 670, 677 (2023) (quoting Free Enterprise Fund v. Public
Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. 477, 505
(2010)). And it is an especially telling sign here, because as
noted, States did disqualify persons from holding state of-
fces following ratifcation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
That pattern of disqualifcation with respect to state, but not
federal offces provides “persuasive evidence of a general un-
derstanding” that the States lacked enforcement power with
respect to the latter. U. S. Term Limits, 514 U. S., at 826.
Instead, it is Congress that has long given effect to Section
3 with respect to would-be or existing federal offceholders.
Shortly after ratifcation of the Amendment, Congress
enacted the Enforcement Act of 1870. That Act authorized
federal district attorneys to bring civil actions in federal
court to remove anyone holding nonlegislative offce—federal
or state—in violation of Section 3, and made holding or at-
Page Proof Pending Publication
tempting to hold offce in violation of Section 3 a federal
crime. §§ 14, 15, 16 Stat. 143–144 (repealed, 35 Stat. 1153–
1154, 62 Stat. 992–993). In the years following ratifcation,
the House and Senate exercised their unique powers under
Article I to adjudicate challenges contending that certain
prospective or sitting Members could not take or retain their
seats due to Section 3. See Art. I, § 5, cls. 1, 2; 1 A. Hinds,
Precedents of the House of Representatives §§ 459–463,
pp. 470–486 (1907). And the Confscation Act of 1862, which
predated Section 3, effectively provided an additional proce-
dure for enforcing disqualifcation. That law made engaging
in insurrection or rebellion, among other acts, a federal
election, because—in the Governor's view—Section 3 made Christy ineli-
gible to serve. But the Governor's determination was not fnal; a commit-
tee of the House reviewed Christy's qualifcations itself and recommended
that he not be seated. The full House never acted on the matter, and
Christy was never seated. See 1 A. Hinds, Precedents of the House of
Representatives § 459, pp. 470–472 (1907).
Cite as: 601 U. S. 100 (2024) 115
Per Curiam
crime punishable by disqualifcation from holding offce
under the United States. See §§ 2, 3, 12 Stat. 590. A suc-
cessor to those provisions remains on the books today. See
18 U. S. C. § 2383.
Moreover, permitting state enforcement of Section 3
against federal offceholders and candidates would raise seri-
ous questions about the scope of that power. Section 5 lim-
its congressional legislation enforcing Section 3, because
Section 5 is strictly “remedial.” City of Boerne, 521 U. S.,
at 520. To comply with that limitation, Congress “must tai-
lor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing” the
specifc conduct the relevant provision prohibits. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings
Bank, 527 U. S. 627, 639 (1999). Section 3, unlike other pro-
visions of the Fourteenth Amendment, proscribes conduct of
individuals. It bars persons from holding offce after
taking a qualifying oath and then engaging in insurrection
Page Proof Pending Publication
or rebellion—nothing more. Any congressional legislation
enforcing Section 3 must, like the Enforcement Act of 1870
and § 2383, refect “congruence and proportionality” between
preventing or remedying that conduct “and the means
adopted to that end.” City of Boerne, 521 U. S., at 520.
Neither we nor the respondents are aware of any other legis-
lation by Congress to enforce Section 3. See Tr. of Oral
Arg. 123.
Any state enforcement of Section 3 against federal offce-
holders and candidates, though, would not derive from Sec-
tion 5, which confers power only on “[t]he Congress.” As a
result, such state enforcement might be argued to sweep
more broadly than congressional enforcement could under
our precedents. But the notion that the Constitution grants
the States freer rein than Congress to decide how Section 3
should be enforced with respect to federal offces is simply
implausible.
Finally, state enforcement of Section 3 with respect to the
Presidency would raise heightened concerns. “[I]n the con-
116 TRUMP v. ANDERSON
Per Curiam
text of a Presidential election, state-imposed restrictions im-
plicate a uniquely important national interest.” Anderson
v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 794–795 (1983) (footnote omitted).
But state-by-state resolution of the question whether Sec-
tion 3 bars a particular candidate for President from serving
would be quite unlikely to yield a uniform answer consistent
with the basic principle that “the President . . . represent[s]
all the voters in the Nation.” Id., at 795 (emphasis added).
Conficting state outcomes concerning the same candidate
could result not just from differing views of the merits, but
from variations in state law governing the proceedings that
are necessary to make Section 3 disqualifcation determina-
tions. Some States might allow a Section 3 challenge to suc-
ceed based on a preponderance of the evidence, while others
might require a heightened showing. Certain evidence (like
the congressional Report on which the lower courts relied
here) might be admissible in some States but inadmissible
hearsay in others. Disqualifcation might be possible only
Page Proof Pending Publication
through criminal prosecution, as opposed to expedited civil
proceedings, in particular States. Indeed, in some States—
unlike Colorado (or Maine, where the secretary of state re-
cently issued an order excluding former President Trump
from the primary ballot)—procedures for excluding an ineli-
gible candidate from the ballot may not exist at all. The
result could well be that a single candidate would be declared
ineligible in some States, but not others, based on the same
conduct (and perhaps even the same factual record).
The “patchwork” that would likely result from state en-
forcement would “sever the direct link that the Framers
found so critical between the National Government and the
people of the United States” as a whole. U. S. Term Limits,
514 U. S., at 822. But in a Presidential election “the impact
of the votes cast in each State is affected by the votes cast”—
or, in this case, the votes not allowed to be cast—“for the
various candidates in other States.” Anderson, 460 U. S., at
795. An evolving electoral map could dramatically change
the behavior of voters, parties, and States across the country,
Cite as: 601 U. S. 100 (2024) 117
Opinion of Barrett, J.
in different ways and at different times. The disruption
would be all the more acute—and could nullify the votes of
millions and change the election result—if Section 3 enforce-
ment were attempted after the Nation has voted. Nothing
in the Constitution requires that we endure such chaos—
arriving at any time or different times, up to and perhaps
beyond the Inauguration.
* * *
For the reasons given, responsibility for enforcing Section
3 against federal offceholders and candidates rests with Con-
gress and not the States. The judgment of the Colorado
Supreme Court therefore cannot stand.
All nine Members of the Court agree with that result.
Our colleagues writing separately further agree with many
of the reasons this opinion provides for reaching it. See
post, Part I ( joint opinion of Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jack-
Page Proof Pending Publication
son, JJ.); see also post, at 117–118 (opinion of Barrett, J.).
So far as we can tell, they object only to our taking into
account the distinctive way Section 3 works and the fact that
Section 5 vests in Congress the power to enforce it. These
are not the only reasons the States lack power to enforce
this particular constitutional provision with respect to fed-
eral offces. But they are important ones, and it is the com-
bination of all the reasons set forth in this opinion—not, as
some of our colleagues would have it, just one particular ra-
tionale—that resolves this case. In our view, each of these
reasons is necessary to provide a complete explanation for
the judgment the Court unanimously reaches.
The judgment of the Colorado Supreme Court is reversed.
The mandate shall issue forthwith.
It is so ordered.
Justice Barrett, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
I join Parts I and II–B of the Court's opinion. I agree
that States lack the power to enforce Section 3 against Presi-
118 TRUMP v. ANDERSON
Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson, JJ., concurring in judgment
dential candidates. That principle is suffcient to resolve
this case, and I would decide no more than that. This suit
was brought by Colorado voters under state law in state
court. It does not require us to address the complicated
question whether federal legislation is the exclusive vehicle
through which Section 3 can be enforced.
The majority's choice of a different path leaves the remain-
ing Justices with a choice of how to respond. In my judg-
ment, this is not the time to amplify disagreement with stri-
dency. The Court has settled a politically charged issue in
the volatile season of a Presidential election. Particularly
in this circumstance, writings on the Court should turn the
national temperature down, not up. For present purposes,
our differences are far less important than our unanimity:
All nine Justices agree on the outcome of this case. That is
the message Americans should take home.
Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice
Page ProofinPending
Jackson, concurring the judgment. Publication
“If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case,
then it is necessary not to decide more.” Dobbs v. Jackson
Women's Health Organization, 597 U. S. 215, 348 (2022)
(Roberts, C. J., concurring in judgment). That fundamen-
tal principle of judicial restraint is practically as old as our
Republic. This Court is authorized “to say what the law is”
only because “[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases
. . . must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis
added).
Today, the Court departs from that vital principle, decid-
ing not just this case, but challenges that might arise in the
future. In this case, the Court must decide whether Colo-
rado may keep a Presidential candidate off the ballot on the
ground that he is an oathbreaking insurrectionist and thus
disqualifed from holding federal offce under Section 3 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Allowing Colorado to do so would,
Cite as: 601 U. S. 100 (2024) 119
Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson, JJ., concurring in judgment
we agree, create a chaotic state-by-state patchwork, at odds
with our Nation's federalism principles. That is enough to
resolve this case. Yet the majority goes further. Even
though “[a]ll nine Members of the Court” agree that this in-
dependent and suffcient rationale resolves this case, fve
Justices go on. They decide novel constitutional questions
to insulate this Court and petitioner from future controversy.
Ante, at 117. Although only an individual State's action is
at issue here, the majority opines on which federal actors can
enforce Section 3, and how they must do so. The majority
announces that a disqualifcation for insurrection can occur
only when Congress enacts a particular kind of legislation
pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
doing so, the majority shuts the door on other potential
means of federal enforcement. We cannot join an opinion
that decides momentous and diffcult issues unnecessarily,
and we therefore concur only in the judgment.
Page Proof Pending
I Publication
Our Constitution leaves some questions to the States while
committing others to the Federal Government. Federalism
principles embedded in that constitutional structure decide
this case. States cannot use their control over the ballot to
“undermine the National Government.” U. S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779, 810 (1995). That danger is
even greater “in the context of a Presidential election.”
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 794–795 (1983). State
restrictions in that context “implicate a uniquely important
national interest” extending beyond a State's “own borders.”
Ibid. No doubt, States have signifcant “authority over
presidential electors” and, in turn, Presidential elections.
Chiafalo v. Washington, 591 U. S. 578, 588 (2020). That
power, however, is limited by “other constitutional con-
straint[s],” including federalism principles. Id., at 589.
The majority rests on such principles when it explains why
Colorado cannot take petitioner off the ballot. “[S]tate-by-
120 TRUMP v. ANDERSON
Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson, JJ., concurring in judgment
state resolution of the question whether Section 3 bars a
particular candidate for President from serving,” the major-
ity explains, “would be quite unlikely to yield a uniform an-
swer consistent with the basic principle that `the President
. . . represent[s] all the voters in the Nation.' ” Ante, at 116
(quoting Anderson, 460 U. S., at 795). That is especially so,
the majority adds, because different States can reach “[c]on-
ficting . . . outcomes concerning the same candidate . . . not
just from differing views of the merits, but from variations
in state law governing the proceedings” to enforce Sec-
tion 3. Ante, at 116.
The contrary conclusion that a handful of offcials in a few
States could decide the Nation's next President would be
especially surprising with respect to Section 3. The Recon-
struction Amendments “were specifcally designed as an
expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state sover-
eignty.” City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 179
Page Proof Pending Publication
(1980). Section 3 marked the frst time the Constitution
placed substantive limits on a State's authority to choose its
own offcials. Given that context, it would defy logic for
Section 3 to give States new powers to determine who may
hold the Presidency. Cf. ante, at 112 (“It would be incongru-
ous to read this particular Amendment as granting the
States the power—silently no less—to disqualify a candidate
for federal offce”).
That provides a secure and suffcient basis to resolve this
case. To allow Colorado to take a Presidential candidate off
the ballot under Section 3 would imperil the Framers' vision
of “a Federal Government directly responsible to the peo-
ple.” U. S. Term Limits, 514 U. S., at 821. The Court
should have started and ended its opinion with this
conclusion.
II
Yet the Court continues on to resolve questions not before
us. In a case involving no federal action whatsoever, the
Cite as: 601 U. S. 100 (2024) 121
Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson, JJ., concurring in judgment
Court opines on how federal enforcement of Section 3 must
proceed. Congress, the majority says, must enact legisla-
tion under Section 5 prescribing the procedures to “ ` “ascer-
tain[ ] what particular individuals” ' ” should be disqualifed.
Ante, at 109 (quoting Griffn's Case, 11 F. Cas. 7, 26 (No.
5,815) (CC Va. 1869) (Chase, Circuit Justice)). These mus-
ings are as inadequately supported as they are gratuitous.
To start, nothing in Section 3's text supports the majori-
ty's view of how federal disqualifcation efforts must operate.
Section 3 states simply that “[n]o person shall” hold certain
positions and offces if they are oathbreaking insurrection-
ists. Amdt. 14. Nothing in that unequivocal bar suggests
that implementing legislation enacted under Section 5 is
“critical” (or, for that matter, what that word means in this
context). Ante, at 110. In fact, the text cuts the opposite
way. Section 3 provides that when an oathbreaking insur-
rectionist is disqualifed, “Congress may by a vote of two-
Page Proof Pending Publication
thirds of each House, remove such disability.” It is hard to
understand why the Constitution would require a congres-
sional supermajority to remove a disqualifcation if a simple
majority could nullify Section 3's operation by repealing or
declining to pass implementing legislation. Even petition-
er's lawyer acknowledged the “tension” in Section 3 that the
majority's view creates. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 31.
Similarly, nothing else in the rest of the Fourteenth
Amendment supports the majority's view. Section 5 gives
Congress the “power to enforce [the Amendment] by appro-
priate legislation.” Remedial legislation of any kind, how-
ever, is not required. All the Reconstruction Amendments
(including the due process and equal protection guarantees
and prohibition of slavery) “are self-executing,” meaning that
they do not depend on legislation. City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U. S. 507, 524 (1997); see Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3,
20 (1883). Similarly, other constitutional rules of disqualif-
cation, like the two-term limit on the Presidency, do not re-
122 TRUMP v. ANDERSON
Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson, JJ., concurring in judgment
quire implementing legislation. See, e.g., Art. II, § 1, cl. 5
(Presidential Qualifcations); Amdt. 22 (Presidential Term
Limits). Nor does the majority suggest otherwise. It sim-
ply creates a special rule for the insurrection disability in
Section 3.
The majority is left with next to no support for its require-
ment that a Section 3 disqualifcation can occur only pursuant
to legislation enacted for that purpose. It cites Griffn's
Case, but that is a nonprecedential, lower court opinion by a
single Justice in his capacity as a circuit judge. See ante, at
109 (quoting 11 F. Cas., at 26). Once again, even petitioner's
lawyer distanced himself from fully embracing this case as
probative of Section 3's meaning. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 35–
36. The majority also cites Senator Trumbull's statements
that Section 3 “ `provide[d] no means for enforcing' ” itself.
Ante, at 110 (quoting Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 1st Sess., 626
(1869)). The majority, however, neglects to mention the
Page Proof Pending Publication
Senator's view that “[i]t is the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment
that prevents a person from holding offce,” with the pro-
posed legislation simply “afford[ing] a more effcient and
speedy remedy” for effecting the disqualifcation. Id., at
626–627.
Ultimately, under the guise of providing a more “complete
explanation for the judgment,” ante, at 117, the majority re-
solves many unsettled questions about Section 3. It fore-
closes judicial enforcement of that provision, such as might
occur when a party is prosecuted by an insurrectionist and
raises a defense on that score. The majority further holds
that any legislation to enforce this provision must prescribe
certain procedures “ `tailor[ed]' ” to Section 3, ante, at 115,
ruling out enforcement under general federal statutes re-
quiring the Government to comply with the law. By resolv-
ing these and other questions, the majority attempts to insu-
late all alleged insurrectionists from future challenges to
their holding federal offce.
Cite as: 601 U. S. 100 (2024) 123
Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson, JJ., concurring in judgment
* * *
“What it does today, the Court should have left undone.”
Bush v. Gore, 531 U. S. 98, 158 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
The Court today needed to resolve only a single question:
whether an individual State may keep a Presidential candi-
date found to have engaged in insurrection off its ballot.
The majority resolves much more than the case before us.
Although federal enforcement of Section 3 is in no way at
issue, the majority announces novel rules for how that en-
forcement must operate. It reaches out to decide Section 3
questions not before us, and to foreclose future efforts to
disqualify a Presidential candidate under that provision. In
a sensitive case crying out for judicial restraint, it abandons
that course.
Section 3 serves an important, though rarely needed, role
in our democracy. The American people have the power to
vote for and elect candidates for national offce, and that is a
Page Proof Pending Publication
great and glorious thing. The men who drafted and ratifed
the Fourteenth Amendment, however, had witnessed an “in-
surrection [and] rebellion” to defend slavery. § 3. They
wanted to ensure that those who had participated in that
insurrection, and in possible future insurrections, could not
return to prominent roles. Today, the majority goes beyond
the necessities of this case to limit how Section 3 can bar an
oathbreaking insurrectionist from becoming President. Al-
though we agree that Colorado cannot enforce Section 3, we
protest the majority's effort to use this case to defne the
limits of federal enforcement of that provision. Because we
would decide only the issue before us, we concur only in
the judgment.
Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
Page Proof Pending Publication
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None