393 U.S. 544 (1969)

ALLEN ET AL.
v.
STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS ET AL.

No. 3.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued October 15, 1968. Decided March 3, 1969.^[*] APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA.

*546 Norman C. Amaker argued the cause for appellants in No. 3 With him on the brief were Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Oliver W. Hill, S. W. Tucker, Henry L. Marsh III, and Anthony G. Amsterdam. Armand Derfner and Elliott C. Lichtman argued the cause for appellants in Nos. 25, 26, and 36. Lawrence *547 Aschenbrenner was on the brief for appellants in Nos. 25 and 26. With Mr. Derfner on the brief for appellants in No. 36 were Alvin J. Bronstein and Richard B. Sobol.

R. D. McIlwaine III, First Assistant Attorney General of Virginia, argued the cause for appellees in No. 3. With him on the brief were Robert Y. Button, Attorney General, William R. Blandford, and William C. Carter. William A. Allain and Will S. Wells, Assistant Attorneys General of Mississippi, argued the cause for appellees in Nos. 25, 26, and 36. With Mr. Allain on the brief for appellees in No. 25 were Joe T. Patterson, Attorney General, and Dudley W. Conner. With Mr. Wells on the briefs for appellees in Nos. 26 and 36 was Mr. Patterson.

Assistant Attorney General Pollak argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, urging reversal in Nos. 25, 26, and 36. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Louis F. Claiborne, Francis X. Beytagh, Jr., and Nathan Lewin.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

These four cases, three from Mississippi and one from Virginia, involve the application of the Voting Rights Act of 1965^[1] to state election laws and regulations. The Mississippi cases were consolidated on appeal and argued together in this Court. Because of the grounds on which we decide all four cases, the appeal in the Virginia case is also disposed of by this opinion.^[2]

*548 In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966), we held the provisions of the Act involved in these cases to be constitutional. These cases merely require us to determine whether the various state enactments involved are subject to the requirements of the Act.

We gave detailed treatment to the history and purposes of the Voting Rights Act in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra. Briefly, the Act implemented Congress' firm intention to rid the country of racial discrimination in voting. It provided stringent new remedies against those practices which have most frequently denied citizens the right to vote on the basis of their race. Thus, in States covered by the Act,^[3] literacy tests and similar voting qualifications were suspended for a period of five years from the last occurrence of substantial voting discrimination. However, Congress apparently feared that the mere suspension of existing tests would not completely solve the problem, given the history some States had of simply enacting new and slightly different requirements with the same discriminatory effect.^[4] Not underestimating the ingenuity of those bent on preventing Negroes from voting, Congress therefore enacted § 5, the focal point of these cases.

Under § 5, if a State covered by the Act passes any "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964," no person can be deprived of his right to vote "for failure to comply with" the new enactment "unless and until" the State seeks and receives a declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the District of *549 Columbia that the new enactment "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." 79 Stat. 439, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (1964 ed., Supp. I). See Appendix, infra.

However, § 5 does not necessitate that a covered State obtain a declaratory judgment action before it can enforce any change in its election laws. It provides that a State may enforce a new enactment if the State submits the new provision to the Attorney General of the United States and, within 60 days of the submission, the Attorney General does not formally object to the new statute or regulation. The Attorney General does not act as a court in approving or disapproving the state legislation. If the Attorney General objects to the new enactment, the State may still enforce the legislation upon securing a declaratory judgment in the District Court for the District of Columbia. Also, the State is not required to first submit the new enactment to the Attorney General as it may go directly to the District Court for the District of Columbia. The provision for submission to the Attorney General merely gives the covered State a rapid method of rendering a new state election law enforceable.^[5] Once the State has successfully complied with the § 5 approval requirements, private parties may enjoin the enforcement of the new enactment only in traditional *550 suits attacking its constitutionality; there is no further remedy provided by § 5.

In these four cases, the States have passed new laws or issued new regulations. The central issue is whether these provisions fall within the prohibition of § 5 that prevents the enforcement of "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" unless the State first complies with one of the section's approval procedures.

No. 25, Fairley v. Patterson, involves a 1966 amendment to § 2870 of the Mississippi Code of 1942.^[6] The amendment provides that the board of supervisors of each county may adopt an order providing that board members be elected at large by all qualified electors of the county. Prior to the 1966 amendment, all counties by law were divided into five districts; each district elected one member of the board of supervisors. After the amendment, Adams and Forrest Counties adopted the authorized orders, specifying that each candidate must run at large, but also requiring that each candidate be a resident of the county district he seeks to represent.

The appellants are qualified electors and potential candidates in the two counties. They sought a declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi that the amendment to § 2870 was subject to the provisions of § 5 of the Act and hence could not be enforced until the State complied with the approval requirements of § 5.^[7]

No. 26, Bunton v. Patterson, concerns a 1966 amendment to § 6271-08 of the Mississippi Code.^[8] The amendment *551 provides that in 11 specified counties, the county superintendent of education shall be appointed by the board of education. Before the enactment of this amendment, all these counties had the option of electing or appointing the superintendent. Appellants are qualified electors and potential candidates for the position of county superintendent of education in three of the counties covered by the 1966 amendment. They sought a declaratory judgment that the amendment was subject to § 5, and thus unenforceable unless the State complied with the § 5 approval requirements.

No. 36, Whitley v. Williams, involves a 1966 amendment to § 3260 of the Mississippi Code, which changed the requirements for independent candidates running in general elections.^[9] The amendment makes four revisions: (1) it establishes a new rule that no person who has voted in a primary election may thereafter be placed on the ballot as an independent candidate in the general election; (2) the time for filing a petition as an independent candidate is changed to 60 days before the primary election from the previous 40 days before the general election; (3) the number of signatures of qualified electors needed for the independent qualifying petition is increased substantially; and (4) a new provision is added that each qualified elector who signs the independent qualifying petition must personally sign the petition and must include his polling precinct and county. Appellants are potential candidates whose nominating petitions for independent listing on the ballot were rejected for failure to comply with one or more of the amended provisions.^[10]

*552 In all three of these cases, the three-judge District Court ruled that the amendments to the Mississippi Code did not come within the purview of and are not covered by § 5, and dismissed the complaints.^[11] Appellants brought direct appeals to this Court.^[12] We consolidated the cases and postponed consideration of jurisdiction to a hearing on the merits. 392 U. S. 902 (1968).

No. 3, Allen v. State Board of Elections, concerns a bulletin issued by the Virginia Board of Elections to all election judges. The bulletin was an attempt to modify the provisions of § 24-252 of the Code of Virginia of 1950 which provides, inter alia, that "any voter [may] place on the official ballot the name of any person in his own handwriting . . . ."^[13] The Virginia Code (§ 24-251) further provides that voters with a physical incapacity may be assisted in preparing their ballots. For example, one who is blind may be aided in the preparation of his ballot by a person of his choice. Those unable to mark their ballots due to any other physical disability may be assisted by one of the election judges. However, no statutory provision is made for assistance to those who wish to write in a name, but who are unable to do so because of illiteracy. When Virginia was brought under the coverage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Virginia election officials apparently thought that the provision in § 24-252, requiring a voter to cast a write-in vote in the voter's own handwriting, was incompatible with the provisions of § 4 (a) of the Act suspending the *553 enforcement of any test or device as a prerequisite to voting.^[14] Therefore, the Board of Elections issued a bulletin to all election judges, instructing that the election judge could aid any qualified voter in the preparation of his ballot, if the voter so requests and if the voter is unable to mark his ballot due to illiteracy.^[15]

Appellants are functionally illiterate registered voters from the Fourth Congressional District of Virginia. They brought a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, claiming that § 24-252 and the modifying bulletin violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. A three-judge court was convened and the complaint dismissed.^[16] A direct appeal was brought to this Court and we postponed consideration of jurisdiction to a hearing on the merits. 392 U. S. 902 (1968).

In the 1966 elections, appellants attempted to vote for a write-in candidate by sticking labels, printed with the name of their candidate, on the ballot. The election officials refused to count appellants' ballots, claiming that the Virginia election law did not authorize marking ballots with labels. As the election outcome would not have been changed had the disputed ballots been counted, appellants sought only prospective relief. In the District Court, appellants did not assert that § 5 precluded enforcement *554 of the procedure prescribed by the bulletin. Rather, they argued § 4 suspended altogether the requirement of § 24-252 that the voter write the name of his choice in the voter's own handwriting. Appellants first raised the applicability of § 5 in their jurisdictional statement filed with this Court. We are not precluded from considering the applicability of § 5, however. The Virginia legislation was generally attacked on the ground that it was inconsistent with the Voting Rights Act. Where all the facts are undisputed, this Court may, in the interests of judicial economy, determine the applicability of the provisions of that Act, even though some specific sections were not argued below.^[17]

We postponed consideration of our jurisdiction in these cases to a hearing on the merits. Therefore, before reaching the merits, we first determine whether these cases are properly before us on direct appeal from the district courts.

I.

These suits were instituted by private citizens; an initial question is whether private litigants may invoke the jurisdiction of the district courts to obtain the relief requested in these suits. 28 U. S. C. § 1343 provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:. . . (4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote." Clearly, if § 5 authorizes appellants to secure the relief sought, the district courts had jurisdiction over these suits.

The Voting Rights Act does not explicitly grant or deny private parties authorization to seek a declaratory judgment *555 that a State has failed to comply with the provisions of the Act.^[18] However, § 5 does provide that "no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with [a new state enactment covered by, but not approved under, § 5]." Analysis of this language in light of the major purpose of the Act indicates that appellants may seek a declaratory judgment that a new state enactment is governed by § 5. Further, after proving that the State has failed to submit the covered enactment for § 5 approval, the private party has standing to obtain an injunction against further enforcement, pending the State's submission of the legislation pursuant to § 5.^[19]

*556 The Act was drafted to make the guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment finally a reality for all citizens. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, at 308, 309. Congress realized that existing remedies were inadequate to accomplish this purpose and drafted an unusual, and in some aspects a severe, procedure for insuring that States would not discriminate on the basis of race in the enforcement of their voting laws.^[20]

The achievement of the Act's laudable goal could be severely hampered, however, if each citizen were required to depend solely on litigation instituted at the discretion of the Attorney General.^[21] For example, the provisions of the Act extend to States and the subdivisions thereof. The Attorney General has a limited staff and often might be unable to uncover quickly new regulations and enactments passed at the varying levels of state government.^[22]*557 It is consistent with the broad purpose of the Act to allow the individual citizen standing to insure that his city or county government complies with the § 5 approval requirements.

We have previously held that a federal statute passed to protect a class of citizens, although not specifically authorizing members of the protected class to institute suit, nevertheless implied a private right of action. In J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426 (1964), we were called upon to consider § 14 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 48 Stat. 895, 15 U. S. C. § 78n (a). That section provides that it shall be "unlawful for any person . . . [to violate] such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." We held that "[w]hile this language makes no specific reference to a private right of action, among its chief purposes is `the protection of investors,' which certainly implies the availability of judicial relief where necessary to achieve that result." 377 U. S., at 432.

A similar analysis is applicable here. The guarantee of § 5 that no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with an unapproved new enactment subject to § 5, might well prove an empty promise unless the private citizen were allowed to seek judicial enforcement of the prohibition.^[23]

II.

Another question involving the jurisdiction of the district courts is presented by § 14 (b) of the Act. It provides that "[n]o court other than the District Court *558 for the District of Columbia . . . shall have jurisdiction to issue any declaratory judgment pursuant to [§ 5] or any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction against the execution or enforcement of any provision of this Act . . . ." 79 Stat. 445, 42 U. S. C. § 1973l (b) (1964 ed., Supp. I). The appellants sought declaratory judgments that the state enactments were subject to § 5 of the Act; appellees thus argue that these actions could be initiated only in the District Court for the District of Columbia.

Section 14 (b) must be read with the Act's other enforcement provisions. Section 12 (f) provides that the district courts shall have jurisdiction over actions brought pursuant to § 12 (d) to enjoin a person from acting when "there are reasonable grounds to believe that [such person] is about to engage in any act or practice prohibited by [§ 5]."^[24] These § 12 (f) injunctive actions are distinguishable from the actions mentioned in § 14 (b). The § 14 (b) injunctive action is one aimed at prohibiting enforcement of the provisions of the Voting Rights Act, and would involve an attack on the constitutionality of the Act itself. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966). On the other hand, the § 12 (f) action is aimed at prohibiting the enforcement of a state enactment that is for some reason violative of the Act. Cf. United States v. Ward, 352 F. 2d 329 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1965); Perez v. Rhiddlehoover, 247 F. Supp. 65 (D. C. E. D. La. 1965).

A similar distinction is possible with respect to declaratory judgments. A declaratory judgment brought by the State pursuant to § 5 requires an adjudication that a new enactment does not have the purpose or effect of racial discrimination. However, a declaratory judgment action brought by a private litigant does not require the Court to reach this difficult substantive issue. The only *559 issue is whether a particular state enactment is subject to the provisions of the Voting Rights Act, and therefore must be submitted for approval before enforcement. The difference in the magnitude of these two issues suggests that Congress did not intend that both can be decided only by the District of Columbia District Court. Indeed, the specific grant of jurisdiction to the district courts in § 12 (f) indicates Congress intended to treat "coverage" questions differently from "substantive discrimination" questions. See Perez v. Rhiddlehoover, supra, at 72.

Moreover, as we indicated in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, the power of Congress to require suits to be brought only in the District of Columbia District Court is grounded in Congress' power, under Art. III, § 1, to "ordain and establish" inferior federal tribunals. We further noted Congress did not exceed constitutional bounds in imposing limitations on "litigation against the Federal Government. . . ." 383 U. S., at 332 (emphasis added). Of course, in declaratory judgment actions brought by private litigants, the United States will not be a party. This distinction further suggests interpreting § 14 (b) as applying only to declaratory judgment actions brought by the State.

There are strong reasons for adoption of this interpretation. Requiring that declaratory judgment actions be brought in the District of Columbia places a burden on the plaintiff. The enormity of the burden, of course, will vary with the size of the plaintiff's resources. Admittedly, it would be easier for States to bring § 5 actions in the district courts in their own States. However, the State has sufficient resources to prosecute the actions easily in the Nation's Capital; and, Congress has power to regulate which federal court shall hear suits against the Federal Government. On the other hand, the individual litigant will often not have sufficient resources *560 to maintain an action easily outside the district in which he resides, especially in cases where the individual litigant is attacking a local city or county regulation. Thus, for the individual litigant, the District of Columbia burden may be sufficient to preclude him from bringing suit.

We hold that the restriction of § 14 (b) does not apply to suits brought by private litigants seeking a declaratory judgment that a new state enactment is subject to the approval requirements of § 5, and that these actions may be brought in the local district court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (4).

III.

A final jurisdictional question remains. These actions were all heard before three-judge district courts. We have jurisdiction over an appeal brought directly from the three-judge court only if the three-judge court was properly convened. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 382 U. S. 281 (1965); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 5 (1965); see 28 U. S. C. § 1253. Appellants initially claimed that the statutes and regulations in question violated the Fifteenth Amendment. However, by stipulation these claims were removed from the cases prior to a hearing in the District Court and the cases were submitted solely on the question of the applicability of § 5.^[25] We held in Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 111, 127 (1965), that a three-judge court is not required under 28 U. S. C. § 2281 if the state statute is attacked on the grounds that it is in conflict with a federal statute and consequently violates the Supremacy Clause. These suits involve such an attack *561 and, in the absence of a statute authorizing a three-judge court, would not be proper before a district court of three judges.

Appellants maintain that § 5 authorizes a three-judge court in suits brought by private litigants to enforce the approval requirements of the section. The final sentence of § 5 provides that "[a]ny action under this section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges . . . and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court." 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (1964 ed., Supp. I) (emphasis added). Appellees argue that this sentence refers only to the action specifically mentioned in the first sentence of § 5 (i. e., declaratory judgment suits brought by the State) and does not apply to suits brought by the private litigant.

As we have interpreted § 5, suits involving the section may be brought in at least three ways. First, of course, the State may institute a declaratory judgment action. Second, an individual may bring a suit for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, claiming that a state requirement is covered by § 5, but has not been subjected to the required federal scrutiny. Third, the Attorney General may bring an injunctive action to prohibit the enforcement of a new regulation because of the State's failure to obtain approval under § 5. All these suits may be viewed as being brought "under" § 5. The issue is whether the language "under this section" should be interpreted as authorizing a three-judge action in these suits.

We have long held that congressional enactments providing for the convening of three-judge courts must be strictly construed. Phillips v. United States, 312 U. S. 246 (1941). Convening a three-judge court places a burden on our federal court system, and may often result in a delay in a matter needing swift initial adjudication. See Swift & Co. v. Wickham, supra, at 128. Also, a *562 direct appeal may be taken from a three-judge court to this Court, thus depriving us of the wise and often crucial adjudications of the courts of appeals. Thus we have been reluctant to extend the range of cases necessitating the convening of three-judge courts. Ibid.

However, we have not been unaware of the legitimate reasons that prompted Congress to enact three-judge-court legislation. See Swift & Co. v. Wickham, supra, at 116-119. Notwithstanding the problems for judicial administration, Congress has determined that three-judge courts are desirable in a number of circumstances involving confrontations between state and federal power or in circumstances involving a potential for substantial interference with government administration.^[26] The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is an example. Federal supervision over the enforcement of state legislation always poses difficult problems for our federal system. The problems are especially difficult when the enforcement of state enactments may be enjoined and state election procedures suspended because the State has failed to comply with a federal approval procedure.

In drafting § 5, Congress apparently concluded that if the governing authorities of a State differ with the Attorney General of the United States concerning the purpose or effect of a change in voting procedures, it is inappropriate to have that difference resolved by a single district judge. The clash between federal and state power and the potential disruption to state government are apparent. There is no less a clash and potential for disruption when the disagreement concerns whether a state enactment is subject to § 5. The result of both *563 suits can be an injunction prohibiting the State from enforcing its election laws. Although a suit brought by the individual citizen may not involve the same federal-state confrontation, the potential for disruption of state election procedures remains.

Other provisions of the Act indicate that Congress was well aware of the extraordinary effect the Act might have on federal-state relationships and the orderly operation of state government. For example, § 10, which prohibits the collection of poll taxes as a prerequisite to voting, contains a provision authorizing a three-judge court when the Attorney General brings an action "against the enforcement of any requirement of the payment of a poll tax as a precondition to voting . . . ." 79 Stat. 442, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1973h (a)-(c) (1964 ed., Supp. I). See also 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a) (1964 ed., Supp. I).

We conclude that in light of the extraordinary nature of the Act in general, and the unique approval requirements of § 5, Congress intended that disputes involving the coverage of § 5 be determined by a district court of three judges.

IV.

Finding that these cases are properly before us, we turn to a consideration of whether these state enactments are subject to the approval requirements of § 5. These requirements apply to "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting . . . ." 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (1964 ed., Supp. I). The Act further provides that the term "voting" "shall include all action necessary to make a vote effective in any primary, special, or general election, including, but not limited to, registration, listing . . . or other action required by law prerequisite to voting, casting a ballot, and having such ballot counted properly and included in the appropriate totals of votes cast with respect to candidates for public *564 or party office and propositions for which votes are received in an election." § 14 (c) (1), 79 Stat. 445, 42 U. S. C. § 1973l (c) (1) (1964 ed., Supp. I). See Appendix, infra. Appellees in the Mississippi cases maintain that § 5 covers only those state enactments which prescribe who may register to vote. While accepting that the Act is broad enough to insure that the votes of all citizens should be cast, appellees urge that § 5 does not cover state rules relating to the qualification of candidates or to state decisions as to which offices shall be elective.

Appellees rely on the legislative history of the Act to support their view, citing the testimony of former Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall before a subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary:

"Mr. CORMAN. We have not talked at all about whether we have to be concerned with not only who can vote, but who can run for public office and that has been an issue in some areas in the South in 1964. Have you given any consideration to whether or not this bill ought to address itself to the qualifications for running for public office as well as the problem of registration?

"Mr. MARSHALL. The problem that the bill was aimed at was the problem of registration, Congressman. If there is a problem of another sort, I would like to see it corrected, but that is not what we were trying to deal with in the bill."^[27]

Appellees in No. 25 also argue that § 5 was not intended to apply to a change from district to at-large voting, because application of § 5 would cause a conflict in the administration of reapportionment legislation. *565 They contend that under such a broad reading of § 5, enforcement of a reapportionment plan could be enjoined for failure to meet the § 5 approval requirements, even though the plan had been approved by a federal court.^[28] Appellees urge that Congress could not have intended to force the States to submit a reapportionment plan to two different courts.^[29]

We must reject a narrow construction that appellees would give to § 5. The Voting Rights Act was aimed at the subtle, as well as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because of their race.^[30] Moreover, compatible with the decisions of this Court, the Act gives a broad interpretation *566 to the right to vote, recognizing that voting includes "all action necessary to make a vote effective." 79 Stat. 445, 42 U. S. C. § 1973l (c) (1) (1964 ed., Supp. I). See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 555 (1964). We are convinced that in passing the Voting Rights Act, Congress intended that state enactments such as those involved in the instant cases be subject to the § 5 approval requirements.

The legislative history on the whole supports the view that Congress intended to reach any state enactment which altered the election law of a covered State in even a minor way. For example, § 2 of the Act, as originally drafted, included a prohibition against any "qualification or procedure." During the Senate hearings on the bill, Senator Fong expressed concern that the word "procedure" was not broad enough to cover various practices that might effectively be employed to deny citizens their right to vote. In response, the Attorney General said he had no objection to expanding the language of the section, as the word "procedure" "was intended to be all-inclusive of any kind of practice."^[31] Indicative of an intention *567 to give the Act the broadest possible scope, Congress expanded the language in the final version of § 2 to include any "voting qualifications or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure." 42 U. S. C. § 1973 (1964 ed., Supp. I).

Similarly, in the House hearings, it was emphasized that § 5 was to have a broad scope:

"Mr. KATZENBACH. The justification for [the approval requirements] is simply this: Our experience in the areas that would be covered by this bill has been such as to indicate frequently on the part of State legislatures a desire in a sense to outguess the courts of the United States or even to outguess the Congress of the United States. . . . [A]s the Chairman may recall . . . at the time of the initial school desegregation, . . . the legislature passed I *568 don't know how many laws in the shortest period of time. Every time the judge issued a decree, the legislature . . . passed a law to frustrate that decree.

"If I recollect correctly, the school board was ordered to do something and the legislature immediately took away all authority of the school boards. They withdrew all funds from them to accomplish the purposes of the act." House Hearings 60.

Also, the remarks of both opponents and proponents during the debate over passage of the Act demonstrate that Congress was well aware of another admonition of the Attorney General.^[32] He had stated in the House hearings that two or three types of changes in state election law (such as changing from paper ballots to voting machines) could be specifically excluded from § 5 without undermining the purpose of the section. He emphasized, however, that there were "precious few" changes that could be excluded "because there are an awful lot of things that could be started for purposes of evading the 15th amendment if there is the desire to do so." House Hearings 95. It is significant that Congress chose not to include even these minor exceptions in § 5, thus indicating an intention that all changes, no matter how small, be subjected to § 5 scrutiny.

In light of the mass of legislative history to the contrary, especially the Attorney General's clear indication that the section was to have a broad scope and Congress' refusal to engraft even minor exceptions, the single remark of Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall cannot be given determinative weight. Indeed, in any case where the legislative hearings and debate are so voluminous, no single statement or excerpt of testimony can *569 be conclusive.^[33] Also, the question of whether § 5 might cause problems in the implementation of reapportionment legislation is not properly before us at this time. There is no direct conflict between our interpretation of this statute and the principles involved in the reapportionment cases. The argument that some administrative problem might arise in the future does not establish that Congress intended that § 5 have a narrow scope; we leave to another case a consideration of any possible conflict.

The weight of the legislative history and an analysis of the basic purposes of the Act indicate that the enactment in each of these cases constitutes a "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" within the meaning of § 5.

No. 25 involves a change from district to at-large voting for county supervisors. The right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 555 (1964). Voters who are members of a racial minority might well be in the majority in one district, but in a decided minority in the county as a whole. This type of change could therefore nullify their ability to elect the candidate of their choice just as would prohibiting some of them from voting.

In No. 26 an important county officer in certain counties was made appointive instead of elective. The power of a citizen's vote is affected by this amendment; after *570 the change, he is prohibited from electing an officer formerly subject to the approval of the voters. Such a change could be made either with or without a discriminatory purpose or effect; however, the purpose of § 5 was to submit such changes to scrutiny.

The changes in No. 36 appear aimed at increasing the difficulty for an independent candidate to gain a position on the general election ballot. These changes might also undermine the effectiveness of voters who wish to elect independent candidates. One change involved in No. 36 deserves special note. The amendment provides that no person who has voted in a primary election may thereafter be placed on the ballot as an independent candidate in the general election. This is a "procedure with respect to voting" with substantial impact. One must forgo his right to vote in his party primary if he thinks he might later wish to become an independent candidate.

The bulletin in No. 3 outlines new procedures for casting write-in votes. As in all these cases, we do not consider whether this change has a discriminatory purpose or effect. It is clear, however, that the new procedure with respect to voting is different from the procedure in effect when the State became subject to the Act; therefore, the enactment must meet the approval requirements of § 5 in order to be enforceable.

In these cases, as in so many others that come before us, we are called upon to determine the applicability of a statute where the language of the statute does not make crystal clear its intended scope. In all such cases we are compelled to resort to the legislative history to determine whether, in light of the articulated purposes of the legislation, Congress intended that the statute apply to the particular cases in question. We are of the opinion that, with the exception of the statement of Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall, the balance of legislative history (including the statements of the Attorney General and congressional action expanding the *571 language) indicates that § 5 applies to these cases. In saying this, we of course express no view on the merit of these enactments; we also emphasize that our decision indicates no opinion concerning their constitutionality.

V.

Appellees in the Mississippi cases argue that even if these state enactments are covered by § 5, they may now be enforced, since the State submitted them to the Attorney General and he has failed to object. While appellees admit that they have made no "formal" submission to the Attorney General, they argue that no formality is required. They say that once the Attorney General has become aware of the state enactment, the enactment has been "submitted" for purposes of § 5. Appellees contend that the Attorney General became aware of the enactments when served with a copy of appellees' briefs in these cases.

We reject this argument. While the Attorney General has not required any formal procedure, we do not think the Act contemplates that a "submission" occurs when the Attorney General merely becomes aware of the legislation, no matter in what manner. Nor do we think the service of the briefs on the Attorney General constituted a "submission." A fair interpretation of the Act requires that the State in some unambiguous and recordable manner submit any legislation or regulation in question directly to the Attorney General with a request for his consideration pursuant to the Act.

VI.

Appellants in the Mississippi cases have asked this Court to set aside the elections conducted pursuant to these enactments and order that new elections he held under the pre-amendment laws. The Solicitor General has also urged us to order new elections if the State does not promptly institute § 5 approval proceedings. We decline *572 to take corrective action of such consequence, however. These § 5 coverage questions involve complex issues of first impression—issues subject to rational disagreement. The state enactments were not so clearly subject to § 5 that the appellees' failure to submit them for approval constituted deliberate defiance of the Act. Moreover, the discriminatory purpose or effect of these statutes, if any, has not been determined by any court. We give only prospective effect to our decision, bearing in mind that our judgment today does not end the matter so far as these States are concerned. They remain subject to the continuing strictures of § 5 until they obtain from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia a declaratory judgment that for at least five years they have not used the "tests or devices" prohibited by § 4. 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a) (1964 ed., Supp. I).

In No. 3 the judgment of the District Court is vacated; in Nos. 25, 26, and 36 the judgments of the District Court are reversed. All four cases are remanded to the District Courts with instructions to issue injunctions restraining the further enforcement of the enactments until such time as the States adequately demonstrate compliance with § 5.

It is so ordered.

APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT.

Changes in the Mississippi statutes are indicated as follows: material added by amendment is italicized and material deleted by amendment is underscored. Portions of the statutes unchanged by amendment are printed in plain roman.

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965:

"Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 4 (a) [42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a)] are in effect shall enact or seek *573 to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964, such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission, except that neither the Attorney General's failure to object nor a declaratory judgment entered under this section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of title 28 of the United States Code and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court." 79 Stat. 439, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (1964 ed., Supp. I).

The Act further provides:

"The terms `vote' or `voting' shall include all action necessary to make a vote effective in any primary, special, or general election, including, but not limited to, registration, listing pursuant to this Act, or other action required by law prerequisite to voting, casting a ballot, *574 and having such ballot counted properly and included in the appropriate totals of votes cast with respect to candidates for public or party office and propositions for which votes are received in an election." 79 Stat. 445, 42 U. S. C. § 1973l (c) (1) (1964 ed., Supp. I).

Section 2870 of the Mississippi Code:

"Each county shall be divided into five (5) districts, with due regard to equality of population and convenience of situation for the election of members of the boards of supervisors, but the districts as now existing shall continue until changed. The qualified electors of each district shall elect, at the next general election, and every four (4) years thereafter, in their district, one (1) member of the board of supervisors; and the board, by unanimous vote of all members elected or when so ordered by a vote of the majority of the qualified electors of the districts affected voting in an election as hereinafter provided, may at any time, except as hereinafter provided, change or alter the district, the boundaries to be entered at large in the minutes of the proceedings of the board.

"The board, upon the petition of twenty-five per cent (25%)