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Full Opinion
SHAPIRO, COMMISSIONER OF WELFARE OF CONNECTICUT
v.
THOMPSON.
Supreme Court of United States.
*620 Francis J. MacGregor, Assistant Attorney General of Connecticut, argued the cause for appellant in No. 9 on the original argument and on the reargument. With him on the brief on the original argument was Robert K. Killian, Attorney General. Richard W. Barton argued the cause for appellants in No. 33 on the original argument and on the reargument. With him on the brief on the original argument were Charles T. Duncan and Hubert B. Pair. William C. Sennett, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, argued the cause for appellants in No. 34 on the original argument and on the reargument. With him on the brief on the reargument was Edgar R. Casper, Deputy Attorney General, and on the original argument were Mr. Casper and Edward Friedman.
Archibald Cox argued the cause for appellees in all three cases on the reargument. With him on the brief were Peter S. Smith and Howard Lesnick. Brian L. Hollander argued the cause pro hac vice for appellee in No. 9 on the original argument. With him on the brief were Norman Dorsen and William D. Graham. Mr. Smith argued the cause for appellees in No. 33 on the original argument. With him on the brief were Joel J. Rabin, Jonathan Weiss, and Joseph F. Dugan. Thomas K. Gilhool argued the cause pro hac vice for appellees in No. 34 on the original argument. With him on the brief were Harvey N. Schmidt, Paul Bender, and Mr. Lesnick.
Lorna Lawhead Williams, Special Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for the State of Iowa as amicus curiae in support of appellants in all three cases on the original argument and on the reargument. With *621 her on the briefs on the original argument was Richard C. Turner, Attorney General.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
These three appeals were restored to the calendar for reargument. 392 U. S. 920 (1968). Each is an appeal from a decision of a three-judge District Court holding *622 unconstitutional a State or District of Columbia statutory provision which denies welfare assistance to residents of the State or District who have not resided within their jurisdictions for at least one year immediately preceding their applications for such assistance.[1] We affirm the judgments of the District Courts in the three cases.
I.
In No. 9, the Connecticut Welfare Department invoked § 17-2d of the Connecticut General Statutes[2] to *623 deny the application of appellee Vivian Marie Thompson for assistance under the program for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). She was a 19-year-old unwed mother of one child and pregnant with her second child when she changed her residence in June 1966 from Dorchester, Massachusetts, to Hartford, Connecticut, to live with her mother, a Hartford resident. She moved to her own apartment in Hartford in August 1966, when her mother was no longer able to support her and her infant son. Because of her pregnancy, she was unable to work or enter a work training program. Her application for AFDC assistance, filed in August, was denied in November solely on the ground that, as required by § 17-2d, she had not lived in the State for a year before her application was filed. She brought this action in the District Court for the District of Connecticut where a three-judge court, one judge dissenting, declared § 17-2d unconstitutional. 270 F. Supp. 331 (1967). The majority held that the waiting-period requirement is unconstitutional because it "has a chilling effect on the right to travel." Id., at 336. The majority also held that the provision was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the denial of relief to those resident in the State for less than a year is not based on any permissible purpose but is solely designed, as "Connecticut states quite frankly," "to protect its fisc by discouraging entry of those who come needing relief." Id., at 336-337. We noted probable jurisdiction. 389 U. S. 1032 (1968).
In No. 33, there are four appellees. Three of them appellees Harrell, Brown, and Legrantapplied for and were denied AFDC aid. The fourth, appellee Barley, applied for and was denied benefits under the program for Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled. The denial in each case was on the ground that the applicant had not resided in the District of Columbia for one year *624 immediately preceding the filing of her application, as required by § 3-203 of the District of Columbia Code.[3]
Appellee Minnie Harrell, now deceased, had moved with her three children from New York to Washington in September 1966. She suffered from cancer and moved to be near members of her family who lived in Washington.
Appellee Barley, a former resident of the District of Columbia, returned to the District in March 1941 and was committed a month later to St. Elizabeths Hospital as mentally ill. She has remained in that hospital ever since. She was deemed eligible for release in 1965, and a plan was made to transfer her from the hospital to a foster home. The plan depended, however, upon Mrs. Barley's obtaining welfare assistance for her support. Her application for assistance under the program for Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled was denied because her time spent in the hospital did not count in determining compliance with the one-year requirement.
Appellee Brown lived with her mother and two of her three children in Fort Smith, Arkansas. Her third child was living with appellee Brown's father in the District of Columbia. When her mother moved from Fort Smith to Oklahoma, appellee Brown, in February 1966, returned to the District of Columbia where she had lived as a child. Her application for AFDC assistance was approved insofar as it sought assistance for the child who *625 had lived in the District with her father but was denied to the extent it sought assistance for the two other children.
Appellee Legrant moved with her two children from South Carolina to the District of Columbia in March 1967 after the death of her mother. She planned to live with a sister and brother in Washington. She was pregnant and in ill health when she applied for and was denied AFDC assistance in July 1967.
The several cases were consolidated for trial, and a three-judge District Court was convened.[4] The court, one judge dissenting, held § 3-203 unconstitutional. 279 F. Supp. 22 (1967). The majority rested its decision on the ground that the one-year requirement was unconstitutional as a denial of the right to equal protection secured by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We noted probable jurisdiction. 390 U. S. 940 (1968).
In No. 34, there are two appellees, Smith and Foster, who were denied AFDC aid on the sole ground that they had not been residents of Pennsylvania for a year prior to their applications as required by § 432 (6) of the *626 Pennsylvania Welfare Code.[5] Appellee Smith and her five minor children moved in December 1966 from Delaware to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where her father lived. Her father supported her and her children for several months until he lost his job. Appellee then applied for AFDC assistance and had received two checks when the aid was terminated. Appellee Foster, after living in Pennsylvania from 1953 to 1965, had moved with her four children to South Carolina to care for her grandfather and invalid grandmother and had returned to Pennsylvania in 1967. A three-judge District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, one judge dissenting, declared § 432 (6) unconstitutional. 277 F. Supp. 65 (1967). The majority held that the classification established by the waiting-period requirement is "without rational basis and without legitimate purpose or function" and therefore a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id., at 67. The majority noted further that if the purpose of the statute was "to erect a barrier against the movement of indigent persons into the State or to *627 effect their prompt departure after they have gotten there," it would be "patently improper and its implementation plainly impermissible." Id., at 67-68. We noted probable jurisdiction. 390 U. S. 940 (1968).
II.
There is no dispute that the effect of the waiting-period requirement in each case is to create two classes of needy resident families indistinguishable from each other except that one is composed of residents who have resided a year or more, and the second of residents who have resided less than a year, in the jurisdiction. On the basis of this sole difference the first class is granted and the second class is denied welfare aid upon which may depend the ability of the families to obtain the very means to subsistfood, shelter, and other necessities of life. In each case, the District Court found that appellees met the test for residence in their jurisdictions, as well as all other eligibility requirements except the requirement of residence for a full year prior to their applications. On reargument, appellees' central contention is that the statutory prohibition of benefits to residents of less than a year creates a classification which constitutes an invidious discrimination denying them equal protection of the laws.[6] We agree. The interests which appellants assert are promoted by the classification either may not constitutionally be promoted by government or are not compelling governmental interests.
III.
Primarily, appellants justify the waiting-period requirement as a protective device to preserve the fiscal integrity of state public assistance programs. It is asserted that people who require welfare assistance during their first *628 year of residence in a State are likely to become continuing burdens on state welfare programs. Therefore, the argument runs, if such people can be deterred from entering the jurisdiction by denying them welfare benefits during the first year, state programs to assist long-time residents will not be impaired by a substantial influx of indigent newcomers.[7]
There is weighty evidence that exclusion from the jurisdiction of the poor who need or may need relief was the specific objective of these provisions. In the Congress, sponsors of federal legislation to eliminate all residence requirements have been consistently opposed by representatives of state and local welfare agencies who have stressed the fears of the States that elimination of the requirements would result in a heavy influx of individuals into States providing the most generous benefits. See, e. g., Hearings on H. R. 10032 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 309-310, 644 (1962); Hearings on H. R. 6000 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 81st Cong., *629 2d Sess., 324-327 (1950). The sponsor of the Connecticut requirement said in its support: "I doubt that Connecticut can and should continue to allow unlimited migration into the state on the basis of offering instant money and permanent income to all who can make their way to the state regardless of their ability to contribute to the economy." H. B. 82, Connecticut General Assembly House Proceedings, February Special Session, 1965, Vol. II, pt. 7, p. 3504. In Pennsylvania, shortly after the enactment of the one-year requirement, the Attorney General issued an opinion construing the one-year requirement strictly because "[a]ny other conclusion would tend to attract the dependents of other states to our Commonwealth." 1937-1938 Official Opinions of the Attorney General, No. 240, p. 110. In the District of Columbia case, the constitutionality of § 3-203 was frankly defended in the District Court and in this Court on the ground that it is designed to protect the jurisdiction from an influx of persons seeking more generous public assistance than might be available elsewhere.
We do not doubt that the one-year waiting-period device is well suited to discourage the influx of poor families in need of assistance. An indigent who desires to migrate, resettle, find a new job, and start a new life will doubtless hesitate if he knows that he must risk making the move without the possibility of falling back on state welfare assistance during his first year of residence, when his need may be most acute. But the purpose of inhibiting migration by needy persons into the State is constitutionally impermissible.
This Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement. That *630 proposition was early stated by Chief Justice Taney in the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492 (1849):
"For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed, we are one people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States."
We have no occasion to ascribe the source of this right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional provision.[8] It suffices that, as MR. JUSTICE STEWART said for the Court in United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745, 757-758 (1966):
"The constitutional right to travel from one State to another . . . occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized.
". . . [T]he right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason, it has been suggested, is *631 that a right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created. In any event, freedom to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution."
Thus, the purpose of deterring the in-migration of indigents cannot serve as justification for the classification created by the one-year waiting period, since that purpose is constitutionally impermissible. If a law has "no other purpose . . . than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it [is] patently unconstitutional." United States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570, 581 (1968).
Alternatively, appellants argue that even if it is impermissible for a State to attempt to deter the entry of all indigents, the challenged classification may be justified as a permissible state attempt to discourage those indigents who would enter the State solely to obtain larger benefits. We observe first that none of the statutes before us is tailored to serve that objective. Rather, the class of barred newcomers is all-inclusive, lumping the great majority who come to the State for other purposes with those who come for the sole purpose of collecting higher benefits. In actual operation, therefore, the three statutes enact what in effect are nonrebuttable presumptions that every applicant for assistance in his first year of residence came to the jurisdiction solely to obtain higher benefits. Nothing whatever in any of these records supplies any basis in fact for such a presumption.
More fundamentally, a State may no more try to fence out those indigents who seek higher welfare benefits than it may try to fence out indigents generally. Implicit in any such distinction is the notion that indigents who enter a State with the hope of securing higher welfare benefits are somehow less deserving than indigents who do not *632 take this consideration into account. But we do not perceive why a mother who is seeking to make a new life for herself and her children should be regarded as less deserving because she considers, among others factors, the level of a State's public assistance. Surely such a mother is no less deserving than a mother who moves into a particular State in order to take advantage of its better educational facilities.
Appellants argue further that the challenged classification may be sustained as an attempt to distinguish between new and old residents on the basis of the contribution they have made to the community through the payment of taxes. We have difficulty seeing how longterm residents who qualify for welfare are making a greater present contribution to the State in taxes than indigent residents who have recently arrived. If the argument is based on contributions made in the past by the long-term residents, there is some question, as a factual matter, whether this argument is applicable in Pennsylvania where the record suggests that some 40% of those denied public assistance because of the waiting period had lengthy prior residence in the State.[9] But we need not rest on the particular facts of these cases. Appellants' reasoning would logically permit the State to bar new residents from schools, parks, and libraries or deprive them of police and fire protection. Indeed it would permit the State to apportion all benefits and services according to the past tax contributions of its *633 citizens. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits such an apportionment of state services.[10]
We recognize that a State has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its programs. It may legitimately attempt to limit its expenditures, whether for public assistance, public education, or any other program. But a State may not accomplish such a purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens. It could not, for example, reduce expenditures for education by barring indigent children from its schools. Similarly, in the cases before us, appellants must do more than show that denying welfare benefits to new residents saves money. The saving of welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise invidious classification.[11]
In sum, neither deterrence of indigents from migrating to the State nor limitation of welfare benefits to those regarded as contributing to the State is a constitutionally permissible state objective.
IV.
Appellants next advance as justification certain administrative and related governmental objectives allegedly served by the waiting-period requirement.[12] They argue *634 that the requirement (1) facilitates the planning of the welfare budget; (2) provides an objective test of residency; (3) minimizes the opportunity for recipients fraudulently to receive payments from more than one jurisdiction; and (4) encourages early entry of new residents into the labor force.
At the outset, we reject appellants' argument that a mere showing of a rational relationship between the waiting period and these four admittedly permissible state objectives will suffice to justify the classification. See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78 (1911); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 611 (1960); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 426 (1961). The waiting-period provision denies welfare benefits to otherwise eligible applicants solely because they have recently moved into the jurisdiction. But in moving from State to State or to the District of Columbia appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional. Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 216 (1944); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 524 (1960); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 406 (1963).
The argument that the waiting-period requirement facilitates budget predictability is wholly unfounded. The records in all three cases are utterly devoid of evidence that either State or the District of Columbia in fact uses the one-year requirement as a means to predict the number of people who will require assistance in the budget year. None of the appellants takes a census of new residents or collects any other data that would reveal the number of newcomers in the State less than a year. *635 Nor are new residents required to give advance notice of their need for welfare assistance.[13] Thus, the welfare authorities cannot know how many new residents come into the jurisdiction in any year, much less how many of them will require public assistance. In these circumstances, there is simply no basis for the claim that the one-year waiting requirement serves the purpose of making the welfare budget more predictable. In Connecticut and Pennsylvania the irrelevance of the one-year requirement to budgetary planning is further underscored by the fact that temporary, partial assistance is given to some new residents[14] and full assistance is given to other new residents under reciprocal agreements.[15] Finally, the claim that a one-year waiting requirement is used for planning purposes is plainly belied by the fact that the requirement is not also imposed on applicants who are long-term residents, the group that receives the bulk of welfare payments. In short, the States rely on methods other than the one-year requirement to make budget estimates. In No. 34, the Director of the Pennsylvania Bureau of Assistance Policies and Standards testified that, based on experience in Pennsylvania and elsewhere, her office had already estimated how much the elimination of the one-year requirement would cost and that the estimates of costs of other changes in regulations "have proven exceptionally accurate."
*636 The argument that the waiting period serves as an administratively efficient rule of thumb for determining residency similarly will not withstand scrutiny. The residence requirement and the one-year waiting-period requirement are distinct and independent prerequisites for assistance under these three statutes, and the facts relevant to the determination of each are directly examined by the welfare authorities.[16] Before granting an application, the welfare authorities investigate the applicant's employment, housing, and family situation and in the course of the inquiry necessarily learn the facts upon which to determine whether the applicant is a resident.[17]
*637 Similarly, there is no need for a State to use the one-year waiting period as a safeguard against fraudulent receipt of benefits;[18] for less drastic means are available, and are employed, to minimize that hazard. Of course, a State has a valid interest in preventing fraud by any applicant, whether a newcomer or a long-time resident. It is not denied, however, that the investigations now conducted entail inquiries into facts relevant to that subject. In addition, cooperation among state welfare departments is common. The District of Columbia, for example, provides interim assistance to its former residents who have moved to a State which has a waiting period. As a matter of course, District officials send a letter to the welfare authorities in the recipient's new community "to request the information needed to continue assistance."[19] A like procedure would be an effective safeguard against the hazard of double payments. Since double payments can be prevented by a letter or a telephone call, it is unreasonable to accomplish this objective by the blunderbuss method of denying assistance to all indigent newcomers for an entire year.
Pennsylvania suggests that the one-year waiting period is justified as a means of encouraging new residents to join the labor force promptly. But this logic would also require a similar waiting period for long-term residents of the State. A state purpose to encourage employment *638 provides no rational basis for imposing a one-year waiting-period restriction on new residents only.
We conclude therefore that appellants in these cases do not use and have no need to use the one-year requirement for the governmental purposes suggested. Thus, even under traditional equal protection tests a classification of welfare applicants according to whether they have lived in the State for one year would seem irrational and unconstitutional.[20] But, of course, the traditional criteria do not apply in these cases. Since the classification here touches on the fundamental right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest. Under this standard, the waiting-period requirement clearly violates the Equal Protection Clause.[21]
V.
Connecticut and Pennsylvania argue, however, that the constitutional challenge to the waiting-period requirements must fail because Congress expressly approved the imposition of the requirement by the States as part of the jointly funded AFDC program.
Section 402 (b) of the Social Security Act of 1935, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 602 (b), provides that:
"The Secretary shall approve any [state assistance] plan which fulfills the conditions specified in subsection *639 (a) of this section, except that he shall not approve any plan which imposes as a condition of eligibility for aid to families with dependent children, a residence requirement which denies aid with respect to any child residing in the State (1) who has resided in the State for one year immediately preceding the application for such aid, or (2) who was born within one year immediately preceding the application, if the parent or other relative with whom the child is living has resided in the State for one year immediately preceding the birth."
On its face, the statute does not approve, much less prescribe, a one-year requirement. It merely directs the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare not to disapprove plans submitted by the States because they include such a requirement.[22] The suggestion that Congress enacted that directive to encourage state participation in the AFDC program is completely refuted by the legislative history of the section. That history discloses that Congress enacted the directive to curb hardships resulting from lengthy residence requirements. Rather than constituting an approval or a prescription of the requirement in state plans, the directive was the means chosen by Congress to deny federal funding to any State which persisted in stipulating excessive residence requirements as a condition of the payment of benefits.
One year before the Social Security Act was passed, 20 of the 45 States which had aid to dependent children programs required residence in the State for two or more years. Nine other States required two or more years of *640 residence in a particular town or county. And 33 jurisdictions required at least one year of residence in a particular town or county.[23] Congress determined to combat this restrictionist policy. Both the House and Senate Committee Reports expressly stated that the objective of § 402 (b) was to compel "[l]iberality of residence requirement."[24] Not a single instance can be found in the debates or committee reports supporting the contention that § 402 (b) was enacted to encourage participation by the States in the AFDC program. To the contrary, those few who addressed themselves to waiting-period requirements emphasized that participation would depend on a State's repeal or drastic revision of existing requirements. A congressional demand on 41 States to repeal or drastically revise offending statutes is hardly a way to enlist their cooperation.[25]
*641 But even if we were to assume, arguendo, that Congress did approve the imposition of a one-year waiting period, it is the responsive state legislation which infringes constitutional rights. By itself § 402 (b) has absolutely no restrictive effect. It is therefore not that statute but only the state requirements which pose the constitutional question.
Finally, even if it could be argued that the constitutionality of § 402 (b) is somehow at issue here, it follows from what we have said that the provision, insofar as it permits the one-year waiting-period requirement, would be unconstitutional. Congress may not authorize the States to violate the Equal Protection Clause. Perhaps Congress could induce wider state participation in school construction if it authorized the use of joint funds for the building of segregated schools. But could it seriously be contended that Congress would be constitutionally justified in such authorization by the need to secure state cooperation? Congress is without power to enlist state cooperation in a joint federal-state program by legislation which authorizes the States to violate the Equal Protection Clause. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 651, n. 10 (1966).
VI.
The waiting-period requirement in the District of Columbia Code involved in No. 33 is also unconstitutional even though it was adopted by Congress as an exercise of federal power. In terms of federal power, the discrimination created by the one-year requirement violates the Due *642 Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. "[W]hile the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is `so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.' " Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U. S. 163, 168 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 (1954). For the reasons we have stated in invalidating the Pennsylvania and Connecticut provisions, the District of Columbia provision is also invalid the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits Congress from denying public assistance to poor persons otherwise eligible solely on the ground that they have not been residents of the District of Columbia for one year at the time their applications are filed.
Accordingly, the judgments in Nos. 9, 33, and 34 are
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring.
In joining the opinion of the Court, I add a word in response to the dissent of my Brother HARLAN, who, I think, has quite misapprehended what the Court's opinion says.
The Court today does not "pick out particular human activities, characterize them as `fundamental,' and give them added protection . . . ." To the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it must, an established constitutional right, and gives to that right no less protection than the Constitution itself demands.
"The constitutional right to travel from one State to another . . . has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized." United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745, 757. This constitutional right, which, of course, includes the right of "entering and abiding in any State in the Union," Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 39, is not a mere conditional liberty subject to regulation and control under conventional *643 due process or equal protection standards.[1] "[T]he right to travel freely from State to State finds constitutional protection that is quite independent of the Fourteenth Amendment." United States v. Guest, supra, at 760, n. 17.[2] As we made clear in Guest, it is a right broadly assertable against private interference as well as governmental action.[3] Like the right of association, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, it is a virtually unconditional personal right,[4] guaranteed by the Constitution to us all.
It follows, as the Court says, that "the purpose of deterring the in-migration of indigents cannot serve as justification for the classification created by the one-year waiting period, since that purpose is constitutionally impermissible." And it further follows, as the Court says, that any other purposes offered in support of a *644 law that so clearly impinges upon the constitutional right of interstate travel must be shown to reflect a compelling governmental interest. This is necessarily true whether the impinging law be a classification statute to be tested against the Equal Protection Clause, or a state or federal regulatory law, to be tested against the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth or Fifth Amendment. As MR. JUSTICE HARLAN wrote for the Court more than a decade ago, "[T]o justify the deterrent effect . . . on the free exercise . . . of their constitutionally protected right . . . a `. . . subordinating interest of the State must be compelling.' " NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 463.
The Court today, therefore, is not "contriving new constitutional principles." It is deciding these cases under the aegis of established constitutional law.[5]
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK joins, dissenting.
In my opinion the issue before us can be simply stated: May Congress, acting under one of its enumerated powers, impose minimal nationwide residence requirements or authorize the States to do so? Since I believe that Congress does have this power and has constitutionally exercised it in these cases, I must dissent.
I.
The Court insists that § 402 (b) of the Social Security Act "does not approve, much less prescribe, a one-year requirement." Ante, at 639. From its reading of the legislative history it concludes that Congress did not intend to authorize the States to impose residence requirements. *645 An examination of the relevant legislative materials compels, in my view, the opposite conclusion, i. e., Congress intended to authorize state residence requirements of up to one year.
The Great Depression of the 1930's exposed the inadequacies of state and local welfare programs and dramatized the need for federal participation in welfare assistance. See J. Brown, Public Relief 1929-1939 (1940). Congress determined that the Social Security Act, containing a system of unemployment and old-age insurance as well as the categorical assistance programs now at issue, was to be a major step designed to ameliorate the problems of economic insecurity. The primary purpose of the categorical assistance programs was to encourage the States to provide new and greatly enhanced welfare programs. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 5-6, 18-19 (1935); H. R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1935). Federal aid would mean an immediate increase in the amount of benefits paid under state programs. But federal aid was to be conditioned upon certain requirements so that the States would remain the basic administrative units of the welfare system and would be unable to shift the welfare burden to local governmental units with inadequate financial resources. See Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Statutory and Administrative Controls Associated with Federal Grants for Public Assistance 9-26 (1964). Significantly, the categories of assistance programs created by the Social Security Act corresponded to those already in existence in a number of States. See J. Brown, Public Relief 1929-1939, at 26-32. Federal entry into the welfare area can therefore be best described as a major experiment in "cooperative federalism," King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 317 (1968), combining state and federal participation to solve the problems of the depression.
*646 Each of the categorical assistance programs contained in the Social Security Act allowed participating States to impose residence requirements as a condition of eligibility for benefits. Congress also imposed a one-year requirement for the categorical assistance programs operative in the District of Columbia. See H. R. Rep. No. 891, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) (old-age pensions); H. R. Rep. No. 201, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) (aid to the blind). The congressional decision to allow the States to impose residence requirements and to enact such a requirement for the District was the subject of considerable discussion. Both those favoring lengthy residence requirements[1] and those opposing all requirements[2] pleaded their case during the congressional hearings on the Social Security Act. Faced with the competing claims of States which feared that abolition of residence requirements would result in an influx of persons seeking higher welfare payments and of organizations which stressed the unfairness of such requirements to transient workers forced by the economic dislocation of the depression to seek work far from their homes, Congress chose a middle course. It required those States seeking federal grants for categorical assistance to reduce their existing residence requirements to what Congress viewed as an acceptable maximum. However, Congress accommodated state fears by allowing the States to retain minimal residence requirements.
Congress quickly saw evidence that the system of welfare assistance contained in the Social Security Act including residence requirements was operating to encourage States to expand and improve their categorical *647 assistance programs. For example, the Senate was told in 1939:
"The rapid expansion of the program for aid to dependent children in the country as a whole since 1935 stands in marked contrast to the relatively stable picture of mothers' aid in the preceding 4-year period from 1932 through 1935. The extension of the program during the last 3 years is due to Federal contributions which encouraged the matching of State and local funds." S. Rep. No. 734, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 29 (1939).
The trend observed in 1939 continued as the States responded to the federal stimulus for improvement in the scope and amount of categorical assistance programs. See Wedemeyer & Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 326, 347-356 (1966). Residence requirements have remained a part of this combined state-federal welfare program for 34 years. Congress has adhered to its original decision that residence requirements were necessary in the face of repeated attacks against these requirements.[3] The decision to retain residence requirements, combined with Congress' continuing desire to encourage wider state participation in categorical assistance programs, indicates to me that Congress has authorized the imposition by the States of residence requirements.
II.
Congress has imposed a residence requirement in the District of Columbia and authorized the States to impose similar requirements. The issue before us must therefore be framed in terms of whether Congress may *648 create minimal residence requirements, not whether the States, acting alone, may do so. See Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408 (1946); In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545 (1891). Appellees insist that a congressionally mandated residence requirement would violate their right to travel. The import of their contention is that Congress, even under its "plenary"[4] power to control interstate commerce, is constitutionally prohibited from imposing residence requirements. I reach a contrary conclusion for I am convinced that the extent of the burden on interstate travel when compared with the justification for its imposition requires the Court to uphold this exertion of federal power.
Congress, pursuant to its commerce power, has enacted a variety of restrictions upon interstate travel. It has taxed air and rail fares and the gasoline needed to power cars and trucks which move interstate. 26 U. S. C. § 4261 (air fares); 26 U. S. C. § 3469 (1952 ed.), repealed in part by Pub. L. 87-508, § 5 (b), 76 Stat. 115 (rail fares); 26 U. S. C. § 4081 (gasoline). Many of the federal safety regulations of common carriers which cross state lines burden the right to travel. 45 U. S. C. §§ 1-43 (railroad safety appliances); 49 U. S. C. § 1421 (air safety regulations). And Congress has prohibited by criminal statute interstate travel for certain purposes. E. g., 18 U. S. C. § 1952. Although these restrictions operate as a limitation upon free interstate movement of persons, their constitutionality appears well settled. See Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 41 (1916); Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20 (1911); United States v. Zizzo, 338 F. 2d 577 (C. A. 7th Cir., 1964), cert. denied, 381 U. S. 915 (1965). As the Court observed in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 14 (1965), "the fact that a liberty cannot be inhibited without due *649 process of law does not mean that it can under no circumstances be inhibited."
The Court's right-to-travel cases lend little support to the view that congressional action is invalid merely because it burdens the right to travel. Most of our cases fall into two categories: those in which state-imposed restrictions were involved, see, e. g., Edwards v. California, Additional Information