Whitcomb v. Chavis

delivered the opinion of the Court with respéct to the validity of the multi-member election district in Marion County, Indiana (Parts I-VI), together with an opinion (Part VII), in which The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Black, and Me. Justice Black-mun joined, on the propriety of ordering redistricting of the entire State of Indiana, and announced the judgment of the Court.

We have before us in this case the validity under the Equal Protection Clause of the statutes districting and apportioning the State of Indiana for its general assembly elections. The principal issue centers on those provisions constituting Marion County, which includes the city of Indianapolis, a multi-member district for electing state senators and representatives.

I

Indiana has a bicameral general assembly consisting of a house of representatives of 100 members and a senate of 50 members. Eight of the 31 senatorial districts and 25 of the 39 house districts are multi-member districts, that is, districts that are represented by two or more *128legislators elected at large by the voters of the district.1 Under the statutes here challenged, Marion County is a multi-member district electing eight senators and 15 members of the house.

On January 9, 1969,. six residents of Indiana, five of whom were residents of Marion County, filed a suit described by them as “attacking the constitutionality of two statutes of the State of Indiana which provide for multi-member districting at large of General Assembly seats in Marion County, Indiana- . . . 2 Plaintiffs3 Chavis, Ramsey, and Bryant alleged that the two statutes invidiously diluted the force and .effect of the vote of *129Negroes and poor persons living within certain Marion .County census tracts constituting what was termed “the ghetto area.” Residents of the area were alleged to have particular demographic characteristics rendering them cognizable as a minority interest group with distinctive interests in specific areas of the substantive law. With single-member districting, it was said, the ghetto area would elect three members of the house and one senator, whereas under the present districting voters in the area “have almost no. political force or control over législators because the effect of their vote is cancelled out by other contrary interest groups” in Marion County. The mechanism of political party organization and the influence of party chairmen in nominating candidates were additional factors alleged to frustrate the exercise of power by .residents of the ghetto area.

Plaintiff Walker, a Negro resident of Lake County, also a multi-member district but a smaller one, alleged an invidious discrimination against Lake County Negroes because-Marion County Negroes, although no greater in number than Lake County Negroes, had the opportunity to influence the election of more legislators than Lake Gounty Negroes.4 The claim was that Marion County was one-third larger in population and thus had approximately one-third more assembly seats than Lake County, but that voter influence does not vary inversely with’ population and that permitting Marion County voters to elect 23 assemblymen at large gave them a disproportionate advantage over voters in Lake County.5 The. *130: two remaining plaintiffs presented claims not at issue here.6

A three-judge court convened and tried the case on June 17 and 18, 1969. Both documentary evidence and oral testimony were taken concerning the composition and characteristics of the alleged ghetto area, the manner in which legislative candidates were chosen and their residence and tenure, and the performance of Marion County’s delegation in the Indiana general assembly.7

*131The three-judge court filed its opinion containing its findings and conclusions on July 28, 1969, holding for plaintiffs. Chavis v. Whitcomb, 305 F. Supp. 1364 (SD Ind. 1969). See also 305 F. Supp. 1359 (1969) (pre-trial orders) and 307 F. Supp. 1362 (1969) (statewide reapportionment plan and implementing order). . In sum, it concluded that Marion County’s multi-member district must be disestablished and, because of population disparities not directly related to the phenomena alleged in the complaint, the entire State must be redistricted. More particularly, it first determined that a racial minority group inhabited an identifiable ghetto area in Indianapolis.8 That area, located in the northern half of Center Township and termed the “Center Township ghetto,” comprised 28'contiguous census tracts and parts of four others.9 The area contained a 1967 population *132of 97,000 nonwhites, over 99% of whom were Negro, and 35,000 whites. The court proceeded to compare six of these tracts, representative of the area, with tract 211, a predominantly white, relatively wealthy suburban census tract in Washington Township contiguous to the northwest corner of the court’s ghetto area and with tract 220, also in Washington Township, a contiguous tract inhabited by middle class Negroes. Strong differences were found in terms of housing conditions, income and educational levels, rates of unemployment, juvenile crime, and welfare assistance. The contrasting characteristics between the court’s ghetto area, and its inhabitants on the one hand and tracts 211 and 220 on the other indicated the ghetto’s “compelling interests in such legislative areas as urban renewal and rehabilitation, health care, employment training and opportunities, welfare, and relief of the poor, law enforcement, quality of education, and anti-discrimination measures.” 305 F. Supp., at 1380. These interests were in addition to those the ghetto shared with the rest of the county, such as metropolitan transportation, flood control, sewage disposal, and education

The court then turned to evidence showing the residences of Marion County’s representatives and senators *133in each of the five general assemblies elected during the period 1960 through 1968.10 Excluding tract 220, the middle class Negro district, Washington Township, the relatively wealthy suburban area in which tract 211 was located, with an average of 13.98% of Marion County’s population, was the residence of 47.52% of its senators and - 34.33% of its representatives. The court’s Center Township ghetto area, with 17.-8% of the population, had 4.75% of the senators and 5.97% of the representatives. The nonghetto area of Center Township, with 23.32% of the population, had done little better. Also, tract 220 alone, the middle class Negro district, had only 0.66% of the county’s population but had been the residence of more representatives than had the ghetto area. The ghetto area had been represented in the senate only once — -in 1964 by one senator — and the. house three times — with one representative in 1962 and 1964 and by two representatives in the 1968 general assembly. The court found, the “Negro Center Township Ghetto population” to be sufficiently large to elect two representatives and one senator if the ghetto tracts “were specific single-member legislative districts” in Marion County. 305 F. Supp., at 1385. From these data the court found gross inequity of representation, as determined by residence of legislators, between Washington Township and tract 220 on the one hand and Center Township and the Center Township ghetto area on the other.

The court also characterized Marion County’s general assembly delegation as tending to coalesce and take common positions on proposed legislation. This was “largely the result of election at large from a common constituency, and obviates representation of a substantial, though minority, interest group within that common *134constituency.” Ibid. Related findings were that, as a rule, a candidate could not be elected in Marion County unless his party carried the election;11 county political organizations had substantial influence on the selection and election of assembly candidates (an influence that would be diminished by single-member districting), as well as upon the actions of the county’s delegation in the assembly; and that at-large elections made it difficult for the conscientious voter to make a rational selection.

The court’s conclusions of law on- the merits may be summarized as follows:

1. There exists within Marion County an identifiable racial element, “the Negro residents of the Center Township Ghetto,” with special interests in various areas of *135substantive law, diverging significantly from interests of nonresidents of the ghetto.12

2. The voting strength of this racial group has been minimized by Marion County’s multi-member senate and house district because of the strong control exercised by political parties over the selection of candidates, the inability of the Negro voters to assure themselves the opportunity to vote for prospective legislators of their choice and- the absence of any particular legislators who were accountable for their legislative record to Negro voters.

3. Party control of nominations, the inability of voters to know the candidate and the responsibility of legislators to their party and the county at large make it diffi-, cult for any legislator to diverge from the majority of his delegation and to be an effective representative of minority ghetto interests.

4. Although each legislator in Marion County is arguably responsible to all the voters, including those in the ghetto, “[p]artial responsiveness of all legislators is [not] . . . equal [to] total responsiveness and the informed concern of a few specific legislators.” 13

*1365. The apportionment statutes of Indiana ■ as they relate to Marion County operate to minimize and cancel out the voting strength óf a minority racial group, namely Negroes residing in the Center Township ghetto, and to deprive them of the equal protection- of the laws.

6. As a legislative district, Marion County is large as compared with the total number of legislators, it is not. subdistricted to insure distribution of the legislators over the county and comprises a multi-member district for both the house and the senate. (See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73, 88 (1966).)

7. To redistrict Marion County alone would leave impermissible variations between Marion County districts, and other districts in the State. Statewide redistricting was required, and it could not await the 1970 census figures estimated to be available within a year.

8. It may not be possible for the Indiana general assembly to comply with the state constitutional require^ ment prohibiting crossing or dividing counties for sena-, torial apportionment14 and still meet the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause adumbrated in recent cases.15

9. Plaintiff Walker’s claim as a Negro voter resident of Lake County that he was discriminated against because Lake County Negroes could vote for only 16 assemblymen while Marion County Negroes could vote for 23 was deemed untenable. In his second'capacity, as a. general voter in Lake County, Walker “probably has received less effective representation” than Marion County voters because “he votes for fewer legislators and, therefore, has fewer legislators to speak for him,” and, since *137in theory voting power in multi-member districts does not vary inversely to the number of voters, Marion County voters had greater opportunity to cast tie-breaking or “critical” votes. But the court declined to hold that the latter ground had been proved, absent , more evidence concerning Lake County.16 In this respect consideration of Walker’s claim was limited to that to be given the uniform districting principle in reapportioning the Indiana general assembly.17

Turning to the proper remedy, the court found redistricting of. Marion County essential. Also, although recognizing the complaint was directed only to Marion County, the court thought it must act on the evidence indicating that the entire State required reapportionment.18 Judgment was withheld in all respects, however, to give the State until October 1, 1969, to enact legisla*138tion remedying the improper districting and malappor-tionment found to exist by the court.19 In so doing the court thought the State “might wish to give consideration to certain principles of legislative apportionment brought out at the trial in these proceedings.” Id., at 1391. First, the court eschewed any indication that Negroes living in the ghetto were entitled to any certain number of legislators-^districts should be drawn with an eye that is color blind, and sophisticated gerrymandering would not be countenanced. Second, the legislature was advised to keep in mind the theoretical advantage inhering in voters in multi-member districts, that is, their theoretical opportunity to cast more deciding votes in any legislative election. Referring to the testimony that bloc-voting, multi-member delegations have disproportionately more power than single-member districts, the court thought that “the testimony has application here.” Also,< “as each member of the bloc delegation is responsible to the voter majority who elected the whole, each Marion County voter has a greater voice in the legislature, having more legislators to speak for him than does a comparable voter” in a single-member district. Single-member districts, the court thought, would equalize voting power among the districts as well as avoiding diluting political or racial groups located in multi-member districts. The court therefore recommended that the general assembly give consideration to the uniform district principle in making its apportionment.20

*139On October 15, the court judicially noticed that the Indiana general assembly had not been called to redistrict and reapportion the State. Following further hearings and examination of various plans submitted by the parties, the court drafted and adopted a plan based on the 1960 census figures. With respect to Marion County, the court followed plaintiffs’ suggested scheme, which was said to protect “the legally cognizable racial minority group against dilution of its voting strength.” 307 F. Supp. 1362, 1365 (SD Ind. 1969). Single-member districts were employed throughout the State, county lines were • .crossed where necessary, judicial notice was taken of the location of the nonwhite population in establishing district lines in metropolitan areas of the State and the court’s plan expressly aimed at giving “recognition to the cognizable racial minority group whose grievance lead [sic] to this litigation.” Id., at 1366.

The court enjoined state officials from conducting any elections under the existing apportionment statutes and ordered that the 1970 elections be held in accordance with the plan prepared by the court. Jurisdiction was retained to pass upon any future claims of unconstitutionality .with respect to any future legislative apportionments adopted by the State.21

*140Appeal was taken following the final judgment by the three-judge court, we noted probable jurisdiction, 397 U. S. 984 (1970), and the State’s motion for stay of judgment was granted pending our final action on this case, 396 U. S. 1055 (1970), thus permitting.the 1970 elections to. be held under the existing apportionment statutes declared unconstitutional by the District Court. On June 1, 1971, wé were advised by the parties that the Indiana Legislature had passed, and the Governor had signed, new apportionment legislation soon to become effective for the 1972 elections and that the new legislation provides for single-member house and senate districts throughout" the State, including Marion County.’

II

With the 1970 elections long past and the appearance of new legislation abolishing multi-member districts in Indiana,’ the issue of mootness emerges, ’ Neither party deems the case mooted by recent events. Appellees, plaintiffs below, urge that if the appeal is dismissed as moot and the judgment of the District Court is vacated, as is our practice in such cases, there would be no outstanding judgment invalidating the Marion County multi-member district and that the new apportionment legislation would be in conflict with the state constitutional provision forbidding the division of Marion County for the purpose.of electing senators. If the new sena-’ torial districts were invalidated in the state courts in this respect, it is argued that the issue involved in the present litigation would simply reappear for decision. *141The attorney general for the State of Indiana, for the appellant, taking a somewhat different tack, urges that the issue of the Marion County multi-member district is not moot since the District Court has retained jurisdiction to pass on the legality of subsequent apportionment statutes for the purpose, among others, of determining whether the alleged discriminátion against a cognizable minority group hgs been remedied, an issue that would not arise if the District Court erred in invalidating multi-member districts in Indiana.

We agree that the case is not moot and that the central issues before us must be decided. We do not, however, pass upon the details of the plan, adopted by the District Court, since that plan in any event would, have required revision in light of the 1970 census figures.

HI

The line of cases from Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368 (1963), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964), to Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526 (1969), and Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U. S. 542 (1969), recognizes that “representative government is in essence self-government through the medium of elected representatives of the' people, and each and every citizen has ah inalienable right to full and effective participation in the political processes of his State’s legislative bodies.”- ' Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S., at 565. Since most citizens find it possible to participate only as qualified voters in electing their representatives, “[f]ull and effective participation- by all citizens in state.government requires, therefore, that each citizen have an equally effective voice in the election of members of his state legislature.” Ibid. Hence,- apportionment schemes “which give the same number of representatives to unequal numbers of constituents,” 377 U. S., at 563, unconstitutionally dilute the value of the votes in the larger districts. And hence the requirement that, “the seats in both Jiouses of a bicameral state legis*142lature must be apportioned on a population basis.” 377 U. S., at 568.

The question of the constitutional validity of multi-member districts has been pressed in this Court since the first of the modern reapportionment cases. These questions have focused not on population-based apportionment but on the quality of representation afforded by the multi-member district as compared with single-member districts. In Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U. S. 713 (1964), decided with Reynolds v. Sims, we noted certain undesirable features of the multi-member district but expressly, withheld any intimation “that apportionment schemes which provide for the at-large election of a number of legislators from a county, or any political subdivision, are constitutionally defective.” 377 U. S., at 731 n. 21. Subsequently, when the validity of the multi-member district, as such, was squarely presented, we held that such a district is not per se illegal under the Equal Protection Clause. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433 (1965); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73 (1966); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U. S. 120 (1967). .See also Bur-nette v. Davis, 382 U. S. 42 (1965); Harrison v. Schaefer, 383 U. S. 269 (1966).22 That voters in multi-member *143districts vote for and are represented by more legislators than voters in single-member districts has so far not demonstrated an invidious discrimination against the latter. But w,e have deemed the validity of multi-mem-ber district systems justiciable, recognizing also that they may be subject to challenge where the circumstances of a particular case may “operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.” Fortson, 379 U. S., at 439, and Burns, 384 U. S., at 88. Such a tendency, we have said, is enhanced when the district is large and elects a substantial proportion of the seats in éither hoüse of a bicameral legislature, if it is multi-member for both *144houses of the legislature or if it lacks provision for at-large candidates running from particular geographical sub-districts, as in Fortson. Burns, 384 U. S., at 88. But we have insisted that the challenger carry the Burden of proving that multi-member districts unconstitutionally operate to dilute or cancel the voting strength of racial or political elements. We have not yet sustained .such an attack.

IV

Plaintiffs level two quite distinct challenges .to the Marion County district. The first charge is that any multi-member district bestows on its voters several unconstitutional advantages over voters, in single-member districts or smaller multi-member districts. The other allegation is that the Maripn County district, on the record of this case, illegally minimizes and cancels out the voting power of a cognizable racial minority in Marion County. The District Court sustained the latter claim and considered the former sufficiently persuasive to be a substantial factor in prescribing uniform, single-member districts as the basic scheme of the court’s own plan. See 307 F. Supp., at 1366.

In asserting discrimination against-, voters outside Marion County, plaintiffs recognize that Fortson, Burns, and Kilgarlin proceeded on the assumption that the dilution of voting power suffered by a voter who is placed in a district 10 times the population of another is cured by allocating 10 legislators to the larger district instead of the one assigned to the smaller district. Plaintiffs challenge this assumption at both the voter and legislator level. They demonstrate mathematically that in theory voting power does not vary inversely with the size of the district and that to increase legislative seats in proportion to increased population gives undue voting power, to the voter in the multi-member district since he has more chances to determine election outcomes than *145does the voter in the single-member district. This consequence obtains wholly aside from the quality or effectiveness of representation later furnished by the successful candidates. The District Court did -not quarrel with plaintiffs’ mathematics, nór do we. But like the District Court we note that the position remains a theoretical one23 and, as plaintiffs’ witness conceded, knowingly *146avoids and does “not take into account any political or other factors which might affect the actual voting power of the' residents, which might include party affiliation, race, previous voting characteristics or any other factors which go into the entire political voting situation.”24 The real-life impact of' multi-memb.er districts on individual voting power has not been sufficiently demonstrated, at least on this record, to warrant departure from prior cases.

The District Court was more impressed with the other branch of the claim that multi-member districts inherently discriminate against other districts. This, was the assertion that whatever the individual voting power of Marion County voters in choosing legislators may be, they nevertheless have more effective representation in the Indiana general assembly for two reasons. First, each voter is represented by more legislators and therefore, in theory at least, has more chances to influence critical legislative votes. Second, since multi-member delegations are elected at large and' represent the voters of the entire district, they tend to vote as a bloc, which is tantamount to the district having one representative with several votes.25 The District Court did not squarely *147sustain this position,26 but it appears to have found it sufficiently persuasive to have suggested uniform district-ing to the Indiana Legislature and to have eliminated multi-metiiber districts in the court’s own plan redistricting the State. See 307 F. Supp., at 1368-1383.

We are not ready, however, to agree that multi-member districts, wherever they exist, overrepresent their voters as compared with voters in single-member districts, even if the multi-member delegation tends to bloc voting. The theory that plural representation itself unduly enhances a district’s power and the influence of its voters remains to be demonstrated in practice and in the day-today operation of the legislature. Neither the findings of the trial court nor the record before us sustains it, even where bloc voting is posited.

In fashioning relief, the three-judge court appeared to embrace the idea that each member of a bloc-voting delegation has more influence than legislators, from a single-member district. But its findings of fact fail to deal with the actual influence of Marion County’s delegation in the' Indiana Legislature. Nor did plaintiffs’ evidence make such a showing. That bloc voting tended to occur is sustained by the record, and defendants’ own witness thought- it was advantageous for Marion County’s delegation to stick together. But nothing demonstrates that senators and representatives from Marion County counted for more in the legislature than members from single-member "districts or from smaller multi-member districts. Nor is there any thing, in the court’s findings indicating that what might be true of Marion County is also true of other multi-member districts in Indiana or is true of *148multi-member districts generally. Moreover, Marion County would have no less advantage, if advántage there is, if it elected from individual districts and the elected representatives demonstrated the same bloc-voting tendency, which may also develop among legislators representing single-member districts widely , scattered throughout the State.27 Of course it is advantageous to start with more than one vote for a bill. But nothing before us shows dr suggests that any legislative skirmish affecting the State of Indiana or Marion County ip particular would have come out differently had Marion County been subdistricted and its delegation elected from single-member districts.

Rather than squarely finding unacceptable discrimination against out-state voters in favor of Marion County voters, the trial court struck "down Marion County’s multi-member district because it found the scheme worked invidiously against a specific segment of the county’s voters as compared with others. The court identified an area of the city as a ghetto, found it predominantly inhabited, by poor Negroes with distinctive substantive-láw interests and thought this group unconstitutionally underrepresented because the proportion of legislators with residences in the ghetto elected from 1960 to 1968 was less than the ghetto’s proportion of the population, léss than the proportion of legislators elected from Washington Township, a less populous district, and less than the ghetto would likely have elected had the *149county consisted of single-member districts.28 We find major deficiencies in this approach.

First, it needs no emphasis here that the Civil War Amendments were designed to protect the civil rights of Negroes and that the courts have been vigilant in scrutinizing schemes allegedly conceived or operated as purposeful devices to further racial discrimination. There has been no hesitation in striking down those contrivances that can fairly be said to infringe on Fourteenth Amendment rights. Sims v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96 (MD Ala. 1965); Smith v. Paris, 257 F. Supp. 901 (MD Ala. 1966), aff’d, 386 F. 2d 979 (CA5 1967); and see Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). See also Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544 (1969). But there is no suggestion here that Marion County’s multi-member district, or similar districts throughout the State, were conceived or operated as purposeful devices to further racial or economic discrimination. As plaintiffs concede, “there was no basis for asserting that the legislative districts in' Indiana were designed to dilute the vote of minorities.” Brief of Appellees (Plaintiffs) 28-29. Accordingly, the circumstances here lie outside the reach of decisions such as Sims v. Baggett, supra.

Nor does the fact that the number of ghetto residents who were legislators was not in proportion to ghetto, population satisfactorily prove invidious discrimination absent evidence and findings that ghetto residents had less opportunity than did other Marion County residents to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice.- We have discovered nothing in the record or in the court’s findings indicating that poor Negroes were not allowed to register or vote, to choose the political party they desired to support, to participate in its affairs or to be equally represented on those occasions when legislative candidates were chosen. Nor did *150the evidence purport to show or the court find that inhabitants of the ghetto were regularly excluded from the slatés of both major parties, thus denying them the chance of occupying legislative seats.29 It appears reasonably clear that the Republican Party won four of the five elections from 1960 to 1968, that Center Township ghetto voted heavily Democratic and . that ghetto votes were critical to Democratic Party success. Although we cannot-be sure of the facts since the court ignored the question, it seems unlikely that the Democratic Party could afford to overlook.the ghetto in slating its candidates.30 Clearly, in 1964 — the one election that the *151Democrats won— the party slated and elected one senator and one representative from Center Township ghetto as well as one senator and four representatives from other *152parts of Center Township and two representatives from census tract 220, which was- within the ghetto area described by plaintiff.31 Nor is there any indication that, the party failed to slate candidates satisfactory to the ghetto in. other years. Absent evidence or findings we are not sure, but it seems reasonable to infer that had the Democrats won all of the elections or even most of them, the ghetto would have had no justifiable complaints about representation. The fact is, however, that four of the five elections were won by Republicans, which was not the party of the ghetto and which would not always slate ghetto candidates — although in 1962 it nominated and elected one representative and in 1968 two representatives from that area.32 *153If this is the proper view of this case, the failure of the ghetto to have legislative seats in proportion to its population emerges more as a function of losing elections than of built-in bias against poor Negroes. The voting power of ghetto residents may have been "cancelled out” as the District Court held, but this seems a mere euphemism for political defeat at the polls.

On the record before us plaintiffs’ position comes to' this: that although they have equal opportunity to participate in and influence the selection of candidates and legislators, and although the ghetto votes predominantly Democratic and that party slates candidates satisfactory to the ghetto, invidious discrimination nevertheless results when the ghetto, along with all other Democrats, suffers the disaster of losing too many elections. But typical American legislative elections are district-oriented, head-on races between candidates of two or more parties. As our system has it,- one candidate wins, the others lose. Arguably the losing candidates’ supporters are without representation since the men they voted for have been defeated; arguably they have been denied equal protection of the laws since they have no legislative voice of their own. This is true of both single-member and multi-member districts. But we have not yet deemed it a denial of equal protection to deny legislative seats to losing candidates, even in those so-called “safe” districts where the same party wins year after year.

Plainly, the District Court saw nothing unlawful about the impact of typical single-member district elections. The court’s own plan created districts giving both Rer publicans and Democrats several predictably safe general assembly seats, with political, racial or economic minorities in those districts being “unrepresented” year after year. But similar consequences flowing from Marion County multi-member district elections were viewed differéntly. Conceding that all Marion County voters could fairly be said to be represented by the entire dele*154gation, just as is each voter in a single-member district by the winning candidate, the District Court thought the ghetto voters’ claim to the partial allegiance of eight senators and 15 representatives was not equivalent to the undivided allegiance of one senator and two representative's; nor was the ghetto voters’ chance of influencing the election of an entire slate as significant as the guarantee of one ghetto, senator and' two ghetto representatives.33 As the trial court saw it, ghetto voters could ñot be ade--quately and equally represented unless some of Marion County’s general assembly seats were reserved for ghetto residents serving the interests of the ghetto majority. But are poor Negroes of the ghetto any more underrepresented than poor ghetto whites who also voted Democratic and lost, or any more discriminated against than other interest groups or voters in Marion County with allegiance to the Democratic Party, or, conversely, any less represented than Republican areas or voters in years of Republican defeat? We think not. The mere fact that one interest group or another concerned with the outcome of Marion County elections has found itself *155outvoted and without legislative seats of its own provides no basis for invoking constitutional remedies where, as here, there is no indication that this segment of the population is being denied access to the political system.

There is another gap in the trial court’s reasoning. As noted by the court, the interest of ghetto residents in certain issues did not measurably differ from that of other voters. Presumably in these respects Marion County’s assemblymen were satisfactorily representative of the ghetto. As to other matters, ghetto residents had unique interests not necessarily shared by others in the community and on these issues the ghetto residents were invidiously underrepresented absent their own legislative voice to further their own policy views.

Part of the difficulty with this conclusion is that the findings failed to support it. Plaintiffs’ evidence purported to show disregard for the ghetto’s distinctive interests.; r defendants claimed quite the contrary. We see nothing in the findings of the District Court indicating recurring poor performance by Marion County’s delegation with respect to Center Township ghetto, nothing to show what the ghetto’s interests were in particular legislative situations and nothing to indicate that the outcome would have been any different if the 23 assemblymen had been chosen from single-member districts.' Moreover, even assuming bloc voting by the delegation contrary to the wishes of the ghetto majority, it would not follow that the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated unless it is invidiously discriminatory for a county to elect its delegation by majority vote based on party or candidate platforms and so to some extent predetermine legislative votes on particular issues. Such tendencies are inherent in government by elected representatives; and surely elections in single-member districts visit precisely the same consequences on the supporters of losing candidates whose views are rejected at the polls.

*156. Y

The District Court’s holding, although on the facts of this case limited to guaranteeing one racial group representation, is not. easily contained. It is expressive of the more general proposition that any group with distinctive interests must be represented in legislative halls if it is numerous enough to command at least, one seat and represents a majority living in an area sufficiently compact to constitute a single-member district.34 This approach would make it difficult to reject claims of Democrats, Republicans, or members of any political organization in Marion County who live in what would be safe districts in a single-member district system but who in one year or another, or year after year, are submerged in a one-sided multi-member district vote.35 There are also union oriented workers, the university community, religious or ethnic groups occupying identifiable areas of our heterogeneous cities and urban areas. Indeed, it would be difficult for a great many, if not most; multi-member districts to survive analysis under the District Court’s view unless combined with some voting arrangement such as proportional representation or cumulative voting aimed *157at providing representation for minority parties or interests.36 At the very least, affirmance of the District Court would spawn endless litigation concerning the multi-member district systems now widely employed in this country.37

We are not insensitive to the objections long voiced to multi-member district plans.38 Although not as prevalent as they were in our early history, they have been *158with us since colonial times and were much in evidence both before and after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.39 Criticism is rooted in their winner-take-*159all aspects, their tendency to submerge minorities and to overrepresent the winning party as compared with the party’s statewide electoral position, a general preference for legislatures reflecting community interests as closely as possible and disenchantment with political parties and elections as devices to settle policy differences between contending interests. The chance of winning or significantly influencing intraparty fights and issue-oriented elections has seemed to some inadequate protection to minorities, political, racial, or economic; rather, their voice, it is said, should also be heard in the legislative forum where public policy is finally fashioned. In our view, however, experience and insight have not yet dem*160onstrated that multi-member districts are inherently invidious and violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. Surely the findings of the District Court do not demonstrate it. Moreover, if the problems of multi-member districts are unbearable or even unconstitutional it is not at all clear that the remedy is a single-member district system with its lines carefully drawn to ensure representation to sizable racial, ethnic, economic, or religious groups and with its. own capacity for overrepresenting and underrepresenting parties and interests and even for permitting a minority of the voters to control the legislature and government of a State. The short of it is that we are unprepared to hold that district-based elections decided by plurality vote are unconstitutional in either single- or multi-member districts simply because the supporters of losing candidates have no legislative seats assigned to them. As presently advised we hold that the District Court misconceived the Equal Pro tec-, tion Clause in applying it to invalidate the Marion County multi-member district.

VI

Even if the District Court was correct in finding, unconstitutional discrimination against poor inhabitants of the ghetto, it did not explain why it was constitutionally compelled to disestablish the entire county district and to intrude upon state policy any more than necessary to ensure representation of ghetto interests. The court entered judgment without expressly putting aside on supportable grounds the alternative of creating single-member districts in the ghetto and leaving the district otherwise intact, as well as the possibility that the Fourteenth Amendment could be satisfied by a simple requirement that some of the at-large candidates each year must reside in the ghetto.. Cf. Fortson v. <