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Full Opinion
SAXBE, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL.
v.
WASHINGTON POST CO. ET AL.
Supreme Court of United States.
Solicitor General Bork argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Acting Assistant Attorney General Jaffe, Edmund W. Kitch, and Leonard Schaitman.
Joseph A. Califano, Jr., argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Charles H. Wilson, Jr., and Richard M. Cooper.[*]
*844 MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondents, a major metropolitan newspaper and one of its reporters, initiated this litigation to challenge the constitutionality of ¶ 4b (6) of Policy Statement 1220.1A of the Federal Bureau of Prisons.[1] At the time that the case was in the District Court and the Court of Appeals, this regulation prohibited any personal interviews between newsmen and individually designated federal prison inmates. The Solicitor General has informed the Court that the regulation was recently amended "to permit press interviews at federal prison institutions that can be characterized as minimum security."[2] The general prohibition of press interviews with inmates remains in effect, however, in three-quarters of the federal prisons, i. e., in all medium security and maximum security institutions, including the two institutions involved in this case.
In March 1972, the respondents requested permission from the petitioners, the officials responsible for administering federal prisons, to conduct several interviews with specific inmates in the prisons at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, and Danbury, Connecticut. The petitioners denied permission for such interviews on the authority of Policy Statement 1220.1A. The respondents thereupon commenced this suit to challenge these denials and the regulation on which they were predicated. Their essential contention was that the prohibition of all press interviews *845 with prison inmates abridges the protection that the First Amendment accords the newsgathering activity of a free press. The District Court agreed with this contention and held that the Policy Statement, insofar as it totally prohibited all press interviews at the institutions involved, violated the First Amendment. Although the court acknowledged that institutional considerations could justify the prohibition of some press-inmate interviews, the District Court ordered the petitioners to cease enforcing the blanket prohibition of all such interviews and, pending modification of the Policy Statement, to consider interview requests on an individual basis and "to withhold permission to interview . . . only where demonstrable administrative or disciplinary considerations dominate." 357 F. Supp. 770, 775 (DC 1972).
The petitioners appealed the District Court's judgment to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. We stayed the District Court's order pending the completion of that appeal, sub nom. Kleindienst v. Washington Post Co., 406 U. S. 912 (1972). The first time this case was before it, the Court of Appeals remanded it to the District Court for additional findings of fact and particularly for reconsideration in light of this Court's intervening decision in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665 (1972). 155 U. S. App. D. C. 283, 477 F. 2d 1168 (1972). On remand, the District Court conducted further evidentiary hearings, supplemented its findings of fact, and reconsidered its conclusions of law in light of Branzburg and other recent decisions that were urged upon it. In due course, the court reaffirmed its original decision, 357 F. Supp. 779 (DC 1972), and the petitioners again appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court. It held that press interviews with prison inmates could not be totally prohibited as the Policy *846 Statement purported to do, but may "be denied only where it is the judgment of the administrator directly concerned, based on either the demonstrated behavior of the inmate, or special conditions existing at the institution at the time the interview is requested, or both, that the interview presents a serious risk of administrative or disciplinary problems." 161 U. S. App. D. C. 75, 87-88, 494 F. 2d 994, 1006-1007 (1974). Any blanket prohibition of such face-to-face interviews was held to abridge the First Amendment's protection of press freedom. Because of the important constitutional question involved, and because of an apparent conflict in approach to the question between the District of Columbia Circuit and the Ninth Circuit,[3] we granted certiorari. 415 U. S. 956 (1974).
The policies of the Federal Bureau of Prisons regarding visitations to prison inmates do not differ significantly from the California policies considered in Pell v. Procunier, ante, p. 817. As the Court of Appeals noted, "inmates' families, their attorneys, and religious counsel are accorded liberal visitation privileges. Even friends of inmates are allowed to visit, although their privileges appear to be somewhat more limited." 161 U. S. App. D. C., at 78, 494 F. 2d, at 997. Other than members of these limited groups with personal and professional ties to the inmates, members of the general public are not permitted under the Bureau's policy to enter the prisons and interview consenting inmates. This policy is applied with an even hand to all prospective visitors, including newsmen, who, like other members of the public, may enter the prisons to visit friends or family members. But, again like members of the general public, they may not enter *847 the prison and insist on visiting an inmate with whom they have no such relationship. There is no indication on this record that Policy Statement 1220.1A has been interpreted or applied to prohibit a person, who is otherwise eligible to visit and interview an inmate, from doing so merely because he is a member of the press.[4]
Except for the limitation in Policy Statement 1220.1A on face-to-face press-inmate interviews, members of the press are accorded substantial access to the federal prisons in order to observe and report the conditions they find there. Indeed, journalists are given access to the prisons and to prison inmates that in significant respects exceeds that afforded to members of the general public. For example, Policy Statement 1220.1A permits press representatives to tour the prisons and to photograph any prison facilities.[5] During such tours a newsman is permitted to conduct brief interviews with any inmates he might encounter.[6] In addition, newsmen and inmates are permitted virtually unlimited written correspondence with each other.[7] Outgoing correspondence from inmates to press representatives is neither censored nor inspected. Incoming mail from press representatives is inspected only for contraband or statements inciting illegal action. Moreover, prison officials are available to the press and are required by Policy Statement 1220.1A to "give all possible assistance" to press representatives "in providing *848 background and a specific report" concerning any inmate complaints.[8]
The respondents have also conceded in their brief that Policy Statement 1220.1A "has been interpreted by the Bureau to permit a newsman to interview a randomly selected group of inmates." As a result, the reporter respondent in this case was permitted to interview a randomly selected group of inmates at the Lewisburg prison. Finally, in light of the constant turnover in the prison population, it is clear that there is always a large group of recently released prisoners who are available to both the press and the general public as a source of information about conditions in the federal prisons.[9]
Thus, it is clear that Policy Statement 1220.1A is not part of any attempt by the Federal Bureau of Prisons to conceal from the public the conditions prevailing in federal prisons. This limitation on prearranged press interviews with individually designated inmates was motivated by the same disciplinary and administrative considerations that underline § 115.071 of the California Department of Corrections Manual, which we considered in Pell v. Procunier and Procunier v. Hillery, ante, p. 817. The experience of the Bureau accords with that of the California Department of Corrections and suggests that the interest of the press is often "concentrated on a relatively small number of inmates who, as a result, [become] virtual `public figures' within the prison society and gai[n] a disproportionate degree of notoriety and influence among their fellow inmates." Pell, ante, at 831-832. As a result those inmates who are conspicuously publicized because of *849 their repeated contacts with the press tend to become the source of substantial disciplinary problems that can engulf a large portion of the population at a prison.
The District Court and the Court of Appeals sought to meet this problem by decreeing a selective policy whereby prison officials could deny interviews likely to lead to disciplinary problems. In the expert judgment of the petitioners, however, such a selective policy would spawn serious discipline and morale problems of its own by engendering hostility and resentment among inmates who were refused interview privileges granted to their fellows. The Director of the Bureau testified that "one of the very basic tenets of sound correctional administration" is "to treat all inmates incarcerated in [the] institutions, as far as possible, equally." This expert and professional judgment is, of course, entitled to great deference.
In this case, however, it is unnecessary to engage in any delicate balancing of such penal considerations against the legitimate demands of the First Amendment. For it is apparent that the sole limitation imposed on newsgathering by Policy Statement 1220.1A is no more than a particularized application of the general rule that nobody may enter the prison and designate an inmate whom he would like to visit, unless the prospective visitor is a lawyer, clergyman, relative, or friend of that inmate. This limitation on visitations is justified by what the Court of Appeals acknowledged as "the truism that prisons are institutions where public access is generally limited." 161 U. S. App. D. C., at 80, 494 F. 2d, at 999. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, 41 (1966). In this regard, the Bureau of Prisons visitation policy does not place the press in any less advantageous position than the public generally. Indeed, the total access to federal prisons and prison inmates that the Bureau of Prisons accords to the press far surpasses that available to other members of the public.
*850 We find this case constitutionally indistinguishable from Pell v. Procunier, ante, p. 817, and thus fully controlled by the holding in that case. "[N]ewsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public." Id., at 834. The proposition "that the Constitution imposes upon government the affirmative duty to make available to journalists sources of information not available to members of the public generally . . . finds no support in the words of the Constitution or in any decision of this Court." Id., at 834-835. Thus, since Policy Statement 1220.1A "does not deny the press access to sources of information available to members of the general public," id., at 835, we hold that it does not abridge the freedom that the First Amendment guarantees. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[For dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, see ante, p. 836.]
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.
The Court today upholds the authority of the Bureau of Prisons to promulgate and enforce an absolute ban against personal interviews of prison inmates by representatives of the news media.[1] In my view the interview ban impermissibly burdens First Amendment freedoms. My analysis proceeds as follows. Part I addresses the nature and effect of the Bureau's policy. *851 Part II concerns the constitutional underpinnings of respondents' attack on that policy. Part III considers the Bureau's justifications for an absolute interview ban in light of the appropriate standard of First Amendment review, and Part IV surveys some of the factors that the Bureau may consider in formulating a constitutionally acceptable interview policy. Part V contains some concluding remarks.
I
The ban against press interviews is not part of any general news blackout in the federal prisons. Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement 1220.1A establishes the official policy regarding prisoner-press communications, and that policy in many respects commendably facilitates public dissemination of information about federal penal institutions. Inmate letters addressed to members of the news media are neither opened nor censored, and incoming mail from press representatives is inspected only for contra-band and for content likely to incite illegal conduct. Furthermore, the Bureau officially encourages newsmen to visit federal prisons in order to report on correctional facilities and programs.
The specific issue in this case is the constitutionality of the Bureau's ban against prisoner-press interviews. That policy is set forth in ¶ 4b (6) of the Policy Statement:
"Press representatives will not be permitted to interview individual inmates. This rule shall apply even where the inmate requests or seeks an interview. However, a conversation may be permitted with inmates whose identity is not to be made public, if it is limited to the discussion of institutional facilities, programs and activities."
The Policy Statement does not explicate the distinction between an "interview" and a "conversation," but that subject was explored in evidentiary proceedings before the *852 District Court. The court found that a "conversation" generally occurs when a newsman is taking a supervised tour of an institution and stops to ask an inmate about prison conditions and the like. It is a brief, spontaneous discussion with a randomly encountered inmate on subjects limited to "institutional facilities, programs, and activities." An "interview," by contrast, is a prearranged private meeting with a specifically designated inmate. It is unrestricted as to subject matter and lasts a sufficient time to permit full discussion.[2]
The Bureau's prohibition against press interviews is absolute in nature. It applies without regard to the record and characteristics of the particular inmate involved, the purpose of the interview, or the conditions then prevailing at the institution in question. At the time of the decisions of the District Court and the Court of Appeals, the interview ban applied with equal rigor to every correctional facility administered by the Bureau, community treatment centers as well as major penitentiaries. By letter dated April 16, 1974, the Solicitor General informed us that the Bureau subsequently modified its policy to exempt minimum security facilities from the absolute prohibition of press interviews. This change affects approximately one-quarter of the inmate population of the federal prisons. For the remainder, the Bureau intends to continue its established policy.
In its order remanding the case for reconsideration in light of Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665 (1972), the Court of Appeals directed the District Court to determine *853 the "extent to which the accurate and effective reporting of news has a critical dependence upon the opportunity for private personal interviews." 155 U. S. App. D. C. 283, 284, 477 F. 2d 1168, 1169 (1972). The District Court held an evidentiary hearing on this subject and made specific findings of fact. 357 F. Supp. 779 (DC 1972). Thanks to this special effort by the Court of Appeals and the District Court, we have an unusually detailed and informative account of the effect of the interview ban on prisoner-press communications.[3]
The District Court received testimony on this point from six knowledgeable persons.[4] All agreed that personal interviews are crucial to effective reporting in the prison context. A newsman depends on interviews in much the same way that a trial attorney relies on cross-examination. *854 Only in face-to-face discussion can a reporter put a question to an inmate and respond to his answer with an immediate follow-up question. Only in an interview can the reporter pursue a particular line of inquiry to a satisfactory resolution or confront an inmate with discrepancies or apparent inconsistencies in his story. Without a personal interview a reporter is often at a loss to determine the honesty of his informant or the accuracy of the information received.[5] This is particularly true in the prison environment, where the sources of information are unlikely to be well known to newsmen or to have established any independent basis for assessing credibility. Consequently, ethical newsmen are reluctant to publish a story without an opportunity through face-to-face discussion to evaluate the veracity and reliability of its source. Those who do publish without interviews are likely to print inaccurate, incomplete, and sometimes jaundiced news items. The detailed testimony on this point led the District Court to find as a fact that the absolute interview ban precludes accurate and effective reporting on prison conditions and inmate grievances.
The District Court also found that the alternative avenues of prisoner-press communication allowed by the Policy Statement, whether considered singly or in aggregation, are insufficient to compensate for the prohibition of personal interviews. For the reasons stated above, correspondence is decidedly inferior to face-to-face discussion as a means of obtaining reliable information about prison conditions and inmate grievances. In addition, the prevalence of functional illiteracy among the inmate population poses a serious difficulty; many prisoners *855 are simply incapable of communicating effectively in writing.
Random conversations during supervised tours of prison facilities are also no substitute for personal interviews with designated inmates. The conversations allowed by the Policy Statement are restricted in both duration and permissible subject matter. Furthermore, not every inmate is equally qualified to speak on every subject. If a reporter is investigating a particular incident, the opportunity to converse with inmates who were not present is of little consequence. Moreover, the conversations associated with guided tours are often held in the presence of several inmates, a factor likely to result in distortion of the information obtained.[6] The District Court received *856 detailed testimony concerning the kinds of information that can only be obtained through personal interviews of individual inmates.
On the basis of this and other evidence, the District Court found that personal interviews are essential to accurate and effective reporting in the prison environment. The Court of Appeals endorsed that conclusion, noting that the trial court's findings of fact on this issue "are supported by a substantial body of evidence of record, and indeed appear to be uncontradicted." 161 U. S. App. D. C., at 82, 494 F. 2d, at 1001. The Government does not seriously attack this conclusion. Instead, it contends that the effect of the Bureau's interview ban on prisoner-press communications raises no claim of constitutional dimensions. It is to that question that I now turn.
II
Respondents assert a constitutional right to gather news. In the language of the Court of Appeals, they claim a right of access by the press to newsworthy events. However characterized, the gist of the argument is that the constitutional guarantee of a free press may be rendered ineffective by excessive restraints on access to information and therefore that the Government may not enforce such restrictions absent some substantial justification for doing so. In other words, respondents contend that the First Amendment protects both the dissemination of news and the antecedent activity of obtaining the information that becomes news.
The Court rejects this claim on the ground that "newsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons or *857 their inmates beyond that afforded the general public." Pell v. Procunier, ante, at 834. It is said that First Amendment protections for newsgathering by the press reach only so far as the opportunities available for the ordinary citizen to have access to the source of news. Because the Bureau of Prisons does not specifically discriminate against the news media, its absolute prohibition of prisoner-press interviews is not susceptible to constitutional attack. In the Court's view, this is true despite the factual showing that the interview ban precludes effective reporting on prison conditions and inmate grievances. From all that appears in the Court's opinion, one would think that any governmental restriction on access to information, no matter how severe, would be constitutionally acceptable to the majority so long as it does not single out the media for special disabilities not applicable to the public at large.
I agree, of course, that neither any news organization nor reporters as individuals have constitutional rights superior to those enjoyed by ordinary citizens. The guarantees of the First Amendment broadly secure the rights of every citizen; they do not create special privileges for particular groups or individuals. For me, at least, it is clear that persons who become journalists acquire thereby no special immunity from governmental regulation. To this extent I agree with the majority. But I cannot follow the Court in concluding that any governmental restriction on press access to information, so long as it is nondiscriminatory, falls outside the purview of First Amendment concern.
The Court principally relies on two precedents. In Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1 (1965), the Court rejected a United States citizen's contention that he had a First Amendment right to visit Cuba in order to inform himself of the conditions there. The more recent authority is Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665 (1972), where we *858 considered the assertion by newsmen of a qualified First Amendment right to refuse to reveal their confidential sources or the information obtained from them to grand juries. The Court rejected this claim, primarily on the ground that the largely speculative public interest "in possible future news about crime from undisclosed, unverified sources" could not override the competing interest "in pursuing and prosecuting those crimes reported to the press by informants and in thus deterring the commission of such crimes in the future." Id., at 695.
Relying on these precedents, the majority apparently concludes that nondiscriminatory restrictions on press access to information are constitutionally irrelevant. Neither Zemel nor Branzburg warrants so broad a reading. In Zemel the Court rejected the asserted First Amendment right to visit Cuba on the ground that the governmental restriction on trips to that country was "an inhibition of action" rather than a restraint of speech. 381 U. S., at 16. However appropriate to the context of that case, this distinction could not have been intended as an all-embracing test for determining which governmental regulations implicate First Amendment freedoms and which do not. The decision in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968), is sufficient answer to any such suggestion. Moreover, the dichotomy between speech and action, while often helpful to analysis, is too uncertain to serve as the dispositive factor in charting the outer boundaries of First Amendment concerns. In the instant case, for example, it may be said with equal facility that the Bureau forbids the conduct, at least by newsmen and the public generally, of holding a private meeting with an incarcerated individual or, alternatively, that the Bureau prohibits the direct exchange of speech that constitutes an interview with a press representative. In light of the Bureau's willingness to allow lawyers, clergymen, relatives, and friends to meet privately with *859 designated inmates, the latter characterization of the interview ban seems closer to the mark, but in my view the scope and meaning of First Amendment guarantees do not hinge on these semantic distinctions. The reality of the situation is the same, certainly in this case, and there is no magic in choosing one characterization rather than the other. Simply stated, the distinction that formed the basis for decision in Zemel is not helpful here.
Nor does Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, compel the majority's resolution of this case. It is true, of course, that the Branzburg decision rejected an argument grounded in the assertion of a First Amendment right to gather news and that the opinion contains language which, when read in isolation, may be read to support the majority's view. E. g., 408 U. S., at 684-685. Taken in its entirety, however, Branzburg does not endorse so sweeping a rejection of First Amendment challenges to restraints on access to news. The Court did not hold that the government is wholly free to restrict press access to newsworthy information. To the contrary, we recognized explicitly that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press does extend to some of the antecedent activities that make the right to publish meaningful: "Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." Id., at 681. We later reiterated this point by noting that "news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections. . . ." Id., at 707. And I emphasized the limited nature of the Branzburg holding in my concurring opinion: "The Court does not hold that newsmen, subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, are without constitutional rights with respect to the gathering of news or in safeguarding their sources." Id., at 709. In addition to these explicit statements, a fair reading of the majority's analysis in Branzburg makes plain that the result hinged *860 on an assessment of the competing societal interests involved in that case rather than on any determination that First Amendment freedoms were not implicated. See especially id., at 700-701.
In sum, neither Zemel nor Branzburg presents a barrier to independent consideration of respondents' constitutional attack on the interview ban. Those precedents arose in contexts far removed from that of the instant case, and in my view neither controls here. To the extent that Zemel and Branzburg speak to the issue before us, they reflect no more than a sensible disinclination to follow the right-to-access argument as far as dry logic might extend. As the Court observed in Zemel: "There are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow." 381 U. S., at 16-17. It goes too far to suggest that the government must justify under the stringent standards of First Amendment review every regulation that might affect in some tangential way the availability of information to the news media. But to my mind it is equally impermissible to conclude that no governmental inhibition of press access to newsworthy information warrants constitutional scrutiny. At some point official restraints on access to news sources, even though not directed solely at the press, may so undermine the function of the First Amendment that it is both appropriate and necessary to require the government to justify such regulations in terms more compelling than discretionary authority and administrative convenience. It is worth repeating our admonition in Branzburg that "without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." 408 U. S., at 681.
The specific issue here is whether the Bureau's prohibition of prisoner-press interviews gives rise to a claim of constitutional dimensions. The interview ban is categorical in nature. Its consequence is to preclude accurate *861 and effective reporting on prison conditions and inmate grievances. These subjects are not privileged or confidential. The Government has no legitimate interest in preventing newsmen from obtaining the information that they may learn through personal interviews or from reporting their findings to the public. Quite to the contrary, federal prisons are public institutions. The administration of these institutions, the effectiveness of their rehabilitative programs, the conditions of confinement that they maintain, and the experiences of the individuals incarcerated therein are all matters of legitimate societal interest and concern.[7] Respondents do not assert a right to force disclosure of confidential information or to invade in any way the decision making processes of governmental officials. Neither do they seek to question any inmate who does not wish to be interviewed. They only seek to be free of an exceptionless prohibition against a method of newsgathering that is essential to effective reporting in the prison context.
I believe that this sweeping prohibition of prisoner-press interviews substantially impairs a core value of the First Amendment. Some years ago, Professor Chafee *862 pointed out that the guarantee of freedom of speech and press protects two kinds of interests: "There is an individual interest, the need of many men to express their opinions on matters vital to them if life is to be worth living, and a social interest in the attainment of truth, so that the country may not only adopt the wisest course of action but carry it out in the wisest way." Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 33 (1954). In its usual application as a bar to governmental restraints on speech or publicationthe First Amendment protects important values of individual expression and personal self-fulfillment. But where as here, the Government imposes neither a penalty on speech nor any sanction against publication, these individualistic values of the First Amendment are not directly implicated.
What is at stake here is the societal function of the First Amendment in preserving free public discussion of governmental affairs. No aspect of that constitutional guarantee is more rightly treasured than its protection of the ability of our people through free and open debate to consider and resolve their own destiny. As the Solicitor General made the point, "[t]he First Amendment is one of the vital bulwarks of our national commitment to intelligent self-government." Brief for Petitioners 47-48. It embodies our Nation's commitment to popular self-determination and our abiding faith that the surest course for developing sound national policy lies in a free exchange of views on public issues.[8] And public debate must not *863 only be unfettered; it must also be informed. For that reason this Court has repeatedly stated that First Amendment concerns encompass the receipt of information and ideas as well as the right of free expression. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 762 (1972); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 390 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301 (1965); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 143 (1943).
In my view this reasoning also underlies our recognition in Branzburg that "news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections . . . ." 408 U. S., at 707. An informed public depends on accurate and effective reporting by the news media. No individual can obtain for himself the information needed for the intelligent discharge of his political responsibilities. For most citizens the prospect of personal familiarity with newsworthy events is hopelessly unrealistic. In seeking out the news the press therefore acts as an agent of the public at large. It is the means by which the people receive that free flow of information and ideas essential to intelligent self-government. By enabling the public to assert meaningful control over the political process, the press performs a crucial function in effecting the societal purpose of the First Amendment. That function is recognized by specific reference to the press in the text of the Amendment and by the precedents of this Court:
"The Constitution specifically selected the press . . . to play an important role in the discussion of public affairs. Thus the press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the *864 people responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve." Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214, 219 (1966).
This constitutionally established role of the news media is directly implicated here. For good reasons, unrestrained public access is not permitted. The people must therefore depend on the press for information concerning public institutions. The Bureau's absolute prohibition of prisoner-press interviews negates the ability of the press to discharge that function and thereby substantially impairs the right of the people to a free flow of information and ideas on the conduct of their Government. The underlying right is the right of the public generally. The press is the necessary representative of the public's interest in this context and the instrumentality which effects the public's right. I therefore conclude that the Bureau's ban against personal interviews must be put to the test of First Amendment review.
III
Because I believe that the ban against prisoner-press interviews significantly impinges on First Amendment freedoms, I must consider whether the Government has met its heavy burden of justification for that policy. In Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U. S. 503 (1969), the Court noted that First Amendment guarantees must be "applied in light of the special characteristics of the . . . environment." Id., at 506. Earlier this Term we had occasion to consider the applicability of those guarantees in light of the special characteristics of the prison environment. That opportunity arose in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396 (1974), where we considered the constitutionality of California prison regulations authorizing censorship of inmate correspondence. We declined to analyze that case in terms of "prisoners' *865 rights," for we concluded that censorship of prisoner mail, whether incoming or outgoing, impinges on the interest in communication of both the inmate and the nonprisoner correspondent: "Whatever the status of a prisoner's claim to uncensored correspondence with an outsider, it is plain that the latter's interest is grounded in the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech." Id., at 408. We therefore looked for guidance "not to cases involving questions of `prisoners' rights,' but to decisions of this Court dealing with the general problem of incidental restrictions on First Amendment liberties imposed in furtherance of legitimate governmental activities." Id., at 409. Adopting the approach followed in Tinker, supra; Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169 (1972); and United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968), we enunciated the following standard for determining the constitutionality of prison regulations that limit the First Amendment liberties of nonprisoners:
"First, the regulation or practice in question must further an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression.. . . Second, the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved." 416 U. S., at 413.
We announced Procunier v. Martinez, supra, after final decision of this case by the District Court and affirmance by the Court of Appeals. Happily, those courts anticipated our holding in Procunier and decided this case under a standard of First Amendment review that is in substance identical to our formulation there. Thus, the Court of Appeals sought to assure that the impairment of the public's right to a free flow of information about prisons is "no greater than is necessary for the protection of the legitimate societal interests in the effective administration *866 of [penal] systems." 161 U. S. App. D. C., at 80, 494 F. 2d, at 999.[9] The court reviewed in detail the various interests asserted by the Bureau and reached the following conclusion:
"[W]hile we do not question that the concerns voiced by the Bureau are legitimate interests that merit protection, we must agree with the District Court that they do not, individually or in total, justify the sweeping absolute ban that the Bureau has chosen to impose. When regulating an area in which First Amendment interests are involved, administrative officials must be careful not only to assure that they are responding to legitimate interests which are within their powers to protect; they must also take care not to cast regulations in a broad manner that unnecessarily sacrifices First Amendment rights. In this case the scope of the interview ban is excessive; the Bureau's interests can and must be protected on a more selective basis." Id., at 86, 494 F. 2d, at 1005.
I agree with this conclusion by the Court of Appeals. The Bureau's principal justification for its interview ban has become known during the course of this litigation as the "big wheel" phenomenon. The phrase refers generally to inmate leaders. The Bureau argues that press interviews with "big wheels" increase their status and influence and thus enhance their ability to persuade other prisoners to engage in disruptive behavior. As a result security is threatened, discipline impaired, and meaningful rehabilitation rendered more problematical than ever.
There seems to be little question that "big wheels" do *867 exist[10] and that their capacity to influence their fellow inmates may have a negative impact on the correctional environment of penal institutions. Whether press interviews *868 play a significant role in the creation of "big wheels" or in the enhancement of their prestige was a subject of dispute in the District Court. With appropriate regard for the expertise of prison administrators, that court found that the problems associated with the "big wheel" phenomenon "are all real considerations and while somewhat impressionistic, they are supported by experience and advanced in good faith." 357 F. Supp. 770, 77