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Full Opinion
MIDDENDORF, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, ET AL.
v.
HENRY ET AL.
Supreme Court of United States.
*27 Harvey M. Stone argued the cause pro hac vice for petitioners in No. 74-175 and respondents in No. 74-5176 on the reargument. Deputy Solicitor General Frey argued the cause for those parties on the original argument. With Mr. Stone on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Petersen, Harriet S. Shapiro, Sidney M. Glazer, Merlin H. Staring, H. B. Robertson, Jr., and Max G. Halliday.
Nathan R. Zahm reargued the cause for petitioners in No. 74-5176 and respondents in No. 74-175. With him on the briefs were A. L. Wirin, Fred Okrand, David F. Addlestone, and Thomas M. Geisler, Jr.
*28 MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
In February 1973 plaintiffs[1]then enlisted members of the United States Marine Corpsbrought this class action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California challenging the authority of the military to try them at summary courts-martial without providing them with counsel. Five plaintiffs[2] had been charged with "unauthorized absences"[3] in violation of Art. 86, UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 886, convicted at summary courts-martial, and sentenced, inter alia, to periods of confinement ranging from 20 to 30 days at hard labor. The other three plaintiffs, two of whom were charged, inter alia, with unauthorized absence and one with assault, Art. 128, UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 928, had been ordered to stand trial at summary courts-martial which had not been convened. Those who were convicted had not been provided counselthose who were awaiting trial had been informed that counsel would not be provided. All convicted plaintiffs were informed prior to trial that they would not be afforded counsel and that they could refuse trial by summary court-martial if they so desired. In the event of such refusal their cases would be referred to special courts-martial at which counsel would be provided. All plaintiffs consented in writing to proceed to trial by summary court-martial, without *29 counsel.[4] Plaintiffs' court-martial records were reviewed and approved[5] by the Staff Judge Advocate pursuant to Art. 65 (c), UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 865 (c). Plaintiffs did not file a petition for review with the Judge Advocate General of the Navy pursuant to Art. 69, UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 869.[6]
In the District Court, plaintiffs brought a class action seeking habeas corpus (release from confinement), an *30 injunction against future confinement resulting from uncounseled summary court-martial convictions, and an order vacating the convictions of those previously convicted.
The District Court allowed the suit to proceed as a class action, expunged all of plaintiffs' convictions, released all plaintiffs and all other members of their class[7] from confinement, and issued a worldwide injunction against summary courts-martial without counsel. Because of our disposition of this case on the merits, we have no occasion to reach the question of whether Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23, providing for class actions, is applicable to petitions for habeas corpus, see Harris v. Nelson, 394 U. S. 286 (1969), or whether the District Court properly determined that its remedial order was entitled to be enforced outside of the territorial limits of the district in which the court sat.
The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the District Court, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the court of Appeals' opinion in Daigle v. Warner, 490 F. 2d 358 (CA9 1973). Daigle had held that there was no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in summary courts-martial, and likewise held that there was no absolute Fifth Amendment due process right to counsel in every case in which a military defendant might be imprisoned. However, citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973), it did hold that counsel was required where the "accused makes a request based on a timely and colorable claim (1) that he has a defense, or (2) that there are mitigating circumstances, and the assistance of counsel is necessary in order adequately to *31 present the defense or mitigating circumstances." Daigle made an exception from this general rule for cases in which counsel "is not reasonably available," in which instance it would not be required. 490 F. 2d, at 365. We granted certiorari. 419 U. S. 895 (1974).
I
The UCMJ provides four methods for disposing of cases involving offenses committed by servicemen: the general, special, and summary courts-martial, and disciplinary punishment administered by the commanding officer pursuant to Art. 15, UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 815. General and special courts-martial resemble judicial proceedings, nearly always presided over by lawyer judges with lawyer counsel for both the prosecution and the defense.[8] General courts-martial are authorized to award any lawful sentence, including death. Art. 18, UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 818. Special courts-martial may award a bad-conduct discharge, up to six months' confinement at hard labor, forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month for six months, and in the case of an enlisted member, reduction to the lowest pay grade, Art. 19, UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 819. Article 15 punishment, conducted personally by the accused's commanding officer, is an administrative *32 method of dealing with the most minor offenses. Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 750 (1974).[9]
The summary court-martial occupies a position between informal nonjudicial disposition under Art. 15 and the courtroom-type procedure of the general and special courts-martial. Its purpose, "is to exercise justice promptly for relatively minor offenses under a simple form of procedure." Manual for courts-Martial ¶ 79a (1969) (MCM). It is an informal proceeding conducted by a single commissioned officer with jurisdiction only over noncommissioned officers and other enlisted personnel. Art. 20, UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 820. The presiding officer acts as judge, factfinder, prosecutor, and defense counsel. The presiding officer must inform the accused of the charges and the name of the accuser and call all witnesses whom he or the accused desires to call.[10] MCM ¶ 79d (1). The accused must consent to trial *33 by summary court-martial; if he does not do so, trial may be ordered by special or general court-martial.
The maximum sentence elements which may be imposed by summary courts-martial are: one month's confinement at hard labor; 45 days' hard labor without confinement; two months' restriction to specified limits; reduction to the lowest enlisted pay grade; and forfeiture of two-thirds pay for one month. Art. 20, UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 820.[11]
II
The question of whether an accused in a court-martial has a constitutional right to counsel has been much debated[12] and never squarely resolved. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1, 37 (1957). Dicta in Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 123 (1866), said that "the framers of the Constitution, doubtless, meant to limit the right of trial by *34 jury, in the sixth amendment, to those persons who were subject to indictment or presentment in the fifth." In Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, 40 (1942), it was said that " `cases arising in the land or naval forces' . . . are expressly excepted from the Fifth Amendment, and are deemed excepted by implication from the Sixth."
We find it unnecessary in this case to finally resolve the broader aspects of this question, since we conclude that even were the Sixth Amendment to be held applicable to court-martial proceedings, the summary court-martial provided for in these cases was not a "criminal prosecution" within the meaning of that Amendment.[13]
This conclusion, of course, does not answer the ultimate question of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to counsel at a summary court-martial proceeding, but it does shift the frame of reference from the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel "[i]n all criminal prosecutions" to the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against the deprivation of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972), held that the Sixth Amendment's provision for the assistance of counsel extended to misdemeanor prosecutions in civilian courts if conviction would result in imprisonment. A *35 summary court-martial may impose 30 days' confinement at hard labor, which is doubtless the military equivalent of imprisonment. Yet the fact that the outcome of a proceeding may result in loss of liberty does not by itself, even in civilian life, mean that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is applicable. In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973), the respondent faced the prospect of being sent to prison as a result of the revocation of his probation, but we held that the revocation proceeding was nonetheless not a "criminal proceeding." We took pains in that case to observe:
"[T]here are critical differences between criminal trials and probation or parole revocation hearings, and both society and the probationer or parolee have stakes in preserving these differences.
"In a criminal trial, the State is represented by a prosecutor; formal rules of evidence are in force; a defendant enjoys a number of procedural rights which may be lost if not timely raised; and, in a jury trial, a defendant must make a presentation understandable to untrained jurors. In short, a criminal trial under our system is an adversary proceeding with its own unique characteristics. In a revocation hearing, on the other hand, the State is represented, not by a prosecutor, but by a parole officer with the orientation described above; formal procedures and rules of evidence are not employed; and the members of the hearing body are familiar with the problems and practice of probation or parole." Id., at 788-789.
In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967), involved a proceeding in which a juvenile was threatened with confinement. The Court, although holding counsel was required, went on to say:
" `We do not mean . . . to indicate that the hearing *36 to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.' " Id., at 30.
The Court's distinction between various civilian proceedings, and its conclusion that, notwithstanding the potential loss of liberty, neither juvenile hearings nor probation revocation hearings are "criminal proceedings," are equally relevant in assessing the role of the summary court-martial in the military.
The summary court-martial is, as noted above, one of four types of proceedings by which the military imposes discipline or punishment. If we were to remove the holding of Argersinger from its civilian context and apply it to require counsel before a summary court-martial proceeding simply because loss of liberty may result from such a proceeding, it would seem all but inescapable that counsel would likewise be required for the lowest level of military proceeding for dealing with the most minor offenses. For even the so-called Art. 15 "nonjudicial punishment," which may be imposed administratively by the commanding officer, may result in the imposition upon an enlisted man of "correctional custody" with hard labor for not more than 30 consecutive days.[14] 10 U. S. C. § 815 (b).[15] But we think that *37 the analysis made in cases such as Gagnon and Gault, as well as considerations peculiar to the military, counsel against such a mechanical application of Argersinger.
Admittedly Gagnon is distinguishable in that there the defendant had been earlier sentenced at the close of an orthodox criminal prosecution. But Gault is not so distinguishable: there the juvenile faced possible initial confinement as a result of the proceeding in question, but the Court nevertheless based its conclusion that counsel was required on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than on any determination that the hearing was a "criminal prosecution" within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.
It seems to us indisputably clear, therefore, that even in a civilian context the fact that a proceeding will result in loss of liberty does not ipso facto mean that the proceeding is a "criminal prosecution" for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. Nor does the fact that confinement will be imposed in the first instance as a result of that proceeding make it a "criminal prosecution." When we consider in addition the fact that a summary court-martial occurs in the military community, rather than the civilian community, we believe that the considerations supporting the conclusion that it is not a "criminal prosecution" are at least as strong as those which were held dispositive in Gagnon and Gault.
The dissent points out, post, at 56-57, n. 6, that in *38 Gault the Court gave weight to the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile proceedings there involved, and that no such factor is present in summary courts-martial. Undoubtedly both Gault and Gagnon are factually distinguishable from the summary court-martial proceeding here. But together they surely stand for the proposition that even in the civilian community a proceeding which may result in deprivation of liberty is nonetheless not a "criminal proceeding" within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment if there are elements about it which sufficiently distinguish it from a traditional civilian criminal trial. The summary court-martial proceeding here is likewise different from a traditional trial in many respects, the most important of which is that it occurs within the military community. This latter factor, under a long line of decisions of this Court, is every bit as significant, and every bit as entitled to be given controlling weight, as the fact in Gagnon that the defendant had been previously sentenced, or the fact in Gault that the proceeding had a rehabilitative purpose.
We have only recently noted the difference between the diverse civilian community and the much more tightly regimented military community in Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 749 (1974). We said there that the UCMJ "cannot be equated to a civilian criminal code. It, and the various versions of the Articles of War which have preceded it, regulate aspects of the conduct of members of the military which in the civilian sphere are left unregulated. While a civilian criminal code carves out a relatively small segment of potential conduct and declares it criminal, the Uniform Code of Military Justice essays more varied regulation of a much larger segment of the activities of the more tightly knit military community." Ibid. Much of the conduct proscribed by the military is not "criminal" conduct in the civilian sense of the word. Id., at 749-751.
*39 Here, for example, most of the plaintiffs were charged solely with "unauthorized absence," an offense which has no common-law counterpart and which carries little popular opprobrium. Conviction of such an offense would likely have no consequences for the accused beyond the immediate punishment meted out by the military, unlike conviction for such civilian misdemeanors as vagrancy or larceny which could carry a stamp of "bad character" with conviction.[16]
*40 By the same token, the penalties which may be meted out in summary courts-martial are limited to one month's confinement at hard labor, 45 days' hard labor without confinement, or two months' restriction to specified limits.[17] Sanctions which may be imposed affecting a property interest are limited to reduction in grade with attendant loss of pay, or forfeiture or detention of a portion of one month's pay.
Finally, a summary court-martial is procedurally quite different from a criminal trial. In the first place, it is not an adversary proceeding. Yet the adversary nature of civilian criminal proceedings is one of the touchstones of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel[18] which we *41 extended to petty offenses in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972).
Argersinger relied on Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), where we held:
"[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court . . . cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth. Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly society. . . ." Id., at 344.
The function of the presiding officer is quite different from that of any participant in a civilian trial. He is guided by the admonition in ¶ 79a of the MCM: "The function of a summary court-martial is to exercise justice promptly for relatively minor offenses under a simple form of procedure. The summary court will thoroughly and impartially inquire into both sides of the matter and will assure that the interests of both the Government and the accused are safeguarded." The presiding officer is more specifically enjoined to attend to the interests of the accused by these provisions of the same paragraph:
"The accused will be extended the right to cross-examine these witness. The summary court will aid the accused in the cross-examination, and, if the accused desires, will ask questions suggested by the accused. On behalf of the accused, the court will obtain the attendance of witnesses, administer the oath and examine them, and obtain such other evidence *42 as may tend to disprove or negative guilt of the charges, explain the acts or omissions charged, show extenuating circumstances, or establish grounds for mitigation. Before determining the findings, he will explain to the accused his right to testify on the merits or to remain silent and will give the accused full opportunity to exercise his election." MCM ¶ 79d (3).
We believe there are significant parallels between the Court's description of probation and parole revocation proceedings in Gagnon and the summary court-martial, which parallels tend to distinguish both of these proceedings from the civilian misdemeanor prosecution upon which Argersinger focused. When we consider in addition that the court-martial proceeding takes place not in civilian society, as does the parole revocation proceeding, but in the military community with all of its distinctive qualities, we conclude that a summary court-martial is not a "criminal prosecution" for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.[19]
III
The Court of Appeals likewise concluded that there was no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in summary court-martial proceedings such as this, but applying the due process standards of the Fifth Amendment adopted a standard from Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973), which would have made the right to counsel depend upon the nature of the serviceman's defense. We *43 are unable to agree that the Court of Appeals properly applied Gagnon in this military context.
We recognize that plaintiffs, who have either been convicted or are due to appear before a summary court-martial, may be subjected to loss of liberty or property, and consequently are entitled to the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
However, whether this process embodies a right to counsel depends upon an analysis of the interests of the individual and those of the regime to which he is subject. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 556 (1974).
In making such an analysis we must give particular deference to the determination of Congress, made under its authority to regulate the land and naval forces, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, that counsel should not be provided in summary courts-martial. As we held in Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137, 140 (1953):
"[T]he rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty, and the civil courts are not the agencies which must determine the precise balance to be struck in this adjustment. The Framers especially entrusted that task to Congress." (Footnote omitted.)
The United States Court of Military Appeals has held that Argersinger is applicable to the military and requires counsel at summary courts-martial. United States v. Alderman, 22 U. S. C. M. A. 298, 46 C. M. R. 298 (1973). Dealing with areas of law peculiar to the military branches, the Court of Military Appeals' judgments are normally entitled to great deference. But the 2-to-1 decision, in which the majority itself was sharply divided in theory, does not reject the claim of military necessity. Judge Quinn was of the opinion that Argersinger's expansion of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was *44 binding on military tribunals equally with civilian courts.[20]Alderman, supra, at 300, 46 C. M. R., at 300. Judge Duncan, concurring in part, disagreed, reasoning that decisions such as Argersinger were not binding precedent if "there is demonstrated a military necessity demanding nonapplicability." Id., at 303, 46 C. M. R., at 303. He found no convincing evidence of military necessity which would preclude application of Argersinger. Chief Judge Darden, dissenting, disagreed with Judge Quinn, and pointed to that court's decisions recognizing "the need for balancing the application of the constitutional protection against military needs." Id., at 307, 46 C. M. R., at 307. Taking issue as well with Judge Duncan, he stated his belief that the Court of Military Appeals "possesses no special competence to evaluate the effect of a particular procedure on morale and discipline and to require its implementation over and above the balance struck by Congress." Id., at 308, 46 C. M. R., at 308.
Given that only one member of the Court of Military Appeals took issue with the claim of military necessity, and taking the latter of Chief Judge Darden's statements as applying with at least equal force to the Members of this Court, we are left with Congress' previous determination that counsel is not required. We thus need only decide whether the factors militating in favor of counsel at summary courts-martial are so extraordinarily weighty as to overcome the balance struck by Congress.[21]
*45 We first consider the effect of providing counsel at summary courts-martial. As we observed in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, at 787:
"The introduction of counsel into a . . . proceeding will alter significantly the nature of the proceeding. If counsel is provided for the [accused], the State in turn will normally provide its own counsel; lawyers, by training and disposition, are advocates and bound by professional duty to present all available evidence and arguments in support of their clients' positions and to contest with vigor all adverse evidence and views."
In short, presence of counsel will turn a brief, informal hearing which may be quickly convened and rapidly concluded into an attenuated proceeding which consumes the resources of the military to a degree which Congress could properly have felt to be beyond what is warranted by the relative insignificance of the offenses being tried. Such a lengthy proceeding is a particular burden to the Armed Forces because virtually all the participants, including the defendant and his counsel, are members of *46 the military whose time may be better spent than in possibly protracted disputes over the imposition of discipline.[22]
As we observed in U. S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11, 17 (1955):
"[I]t is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise. But trial of soldiers to maintain discipline is merely incidental to an army's primary fighting function. To the extent that those responsible for performance of this primary function are diverted from it by the necessity of trying cases, the basic fighting purpose of armies is not served. . . . [M]ilitary tribunals have not been and probably never can be constituted in such way that they can have the same kind of qualifications that the Constitution has deemed essential to fair trials of civilians in federal courts."
However, the Court of Appeals did not find counsel necessary in all proceedings but only, pursuant to Daigle v. Warner, where the accused makes
"a timely and colorable claim (1) that he has a defense, or (2) that there are mitigating circumstances, and the assistance of counsel is necessary in order adequately to present the defense or mitigating circumstances." 490 F. 2d, at 365.
But if the accused has such a claim, if he feels that in order to properly air his views and vindicate his rights, *47 a formal, counseled proceeding is necessary he may simply refuse trial by summary court-martial and proceed to trial by special or general court-martial at which he may have counsel.[23] Thus, he stands in a considerably more favorable position than the probationer in Gagnon who, though subject to the possibility of longer periods of incarceration, had no such absolute right to counsel.[24]
It is true that by exercising this option the accused subjects himself to greater possible penalties imposed in the special court-martial proceeding. However, we do not find that possible determent to be constitutionally decisive. We have frequently approved the much more difficult decision, daily faced by civilian criminal defendants, to plead guilty to a lesser included offense. E. g., Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 749-750 (1970). In such a case the defendant gives up not only his right to counsel but his right to any trial at all. Furthermore, *48 if he elects to exercise his right to trial he stands to be convicted of a more serious offense which will likely bear increased penalties.[25]
Such choices are a necessary part of the criminal justice system:
"The criminal process, like the rest of the legal system, is replete with situations requiring `the making of difficult judgments' as to which course to follow. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S., at 769. Although a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him to choose." McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 213 (1971).
We therefore agree with the defendants that neither the Sixth nor the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution empowers us to overturn the congressional determination that counsel is not required in summary courts-martial. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Reversed.
or decision of these cases.
*49 MR. JUSTICE STEWART dissents, believing that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that a defendant be accorded the assistance of counsel in a summary court-martial proceeding.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, concurring.
As I agree with the substance and holding of the Court's opinion, I join it. I write separately to emphasize the factor which, in my view, distinguishes this case from Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972). One sentence expresses the fundamental basis for the distinction:
"This Court has long recognized that the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society." Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 743 (1974).
In Parker, the court went on to say that we also have recognized that "the military has, again by necessity, developed laws and traditions of its own during its long history." Ibid. Only last Term in Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U. S. 738, 757 (1975), we said:
"The laws and traditions governing [military] discipline have a long history; . . . they are founded on unique military exigencies as powerful now as in the past. Their contemporary vitality repeatedly has been recognized by Congress."
The Constitution expressly authorized the Congress to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." Art. I, § 8. Court-martial proceedings, as a primary means for the regulation and discipline of the Armed Forces, were well known to the Founding Fathers. The procedures in such courts were *50 never deemed analogous to, or required to conform with, procedures in civilian courts. One must ignore history, tradition, and practice for two centuries to read into the Constitution, at this late date, a requirement for counsel in the discipline of minor violations of military law.[1]
I recognize, of course, that one's constitutional rights are not surrendered upon entering the Armed Services. But the rights are applied, as this Court often has held, in light of the "unique military exigencies" that necessarily govern many aspects of military service. See Parker v. Levy, supra, at 758. In recognition of this, since the founding of the Republic Congress has enacted special legislation applicable only to the Armed Services,[2] including the current provisions in the Uniform Code of *51 Military Justice for summary courts-martial. Art. 16 (3), UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 816 (3).
I find no basis for holding now that the Constitution compels the equating, for purposes of requiring that counsel be provided, of military summary courts with civilian criminal courts.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, dissenting.
We only recently held that, absent a waiver, "no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial." Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25, 37 (1972). Today the Court refuses to apply Argersinger's holding to defendants in summary court-martial proceedings. Assuming for purposes of its opinion that the Sixth Amendment applies to courts-martial in general, the Court holds that, because of their special characteristics, summary courts-martial in particular are simply not "criminal prosecutions" within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment, and that the right to counsel is therefore inapplicable to them. I dissent.
I
Preliminarily, summary courts-martial aside, it is clear to me that a citizen does not surrender all right to appointed counsel when he enters the military. It is inconceivable, for example, that this Court could conclude that a defendant in a general court-martial proceeding, where sentences as severe as life imprisonment may be imposed, is not entitled to the same protection our Constitution affords a civilian defendant facing even a day's imprisonment. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra. Surely those sworn to risk their lives to defend the Constitution should derive some benefit from the right to counsel, a *52 right that has become even more firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence over the past several generations. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932).
The only question that might arise is whether the general guarantee of counsel to court-martial defendants is to be placed under the Fifth Amendment or under the Sixth Amendment. It is my conviction that it is a Sixth Amendment guarantee. That Amendment provides an explicit guarantee of counsel "in all criminal prosecutions." Since, as we recently observed, courts-martial are "convened to adjudicate charges of criminal violations of military law," Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U. S. 34, 42 (1972), it would seem that courts-martial are criminal prosecutions and that the Sixth Amendment therefore applies on its face.
There is legitimate dispute among scholars, it is true, about whether the Framers expressly intended the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to apply to the military. See ante, at 33-34, and n. 12.[1] While the historical evidence is somewhat ambiguous, my reading of the sources suggests that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was intended by the Framers to apply to courts-martial. *53 But even if the historical evidence plainly showed to the contraryand its certainly does notthat would not be determinative of the contemporary scope of the Sixth Amendment. As Mr. Chief Justice Hughes observed:
"If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it means to-day, it is intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must be confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed upon them, the statement carries its own refutation." Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 442-443 (1934).
Application of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the military follows logically and naturally from the modern right-to-counsel decisions, in which the right has been held fully applicable in every case in which a defendant faced conviction of a criminal offense and potential incarceration.[2] See, e. g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, *54 supra; Gideon v. Wainwright, supra. The due process right to counsel, usually applied on a case-by-case basis, extends a qualified right to counsel to persons not involved in criminal proceedings, see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973), but has not been viewed as a replacement for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in situations in which a defendant stands to be convicted of a criminal offense.
In short, it is my belief that the Sixth Amendment demands that court-martial defendants ordinarily be accorded counsel.[3] Only if the special characteristics of summary courts-martial in particular deprive them of the status of "criminal prosecutions" is the Sixth Amendment inapplicable in the cases before us today. It is, of course, this proposition to which the major part of the Court's opinion is addressed and to which I now turn.
II
The Court's conclusion that summary courts-martial are not "criminal prosecutions" is, on its face, a surprising one. No less than in the case of other courts-martial, summary courts-martial are directed at adjudicating "charges of criminal violations of military law," and conviction at a summary court-martial can lead to confinement for one month. Nevertheless, the Court finds its conclusion mandated by a combination of *55 four factors:[4] the limitations on the punishment that can be meted out by a summary court-martial, the nature of the offenses for which a defendant can be tried, the nature of the summary court-martial proceeding itself, and "the distinctive nature of military life and discipline." Ante, at 42 n. 19. I am totally unpersuaded that these considerationsor any others *56 whether taken singly or in combination, justify denying to summary court-martial defendants the right to the assistance of counsel, "one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 462 (1938).
A
It is of course true, as the Court states, that a summary court-martial may not adjudge confinement in excess of one month. Manual for Courts-Martial ¶ 16b (1969) (MCM).[5] But Argersinger itself held the length of confineme