430 U.S. 1 (1977)

PIPER ET AL.
v.
CHRIS-CRAFT INDUSTRIES, INC.

No. 75-353.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued October 6, 1976. Decided February 23, 1977.^[*] CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.

*3 Paul G. Pennoyer, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners in No. 75-353. With him on the briefs was Zachary Shimer. David W. Peck argued the cause for petitioner in No. 75-354. With him on the briefs were Arthur H. Dean, John F. Arning, John L. Warden, Charles W. Sullivan, and Louis Loss. Lloyd N. Cutler argued the cause for petitioners in No. 75-355. With him on the briefs were Manuel F. Cohen, Louis R. Cohen, Stephen F. Black, William T. Lake, Michael S. Helfer, William J. Kolasky, Jr., James V. Ryan, Roger L. Waldman, Charles Alan Wright, Dudley C. Phillips, and John J. Martin.

Arthur L. Liman argued the cause for respondent in all three cases. With him on the brief were Simon H. Rifkind, Stuart Robinowitz, and Jack C. Auspitz.^[†]

*4 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari in these cases, 425 U. S. 910 (1976), to consider, among other issues, whether an unsuccessful tender offeror in a contest for control of a corporation has an implied cause of action for damages under § 14 (e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as added by § 3 of the Williams Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 457, 15 U. S. C. § 78n (e), or under Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-6, 17 CFR § 240.10b-6 (1976), based on alleged antifraud violations by the successful competitor, its investment adviser, and individuals constituting the management of the target corporation.

I

Background

The factual background of this complex contest for control, including the protracted litigation culminating in the cases now before us, is essential to a full understanding of the contending parties' claims.

The three petitions present questions of first impression, arising out of a "sophisticated and hard fought contest" for control of Piper Aircraft Corp., a Pennsylvania-based manufacturer of light aircraft. Piper's management consisted principally of members of the Piper family, who owned 31% of Piper's outstanding stock. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., a diversified manufacturer of recreational products, attempted to secure voting control of Piper through cash and exchange tender offers for Piper common stock. Chris-Craft's takeover attempt failed, and Bangor Punta Corp. (Bangor or Bangor Punta), with the support of the Piper family, obtained control of Piper in September 1969. Chris-Craft brought suit under § 14 (e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-6 alleging that Bangor Punta achieved control of the target corporation as a result of violations of the federal securities laws by the Piper family, Bangor Punta, and Bangor Punta's *5 underwriter, First Boston Corp., who together had sucessfully repelled Chris-Craft's takeover attempt.

The struggle for control of Piper began in December 1968. At that time, Chris-Craft began making cash purchases of Piper common stock. By January 22, 1969, Chris-Craft had acquired 203,700 shares, or approximately 13% of Piper's 1,644,790 outstanding shares. On the next day, following unsuccessful preliminary overtures to Piper by Chris-Craft's president, Herbert Siegel, Chris-Craft publicly announced a cash tender offer for up to 300,000 Piper shares^[1] at $65 per share, which was approximately $12 above the then-current market price. Responding promptly to Chris-Craft's bid, Piper's management met on the same day with the company's investment banker, First Boston, and other advisers. On January 24, the Piper family decided to oppose Chris-Craft's tender offer. As part of its resistance to Chris-Craft's takeover campaign, Piper management sent several letters to the company's stockholders during January 25-27, arguing against acceptance of Chris-Craft's offer. On January 27, a letter to shareholders from W. T. Piper, Jr., president of the company, stated that the Piper Board "has carefully studied this offer and is convinced that it is inadequate and not in the best interests of Piper's shareholders."

In addition to communicating with shareholders, Piper entered into an agreement with Grumman Aircraft Corp. on January 29, whereby Grumman agreed to purchase 300,000 authorized but unissued Piper shares at $65 per share. The agreement increased the amount of stock necessary for Chris-Craft to secure control and thus rendered Piper less vulnerable to Chris-Craft's attack. A Piper press release and letter to shareholders announced the Grumman transaction but failed to state either that Grumman had a "put" or option to sell the shares back to Piper at cost, plus interest, or that *6 Piper was required to maintain the proceeds of the transaction in a separate fund free from liens.

Despite Piper's opposition, Chris-Craft succeeded in acquiring 304,606 shares by the time its cash tender offer expired on February 3. To obtain the additional 17% of Piper stock needed for control, Chris-Craft decided to make an exchange offer of Chris-Craft securities for Piper stock. Although Chris-Craft filed a registration statement and preliminary prospectus with the SEC in late February 1969, the exchange offer did not go into effect until May 15, 1969.

In the meantime, Chris-Craft made cash purchases of Piper stock on the open market until Mr. Siegel, the company's president, was expressly warned by SEC officials that such purchases, when made during the pendency of an exchange offer, violated SEC Rule 10b-6.^[2] At Mr. Siegel's direction, Chris-Craft immediately complied with the SEC's directive and canceled all outstanding orders for purchases of Piper stock.

While Chris-Craft's exchange offer was in registration, Piper in March 1969 terminated the agreement with Grumman *7 man and entered into negotiations with Bangor Punta. Bangor had initially been contacted by First Boston about the possibility of a Piper takeover in the wake of Chris-Craft's initial cash tender offer in January. With Grumman out of the picture, the Piper family agreed on May 8, 1969, to exchange their 31% stockholdings in Piper for Bangor Punta securities. Bangor also agreed to use its best efforts to achieve control of Piper by means of an exchange offer of Bangor securities for Piper common stock. A press release issued the same day announced the terms of the agreement, including a provision that the forthcoming exchange offer would involve Bangor securities to be valued, in the judgment of First Boston, "at not less than $80 per Piper share."^[3]

While awaiting the effective date of its exchange offer, Bangor in mid-May 1969 purchased 120,200 shares of Piper stock in privately negotiated, off-exchange transactions from three large institutional investors. All three purchases were made after the SEC's issuance of a release on May 5 announcing proposed Rule 10b-13, a provision which, upon becoming effective in November 1969, would expressly prohibit a tender offeror from making purchases of the target company's stock during the pendency of an exchange offer. The SEC release stated that the proposed rule was "in effect, a codification of existing interpretations under Rule 10b-6,"^[4] the provision invoked by SEC officials against Mr. Siegel of Chris-Craft a month earlier. Bangor officials, although aware of the release at the time of the three off-exchange purchases, *8 made no attempt to secure an exemption for the transactions from the SEC, as provided by Rule 10b-6 (f). The SEC, however, took no action concerning these purchases as it had with respect to Chris-Craft's open-market transactions.

With these three block purchases, amounting to 7% of Piper stock, Bangor Punta in mid-May took the lead in the takeover contest. The contest then centered upon the competing exchange offers. Chris-Craft's first exchange offer, which began in mid-May 1969, failed to produce tenders of the specified minimum number of Piper shares (80,000). Meanwhile, Bangor Punta's exchange offer, which had been announced on May 8, became effective on July 18. The registration materials which Bangor filed with the SEC in connection with the exchange offer included financial statements, reviewed by First Boston, representing that one of Bangor's subsidiaries, the Bangor & Aroostock Railroad (BAR), had a value of $18.4 million. This valuation was based upon a 1965 appraisal by investment bankers after a proposed sale of the BAR failed to materialize. The financial statements did not indicate that Bangor was considering the sale of the BAR or that an offer to purchase the railroad for $5 million had been received.^[5]

In the final phase of the see-saw of competing offers, Chris-Craft modified the terms of its previously unsuccessful exchange offer to make it more attractive. The revised offer succeeded in attracting 112,089 additional Piper shares, while Bangor's exchange offer, which terminated on July 29, resulted in the tendering of 110,802 shares. By August 4, 1969, at the conclusion of both offers, Bangor Punta owned a total of 44.5%, while Chris-Craft owned 40.6% of Piper stock. The remainder of Piper stock, 14.9%, remained in the hands of the public.

*9 After completion of their respective exchange offers, both companies renewed market purchases of Piper stock,^[6] but Chris-Craft, after purchasing 29,200 shares for cash in mid-August, withdrew from competition.^[7] Bangor Punta continued making cash purchases until September 5, by which time it had acquired a majority interest in Piper. The final tally in the nine-month takeover battle showed that Bangor Punta held over 50% and Chris-Craft held 42% of Piper stock.

II

Before either side had achieved control, the contest moved from the marketplace to the courts. Then began more than seven years of complex litigation growing out of the contest for control of Piper Aircraft.

A

Chris-Craft's Initial Suit May 22, 1969

On May 22, 1969, Chris-Craft filed suit seeking both damages and injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Chris-Craft alleged that Bangor's block purchases of 120,200 Piper shares in mid-May violated Rule 10b-6 and that Bangor's May 8 press release, announcing an $80 valuation of Bangor securities to be offered in the forthcoming exchange offer, violated SEC "gun-jumping" provisions, 15 U. S. C. § 77e (c), and *10 SEC Rule 135, 17 CFR § 230.135 (1976). Chris-Craft sought to enjoin Bangor from voting the Piper shares purchased in violation of Rule 10b-6 and from accepting any shares tendered by Piper stockholders pursuant to the exchange offer.

B

District Court Decision on Preliminary Injunction August 19, 1969

On July 22, 1969, Chris-Craft moved for a preliminary injunction against Bangor. In an opinion filed August 19, 1969, United States District Judge Charles Tenney denied relief. Judge Tenney concluded, first, that the May 8 press release had not violated the gun-jumping provisions, and, second, that Bangor's block purchases of Piper stock were not inconsistent with Rule 10b-6.

"Bangor Punta's cash purchases . . . , effected neither on the Exchange nor from or through a broker or dealer, were obviously not designed to place market pressures on the distribution price of Piper, so as to create an artificially high price for this security." 303 F. Supp. 191, 198. (Emphasis supplied.)^[8]

Judge Tenney, accordingly, concluded that neither irreparable injury nor likelihood of probable success on the merits had been established, particularly since the contest for control was still open.

"[B]oth the Chris-Craft and Bangor Punta exchange offers have expired. Neither party has gained control of Piper, and both are still in a position to do so." Id., at 199.

*11 C

Court of Appeals' Decision on Preliminary Injunction April 28, 1970

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed Judge Tenney's denial of injunctive relief. 426 F. 2d 569 (1970). In an opinion by Judge Waterman, the court held that Bangor had properly been allowed to continue soliciting Piper stock.

"Chris-Craft was free [at the time of the District Court's decision] to compete equally with Bangor Punta for the remaining Piper shares, and it did so. We do not understand Chris-Craft to allege that prior misdeeds of Bangor Punta so determined the course of the competition. . . that Chris-Craft was placed at any real disadvantage." Id., at 573.

The court concluded, however, that Bangor had violated SEC "gun-jumping" provisions and Rule 10b-6, unless the three block purchases fell within an established exemption to the Rule.^[9]

Chief Judge Lumbard in dissent agreed that injunctive relief was unwarranted, but also accepted the District Court's determination that Bangor had not violated the securities laws.^[10]Id., at 579.

*12 The Court of Appeals remanded the case for further proceedings, so that Bangor, among other things, could attempt to establish that its block purchases fell within an exemption to Rule 10b-6.

D

District Court Decision on SEC Injunction August 25, 1971

While Chris-Craft's private suit was pending, the SEC sought an injunction against Bangor on account of the BAR omission in Bangor's registration statement. The SEC sought both an offer of rescission to Piper shareholders who accepted Bangor's exchange offer and an injunction against Bangor from violating the Securities Act of 1933 and the 1934 Act.

In an opinion by Judge Pollack, the District Court concluded that Bangor's registration statement was unintentionally misleading by virtue of the failure to disclose the fact that an offer had been received for the sale of the BAR. Accordingly, the court required Bangor to offer rescission to tendering Piper shareholders; however, the District Court refused to grant an injunction against future violations of the securities laws on the ground that the SEC had failed to establish that Bangor and its officials had a "propensity or natural inclination to violate the securities law." SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154, 1163 (1971).

E

District Court Decision on Liability December 10, 1971

On remand from the Court of Appeals, Chris-Craft's private action also came before Judge Pollack. Although its second amended complaint, which added a claim based on the BAR omission, sought both damages and injunctive relief, Chris-Craft at a pretrial hearing expressly abandoned its *13 prayer for equitable relief; the case was thereafter treated solely as an action for damages. 337 F. Supp. 1128, 1136 n. 8.

Following trial before the District Court without a jury, Judge Pollack in December 1971 dismissed Chris-Craft's complaint against all defendants. In an exhaustive opinion, he concluded that Chris-Craft had standing to seek damages for Bangor's Rule 10b-6 violations, 337 F. Supp., at 1133, but found it unnecessary to decide whether § 14 (e) could be invoked by one competitor for corporate control against another. 337 F. Supp., at 1134.^[11]

On the merits, the District Court held that the Piper communications characterizing Chris-Craft's cash tender offer as "inadequate" were not misleading. The court concluded that the "more rational" view was that the statements referred to factors other than price, such as Piper's views as to the quality of Chris-Craft's management. Id., at 1135. The court also rejected Chris-Craft's contention that it had been injured by the omission in the Grumman press release concerning the "put" or option provision in the agreement. The District Court concluded that Piper's complete description of the provision in a listing application with the New York Stock Exchange, coupled with Chris-Craft's major acquisitions of Piper stock after learning of the "put," undermined Chris-Craft's claim that it was misled or otherwise injured by the announcement of the Grumman transaction. Ibid.

With respect to the May 8 press release, which the Court of Appeals had held violative of the "gun-jumping" rules, the District Court held that the release, although technically a violation, was not false or misleading. Moreover, Chris-Craft had failed to show that it was injured or disadvantaged by the release in its efforts to acquire Piper stock. Id., at 1137.

*14 As to the claim of a misleading valuation of the BAR, Judge Pollack held that Chris-Craft failed to show either scienter or causation as required in a damages action under the 1934 Act's antifraud provisions. Scienter was not established, the court concluded, since the BAR omission was "mere negligent omission or misstatement of fact." Id., at 1140. As to causation, the District Court specifically distinguished this Court's decision in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U. S. 375 (1970), which established a presumption of causation in a § 14 (a) suit by minority shareholders challenging misleading proxy materials. The omission in the proxy statement in that case, the District Court reasoned, directly affected the shareholders on whose behalf the suit was brought:

"It was in that particular context that the Supreme Court deemed sufficient a set of facts under which shareholders could be misled. This does not aid Chris-Craft as it is seeking to recover because of the effect which a misstatement allegedly had on third parties." 337 F. Supp., at 1139. (Emphasis in original.) (Footnote omitted.)

Given the differences between the instant case and Mills, the District Court went on to hold that proof of actual causation was required:

"There is no proof that a single exchanging Piper shareholder would have refrained from the exchange and taken an offer for his shares from Chris-Craft instead of that from Bangor Punta. In a damage suit, as distinct from one for equitable relief, such proof is essential to sustain a 10b-5 claim." Ibid. (Emphasis in original.)

On Chris-Craft's Rule 10b-6 claim, Judge Pollack held that, although the block purchases did not fall within any exemption to the Rule, Chris-Craft had no right to recovery:

"Even granting that the block purchases resulted arithmetically *15 in Bangor Punta's achievement of control, there is no basis for concluding that, absent Bangor Punta's acquisition of these blocks, Chris-Craft would have achieved its goal of control." Id., at 1142.

Based on its findings with respect to Piper and Bangor Punta, the District Court also held in favor of First Boston; the court specifically exonerated the firm of having "committed, or engaged in any course of conduct which operated as a fraud or deceit upon Chris-Craft or the public shareholders of Piper." Id., at 1145.

F

Court of Appeals Decision on Liability March 16, 1973

Chris-Craft appealed, and the SEC sought review of the District Court's denial of injunctive relief against Bangor Punta. In the Court of Appeals, each member of the panel wrote separately. All three members of the panel agreed that Chris-Craft had standing to sue for damages under § 14 (e) and that a claim for damages had been established. However, Judges Gurfein and Mansfield, over Judge Timbers' dissent, sustained the District Court's denial of an injunction against Bangor.

Court of Appeals Majority Opinion

The Court of Appeals directly answered the question concerning Chris-Craft's standing under § 14 (e), which the District Court had not decided.^[12] The Court of Appeals based its holding "on the statute itself [§ 14 (e)] and such decisional law as there is that has touched on the question." 480 F. 2d 341, 358. The opinion noted that the Second *16 Circuit had on four occasions^[13] addressed the issue whether a private cause of action might be implied under § 14 (e). Although acknowledging that no case represented a square holding in this respect, the court interpreted the cases to intimate "that such an implied right of action would be reasonable." 480 F. 2d, at 360. The court then noted that Chris-Craft could likely state a common-law tort claim in state court for "interference with a `prospective advantage.'" Ibid.

"We will not infer from the silence of the statute that Congress intended to deny a federal remedy and to extinguish a liability which, under established principles of tort law, normally attends the doing of a proscribed act." Id., at 360-361.

With respect to the legislative history of § 14 (e), the Court of Appeals expressly acknowledged that the focus of congressional concern was the protection of public shareholders. Given this purpose, the court concluded:

"We can conceive of no more effective means of furthering the general objective of § 14 (e) than to grant a victim of violations of the statute standing to sue for damages. . . . Particularly in light of the enforcement rationale of [J. I. Case Co. v.] Borak, [377 U. S. 426 (1964),] we believe it is both necessary and appropriate that [Chris-Craft] should be granted standing to sue for damages." 480 F. 2d, at 361.

*17 The court next reviewed the alleged § 14 (e) violations for which Chris-Craft sought damages. In contrast to the District Court's conclusions, the Court of Appeals held that Piper's description of the Chris-Craft offer as "inadequate" and the failure to disclose the "put" provision in the Grumman agreement constituted actionable violations of § 14 (e). 480 F. 2d, at 364-365. As to Bangor Punta, the Court of Appeals agreed with Judge Pollack's determination that Chris-Craft had not been injured by the "gun-jumping" press release of May 8; on the other hand, the court held that the BAR omission in Bangor's registration statement was actionable. The Court of Appeals expressly rejected Judge Pollack's conclusion that the registration statement was "unintentionally in error." On the contrary, the Court of Appeals held that Bangor Punta's officers "showed reckless disregard" in failing to disclose the BAR negotiations, although the court conceded that the officers were not shown to have had an "intent to defraud." Id., at 369. First Boston was likewise held culpable because its certification of the registration statement "amounted to an almost complete abdication of its responsibility [as an underwriter] . . . ." Id., at 373.

The Court of Appeals also disagreed with the District Court's analysis of causation. Although agreeing that Chris-Craft failed to show that it would have won the takeover battle,^[14] the court relied upon Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U. S. 375 (1970), as establishing a presumption of reliance *18 and causation applicable to Chris-Craft. Under Mills, so the court held, "we must presume that [Bangor's] offer was not so appealing, considering the BAR loss, as to have attracted any takers." 480 F. 2d, at 375.

"Since [Bangor] eventually acquired only about 51% of the outstanding Piper shares, it is clear that the 7% acquired through its exchange offer was critical to its success. Reliance and causation have been shown." Ibid.

In addition to the § 14 (e) claim, the Court of Appeals held that Chris-Craft could recover damages for Bangor's Rule 10b-6 violations; the three block purchases had a "presumptively. . . stimulating effect . . . which misled the public." 480 F. 2d, at 378. Since those purchases amounted to 7% of Piper stock, "[e]ven arithmetically, it is apparent that the block purchases [by Bangor Punta] . . . were essential to achieve control." Id., at 379.

The Court of Appeals then remanded with directions to the District Court to award damages in the amount of "the reduction in the appraisal value of [Chris-Craft's] Piper holdings attributable to [Bangor Punta's] taking a majority position and reducing [Chris-Craft] to a minority position. . . ." Id., at 380. Damages were to be awarded against all defendants jointly and severally. In addition, without discussing Chris-Craft's abandonment of its claim for equitable relief, the court instructed the District Court to enjoin Bangor for a period of at least five years from voting the Piper shares acquired through the exchange offer and in violation of Rule 10b-6. Ibid.

Finally, Judge Timbers, writing in dissent on this issue, disagreed with the conclusion of Judges Mansfield and Gurfein that the SEC request for an injunction against future violations by Bangor Punta had properly been refused. In Judge Timbers' view, the District Court employed an improper *19 proper legal standard in denying the SEC injunctive relief against Bangor.

Judge Gurfein's Concurring Opinion

Judge Gurfein concurred "generally" in Judge Timbers' opinion for the court. On the issue of standing, Judge Gurfein agreed with the District Court's approach in considering the matter as one of "causation before considering the question of standing." 480 F. 2d, at 393. Under Judge Gurfein's approach, Chris-Craft had standing because Bangor's acquisitions of Piper shares were necessary for control. As to scienter, Judge Gurfein was of the view that "mere negligence" would not suffice but that "`recklessness that is equivalent to wilful fraud' is required . . . ." Ibid. (Citation omitted.)

Judge Gurfein disagreed, however, with Judge Timbers' analysis of the alleged Rule 10b-6 violations. He refused to indulge the presumption of "stimulating effect" embraced by Judge Timbers and concluded rather that because "the [illegal] block purchases were necessary for control causation was established. . . ." 480 F. 2d, at 393.

With respect to the SEC action against Bangor Punta, Judge Gurfein, writing for himself and Judge Mansfield, upheld the District Court's refusal to grant a permanent injunction. Applying the "abuse of discretion" standard, Judge Gurfein concluded that "the matter is not so clear that we should substitute our judgment for the judgment of the experienced trial Judge below who sat as a chancellor in equity." Ibid.

Judge Mansfield's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

Judge Mansfield concurred in the "results" reached by Judge Timbers, except with respect to the Piper family's liability. Judge Mansfield agreed that the Piper communications violated § 14 (e), but concluded that Chris-Craft had failed to prove damages resulting from those infractions. *20 Applying the principles of Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., supra, Judge Mansfield stated:

"[Chris-Craft] must show that it suffered some resulting loss. This it has failed to do." 480 F. 2d, at 401.

On the other issues addressed by the majority opinion, Judge Mansfield concluded that Chris-Craft's standing under § 14 (e) rested solely on the policy of vigorous enforcement of the antifraud provisions. 480 F. 2d, at 396. As to scienter, Judge Mansfield concluded that intent to defraud had not been shown. He formulated instead the following test of scienter:

"In short, the scienter requirement would be met if the corporate officer (1) knew the essential facts and failed to disclose them, or (2) failed or refused, after being put on notice of a possible material failure in disclosure, to apprise himself of the facts under circumstances where he could reasonably have ascertained and disclosed them without any extraordinary effort." Id., at 398.

He concluded that the actions complained of satisfied this standard.

Like Judge Gurfein, Judge Mansfield declined to indulge the presumption that Bangor's Rule 10b-6 violations actually operated to make its exchange offer deceptively attractive; he concurred solely on the ground that where a party achieves control through violations of the securities laws, the party is liable as a matter of law to an injured competitor.^[15]

G

District Court Opinion on Relief November 6, 1974

Pursuant to the remand, Judge Pollack took evidence on damages. Although concluding that the Court of Appeals' *21 mandate required the use of "hypothetical figures," he determined that Chris-Craft's damages were to be measured by comparing the value of its Piper holdings prior and subsequent to Bangor's achieving control. 384 F. Supp. 507, 512 (1974). Employing this method, he concluded on the basis of expert testimony that the fair market value of Piper stock as of the day Bangor achieved control was $48 per share. Id., at 517. After ascertaining that the value of Chris-Craft's takeover opportunity amounted to 5% of the fair market value of the stock, or $2.40 per share, id., at 523, the District Court awarded to Chris-Craft, based on its holdings of 697,495 shares, damages of $1,673,988. Ibid. The District Court also granted an award of prejudgment interest and entered an injunction, consistent with the mandate of the Court of Appeals, barring Bangor from voting the illegally acquired Piper shares for five years. Id., at 526.

H

Court of Appeals' Opinion on Relief April 11, 1975

In the final phase of the litigation, the Court of Appeals reversed on the damages issue and calculated Chris-Craft's damages without further remand to the District Court. The Court of Appeals fixed damages as the difference between what Chris-Craft had actually paid for Piper shares and the price at which the large minority block could have been sold at the earliest point after Bangor Punta gained control. Application of this formula produced damages in the amount of $36.98 per Piper share held by Chris-Craft, or a total of $25,793,365. 516 F. 2d 172, 190 (1975). The court instructed the District Court to recompute prejudgment interest based on the revised damages award. Id., at 191. This new computation increased Chris-Craft's prejudgment interest from $600,000 to approximately $10 million.

It is this judgment which is now under review.

*22 III

The Williams Act

We turn first to an examination of the Williams Act, which was adopted in 1968 in response to the growing use of cash tender offers as a means for achieving corporate takeovers.^[16] Prior to the 1960's, corporate takeover attempts had typically involved either proxy solicitations, regulated under § 14 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78n, or exchange offers of securities, subject to the registration requirements of the 1933 Act. § 77e. The proliferation of cash tender offers, in which publicized requests are made and intensive campaigns conducted for tenders of shares of stock at a fixed price, removed a substantial number of corporate control contests from the reach of existing disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws. See generally S. Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-4 (1967) (hereinafter Senate Report); H. R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 2-4 (1968) (hereinafter House Report).

To remedy this gap in federal regulation, Senator Harrison Williams introduced a bill in October 1965 to subject tender offerors to advance disclosure requirements. The original proposal, S. 2732, evolved over the next two years in response to positions expressed by the SEC and other interested parties from private industry and the New York Stock Exchange. 113 Cong. Rec. 854 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams). As subsequently enacted, the legislation requires takeover bidders to file a statement with the Commission indicating, among other things, the "background and identity" of the offeror, the source and amount of funds or other consideration to be used in making the purchases, the *23 extent of the offeror's holdings in the target corporation, and the offeror's plans with respect to the target corporation's business or corporate structure. 15 U. S. C. § 78m (d) (1).

In addition to disclosure requirements, which protect all target shareholders, the Williams Act provides other benefits for target shareholders who elect to tender their stock. First, stockholders who accept the tender offer are given the right to withdraw their shares during the first seven days of the tender offer and at any time after 60 days from the commencement of the offer. § 78n (d) (5). Second, where the tender offer is for less than all outstanding shares and more than the requested number of shares are tendered, the Act requires that the tendered securities be taken up pro rata by the offeror during the first 10 days of the offer. § 78n (d) (6).^[17] This provision, according to Senator Williams, was specifically designed to reduce pressures on target shareholders to deposit their shares hastily when the takeover bidder makes its tender offer on a first-come, first-served basis. 113 Cong. Rec. 856 (1967). Finally, the Act provides that if, during the course of the offer, the amount paid for the target shares is increased, all tendering shareholders are to receive the additional consideration, even if they tendered their stock before the price increase was announced. 15 U. S. C. § 78n (d) (7). See generally 1 A. Bromberg, Securities Law: Fraud § 6.3 (551), p. 120.2 (1975).

*24 Besides requiring disclosure and providing specific benefits for tendering shareholders, the Williams Act also contains a broad antifraud prohibition, which is the basis of Chris-Craft's claim. Section 14 (e) of the Securities Exchange Act, as added by § 3 of the Williams Act, 82 Stat. 457, 15 U. S. C. § 78n (e), provides:

"It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation."

This provision was expressly directed at the conduct of a broad range of persons, including those engaged in making or opposing tender offers or otherwise seeking to influence the decision of investors or the outcome of the tender offer. Senate Report 11.

The threshold issue in these cases is whether tender offerors such as Chris-Craft, whose activities are regulated by the Williams Act, have a cause of action for damages against other regulated parties under the statute on a claim that antifraud violations by other parties have frustrated the bidder's efforts to obtain control of the target corporation. Without reading such a cause of action into the Act, none of the other issues need be reached.

IV

Our analysis begins, of course, with the statute itself. Section 14 (e), like § 10 (b), makes no provision whatever for a private cause of action, such as those explicitly provided in other sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. E. g., §§ 11, 12, 15 of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 77k, 77l, 77o; §§ 9, 16, 18, 20 *25 of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78i, 78p, 78r, 78t. This Court has nonetheless held that in some circumstances a private cause of action can be implied with respect to the 1934 Act's antifraud provisions, even though the relevant provisions are silent as to remedies. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426 (1964) (§ 14 (a)); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U. S. 6, 13 n. 9 (1971) (§ 10 (b)).

The reasoning of these holdings is that, where congressional purposes are likely to be undermined absent private enforcement, private remedies may be implied in favor of the particular class intended to be protected by the statute. For example, in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, supra, recognizing an implied right of action in favor of a shareholder complaining of a misleading proxy solicitation, the Court concluded as to such a shareholder's right:

"While [§ 14 (a)] makes no specific reference to a private right of action, among its chief purposes is `the protection of investors,' which certainly implies the availability of judicial relief where necessary to achieve that result." 377 U. S., at 432. (Emphasis supplied.)

Indeed, the Court in Borak carefully noted that because of practical limitations upon the SEC's enforcement capabilities, "[p]rivate enforcement . . . provides a necessary supplement to Commission action." Ibid. (Emphasis added.) Similarly, the Court's opinion in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 730 (1975), in reaffirming the availability of a private right of action under § 10 (b), specifically alluded to the language in Borak concerning the necessity for supplemental private remedies without which congressional protection of shareholders would be defeated. See also Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U. S. 49, 62 (1975).

Against this background we must consider whether § 14 (e), which is entirely silent as to private remedies, permits this Court to read into the statute a damages remedy for unsuccessful tender offerors. To resolve that question we turn to the *26 legislative history to discern the congressional purpose underlying the specific statutory prohibition in § 14 (e). Once we identify the legislative purpose, we must then determine whether the creation by judicial interpretation of the implied cause of action asserted by Chris-Craft is necessary to effectuate Congress' goals.

A

Reliance on legislative history in divining the intent of Congress is, as has often been observed, a step to be taken cautiously. Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U. S. 352, 388-389 (1976) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 345 U. S. 295, 319 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring); Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U. S. 4, 11 (1942). In this case both sides press legislative history on the Court not so much to explain the meaning of the language of a statute as to explain the absence of any express provision for a private cause of action for damages. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter reminded us: "We must be wary against interpolating our notions of policy in the interstices of legislative provisions." Ibid. With that caveat, we turn to the legislative history of the Williams Act.

In introducing the legislation on the Senate floor, the sponsor, Senator Williams, stated:

"This legislation will close a significant gap in investor protection under the Federal securities laws by requiring the disclosure of pertinent information to stockholders when persons seek to obtain control of a corporation by a cash tender offer or through open market or privately negotiated purchases of securities." 113 Cong. Rec. 854 (1967). (Emphasis supplied.)

The same theme of investor protection was emphasized eight months later by Senator Williams on the day the measure was passed by the Senate:

"[The federal securities laws] provide protection for millions of American investors by requiring full disclosure