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Full Opinion
MAINE ET AL.
v.
THIBOUTOT ET VIR.
Supreme Court of United States.
*2 James Eastman Smith, Assistant Attorney General of Maine, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Richard S. Cohen, Attorney General.
Robert Edmond Mittel argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Susan Calkins and Hugh Calkins.[*]
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The case presents two related questions arising under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983 and 1988. Respondents brought this suit in the Maine Superior Court alleging that petitioners, the State of Maine and its Commissioner of Human Services, violated § 1983 by depriving respondents of welfare benefits *3 to which they were entitled under the federal Social Security Act, specifically 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (7). The petitioners present two issues: (1) whether § 1983 encompasses claims based on purely statutory violations of federal law, and (2) if so, whether attorney's fees under § 1988 may be awarded to the prevailing party in such an action.[1]
I
Respondents, Lionel and Joline Thiboutot, are married and have eight children, three of whom are Lionel's by a previous marriage. The Maine Department of Human Services notified Lionel that, in computing the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits to which he was entitled for the three children exclusively his, it would no longer make allowance for the money spent to support the other five children, even though Lionel is legally obligated to support them. Respondents, challenging the State's interpretation of 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (7), exhausted their state administrative remedies and then sought judicial review of the administrative action in the State Superior Court. By amended complaint, respondents also claimed relief under § 1983 for themselves and others similarly situated. The Superior Court's judgment enjoined petitioners from enforcing the challenged rule and ordered them to adopt new regulations, to notify class members of the new regulations, and to pay the correct amounts retroactively to respondents and prospectively to eligible class members.[2] The court, however, denied respondents' motion for attorney's fees. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 405 A. 2d 230 (1979), concluded that respondents *4 had no entitlement to attorney's fees under state law, but were eligible for attorney's fees pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, 42 U. S. C. § 1988.[3] We granted certiorari. 444 U. S. 1042 (1980). We affirm.
II
Section 1983 provides:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." (Emphasis added.)
The question before us is whether the phrase "and laws," as used in § 1983, means what it says, or whether it should be limited to some subset of laws. Given that Congress attached no modifiers to the phrase, the plain language of the statute undoubtedly embraces respondents' claim that petitioners violated the Social Security Act.
Even were the language ambiguous, however, any doubt as to its meaning has been resolved by our several cases suggesting, explicitly or implicitly, that the § 1983 remedy broadly encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397 (1970), for example, "held that suits in federal court under § 1983 are proper to secure compliance with the provisions of the Social Security Act on the part of participating States." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 675 (1974). Monell v. New York *5 City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 700-701 (1978), as support for its conclusion that municipalities are "persons" under § 1983, reasoned that "there can be no doubt that § 1 of the Civil Rights Act [of 1871] was intended to provide a remedy, to be broadly construed, against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights." Similarly, Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U. S. 622, 649 (1980), in holding that the common-law immunity for discretionary functions provided no basis for according municipalities a good-faith immunity under § 1983, noted that a court "looks only to whether the municipality has conformed to the requirements of the Federal Constitution and statutes." Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 240, n. 30 (1972), and Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U. S. 538, 543, n. 7 (1972), noted that § 1983's predecessor "was enlarged to provide protection for rights, privileges, or immunities secured by federal law." Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U. S. 808, 829-830 (1966), observed that under § 1983 state "officers may be made to respond in damages not only for violations of rights conferred by federal equal civil rights laws, but for violations of other federal constitutional and statutory rights as well." The availability of this alternative sanction helped support the holding that 28 U. S. C. § 1443 (1) did not permit removal to federal court of a state prosecution in which the defense was that the state law conflicted with the defendants' federal rights. As a final example, Mr. Justice Stone, writing in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 525-526 (1939), expressed the opinion that § 1983 was the product of an "exten[sion] to include rights, privileges and immunities secured by the laws of the United States as well as by the Constitution."
While some might dismiss as dictum the foregoing statements, numerous and specific as they are, our analysis in several § 1983 cases involving Social Security Act (SSA) claims has relied on the availability of a § 1983 cause of action for statutory claims. Constitutional claims were also raised *6 in these cases, providing a jurisdictional base, but the statutory claims were allowed to go forward, and were decided on the merits, under the court's pendent jurisdiction. In each of the following cases § 1983 was necessarily the exclusive statutory cause of action because, as the Court held in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 673-674; id., at 690 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting), the SSA affords no private right of action against a State. Miller v. Youakim, 440 U. S. 125, 132, and n. 13 (1979) (state foster care program inconsistent with SSA); Quern v. Mandley, 436 U. S. 725, 729, and n. 3 (1978) (state emergency assistance program consistent with SSA); Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U. S. 338 (1975) (state shelter allowance provisions inconsistent with SSA); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282 (1971) (state prohibition against AFDC aid for college students inconsistent with SSA); King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 311 (1968) (state cohabitation prohibition inconsistent with SSA). Cf. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 532-533, 543 (1974) (District Court had jurisdiction to decide whether state recoupment provisions consistent with SSA); Carter v. Stanton, 405 U. S. 669, 670 (1972) (District Court had jurisdiction to decide whether state absent-spouse rule consistent with SSA).
In the face of the plain language of § 1983 and our consistent treatment of that provision, petitioners nevertheless persist in suggesting that the phrase "and laws" should be read as limited to civil rights or equal protection laws.[4] Petitioners suggest that when § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, which accorded jurisdiction and a remedy for deprivations of rights secured by "the Constitution of the United States," was divided by the 1874 statutory revision into a remedial section, Rev. Stat. § 1979, and jurisdictional *7 sections, Rev. Stat. §§ 563 (12) and 629 (16), Congress intended that the same change made in § 629 (16) be made as to each of the new sections as well. Section 629 (16), the jurisdictional provision for the circuit courts and the model for the current jurisdictional provision, 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3), applied to deprivations of rights secured by "the Constitution of the United States, or of any right secured by any law providing for equal rights." On the other hand, the remedial provision, the predecessor of § 1983, was expanded to apply to deprivations of rights secured by "the Constitution and laws," and § 563 (12), the provision granting jurisdiction to the district courts, to deprivations of rights secured by "the Constitution of the United States, or of any right secured by any law of the United States."
We need not repeat at length the detailed debate over the meaning of the scanty legislative history concerning the addition of the phrase "and laws." See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600 (1979); id., at 623 (POWELL, J., concurring); id., at 646 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 672 (STEWART, J., dissenting). One conclusion which emerges clearly is that the legislative history does not permit a definitive answer. Id., at 610-611; id., at 674 (STEWART, J., dissenting). There is no express explanation offered for the insertion of the phrase "and laws." On the one hand, a principal purpose of the added language was to "ensure that federal legislation providing specifically for equality of rights would be brought within the ambit of the civil action authorized by that statute." Id., at 637 (POWELL, J., concurring). On the other hand, there are no indications that that was the only purpose, and Congress' attention was specifically directed to this new language. Representative Lawrence, in a speech to the House of Representatives that began by observing that the revisers had very often changed the meaning of existing statutes, 2 Cong. Rec. 825 (1874), referred to the civil rights statutes as "possibly [showing] verbal *8 modifications bordering on legislation," id., at 827. He went on to read to Congress the original and revised versions. In short, Congress was aware of what it was doing, and the legislative history does not demonstrate that the plain language was not intended.[5] Petitioners' arguments amount to the claim that had Congress been more careful, and had it fully thought out the relationship among the various sections,[6] it might have acted differently. That argument, however, can best be addressed to Congress, which, it is important to note, has remained quiet in the face of our many pronouncements on the scope of § 1983. Cf. TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153 (1978).
III
Petitioners next argue that, even if this claim is within § 1983, Congress did not intend statutory claims to be covered by the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, *9 which added the following sentence to 42 U. S. C. § 1988 (emphasis added):
"In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U. S. C. 1681 et seq.] or in any civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of America, to enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision of the United States Internal Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U. S. C. 2000d et seq.], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."
Once again, given our holding in Part II, supra, the plain language provides an answer. The statute states that fees are available in any § 1983 action. Since we hold that this statutory action is properly brought under § 1983, and since § 1988 makes no exception for statutory § 1983 actions, § 1988 plainly applies to this suit.[7]
The legislative history is entirely consistent with the plain language. As was true with § 1983, a major purpose of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act was to benefit those claiming deprivations of constitutional and civil rights. Principal sponsors of the measure in both the House and the Senate, however, explicitly stated during the floor debates that the statute would make fees available more broadly. Representative *10 Drinan explained that the Act would apply to § 1983 and that § 1983 "authorizes suits against State and local officials based upon Federal statutory as well as constitutional rights. For example Blue against Craig, 505 F. 2d 830 (4th Cir. 1974)." 122 Cong. Rec. 35122 (1976).[8] Senator Kennedy also included an SSA case as an example of the cases "enforc[ing] the rights promised by Congress or the Constitution" which the Act would embrace.[9]Id., at 33314.[10] In short, there can be no question that Congress passed the Fees Act anticipating that it would apply to statutory § 1983 claims.
Several States, participating as amici curiae, argue that even if § 1988 applies to § 1983 claims alleging deprivations of statutory rights, it does not apply in state courts. There is no merit to this argument.[11] As we have said above, Martinez *11 v. California, 444 U. S. 277 (1980), held that § 1983 actions may be brought in state courts. Representative Drinan described the purpose of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act as "authoriz[ing] the award of a reasonable attorney's fee in actions brought in State or Federal courts." 122 Cong. Rec. 35122 (1976). And Congress viewed the fees authorized by § 1988 as "an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain" compliance with § 1983. S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 5 (1976). It follows from this history and from the Supremacy Clause that the fee provision is part of the § 1983 remedy whether the action is brought in federal or state court.[12]
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.
The Court holds today, almost casually, that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 creates a cause of action for deprivations under color of state law of any federal statutory right. Having transformed purely statutory claims into "civil rights" actions under § 1983, the Court concludes that 42 U. S. C. § 1988 permits *12 the "prevailing party" to recover his attorney's fees. These two holdings dramatically expand the liability of state and local officials and may virtually eliminate the "American Rule" in suits against those officials.
The Court's opinion reflects little consideration of the consequences of its judgment. It relies upon the "plain" meaning of the phrase "and laws" in § 1983 and upon this Court's assertedly "consistent treatment" of that statute. Ante, at 4, 6. But the reading adopted today is anything but "plain" when the statutory language is placed in historical context. Moreover, until today this Court never had held that § 1983 encompasses all purely statutory claims. Past treatment of the subject has been incidental and far from consistent. The only firm basis for decision is the historical evidence, which convincingly shows that the phrase the Court now finds so clear wasand remainsnothing more than a shorthand reference to equal rights legislation enacted by Congress. To read "and laws" more broadly is to ignore the lessons of history, logic, and policy.
Part I of this opinion examines the Court's claim that it only construes the "plain meaning" of § 1983, while Part II reviews the historical evidence on the enactment. Part III considers the practical consequences of today's decision. The final substantive section demonstrates that this Court's precedents do not support the Court's ruling today.
I
Section 1983 provides in relevant part that "[e]very person who, under color of [state law,] subjects . . . any . . . person. . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured. . . ." The Court asserts that "the phrase `and laws'. . . means what it says," because "Congress attached no modifiers to the phrase. . . ." Ante, at 4. Finding no "definitive" contrary indications in the legislative history of § 1983, the Court concludes that that statute provides a *13 remedy for violations of the Social Security Act. The Court suggests that those who would read the phrase "and laws" more narrowly should address their arguments to Congress. Ante, at 8.
If we were forbidden to look behind the language in legislative enactments, there might be some force to the suggestion that "and laws" must be read to include all federal statutes. Ante, at 4.[1] But the "plain meaning" rule is not as inflexible as the Court imagines. Although plain meaning is always the starting point, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (POWELL, J., concurring), this Court rarely ignores available aids to statutory construction. See, e. g., Cass v. United States, 417 U. S. 72, 77-79 (1974); Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U. S. 476, 479 (1943), quoting United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 543-544 (1940). We have recognized consistently that statutes are to be interpreted "`not only by a consideration *14 of the words themselves, but by considering, as well, the context, the purposes of the law, and the circumstances under which the words were employed.'" District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U. S. 418, 420 (1973), quoting Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U. S. 253, 258 (1937); see generally TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 204-205, and n. 14 (1978) (POWELL, J., dissenting).
The rule is no different when the statute in question is derived from the civil rights legislation of the Reconstruction Era. Those statutes "must be given the meaning and sweep" dictated by "their origins and their language"not their language alone. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U. S. 538, 549 (1972). When the language does not reflect what history reveals to have been the true legislative intent, we have readily construed the Civil Rights Acts to include words that Congress inadvertently omitted. See Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S. 572, 582-586 (1976) (interpreting 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3) to confer jurisdiction upon territorial courts). Thus, "plain meaning" is too simplistic a guide to the construction of § 1983.
Blind reliance on plain meaning is particularly inappropriate where, as here, Congress inserted the critical language without explicit discussion when it revised the statutes in 1874. See ante, at 6-7. Indeed, not a single shred of evidence in the legislative history of the adoption of the 1874 revision mentions this change. Since the legislative history also shows that the revision generally was not intended to alter the meaning of existing law, see Part II, infra, this Court previously has insisted that apparent changes be scrutinized with some care. As Mr. Justice Holmes observed, the Revised Statutes are "not lightly to be read as making a change. . . ." United States v. Sischo, 262 U. S. 165, 168-169 (1923).
II
The origins of the phrase "and laws" in § 1983 were discussed in detail in two concurring opinions last Term. Compare *15 Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U. S. 600, 623 (1979) (POWELL, J., concurring), with id., at 646 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment). I shall not recount the full historical evidence presented in my Chapman opinion. Nevertheless, the Court's abrupt dismissal of the proposition that "Congress did not intend to change the meaning of existing laws when it revised the statutes in 1874," ante, at 8, n. 5, reflects a misconception so fundamental as to require a summary of the historical record.
A
Section 1983 derives from § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which provided a cause of action for deprivations of constitutional rights only. "Laws" were not mentioned. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13. The phrase "and laws" was added in 1874, when Congress consolidated the laws of the United States into a single volume under a new subject-matter arrangement. See 2 Cong. Rec. 827 (Jan. 21, 1874) (remarks of Rep. Lawrence). Consequently, the intent of Congress in 1874 is central to this case.
In addition to creating a cause of action, § 1 of the 1871 Act conferred concurrent jurisdiction upon "the district or circuit courts of the United States. . . ." 17 Stat. 13. In the 1874 revision, the remedial portion of § 1 was codified as § 1979 of the Revised Statutes, which provided for a cause of action in terms identical to the present § 1983. The jurisdictional portion of § 1 was divided into § 563 (12), conferring district court jurisdiction, and § 629 (16), conferring circuit court jurisdiction. Although §§ 1979, 563 (12), and 629 (16) came from the same source, each was worded differently. Section 1979 referred to deprivations of rights "secured by the Constitution and laws"; § 563 (12) described rights secured "by the Constitution of the United States, or . . . by any law of the United States"; and § 629 (16) encompassed rights secured "by the Constitution of the United States, or . . . by any law providing for equal rights of citizens of the United *16 States."[2] When Congress merged the jurisdiction of circuit and district courts in 1911, the narrower language of § 629 (16) was adopted and ultimately became the present 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3). Act of Mar. 3, 1911, § 24 (14), 36 Stat. 1092.[3]
B
In my view, the legislative history unmistakably shows that the variations in phrasing introduced in the 1874 revision were inadvertent, and that each section was intended to have precisely the same scope. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 631-640 (POWELL, J., concurring). Moreover, the only defensible interpretation of the contemporaneous legislative record is that the reference to "laws" in each section was intended "to do no more than ensure that federal legislation providing specifically for equality of rights would be brought within the ambit of the civil action authorized by [§ 1979]." 441 U. S., at 637. Careful study of the available materials leaves no serious doubt that the Court's contrary conclusion is completely at odds with the intent of Congress in 1874. Id., at 640.
*17 The Court holds today that the foregoing reasoning is based on a "flawed premise," because Congress instructed the Revision Commission to change the statutes in certain respects. Ante, at 8, n. 5; Act of June 27, 1866, § 2, 14 Stat. 75. But it is the Court's premise that is flawed. The Revision Commission, which worked for six years on the project, submitted to Congress a draft that did contain substantive changes.[4] But a Joint Congressional Committee, which was appointed in early 1873 to transform the draft into a bill, concluded that it would be "utterly impossible to carry the measure through, if it was understood that it contained new legislation." 2 Cong. Rec. 646 (Jan. 14, 1874) (remarks of Rep. Poland); see Act of Mar. 3, 1873, 17 Stat. 579. Therefore, the Committee employed Thomas Jefferson Durant to "strike out . . . modifications of the existing law" "wherever the meaning of the law had been changed." 2 Cong. Rec. 646 (Jan. 14, 1874) (remarks of Rep. Poland); see id., at 826 (Jan. 21, 1874) (remarks of Rep. Lawrence); id., at 129 (Dec. 10, 1873) (remarks of Rep. Butler). On December 10, 1873, Durant's completed work was introduced in the House with the solemn assurance that the bill "embodies the law as it is." Ibid.[5]
*18 The House met in a series of evening sessions to review the bill and to restore original meaning where necessary. During one of these sessions, Representative Lawrence delivered the speech upon which the Court now relies. Ante, at 7-8. Lawrence explained that the revisers often had separated existing statutes into substantive, remedial, and criminal sections to accord with the new organization of the statutes by topic. He read both the original and revised versions of the civil rights statutes to illustrate the arrangement, and "possibly [to] show verbal modifications bordering on legislation." 2 Cong. Rec. 827 (Jan. 21, 1874). After reading § 1979 without mentioning the addition of "and laws," Lawrence stated that "[a] comparison of all these will present a fair specimen of the manner in which the work has been done, and from these all can judge of the accuracy of the translation." Id., at 828. Observing that "[t]his mode of classifying. . . to some extent duplicates in the revision portions of statutes" that previously were one, Lawrence praised "the general accuracy" of the revision. Ibid. Nothing in this sequence of remarks supports the decision of the Court today. There was no mention of the addition of "and laws" nor any hint that the reach of § 1983 was to be extended. If Lawrence had any such intention, his statement to the House was *19 a singularly disingenuous way of proposing a major piece of legislation.
In context, it is plain that Representative Lawrence did not mention changes "bordering on legislation" as a way of introducing substantive changes in § 1 of the 1871 Act. Rather, he was emphasizing that the revision was not intended to modify existing statutes, and that his reading might reveal errors that should be eliminated. No doubt Congress "was aware of what it was doing." Ante, at 8. It was meeting specially in one last attempt to detect and strike out legislative changes that may have remained in the proposed revision despite the best efforts of Durant and the Joint Committee. No Representative challenged those sections of the Revised Statutes that derived from § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. That silence reflected the understanding of those present that "and laws" did not alter the original meaning of the statute.[6] The Members of Congress who participated in the yearlong effort to expunge all substantive alterations from the Revised Statutes evinced no intent whatever to enact a far-reaching modification of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The relevant evidence, largely ignored by the Court today, shows that Congress painstakingly sought to avoid just such changes.
III
The legislative history alone refutes the Court's assertion that the 43d Congress intended to alter the meaning of § 1983. But there are other compelling reasons to reject the Court's interpretation of the phrase "and laws." First, by reading those words to encompass every federal enactment, the Court extends § 1983 beyond the reach of its jurisdictional counterpart. *20 Second, that reading creates a broad program for enforcing federal legislation that departs significantly from the purposes of § 1983. Such unexpected and plainly unintended consequences should be avoided whenever a statute reasonably may be given an interpretation that is consistent with the legislative purpose. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435, 446-448 (1932); United States v. Ryan, 284 U. S. 167, 175 (1931); Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 459 (1892).
A
The Court acknowledges that its construction of § 1983 creates federal "civil rights" for which 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3) supplies no federal jurisdiction. Ante, at 8, n. 6.[7] The Court finds no "inherent illogic" in this view. Ibid. But the gap in the Court's logic is wide indeed in light of the history and purpose of the civil rights legislation we consider today. Sections 1983 and 1343 (3) derive from the same section of the same Act. See supra, at 15-16. As originally enacted, the two sections necessarily were coextensive. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U. S., at 616. And this Court has emphasized repeatedly that the right to a federal forum in every case was viewed as a crucial ingredient in the federal remedy afforded by § 1983.
We have stated, for example, that a major purpose of the Civil Rights Acts was to "involve the federal judiciary" in the effort to exert federal control over state officials who refused to enforce the law. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U. S., at 427. Congress did so in part because it thought the state courts at the time would not provide an impartial forum. See id., at 426-429. See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. *21 167, 174-183 (1961); Developments in the LawSection 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1133, 1150-1153 (1977). Thus, Congress elected to afford a "uniquely federal remedy," Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 239 (1972), that is, a "`federal right in federal courts,'" District of Columbia v. Carter, supra, at 428, quoting Monroe v. Pape, supra, at 180 (emphasis added). Four Terms ago, we considered the origins of § 1343 (3) and § 1983 and concluded that "the two provisions were meant to be, and are, complementary." Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S., at 583; see Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U. S., at 543, n. 7.
The Court ignores these perceptions and dismisses without explanation the proposition, explicitly accepted in Flores, that § 1983 and § 1343 (3) are coextensive. The Court cites no evidence that Congress ever intended to alter so fundamentally its original remedial plan, and I am aware of none.[8] Nearly every commentator who has considered the question has concluded that § 1343 (3) was intended to supply federal jurisdiction in all § 1983 actions. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 637, n. 19 (POWELL, J., concurring) (collecting citations).[9] Since § 1343 (3) covers statutory *22 claims only when they arise under laws providing for the equal rights of citizens, Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 615-618, the same limitation necessarily is implicit in § 1983. The Court's decision to apply that statute without regard to the scope of its jurisdictional counterpart is at war with the plainly expressed intent of Congress.
B
The Court's opinion does not consider the nature or scope of the litigation it has authorized. In practical effect, today's decision means that state and local governments, officers, and employees[10] now may face liability whenever a person believes he has been injured by the administration of any federal-state cooperative program, whether or not that program is related to equal or civil rights.[11]
1
Even a cursory survey of the United States Code reveals that literally hundreds of cooperative regulatory and social welfare enactments may be affected.[12] The States now participate *23 in the enforcement of federal laws governing migrant labor, noxious weeds, historic preservation, wildlife conservation, anadromous fisheries, scenic trails, and strip mining. Various statutes authorize federal-state cooperative agreements in most aspects of federal land management. In addition, federal grants administered by state and local governments now are available in virtually every area of public administration. Unemployment, Medicaid, school lunch subsidies, food stamps, and other welfare benefits may provide particularly inviting subjects of litigation. Federal assistance also includes a variety of subsidies for education, housing, health care, transportation, public works, and law enforcement. Those who might benefit from these grants now will be potential § 1983 plaintiffs.
No one can predict the extent to which litigation arising from today's decision will harass state and local officials; nor can one foresee the number of new filings in our already overburdened courts. But no one can doubt that these consequences will be substantial. And the Court advances no reason to believe that any Congressfrom 1874 to the present dayintended this expansion of federally imposed liability on state defendants.
Moreover, state and local governments will bear the entire burden of liability for violations of statutory "civil rights" even when federal officials are involved equally in the administration *24 of the affected program. Section 1983 grants no right of action against the United States, and few of the foregoing cooperative programs provide expressly for private actions to enforce their terms. Thus, private litigants may sue responsible federal officials only in the relatively rare case in which a cause of action may be implied from the governing substantive statute. Cf. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560 (1979). It defies reason to believe that Congress intendedwithout discussionto impose such a burden only upon state defendants.
Even when a cause of action against federal officials is available, litigants are likely to focus efforts upon state defendants in order to obtain attorney's fees under the liberal standard of 42 U. S. C. § 1988. There is some evidence that § 1983 claims already are being appended to complaints solely for the purpose of obtaining fees in actions where "civil rights" of any kind are at best an afterthought. In this case, for example, the respondents added a § 1983 count to their complaint some years after the action was initiated, apparently in response to the enactment of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976. See also United States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 595 F. 2d 525, 529 (CA9 1979), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U. S. 352 (1980). The uses of this technique have not been explored fully. But the rules of pendent jurisdiction are quite liberal, and plaintiffs who prevail on pendent claims may win awards under § 1988. Maher v. Gagne, post, p. 122. Consequently, ingenious pleaders may find ways to recover attorney's fees in almost any suit against a state defendant.[13] Nothing in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 suggests that Congress intended *25 to remove so completely the protection of the "American Rule" in suits against state defendants.[14]
2
When Congress revised the statutes in 1874, it hardly could have anticipated the subsequent proliferation of federal statutes. Yet, congressional power to enact laws under the Spending and Commerce Clauses was well known in 1874. Congress need not have foreseen the ultimate scope of those powers to have understood that the expansion of § 1983 to statutory claims would have serious consequences.
Today's decision confers upon the courts unprecedented authority to oversee state actions that have little or nothing to do with the individual rights defined and enforced by the civil rights legislation of the Reconstruction Era.[15] This result cannot be reconciled with the purposes for which § 1983 was enacted. It also imposes unequal burdens on state and federal officials in the joint administration of federal programs and may expose state defendants to liability for attorney's fees in virtually every case. If any Member of the 43d Congress had suggested legislation embodying these results, the proposal certainly would have been hotly debated. It is simply *26 inconceivable that Congress, while professing a firm intention not to make substantive changes in the law, nevertheless intended to enact a major new remedial program by approvingwithout discussionthe addition of two words to a statute adopted only three years earlier.
IV
The Court finally insists that its interpretation of § 1983 is foreordained by a line of precedent so strong that further analysis is unnecessary. Ante, at 4-5. It is true that suits against state officials alleging violations of the Social Security Act have become commonplace in the last decade. Ibid. The instant a