452 U.S. 161 (1981)

COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, OREGON, ET AL.
v.
GUNTHER ET AL.

No. 80-429.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued March 23, 1981. Decided June 8, 1981. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

*163 Lawrence R. Derr argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.

Carol A. Hewitt argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.

Barry Sullivan argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Acting Assistant Attorney General Turner, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Walter W. Barnett, Neil H. Cogan, and Leroy D. Clark.^[*]

Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Kenneth C. McGuiness, Robert E. Williams, and Douglas S. McDowell for the Equal Employment Advisory Council et al.; and by Lawrence Z. Lorber and Robin M. Schachter for the American Society for Personnel Administration.

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented is whether § 703 (h) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 257, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (h), restricts Title VII's prohibition of sex-based wage discrimination to claims of equal pay for equal work.

I

This case arises over the payment by petitioner County of Washington, Ore., of substantially lower wages to female *164 guards in the female section of the county jail than it paid to male guards in the male section of the jail.^[1] Respondents are four women who were employed to guard female prisoners and to carry out certain other functions in the jail.^[2] In January 1974, the county eliminated the female section of the jail, transferred the female prisoners to the jail of a nearby county, and discharged respondents. 20 FEP Cases 788, 790 (Ore. 1976).

Respondents filed suit against petitioners in Federal District Court under Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., seeking backpay and other relief.^[3] They alleged that they were paid unequal wages for work substantially equal to that performed by male guards, and in the alternative, that part of the pay differential was attributable to intentional sex discrimination.^[4] The latter allegation was based on a claim *165 that, because of intentional discrimination, the county set the pay scale for female guards, but not for male guards, at a level lower than that warranted by its own survey of outside markets and the worth of the jobs.

After trial, the District Court found that the male guards supervised more than 10 times as many prisoners per guard as did the female guards, and that the females devoted much of their time to less valuable clerical duties. It therefore held that respondents' jobs were not substantially equal to those of the male guards, and that respondents were thus not entitled to equal pay. 20 FEP Cases, at 791. The Court of Appeals affirmed on that issue, and respondents do not seek review of the ruling.

The District Court also dismissed respondents' claim that the discrepancy in pay between the male and female guards was attributable in part to intentional sex discrimination. It held as a matter of law that a sex-based wage discrimination claim cannot be brought under Title VII unless it would satisfy the equal work standard of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U. S. C. § 206 (d).^[5] 20 FEP Cases, at 791. The court therefore permitted no additional evidence on this claim, and made no findings on whether petitioner county's pay scales for female guards resulted from intentional sex discrimination.

The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that persons alleging sex discrimination "are not precluded from suing under Title VII to protest . . . discriminatory compensation practices" merely because their jobs were not equal to higher paying jobs held by members of the opposite sex. 602 F. 2d 882, 891 (CA9 1979), supplemental opinion on denial of rehearing, 623 F. 2d 1303, 1313, 1317 (1980). The court remanded to the District Court with instructions to take evidence on respondents' claim that part of the difference between their rate of pay and that of the male guards is attributable to sex *166 discrimination. We granted certiorari, 449 U. S. 950 (1980), and now affirm.

We emphasize at the outset the narrowness of the question before us in this case. Respondents' claim is not based on the controversial concept of "comparable worth,"^[6] under which plaintiffs might claim increased compensation on the basis of a comparison of the intrinsic worth or difficulty of their job with that of other jobs in the same organization or community.^[7] Rather, respondents seek to prove, by direct evidence, that their wages were depressed because of intentional sex discrimination, consisting of setting the wage scale for female guards, but not for male guards, at a level lower than its own survey of outside markets and the worth of the jobs warranted. The narrow question in this case is whether such a claim is precluded by the last sentence of § 703 (h) of Title VII, called the "Bennett Amendment."^[8]

*167 II

Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer "to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex . . . ." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (a). The Bennett Amendment to Title VII, however, provides:

"It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 206 (d) of title 29." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (h).

To discover what practices are exempted from Title VII's prohibitions by the Bennett Amendment, we must turn to § 206 (d)—the Equal Pay Act—which provides in relevant part:

"No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex." 77 Stat. 56, 29 U. S. C. § 206 (d) (1).

On its face, the Equal Pay Act contains three restrictions pertinent to this case. First, its coverage is limited to those *168 employers subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act. S. Rep. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1963). Thus, the Act does not apply, for example, to certain businesses engaged in retail sales, fishing, agriculture, and newspaper publishing. See 29 U. S. C. §§ 203 (s), 213 (a) (1976 ed. and Supp. III). Second, the Act is restricted to cases involving "equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions." 29 U. S. C. § 206 (d) (1). Third, the Act's four affirmative defenses exempt any wage differentials attributable to seniority, merit, quantity or quality of production, or "any other factor other than sex." Ibid.

Petitioners argue that the purpose of the Bennett Amendment was to restrict Title VII sex-based wage discrimination claims to those that could also be brought under the Equal Pay Act, and thus that claims not arising from "equal work" are precluded. Respondents, in contrast, argue that the Bennett Amendment was designed merely to incorporate the four affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII for sex-based wage discrimination claims. Respondents thus contend that claims for sex-based wage discrimination can be brought under Title VII even though no member of the opposite sex holds an equal but higher paying job, provided that the challenged wage rate is not based on seniority, merit, quantity or quality of production, or "any other factor other than sex." The Court of Appeals found respondents' interpretation the "more persuasive." 623 F. 2d, at 1311. While recognizing that the language and legislative history of the provision are not unambiguous, we conclude that the Court of Appeals was correct.

A

The language of the Bennett Amendment suggests an intention to incorporate only the affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII. The Amendment bars sex-based wage discrimination claims under Title VII where the *169 pay differential is "authorized" by the Equal Pay Act. Although the word "authorize" sometimes means simply "to permit," it ordinarily denotes affirmative enabling action. Black's Law Dictionary 122 (5th ed. 1979) defines "authorize" as "[t]o empower; to give a right or authority to act."^[9] Cf. 18 U. S. C. § 1905 (prohibiting the release by federal employees of certain information "to any extent not authorized by law"); 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (1976 ed., Supp. III) (granting district courts jurisdiction over "any civil action authorized by law"). The question, then, is what wage practices have been affirmatively authorized by the Equal Pay Act.

The Equal Pay Act is divided into two parts: a definition of the violation, followed by four affirmative defenses. The first part can hardly be said to "authorize" anything at all: it is purely prohibitory. The second part, however, in essence "authorizes" employers to differentiate in pay on the basis of seniority, merit, quantity or quality of production, or any other factor other than sex, even though such differentiation might otherwise violate the Act. It is to these provisions, therefore, that the Bennett Amendment must refer.

Petitioners argue that this construction of the Bennett Amendment would render it superfluous. See United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539 (1955). Petitioners claim that the first three affirmative defenses are simply redundant of the provisions elsewhere in § 703 (h) of Title VII that already exempt bona fide seniority and merit systems and systems measuring earnings by quantity or quality of production,^[10] and that the fourth defense—"any other *170 factor other than sex"—is implicit in Title VII's general prohibition of sex-based discrimination.

We cannot agree. The Bennett Amendment was offered as a "technical amendment" designed to resolve any potential conflicts between Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. See infra, at 173. Thus, with respect to the first three defenses, the Bennett Amendment has the effect of guaranteeing that courts and administrative agencies adopt a consistent interpretation of like provisions in both statutes. Otherwise, they might develop inconsistent bodies of case law interpreting two sets of nearly identical language.

More importantly, incorporation of the fourth affirmative defense could have significant consequences for Title VII litigation. Title VII's prohibition of discriminatory employment practices was intended to be broadly inclusive, proscribing "not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 431 (1971). The structure of Title VII litigation, including presumptions, burdens of proof, and defenses, has been designed to reflect this approach. The fourth affirmative defense of the Equal Pay Act, however, was designed differently, to confine the application of the Act to wage differentials attributable to sex discrimination. H. R. Rep. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1963). Equal Pay Act litigation, therefore, has been structured to permit employers to defend against charges of discrimination where their pay differentials are based on a bona fide use of "other factors other than sex."^[11] Under the Equal *171 Pay Act, the courts and administrative agencies are not permitted to "substitute their judgment for the judgment of the employer . . . who [has] established and applied a bona fide job rating system," so long as it does not discriminate on the basis of sex. 109 Cong. Rec. 9209 (1963) (statement of Rep. Goodell, principal exponent of the Act). Although we do not decide in this case how sex-based wage discrimination litigation under Title VII should be structured to accommodate the fourth affirmative defense of the Equal Pay Act, see n. 8, supra, we consider it clear that the Bennett Amendment, under this interpretation, is not rendered superfluous.

We therefore conclude that only differentials attributable to the four affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act are "authorized" by that Act within the meaning of § 703 (h) of Title VII.

B

The legislative background of the Bennett Amendment is fully consistent with this interpretation.

Title VII was the second bill relating to employment discrimination to be enacted by the 88th Congress. Earlier, the same Congress passed the Equal Pay Act "to remedy what was perceived to be a serious and endemic problem of [sex-based] employment discrimination in private industry," Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U. S. 188, 195 (1974). Any possible inconsistency between the Equal Pay *172 Act and Title VII did not surface until late in the debate over Title VII in the House of Representatives, because, until then. Title VII extended only to discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin, see H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1963), while the Equal Pay Act applied only to sex discrimination. Just two days before voting on Title VII, the House of Representatives amended the bill to proscribe sex discrimination, but did not discuss the implications of the overlapping jurisdiction of Title VII, as amended, and the Equal Pay Act. See 110 Cong. Rec. 2577-2584 (1964). The Senate took up consideration of the House version of the Civil Rights bill without reference to any committee. Thus, neither House of Congress had the opportunity to undertake formal analysis of the relation between the two statutes.^[12]

*173 Several Senators expressed concern that insufficient attention had been paid to possible inconsistencies between the statutes. See id., at 7217 (statement of Sen. Clark); id., at 13647 (statement of Sen. Bennett). In an attempt to rectify the problem, Senator Bennett proposed his amendment. Id., at 13310. The Senate leadership approved the proposal as a "technical amendment" to the Civil Rights bill, and it was taken up on the floor on June 12, 1964, after cloture had been invoked. The Amendment engendered no controversy, and passed without recorded vote. The entire discussion comprised a few short statements:

"Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, after many years of yearning by members of the fair sex in this country, and after very careful study by the appropriate committees of Congress, last year Congress passed the so-called Equal Pay Act, which became effective only yesterday.

"By this time, programs have been established for the effective administration of this act. Now, when the civil rights bill is under consideration, in which the word `sex' has been inserted in many places, I do not believe sufficient attention may have been paid to possible conflicts between the wholesale insertion of the word `sex' in the bill and in the Equal Pay Act.

"The purpose of my amendment is to provide that in the event of conflicts, the provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not be nullified.

"I understand that the leadership in charge of the bill have agreed to the amendment as a proper technical correction of the bill. If they will confirm that understand [sic], I shall ask that the amendment be voted on without asking for the yeas and nays.

*174 "Mr. HUMPHREY. The amendment of the Senator from Utah is helpful. I believe it is needed. I thank him for his thoughtfulness. The amendment is fully acceptable.

"Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute.

"We were aware of the conflict that might develop, because the Equal Pay Act was an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Fair Labor Standards Act carries out certain exceptions.

"All that the pending amendment does is recognize those exceptions, that are carried in the basic act.

"Therefore, this amendment is necessary, in the interest of clarification." Id., at 13647.

As this discussion shows, Senator Bennett proposed the Amendment because of a general concern that insufficient attention had been paid to the relation between the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, rather than because of a specific potential conflict between the statutes.^[13] His explanation that the Amendment assured that the provisions of the Equal Pay Act "shall not be nullified" in the event of conflict with Title VII may be read as referring to the affirmative defenses of the Act. Indeed, his emphasis on the "technical" nature of the Amendment and his concern for not disrupting the "effective *175 administration" of the Equal Pay Act are more compatible with an interpretation of the Amendment as incorporating the Act's affirmative defenses, as administratively interpreted, than as engrafting all the restrictive features of the Equal Pay Act onto Title VII.^[14]

Senator Dirksen's comment that all that the Bennett Amendment does is to "recognize" the exceptions carried in the Fair Labor Standards Act, suggests that the Bennett Amendment was necessary because of the exceptions to coverage in the Fair Labor Standards Act, which made the Equal Pay Act applicable to a narrower class of employers than was Title VII. See supra, at 167-168. The Bennett Amendment clarified that the standards of the Equal Pay Act would govern even those wage discrimination cases where only Title VII would otherwise apply. So understood, Senator Dirksen's remarks are not inconsistent with our interpretation.^[15]

*176 Although there was no debate on the Bennett Amendment in the House of Representatives when the Senate version of the Act returned for final approval, Representative Celler explained each of the Senate's amendments immediately prior to the vote. He stated that the Bennett Amendment "[p]rovides that compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act as amended satisfies the requirement of the title barring discrimination because of sex . . . ." 110 Cong. Rec. 15896 (1964). If taken literally, this explanation would restrict Title VII's coverage of sex discrimination more severely than even petitioners suggest: not only would it confine wage discrimination claims to those actionable under the Equal Pay Act, but it would block all other sex discrimination claims as well. We can only conclude that Representative Celler's explanation was not intended to be precise, and does not provide a solution to the present problem.^[16]

Thus, although the few references by Members of Congress to the Bennett Amendment do not explicitly confirm that its purpose was to incorporate into Title VII the four affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act in sex-based wage discrimination cases, they are broadly consistent with such a reading, and do not support an alternative reading.

*177 C

The interpretations of the Bennett Amendment by the agency entrusted with administration of Title VII—the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission—do not provide much guidance in this case. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S., at 433-434. The Commission's 1965 Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex stated that "the standards of `equal pay for equal work' set forth in the Equal Pay Act for determining what is unlawful discrimination in compensation are applicable to Title VII." 29 CFR § 1604.7 (a) (1966). In 1972, the EEOC deleted this portion of the Guideline, see 37 Fed. Reg. 6837 (1972). Although the original Guideline may be read to support petitioners' argument that no claim of sex discrimination in compensation may be brought under Title VII except where the Equal Pay Act's "equal work" standard is met, EEOC practice under this Guideline was considerably less than steadfast.

The restrictive interpretation suggested by the 1965 Guideline was followed in several opinion letters in the following years.^[17] During the same period, however, EEOC decisions frequently adopted the opposite position. For example, a reasonable-cause determination issued by the Commission in 1968 stated that "the existence of separate and different wage rate schedules for male employees on the one hand, and female employees on the other doing reasonably comparable work, establishes discriminatory wage rates based solely on the sex of the workers." Harrington v. Picadilly Cafeteria, Case No. AU 7-3-173 (Apr. 25, 1968).^[18]

*178 The current Guideline does not purport to explain whether the equal work standard of the Equal Pay Act has any application to Title VII, see 29 CFR § 1604.8 (1980), but the EEOC now supports respondents' position in its capacity as amicus curiae. In light of this history, we feel no hesitation in adopting what seems to us the most persuasive interpretation of the Amendment, in lieu of that once espoused, but not consistently followed, by the Commission.

D

Our interpretation of the Bennett Amendment draws additional support from the remedial purposes of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. Section 703 (a) of Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" because of such individual's sex. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (a) (emphasis added). As Congress itself has indicated, a "broad approach" to the definition of equal employment opportunity is essential to overcoming and undoing the effect of discrimination. S. Rep. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1964). We must therefore avoid interpretations of Title VII that deprive victims of discrimination of a remedy, without clear congressional mandate.

Under petitioners' reading of the Bennett Amendment, only those sex-based wage discrimination claims that satisfy the "equal work" standard of the Equal Pay Act could be brought under Title VII. In practical terms, this means that a woman who is discriminatorily underpaid could obtain no relief—no matter how egregious the discrimination might be—unless her employer also employed a man in an equal job in the same establishment, at a higher rate of pay. Thus, if *179 an employer hired a woman for a unique position in the company and then admitted that her salary would have been higher had she been male, the woman would be unable to obtain legal redress under petitioners' interpretation. Similarly, if an employer used a transparently sex-biased system for wage determination, women holding jobs not equal to those held by men would be denied the right to prove that the system is a pretext for discrimination. Moreover, to cite an example arising from a recent case, Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702 (1978), if the employer required its female workers to pay more into its pension program than male workers were required to pay, the only women who could bring a Title VII action under petitioners' interpretation would be those who could establish that a man performed equal work: a female auditor thus might have a cause of action while a female secretary might not. Congress surely did not intend the Bennett Amendment to insulate such blatantly discriminatory practices from judicial redress under Title VII.^[19]

Moreover, petitioners' interpretation would have other farreaching consequences. Since it rests on the proposition that any wage differentials not prohibited by the Equal Pay Act are "authorized" by it, petitioners' interpretation would lead to the conclusion that discriminatory compensation by employers not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act is "authorized"—since not prohibited—by the Equal Pay Act. Thus it would deny Title VII protection against sex-based wage discrimination by those employers not subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act but covered by Title VII. See supra, at 167-168. There is no persuasive evidence that Congress *180 intended such a result, and the EEOC has rejected it since at least 1965. See 29 CFR § 1604.7 (1966). Indeed, petitioners themselves apparently acknowledge that Congress intended Title VII's broader coverage to apply to equal pay claims under Title VII, thus impliedly admitting the fallacy in their own argument. Brief for Petitioners 48.

Petitioners' reading is thus flatly inconsistent with our past interpretations of Title VII as "prohibit[ing] all practices in whatever form which create inequality in employment opportunity due to discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin." Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 763 (1976). As we said in Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, supra, at 707, n. 13: "In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes." (Emphasis added.) We must therefore reject petitioners' interpretation of the Bennett Amendment.

III

Petitioners argue strenuously that the approach of the Court of Appeals places "the pay structure of virtually every employer and the entire economy . . . at risk and subject to scrutiny by the federal courts." Brief for Petitioners 99-100. They raise the specter that "Title VII plaintiffs could draw any type of comparison imaginable concerning job duties and pay between any job predominantly performed by women and any job predominantly performed by men." Id., at 101. But whatever the merit of petitioners' arguments in other contexts, they are inapplicable here, for claims based on the type of job comparisons petitioners describe are manifestly different from respondents' claim. Respondents contend that the Country of Washington evaluated the worth of their jobs; that the county determined that they should be paid approximately 95% as much as the male correctional officers; that it paid them only about 70% as much, while paying the male *181 officers the full evaluated worth of their jobs; and that the failure of the county to pay respondents the full evaluated worth of their jobs can be proved to be attributable to intentional sex discrimination. Thus, respondents' suit does not require a court to make its own subjective assessment of the value of the male and female guard jobs, or to attempt by statistical technique or other method to quantify the effect of sex discrimination on the wage rates.^[20]

We do not decide in this case the precise contours of law-suits challenging sex discrimination in compensation under Title VII. It is sufficient to note that respondents' claims of discriminatory undercompensation are not barred by § 703 (h) of Title VII merely because respondents do not perform work equal to that of male jail guards. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore

Affirmed.

JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE STEWART, and JUSTICE POWELL join, dissenting.

The Court today holds a plaintiff may state a claim of sex-based wage discrimination under Title VII without even establishing that she has performed "equal or substantially equal work" to that of males as defined in the Equal Pay Act. Because I believe that the legislative history of both the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII clearly establish that there can be no Title VII claim of sex-based wage discrimination without proof of "equal work," I dissent.

I

Because the Court never comes to grips with petitioners' argument, it is necessary to restate it here. Petitioners argue *182 that Congress in adopting the Equal Pay Act specifically addressed the problem of sex-based wage discrimination and determined that there should be a remedy for claims of unequal pay for equal work, but not for "comparable" work. Petitioners further observe that nothing in the legislative history of Title VII, enacted just one year later in 1964, reveals an intent to overrule that determination. Quite the contrary, petitioners note that the legislative history of Title VII, including the adoption of the so-called Bennett Amendment, demonstrates Congress' intent to require all sex-based wage discrimination claims, whether brought under the Equal Pay Act or under Title VII, to satisfy the "equal work" standard. Because respondents have not satisfied the "equal work" standard, petitioners conclude that they have not stated a claim under Title VII.

In rejecting that argument, the Court ignores traditional canons of statutory construction and relevant legislative history. Although I had thought it well settled that the legislative history of a statute is a useful guide to the intent of Congress, the Court today claims that the legislative history "has no bearing on the meaning of the [Act]," ante, at 173, n. 12, "does not provide a solution to the present problem," ante, at 176, and is simply of "no weight." Ante, at 176, n. 16. Instead, the Court rests its decision on its unshakable belief that any other result would be unsound public policy. It insists that there simply must be a remedy for wage discrimination beyond that provided in the Equal Pay Act. The Court does not explain why that must be so, nor does it explain what that remedy might be. And, of course, the Court cannot explain why it and not Congress is charged with determining what is and what is not sound public policy.

The closest the Court can come in giving a reason for its decision is its belief that interpretations of Title VII which "deprive victims of discrimination of a remedy, without clear congressional mandate" must be avoided. Ante, at 178. But that analysis turns traditional canons of statutory construction *183 on their head. It has long been the rule that when a legislature enacts a statute to protect a class of persons, the burden is on the plaintiff to show statutory coverage, not on the defendant to show that there is a "clear congressional mandate" for excluding the plaintiff from coverage. Such a departure from traditional rules is particularly unwarranted in this case, where the doctrine of in pari materia suggests that all claims of sex-based wage discrimination are governed by the substantive standards of the previously enacted and more specific legislation, the Equal Pay Act.

Because the decision does not rest on any reasoned statement of logic or principle, it provides little guidance to employers or lower courts as to what types of compensation practices might now violate Title VII. The Court correctly emphasizes that its decision is narrow, and indeed one searches the Court's opinion in vain for a hint as to what pleadings or proof other than that adduced in this particular case, see ante, at 180-181, would be sufficient to state a claim of sexbased wage discrimination under Title VII. To paraphrase Justice Jackson, the Court today does not and apparently cannot enunciate any legal criteria by which suits under Title VII will be adjudicated and it lays "down no rule other than our passing impression to guide ourselves or our successors." Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U. S. 28, 45 (1948). All we know is that Title VII provides a remedy when, as here, plaintiffs seek to show by direct evidence that their employer intentionally depressed their wages. And, for reasons that go largely unexplained, we also know that a Title VII remedy may not be available to plaintiffs who allege theories different than that alleged here, such as the so-called "comparable worth" theory. One has the sense that the decision today will be treated like a restricted railroad ticket, "good for this day and train only." Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).

In the end, however, the flaw with today's decision is not so much that it is so narrowly written as to be virtually *184 meaningless, but rather that its legal analysis is wrong. The Court is obviously more interested in the consequences of its decision than in discerning the intention of Congress. In reaching its desired result, the Court conveniently and persistently ignores relevant legislative history and instead relies wholly on what it believes Congress should have enacted.

II

The Equal Pay Act

The starting point for any discussion of sex-based wage discrimination claims must be the Equal Pay Act of 1963, enacted as an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U. S. C. §§ 201-219 (1976 ed., Supp. III). It was there that Congress, after 18 months of careful and exhaustive study, specifically addressed the problem of sex-based wage discrimination. The Equal Pay Act states that employers shall not discriminate on the basis of sex by paying different wages for jobs that require equal skill, effort, and responsibility. In adopting the "equal pay for equal work" formula, Congress carefully considered and ultimately rejected the "equal pay for comparable worth" standard advanced by respondents and several amici. As the legislative history of the Equal Pay Act amply demonstrates, Congress realized that the adoption of the comparable-worth doctrine would ignore the economic realities of supply and demand and would involve both governmental agencies and courts in the impossible task of ascertaining the worth of comparable work, an area in which they have little expertise.

The legislative history of the Equal Pay Act begins in 1962 when Representatives Green and Zelenko introduced two identical bills, H. R. 8898 and H. R. 10226 respectively, representing the Kennedy administration's proposal for equal pay legislation. Both bills stated in pertinent part:

"SEC. 4. No employer . . . shall discriminate . . . between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to *185 any employee at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to any employee of the opposite sex for work of comparable character on jobs the performance of which requires comparable skills, except where such payment is made pursuant to a seniority or merit increase system which does not discriminate on the basis of sex." H. R. 8898, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); H. R. 10226, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) (emphasis supplied).^[1]

During the extensive hearings on the proposal, the administration strenuously urged that Congress adopt the "comparable" language, noting that the comparability of different jobs could be determined through job evaluation procedures. Hearings on H. R. 8898, H. R. 10226 before the Select Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 16, 27 (1962) (testimony of Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg and Assistant Secretary of Labor Esther Peterson). A bill containing the comparable-work formula, then denominated H. R. 11677, was reported out of the House Committee on Education and Labor and reached the full House. Once there, Representative St. George objected to the "comparable work" language of the bill and offered an amendment which limited equal pay claims to those "for equal work on jobs, the performance of which requires equal skills." 108 Cong. Rec. 14767 (1962). As she explained, her purpose was to limit wage discrimination claims *186 to the situation where men and women were paid differently for performing the same job.

"What we want to do in this bill is to make it exactly what it says. It is called equal pay for equal work in some of the committee hearings. There is a great difference between the word `comparable' and the word `equal'.

.....

". . . The word `comparable' opens up great vistas. It gives tremendous latitude to whoever is to be arbitrator in these disputes." Ibid. (Emphasis supplied.)

Representative Landrum echoed those remarks. He stressed that the St. George amendment would prevent "the trooping around all over the country of employees of the Labor Department harassing business with their various interpretations of the term `comparable' when `equal' is capable of the same definition throughout the United States." Id., at 14768. The administration, represented by Representatives Zelenko and Green, vigorously urged the House to reject the St. George amendment. They observed that the "equal work" standard was narrower than the existing "equal pay for comparable work" language and cited correspondence from Secretary of Labor Goldberg that "comparable is a key word in our proposal." Id., at 14768-14769. The House, however, rejected that advice and adopted the St. George amendment. When the Senate considered the bill, it too rejected the "comparable work" theory in favor of the "equal work" standard.

Because the Conference Committee failed to report a bill out of Committee, enactment of equal pay legislation was delayed until 1963. Equal pay legislation, containing the St. George amendment, was reintroduced at the beginning of the session. The congressional debate on that legislation leaves no doubt that Congress clearly rejected the entire notion of "comparable worth." For example, Representative *187 Goodell, a cosponsor of the Act, stressed the significance of the change from "comparable work" to "equal work."^[2]

"I think it is important that we have clear legislative history at this point. Last year when the House changed the word `comparable' to `equal' the clear intention was to narrow the whole concept. We went from `comparable' to `equal' meaning that the jobs involved should be virtually identical, that is, that they would be very much alike or closely related to each other.

"We do not expect the Labor Department to go into an establishment and attempt to rate jobs that are not equal. We do not want to hear the Department say, `Well, they amount to the same thing,' and evaluate them so that they come up to the same skill or point. We expect this to apply only to jobs that are substantially identical or equal." 109 Cong. Rec. 9197 (1963) (emphasis supplied).

Representative Frelinghuysen agreed with those remarks.

"[W]e can expect that the administration of the equal pay concept, while fair and effective, will not be excessive nor excessively wide ranging. What we seek to insure, where men and women are doing the same job under the same working conditions[,] that they will receive the same pay. It is not intended that either the Labor Department or individual employees will be equipped with hunting licenses.

.....

". . . [The EPA] is not intended to compare unrelated jobs, or jobs that have been historically and normally considered by the industry to be different." Id., at 9196 (emphasis supplied).^[3]

*188 Thus, the legislative history of the Equal Pay Act clearly reveals that Congress was unwilling to give either the Federal Government or the courts broad authority to determine comparable wage rates. Congress recognized that the adoption of such a theory would ignore economic realities and would result in major restructuring of the American economy. Instead, Congress concluded that governmental intervention to equalize wage differentials was to be undertaken only within one circumstance: when men's and women's jobs were identical or nearly so, hence unarguably of equal worth. It defies common sense to believe that the same Congress— which, after 18 months of hearings and debates, had decided in 1963 upon the extent of federal involvement it desired in the area of wage rate claims—intended sub silentio to reject all of this work and to abandon the limitations of the equal work approach just one year later, when it enacted Title VII.

Title VII

Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a et seq., one year after passing the Equal Pay Act. Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, and sex. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1). The question is whether Congress intended to completely turn its back on the "equal work" standard enacted in the Equal Pay Act of 1963 when it adopted Title VII only one year later.

*189 The Court answers that question in the affirmative, concluding that Title VII must be read more broadly than the Equal Pay Act. In so holding, the majority wholly ignores this Court's repeated adherence to the doctrine of in pari materia, namely, that "[w]here there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment." Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U. S. 148, 153 (1976), citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 550-551 (1974); United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U. S. 164, 169 (1976). In Continental Tuna, for example, the lower court held that an amendment to the Suits in Admiralty Act allowed plaintiffs to sue the United States under that Act and ignore the applicable and more stringent provisions of the previously enacted Public Vessels Act. We rejected that construction because it amounted to a repeal of the Public Vessels Act by implication. We recognized that such an evasion of the congressional purpose reflected in the restrictive provisions would not be permitted absent some clear statement by Congress that such was intended by the later statute. Similarly, in Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, 426 U. S. 1 (1976), this Court rejected a construction of the Federal Water Control Act which would have substantially altered the regulation scheme established under the Atomic Energy Act, without a "clear indication of legislative intent." Id., at 24.

When those principles are applied to this case, there can be no doubt that the Equal Pay Act and Title VII should be construed in pari materia. The Equal Pay Act is the more specific piece of legislation, dealing solely with sex-based wage discrimination, and was the product of exhaustive congressional study. Title VII, by contrast, is a general antidiscrimination provision, passed with virtually no consideration of the specific problem of sex-based wage discrimination. See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 143 (1976) (the legislative history of the sex discrimination amendment *190 is "notable primarily for its brevity").^[4] Most significantly, there is absolutely nothing in the legislative history of Title VII which reveals an intent by Congress to repeal by implication the provisions of the Equal Pay Act. Quite the contrary