452 U.S. 264 (1981)

HODEL, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
v.
VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING & RECLAMATION ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL.

No. 79-1538.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued February 23, 1981. Decided June 15, 1981.^[*] APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA.

*266 Peter Buscemi argued the cause for appellant in No. 79-1538 and appellees in No. 79-1596. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Acting Assistant Attorney General Sagalkin, and Michael A. McCord.

*267 Marshall Coleman, Attorney General of Virginia, argued the cause for appellees in No. 79-1538 and appellants in No. 79-1596. With him on the brief for appellees Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc., et al. were Roger L. Chaffe and Gregory M. Luce, Assistant Attorneys General, and John L. Kilcullen. Robert T. Copeland filed a brief for the Town of St. Charles et al., appellees under this Court's Rule 10.4, in both cases.^[†]

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Alaska et al. by Wilson L. Condon, Attorney General of Alaska, Wayne Minami, Attorney General of Hawaii, and Johnson H. Wong, Deputy Attorney General, David H. Leroy, Attorney General of Idaho, Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General of Kentucky, William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana, and Gary L. Keyser and Carmack M. Blackmon, Assistant Attorneys General, Paul J. Douglas, Attorney General of Nebraska, and Judy K. Hoffman, Assistant Attorney General, Jeff Bingaman, Attorney General of New Mexico, Jan Eric Cartwright, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General of Rhode Island, Mark V. Meierhenry, Attorney General of South Dakota, and Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General of Utah; for the State of Arizona et al. by Robert C. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, Wayne Minami, Attorney General of Hawaii, and Johnson H. Wong, Deputy Attorney General, Richard H. Bryan, Attorney General of Nevada, Larry D. Struve, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and Harry W. Swainston, Deputy Attorney General, Allen I. Olson, Attorney General of North Dakota, and Ray Walton, Special Assistant Attorney General, James M. Brown, Attorney General of Oregon, Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General of Utah, Slade Gorton, Attorney General of Washington, and John D. Troughton, Attorney General of Wyoming; for the State of Illinois by Tyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General, and Harvey M. Sheldon; for the State of Texas by Mark White, Attorney General, John W. Fainter, Jr., First Assistant Attorney General, Richard E. Gray III, Executive Assistant Attorney General, and Justin Andrew Kever, Assistant Attorney General; for Coal Operators and Associates, Inc., by John Robert Leathers, Joseph J. Zaluski, and Eugene F. Mooney; for the Mountain States Legal Foundation by Roger J. Marzulla; for the National Coal Association et al. by John A. MacLeod, and Richard McMillan, Jr.; and for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Ronald A. Zumbrun and Raymond M. Momboisse.

Eugene F. Mooney, George L. Seay, Jr., and John Robert Leathers filed a brief for Pike County, Kentucky, as amicus curiae.

*268 JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

These cases arise out of a pre-enforcement challenge to the constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (Surface Mining Act or Act), 91 Stat. 447, 30 U. S. C. § 1201 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. III). The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia declared several central provisions of the Act unconstitutional and permanently enjoined their enforcement. 483 F. Supp. 425 (1980). In these appeals, we consider whether Congress, in adopting the Act, exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution,^[1] or transgressed affirmative limitations on the exercise of that power contained in the Fifth and Tenth Amendments. We conclude that in the context of a facial challenge, the Surface Mining Act does not suffer from any of these alleged constitutional defects, and we uphold the Act as constitutional.

I

A

The Surface Mining Act is a comprehensive statute designed to "establish a nationwide program to protect society and the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations." § 102 (a), 30 U. S. C. § 1202 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. III). Title II of the Act, 30 U. S. C. § 1211 (1976 ed., Supp. III), creates the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM), within the Department of the Interior, and the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) acting through OSM, is charged with primary responsibility for administering *269 and implementing the Act by promulgating regulations and enforcing its provisions. § 201 (c), 30 U. S. C. § 1211 (c) (1976 ed., Supp. III). The principal regulatory and enforcement provisions are contained in Title V of the Act, 91 Stat. 467-514, 30 U. S. C. §§ 1251-1279 (1976 ed., Supp. III). Section 501, 30 U. S. C. § 1251 (1976 ed., Supp. III), establishes a two-stage program for the regulation of surface coal mining: an initial, or interim regulatory phase, and a subsequent, permanent phase. The interim program mandates immediate promulgation and federal enforcement of some of the Act's environmental protection performance standards, complemented by continuing state regulation. Under the permanent phase, a regulatory program is to be adopted for each State, mandating compliance with the full panoply of federal performance standards, with enforcement responsibility lying with either the State or Federal Government.

Section 501 (a) directs the Secretary to promulgate regulations establishing an interim regulatory program during which mine operators will be required to comply with some of the Act's performance standards, as specified by § 502 (c), 30 U. S. C. § 1252 (c) (1976 ed., Supp. III). Included among those selected standards are requirements governing: (a) restoration of land after mining to its prior condition; (b) restoration of land to its approximate original contour; (c) segregation and preservation of topsoil; (d) minimization of disturbance to the hydrologic balance; (e) construction of coal mine waste piles used as dams and embankments; (f) revegetation of mined areas; and (g) spoil disposal. § 515 (b), 30 U. S. C. § 1265 (b) (1976 ed., Supp. III).^[2] The interim *270 regulations were published on December 13, 1977, see 42 Fed. Reg. 62639,^[3] and they are currently in effect in most States, including Virginia.^[4]

The Secretary is responsible for enforcing the interim regulatory program. § 502 (e), 30 U. S. C. § 1252 (e) (1976 ed., Supp. III). A federal enforcement and inspection program is to be established for each State, and is to remain in effect until a permanent regulatory program is implemented in the State. States may issue permits for surface mining operations during the interim phase, but operations authorized by such permits must comply with the federal interim performance standards. § 502 (b), 30 U. S. C. § 1252 (b) (1976 ed., Supp. III). States may also pursue their own regulatory and inspection programs during the interim phase, and they may *271 assist the Secretary in enforcing the interim standards.^[5] The States are not, however, required to enforce the interim regulatory standards and, until the permanent phase of the program, the Secretary may not cede the Federal Government's independent enforcement role to States that wish to conduct their own regulatory programs.

Section 501 (b), 30 U. S. C. § 1251 (b) (1976 ed., Supp. III), directs the Secretary to promulgate regulations establishing a permanent regulatory program incorporating all the Act's performance standards. The Secretary published the permanent regulations on March 13, 1979, see 44 Fed. Reg. 14902, but these regulations do not become effective in a particular State until either a permanent state program, submitted and approved in accordance with § 503 of the Act, or a permanent federal program for the State, adopted in accordance with § 504, is implemented.

Under § 503, any State wishing to assume permanent regulatory authority over the surface coal mining operations on "non-Federal lands"^[6] within its borders must submit a proposed permanent program to the Secretary for his approval. The proposed program must demonstrate that the state legislature has enacted laws implementing the environmental protection standards established by the Act and accompanying regulations, and that the State has the administrative and technical ability to enforce these standards. 30 U. S. C. § 1253 (1976 ed., Supp. III). The Secretary must approve or disapprove each such proposed program in accordance with time schedules and procedures established by §§ 503 (b), (c), *272 30 U. S. C. §§ 1253 (b), (c) (1976 ed., Supp. III).^[7] In addition, the Secretary must develop and implement a federal permanent program for each State that fails to submit or enforce a satisfactory state program. § 504, 30 U. S. C. § 1254 (1976 ed., Supp. III). In such situations, the Secretary constitutes the regulatory authority administering the Act within that State and continues as such unless and until a "state program" is approved. No later than eight months after adoption of either a state-run or federally administered permanent regulatory program for a State, all surface coal mining and reclamation operations on "non-Federal lands" within that State must obtain a new permit issued in accordance with the applicable regulatory program. § 506 (a), 30 U. S. C. § 1256 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. III).

*273 B

On October 23, 1978, the Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc., an association of coal producers engaged in surface coal mining operations in Virginia, 63 of its member coal companies, and 4 individual landowners filed suit in Federal District Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against various provisions of the Act. The Commonwealth of Virginia and the town of Wise, Va., intervened as plaintiffs.^[8] Plaintiffs' challenge was primarily directed at Title V's performance standards.^[9] Because the permanent regulatory program was not scheduled to become effective until June 3, 1980, plaintiffs' challenge was directed at the sections of the Act establishing the interim regulatory program. Plaintiffs alleged that these provisions violate the Commerce Clause, the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,^[10] the Tenth Amendment,^[11] and the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.^[12]

The District Court held a 13-day trial on plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction. The court subsequently *274 issued an order and opinion declaring several central provisions of the Act unconstitutional. 483 F. Supp. 425 (1980). The court rejected plaintiffs' Commerce Clause, equal protection, and substantive due process challenges to the Act. The court held, however, that the Act "operates to `displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional functions,'. . . and, therefore, is in contravention of the Tenth Amendment." Id., at 435, quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833, 852 (1976). The court also ruled that various provisions of the Act effect an uncompensated taking of private property in violation of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Finally, the court agreed with plaintiffs' due process challenges to some of the Act's enforcement provisions. The court permanently enjoined the Secretary from enforcing various provisions of the Act.^[13]

In No. 79-1538, the Secretary appeals from that portion of the District Court's judgment declaring various sections of the Act unconstitutional and permanently enjoining their enforcement. In No. 79-1596, plaintiffs cross-appeal from the District Court's rejection of their Commerce Clause challenge to the Act.^[14] Because of the importance of the issues raised, we noted probable jurisdiction of both appeals,^[15] 449 U. S. *275 817 (1980), and consolidated the two cases.^[16] For convenience, we shall usually refer to plaintiffs as "appellees."

II

On cross-appeal, appellees argue that the District Court erred in rejecting their challenge to the Act as beyond the scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. They insist that the Act's principal goal is regulating the use of private lands within the borders of the States and not, as the District Court found, regulating the interstate commerce effects of surface coal mining. Consequently, appellees contend that the ultimate issue presented is "whether land as such is subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause, i. e. whether land can be regarded as `in commerce.'" Brief for Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc., et al. 12 (emphasis in original). In urging us to answer "no" to this question, appellees emphasize that the Court has recognized that land-use regulation is within the inherent police powers of the States and their political subdivisions,^[17] and *276 argue that Congress may regulate land use only insofar as the Property Clause^[18] grants it control over federal lands.

We do not accept either appellees' framing of the question or the answer they would have us supply. The task of a court that is asked to determine whether a particular exercise of congressional power is valid under the Commerce Clause is relatively narrow. The court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a finding. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 258 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294, 303-304 (1964). This established, the only remaining question for judicial inquiry is whether "the means chosen by [Congress] must be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution." Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, supra, at 262. See United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 121 (1941); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S., at 304. The judicial task is at an end once the court determines that Congress acted rationally in adopting a particular regulatory scheme. Ibid.

Judicial review in this area is influenced above all by the fact that the Commerce Clause is a grant of plenary authority to Congress. See National League of Cities v. Usery, supra, at 840; Cleveland v. United States, 329 U. S. 14, 19 (1946); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 37 (1937). This power is "complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution." Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196 (1824). Moreover, this Court has made clear that the commerce power extends not only to "the use of channels of interstate or foreign commerce" and *277 to "protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce . . . or persons or things in commerce," but also to "activities affecting commerce." Perez v. United States, 402 U. S. 146, 150 (1971). As we explained in Fry v. United States, 421, U. S. 542, 547 (1975), "[e]ven activity that is purely intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with foreign nations." See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S., at 840; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, supra, at 255; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 127-128 (1942); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U. S. 110, 119 (1942); United States v. Darby, supra, at 120-121.

Thus, when Congress has determined that an activity affects interstate commerce, the courts need inquire only whether the finding is rational. Here, the District Court properly deferred to Congress' express findings, set out in the Act itself, about the effects of surface coal mining on interstate commerce. Section 101 (c), 30 U. S. C. § 1201 (c) (1976 ed., Supp. III), recites the congressional finding that

"many surface mining operations result in disturbances of surface areas that burden and adversely affect commerce and the public welfare by destroying or diminishing the utility of land for commercial, industrial, residential, recreational, agricultural, and forestry purposes, by causing erosion and landslides, by contributing to floods, by polluting the water, by destroying fish and wildlife habitats, by impairing natural beauty, by damaging the property of citizens, by creating hazards dangerous to life and property by degrading the quality of life in local communities, and by counteracting governmental programs and efforts to conserve soil, water, and other natural resources."

The legislative record provides ample support for these statutory findings. The Surface Mining Act became law *278 only after six years of the most thorough legislative consideration.^[19] Committees of both Houses of Congress held extended hearings during which vast amounts of testimony and *279 documentary evidence about the effects of surface mining on our Nation's environment and economy were brought to Congress' attention. Both Committees made detailed findings about these effects and the urgent need for federal legislation to address the problem. The Senate Report explained that

"[s]urface coal mining activities have imposed large social costs on the public . . . in many areas of the country in the form of unreclaimed lands, water pollution, erosion, floods, slope failures, loss of fish and wildlife resources, and a decline in natural beauty." S. Rep. No. 95-128, p. 50 (1977).

See id., at 50-54.

Similarly, the House Committee documented the adverse effects of surface coal mining on interstate commerce as including:

"`Acid drainage which has ruined an estimated 11,000 miles of streams; the loss of prime hardwood forest and the destruction of wildlife habitat by strip mining; the degrading of productive farmland; recurrent *280 landslides; siltation and sedimentation of river systems. . . .'" H. R. Rep. No. 95-218, p. 58 (1977), quoting H. R. Rep. No. 94-1445, p. 19 (1976).

And in discussing how surface coal mining affects water resources and in turn interstate commerce, the House Committee explained:

"The most widespread damages . . . are environmental in nature. Water users and developers incur significant economic and financial losses as well.

"Reduced recreational values, fishkills, reductions in normal waste assimilation capacity, impaired water supplies, metals and masonry corrosion and deterioration, increased flood frequencies and flood damages, reductions in designed water storage capacities at impoundments, and higher operating costs for commercial waterway users are some of the most obvious economic effects that stem from mining-related pollution and sedimentation." H. R. Rep. No. 95-218, at 59.

See id., at 96-122.

The Committees also explained that inadequacies in existing state laws and the need for uniform minimum nationwide standards made federal regulations imperative. See S. Rep. No. 95-128, at 49; H. R. Rep. No. 95-218, at 58. In light of the evidence available to Congress and the detailed consideration that the legislation received, we cannot say that Congress did not have a rational basis for concluding that surface coal mining has substantial effects on interstate commerce.

Appellees do not, in general, dispute the validity of the congressional findings.^[20] Rather, appellees' contention is that *281 the "rational basis" test should not apply in this case because the Act regulates land use, a local activity not affecting interstate commerce. But even assuming that appellees correctly characterize the land use regulated by the Act as a "local" activity, their argument is unpersuasive.

The denomination of an activity as a "local" or "intrastate" activity does not resolve the question whether Congress may regulate it under the Commerce Clause. As previously noted, the commerce power "extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce, or the exertion of the power of Congress over it, as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the effective execution of the granted power to regulate interstate commerce." United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U. S., at 119. See Fry v. United States, 421 U. S., at 547; NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S., at 37. This Court has long held that Congress may regulate the conditions under which goods shipped in interstate commerce are produced where the "local" activity of producing these goods itself affects interstate commerce. See, e. g., United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111 (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., supra; Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517 (1942). Cf. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294 (1964). Appellees do not dispute that coal is a commodity that moves in interstate commerce. Here, Congress rationally determined that regulation of surface coal mining is necessary to protect interstate commerce from adverse effects that may result from that activity. This congressional finding is sufficient to sustain the Act as a valid exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause.

Moreover, the Act responds to a congressional finding that nationwide "surface mining and reclamation standards are essential in order to insure that competition in interstate commerce among sellers of coal produced in different States will not be used to undermine the ability of the several States *282 to improve and maintain adequate standards on coal mining operations within their borders." 30 U. S. C. § 1201 (g) (1976 ed., Supp. III). The prevention of this sort of destructive interstate competition is a traditional role for congressional action under the Commerce Clause. In United States v. Darby, supra, the Court used a similar rationale to sustain the imposition of federal minimum wage and maximum hour regulations on a manufacturer of goods shipped in interstate commerce. The Court explained that the statute implemented Congress' view that "interstate commerce should not be made the instrument of competition in the distribution of goods produced under substandard labor conditions, which competition is injurious to the commerce and to the states from and to which the commerce flows." Id., at 115. The same rationale applies here to support the conclusion that the Surface Mining Act is within the authority granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause.

Finally, we agree with the lower federal courts that have uniformly found the power conferred by the Commerce Clause broad enough to permit congressional regulation of activities causing air or water pollution, or other environmental hazards that may have effects in more than one State.^[21] Appellees do not dispute that the environmental and other problems that the Act attempts to control can properly be addressed through Commerce Clause legislation. In these circumstances, it is difficult to find any remaining foundation *283 for appellees' argument that, because it regulates a particular land use, the Surface Mining Act is beyond congressional Commerce Clause authority. Accordingly, we turn to the question whether the means selected by Congress were reasonable and appropriate.

Appellees' essential challenge to the means selected by the Act is that they are redundant or unnecessary. Appellees contend that a variety of federal statutes such as the Clean Air Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7401 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. III), the Flood Control Acts, 33 U. S. C. § 701 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. III), and the Clean Water Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. III), adequately address the federal interest in controlling the environmental effects of surface coal mining without need to resort to the land-use regulation scheme of the Surface Mining Act. The short answer to this argument is that the effectiveness of existing laws in dealing with a problem identified by Congress is ordinarily a matter committed to legislative judgment. Congress considered the effectiveness of existing legislation and concluded that additional measures were necessary to deal with the interstate commerce effects of surface coal mining. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-218, at 58-60; S. Rep. No. 95-128, at 59-63. And we agree with the court below that the Act's regulatory scheme is reasonably related to the goals Congress sought to accomplish. The Act's restrictions on the practices of mine operators all serve to control the environmental and other adverse effects of surface coal mining.

In sum, we conclude that the District Court properly rejected appellees' Commerce Clause challenge to the Act. We therefore turn to the court's ruling that the Act contravenes affirmative constitutional limitations on congressional exercise of the commerce power.

III

The District Court invalidated §§ 515 (d) and (e) of the Act, which prescribe performance standards for surface coal *284 mining on "steep slopes,"^[22] on the ground that they violate a constitutional limitation on the commerce power imposed by the Tenth Amendment. These provisions require "steep-slope" operators: (i) to reclaim the mined area by completely covering the highwall and returning the site to its "approximate original contour";^[23] (ii) to refrain from dumping spoil material on the downslope below the bench or mining cut; and (iii) to refrain from disturbing land above the highwall unless permitted to do so by the regulatory authority. § 515 (d), 30 U. S. C. § 1265 (d) (1976 ed., Supp. III). Under § 515 (e), a "steep-slope" operator may obtain a variance from the approximate-original-contour requirement by showing that it will allow a postreclamation use that is "deemed to constitute an equal or better economic or public use" than would otherwise be possible. 30 U. S. C. § 1265 (e) (3) (A) (1976 ed., Supp. III).^[24]

The District Court's ruling relied heavily on our decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976). The District Court viewed the central issue as whether the Act governs the activities of private individuals, or whether it instead regulates the governmental decisions of the States. And although the court acknowledged that the Act "ultimately affects the coal mine operator." 483 F. Supp., at 432, it concluded that the Act contravenes the Tenth Amendment *285 because it interferes with the States' "traditional governmental function" of regulating land use. Id., at 435. The court held that, as applied to Virginia, the Act's steep-slope provisions impermissibly constrict the State's ability to make "essential decisions."^[25] The court found the Act accomplishes this result "through forced relinquishment of state control of land use planning; through loss of state control of its economy; and through economic harm, from expenditure of state funds to implement the act and from destruction of the taxing power of certain counties, cities, and towns." Id., at 435.^[26] The court therefore permanently enjoined enforcement of §§ 515 (d) and (e).^[27]

*286 The District Court's reliance on National League of Cities requires a careful review of the actual basis and import of our decision in that case. There, we considered a constitutional challenge to the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act which had extended federal minimum wage and maximum hour regulations to most state and local government employees. Because it was conceded that the challenged regulations were "undoubtedly within the scope of the Commerce Clause," 426 U. S., at 841, the only question presented was whether that particular exercise of the commerce power "encounter[ed] a . . . constitutional barrier because [the regulations] applied directly to the States and subdivisions of States as employers." Ibid. We began by drawing a sharp distinction between congressional regulation of private persons and businesses "necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and of the State in which they reside," id., at 845, and federal regulation "directed, not to private citizens, but to the States as States," ibid. As to the former, we found no Tenth Amendment impediment to congressional action. Instead, we reaffirmed our consistent rule:

"Congressional power over areas of private endeavor, even when its exercise may pre-empt express state-law determinations contrary to the result that has commended itself to the collective wisdom of Congress, has been held to be limited only by the requirement that `the means chosen by [Congress] must be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution.' Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 262 (1964)." Id., at 840.

The Court noted, however, that "the States as States stand on a quite different footing from an individual or corporation when challenging the exercise of Congress' power to regulate commerce." Id., at 854. It indicated that when Congress attempts to directly regulate the States as States the Tenth *287 Amendment requires recognition that "there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that manner." Id., at 845. The Court held that the power to set the wages and work hours of state employees was "an undoubted attribute of state sovereignty." Ibid. And because it further found that the challenged regulations would "displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions," id., at 852, the Court concluded that Congress could not, consistently with the Tenth Amendment, "abrogate the States' otherwise plenary authority to make [these decisions]." Id., at 846.^[28]

It should be apparent from this discussion that in order to succeed, a claim that congressional commerce power legislation is invalid under the reasoning of National League of Cities must satisfy each of three requirements. First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates the "States as States." Id., at 854. Second, the federal regulation *288 must address matters that are indisputably "attribute[s] of state sovereignty." Id., at 845. And third, it must be apparent that the States' compliance with the federal law would directly impair their ability "to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions." Id., at 852.^[29] When the Surface Mining Act is examined in light of these principles, it is clear that appellees' Tenth Amendment challenge must fail because the first of the three requirements is not satisfied. The District Court's holding to the contrary rests on an unwarranted extension of the decision in National League of Cities.

As the District Court itself acknowledged, the steep-slope provisions of the Surface Mining Act govern only the activities of coal mine operators who are private individuals and businesses. Moreover, the States are not compelled to enforce the steep-slope standards, to expend any state funds, or to participate in the federal regulatory program in any manner whatsoever. If a State does not wish to submit a proposed permanent program that complies with the Act and implementing regulations, the full regulatory burden will be borne by the Federal Government. Thus, there can be no suggestion that the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program. Cf. Maryland v. EPA, 530 F. 2d 215, 224-228 (CA4 1975), vacated and remanded sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U. S. 99 (1977); District of Columbia v. Train, 172 U. S. App. D. C. 311, 330-334, 521 F. 2d 971, 990-994 (1975), vacated and remanded sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U. S. 99 (1977); Brown v. EPA, 521 F. *289 2d 827, 837-842 (CA9 1975), vacated and remanded, 431 U. S. 99 (1977). The most that can be said is that the Surface Mining Act establishes a program of cooperative federalism that allows the States, within limits established by federal minimum standards, to enact and administer their own regulatory programs, structured to meet their own particular needs. See In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 199 U. S. App. D. C. 225, 226, 617 F. 2d 807, 808 (1980). In this respect, the Act resembles a number of other federal statutes that have survived Tenth Amendment challenges in the lower federal courts.^[30]

Appellees argue, however, that the threat of federal usurpation of their regulatory roles coerces the States into enforcing the Surface Mining Act. Appellees also contend that the Act directly regulates the States as States because it establishes mandatory minimum federal standards. In essence, appellees urge us to join the District Court in looking beyond the activities actually regulated by the Act to its conceivable effects on the States' freedom to make decisions in areas of "integral governmental functions." And appellees emphasize, as did the court below, that the Act interferes with the States' ability to exercise their police powers by regulating land use.

Appellees' claims accurately characterize the Act insofar as it prescribes federal minimum standards governing surface coal mining, which a State may either implement itself or else yield to a federally administered regulatory program. To object to this scheme, however, appellees must assume that the Tenth Amendment limits congressional power to *290 pre-empt or displace state regulation of private activities affecting interstate commerce. This assumption is incorrect.

A wealth of precedent attests to congressional authority to displace or pre-empt state laws regulating private activity affecting interstate commerce when these laws conflict with federal law. See, e. g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525-526 (1977); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637, 649-650 (1971); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 141-143 (1963); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U. S. 767, 772-776 (1947); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67-68 (1941). Moreover, it is clear that the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to prohibit all—and not just inconsistent—state regulation of such activities. See, e. g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U. S. 624 (1973); Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U. S. 297 (1961); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218 (1947); Transit Comm'n v. United States,