452 U.S. 337 (1981)

RHODES, GOVERNOR OF OHIO, ET AL.
v.
CHAPMAN ET AL.

No. 80-332.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued March 2, 1981. Decided June 15, 1981. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.

*338 Allen P. Adler, Assistant Attorney General of Ohio, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were William J. Brown, Attorney General, and Leo J. Conway, Assistant Attorney General.

Jean P. Kamp argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were Louis A. Jacobs and Bruce A. Campbell.^[*]

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by John A. Krichbaum for the American Medical Association et al.; and by Quin Denvir and Laurance S. Smith for the State Public Defender of California.

Solicitor General McCree filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae.

*339 JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented is whether the housing of two inmates in a single cell at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

I

Respondents Kelly Chapman and Richard Jaworski are inmates at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF), a maximum-security state prison in Lucasville, Ohio. They were housed in the same cell when they brought this action in the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on *340 behalf of themselves and all inmates similarly situated at SOCF. Asserting a cause of action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, they contended that "double celling" at SOCF violated the Constitution. The gravamen of their complaint was that double celling confined cellmates too closely. It also was blamed for overcrowding at SOCF, said to have overwhelmed the prison's facilities and staff.^[1] As relief, respondents sought an injunction barring petitioners, who are Ohio officials responsible for the administration of SOCF, from housing more than one inmate in a cell, except as a temporary measure.

The District Court made extensive findings of fact about SOCF on the basis of evidence presented at trial and the court's own observations during an inspection that it conducted without advance notice. 434 F. Supp. 1007 (1977). These findings describe the physical plant, inmate population, and effects of double celling. Neither party contends that these findings are erroneous.

SOCF was built in the early 1970's. In addition to 1,620 cells, it has gymnasiums, workshops, schoolrooms, "dayrooms," two chapels, a hospital ward, commissary, barbershop, and library.^[2] Outdoors, SOCF has a recreation field, visitation *341 area, and garden. The District Court described this physical plant as "unquestionably a top-flight, first-class facility." Id., at 1009.

Each cell at SOCF measures approximately 63 square feet. Each contains a bed measuring 36 by 80 inches, a cabinet-type night stand, a wall-mounted sink with hot and cold running water, and a toilet that the inmate can flush from inside the cell. Cells housing two inmates have a two-tiered bunk bed. Every cell has a heating and air circulation vent near the ceiling, and 960 of the cells have a window that inmates can open and close. All of the cells have a cabinet, shelf, and radio built into one of the walls, and in all of the cells one wall consists of bars through which the inmates can be seen.

The "dayrooms" are located adjacent to the cellblocks and are open to inmates between 6:30 a. m. and 9:30 p. m. According to the District Court, "[t]he day rooms are in a sense part of the cells and they are designed to furnish that type of recreation or occupation which an ordinary citizen would seek in his living room or den." Id., at 1012. Each dayroom contains a wall-mounted television, card tables, and chairs. Inmates can pass between their cells and the dayrooms during a 10-minute period each hour, on the hour, when the doors to the dayrooms and cells are opened.

As to the inmate population, the District Court found that SOCF began receiving inmates in late 1972 and double celling them in 1975 because of an increase in Ohio's statewide prison population. At the time of trial, SOCF housed 2,300 inmates, 67% of whom were serving life or other long-term sentences for first-degree felonies. Approximately 1,400 inmates were double celled. Of these, about 75% had the choice of spending much of their waking hours outside their cells, in the dayrooms, school, workshops, library, visits, meals, or showers. The other double-celled inmates spent *342 more time locked in their cells because of a restrictive classification.^[3]

The remaining findings by the District Court addressed respondents' allegation that overcrowding created by double celling overwhelmed SOCF's facilities and staff. The food was "adequate in every respect," and respondents adduced no evidence "whatsoever that prisoners have been underfed or that the food facilities have been taxed by the prison population." Id., at 1014. The air ventilation system was adequate, the cells were substantially free of offensive odor, the temperature in the cellblocks was well controlled, and the noise in the cellblocks was not excessive. Double celling had not reduced significantly the availability of space in the dayrooms or visitation facilities,^[4] nor had it rendered inadequate the resources of the library or schoolrooms.^[5] Although there were isolated incidents of failure to provide medical or dental care, there was no evidence of indifference by the SOCF staff to inmates' medical or dental needs.^[6] As to violence, the court found that the number of acts of violence at *343 SOCF had increased with the prison population, but only in proportion to the increase in population. Respondents failed to produce evidence establishing that double celling itself caused greater violence, and the ratio of guards to inmates at SOCF satisfied the standard of acceptability offered by respondents' expert witness. Finally, the court did find that the SOCF administration, faced with more inmates than jobs, had "water[ed] down" jobs by assigning more inmates to each job than necessary and by reducing the number of hours that each inmate worked, id., at 1015; it also found that SOCF had not increased its staff of psychiatrists and social workers since double celling had begun.

Despite these generally favorable findings, the District Court concluded that double celling at SOCF was cruel and unusual punishment. The court rested its conclusion on five considerations. One, inmates at SOCF are serving long terms of imprisonment. In the court's view, that fact "can only accent[uate] the problems of close confinement and overcrowding." Id., at 1020. Two, SOCF housed 38% more inmates at the time of trial than its "design capacity." In reference to this the court asserted: "Overcrowding necessarily involves excess limitation of general movement as well as physical and mental injury from long exposure." Ibid. Three, the court accepted as contemporary standards of decency several studies recommending that each person in an institution have at least 50-55 square feet of living quarters.^[7] In contrast, double-celled inmates at SOCF share 63 square feet. Four, the court asserted that "[a]t the best a prisoner who is double celled will spend most of his time in the cell *344 with his cellmate."^[8]Id., at 1021. Five, SOCF has made double celling a practice; it is not a temporary condition.^[9]

On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, petitioners argued that the District Court's conclusion must be read, in light of its findings, as holding that double celling is per se unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals disagreed; it viewed the District Court's opinion as holding only that double celling is cruel and unusual punishment under the circumstances at SOCF. It affirmed, without further opinion, on the ground that the District Court's findings were not clearly erroneous, its conclusions of law were "permissible from the findings," and its remedy was a reasonable response to the violations found.^[10]

We granted the petition for certiorari because of the importance of the question to prison administration. 449 U. S. 951 (1980). We now reverse.

II

We consider here for the first time the limitation that the Eighth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through *345 the Fourteenth Amendment, Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 (1962), imposes upon the conditions in which a State may confine those convicted of crimes. It is unquestioned that "[c]onfinement in a prison . . . is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment standards." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 685 (1978); see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 669 (1977); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979). But until this case, we have not considered a disputed contention that the conditions of confinement at a particular prison constituted cruel and unusual punishment.^[11] Nor have we had an occasion to consider specifically the principles relevant to assessing claims that conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment. We look, first, to the Eighth Amendment precedents for the general principles that are relevant to a State's authority to impose punishment for criminal conduct.

A

The Eighth Amendment, in only three words, imposes the constitutional limitation upon punishments: they cannot be "cruel and unusual." The Court has interpreted these words "in a flexible and dynamic manner," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 171 (1976) (joint opinion), and has extended the Amendment's reach beyond the barbarous physical punishments at issue in the Court's earliest cases. See Wilkerson *346 v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130 (1879); In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436 (1890). Today the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments which, although not physically barbarous, "involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 173, or are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion); Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910).^[12] Among "unnecessary and wanton" inflictions of pain are those that are "totally without penological justification." Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 183; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 103 (1976).

No static "test" can exist by which courts determine whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, for the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). The Court has held, however, that "Eighth Amendment judgments should neither be nor appear to be merely the subjective views" of judges. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 275 (1980). To be sure, "the Constitution contemplates that in the end [a court's] own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability" of a given punishment. Coker v. Georgia, supra, at 597 (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 182 (joint opinion). But such "`judgment[s] should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent.'" Rummel v. Estelle, supra, at 274-275, quoting Coker v. Georgia, supra, at 592 (plurality opinion). For example, when the question was whether capital punishment for certain crimes violated contemporary values, the Court looked for "objective indicia" derived from history, the action of *347 state legislatures, and the sentencing by juries. Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 176-187; Coker v. Georgia, supra, at 593-596. Our conclusion in Estelle v. Gamble, supra, that deliberate indifference to an inmate's medical needs is cruel and unusual punishment rested on the fact, recognized by the common law and state legislatures, that "[a]n inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met." 429 U. S., at 103.

These principles apply when the conditions of confinement compose the punishment at issue. Conditions must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor may they be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment. In Estelle v. Gamble, supra, we held that the denial of medical care is cruel and unusual because, in the worst case, it can result in physical torture, and, even in less serious cases, it can result in pain without any penological purpose. 429 U. S., at 103. In Hutto v. Finney, supra, the conditions of confinement in two Arkansas prisons constituted cruel and unusual punishment because they resulted in unquestioned and serious deprivations of basic human needs. Conditions other than those in Gamble and Hutto, alone or in combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. Such conditions could be cruel and unusual under the contemporary standard of decency that we recognized in Gamble, supra, at 103-104. But conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under contemporary standards are not unconstitutional. To the extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.

B

In view of the District Court's findings of fact, its conclusion that double celling at SOCF constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is insupportable. Virtually every one *348 of the court's findings tends to refute respondents' claim. The double celling made necessary by the unanticipated increase in prison population did not lead to deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation. Nor did it increase violence among inmates or create other conditions intolerable for prison confinement. 434 F. Supp., at 1018. Although job and educational opportunities diminished marginally as a result of double celling, limited work hours and delay before receiving education do not inflict pain, much less unnecessary and wanton pain; deprivations of this kind simply are not punishments. We would have to wrench the Eighth Amendment from its language and history to hold that delay of these desirable aids to rehabilitation violates the Constitution.

The five considerations on which the District Court relied also are insufficient to support its constitutional conclusion. The court relied on the long terms of imprisonment served by inmates at SOCF; the fact that SOCF housed 38% more inmates than its "design capacity"; the recommendation of several studies that each inmate have at least 50-55 square feet of living quarters; the suggestion that double-celled inmates spend most of their time in their cells with their cellmates; and the fact that double celling at SOCF was not a temporary condition. Supra, at 343-344. These general considerations fall far short in themselves of proving cruel and unusual punishment, for there is no evidence that double celling under these circumstances either inflicts unnecessary or wanton pain or is grossly disproportionate to the severity of crimes warranting imprisonment.^[13] At most, these considerations *349 amount to a theory that double celling inflicts pain.^[14] Perhaps they reflect an aspiration toward an ideal environment for long-term confinement. But the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons of SOCF's type, which house persons convicted of serious crimes, cannot be free of discomfort. Thus, these considerations properly are weighed by the legislature and prison administration rather than a court. There being no constitutional violation,^[15] the District Court had no authority to consider *350 whether double celling in light of these considerations was the best response to the increase in Ohio's statewide prison population.

*351 III

This Court must proceed cautiously in making an Eighth Amendment judgment because, unless we reverse it, "[a] decision that a given punishment is impermissible under the Eighth Amendment cannot be reversed short of a constitutional amendment," and thus "[r]evisions cannot be made in the light of further experience." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 176. In assessing claims that conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, courts must bear in mind that their inquiries "spring from constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 539.^[16]

*352 Courts certainly have a responsibility to scrutinize claims of cruel and unusual confinement, and conditions in a number of prisons, especially older ones, have justly been described as "deplorable" and "sordid." Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 562.^[17] When conditions of confinement amount to cruel and unusual punishment, "federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 405-406 (1974); see Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319, 321 (1972) (per curiam). In discharging this oversight responsibility, however, courts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function in the criminal justice system: to punish justly, to deter future crime, and to return imprisoned persons to society with an improved chance of being useful, law-abiding citizens.

In this case, the question before us is whether the conditions of confinement at SOCF are cruel and unusual. As we find that they are not, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

It is so ordered.

JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS join, concurring in the judgment.

Today's decision reaffirms that "[c]ourts certainly have a responsibility to scrutinize claims of cruel and unusual confinement." Ante, this page. With that I agree. I also agree that the District Court's findings in this case do not support a judgment that the practice of double celling in the Southern *353 Ohio Correctional Facility is in violation of the Eighth Amendment. I write separately, however, to emphasize that today's decision should in no way be construed as a retreat from careful judicial scrutiny of prison conditions, and to discuss the factors courts should consider in undertaking such scrutiny.

I

Although this Court has never before considered what prison conditions constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment, see ante, at 344-345, such questions have been addressed repeatedly by the lower courts. In fact, individual prisons or entire prison systems in at least 24 States have been declared unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,^[1] with litigation *354 underway in many others.^[2] Thus, the lower courts have learned from repeated investigation and bitter experience that judicial intervention is indispensable if constitutional dictates— not to mention considerations of basic humanity—are to be observed in the prisons.

No one familiar with litigation in this area could suggest that the courts have been overeager to usurp the task of running prisons, which, as the Court today properly notes, is entrusted in the first instance to the "legislature and prison administration rather than a court." Ante, at 349. And certainly, no one could suppose that the courts have ordered creation of "comfortable prisons," ibid., on the model of country clubs. To the contrary, "the soul-chilling inhumanity of conditions in American prisons has been thrust upon the judicial conscience." Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 684 (Mass. 1973).

Judicial opinions in this area do not make pleasant reading.^[3] For example, in Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (MD *355 Ala. 1976), aff'd as modified, 559 F. 2d 283 (CA5 1977), rev'd in part on other grounds, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per curiam), Chief Judge Frank Johnson described in gruesome detail the conditions then prevailing in the Alabama penal system. The institutions were "horrendously overcrowded," 406 F. Supp., at 322, to the point where some inmates were forced to sleep on mattresses spread on floors in hallways and next to urinals. Id., at 323. The physical facilities were "dilapidat[ed]" and "filthy," the cells infested with roaches, flies, mosquitoes, and other vermin. Ibid. Sanitation facilities were limited and in ill repair, emitting an "overpowering odor"; in one instance over 200 men were forced to share one toilet. Ibid. Inmates were not provided with toothpaste, toothbrush, shampoo, shaving cream, razors, combs, or other such necessities. Ibid. Food was "unappetizing and unwholesome," poorly prepared and often infested with insects, and served without reasonable utensils. Ibid. There were no meaningful vocational, educational, recreational, or work programs. Id., at 326. A United States health officer described the prisons as "wholly unfit for human habitation according to virtually every criterion used for evaluation by public health inspectors." Id., at 323-324. Perhaps the worst of all was the "rampant violence" within the prison. Id., at 325. Weaker inmates were "repeatedly victimized" by the stronger; robbery, rape, extortion, theft, and assault were "everyday occurrences among the general inmate population." Id., at 324. *356 Faced with this record, the court—not surprisingly—found that the conditions of confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and issued a comprehensive remedial order affecting virtually every aspect of prison administration.^[4]

Unfortunately, the Alabama example is neither abberational nor anachronistic. Last year, in Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F. 2d 559 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 1041 (1981), for example, the Tenth Circuit declared conditions in the maximum-security unit of the Colorado State Penitentiary at Canon City unconstitutional. The living areas of the prison were "unfit for human habitation," 639 F. 2d, at 567; the food unsanitary and "grossly inadequate," id., at 570; the institution "fraught with tension and violence," often leading to injury and death, id., at 572; the health care "blatant[ly] inadequat[e]" and "appalling," id., at 574; and there were various restrictions of prisoners' rights to visitation, mail, and access to courts in violation of basic constitutional rights, id., at 578-585. Similar tales of horror are recounted in dozens of other cases. See, e. g., cases cited in n. 1, supra.

Overcrowding and cramped living conditions are particularly pressing problems in many prisons. Out of 82 court orders in effect concerning conditions of confinement in federal and state correctional facilities as of March 31, 1978, 26 involved the issue of overcrowding. 3 American Prisons and Jails 32. Two-thirds of all inmates in federal, state, and local correctional facilities were confined in cells or dormitories providing less than 60 square feet per person—the minimal standard deemed acceptable by the American Public Health Association, the Justice Department, and other authorities.^[5]

*357 The problems of administering prisons within constitutional standards are indeed "complex and intractable,'" ante, at 351, n. 16, quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 404 (1974), but at their core is a lack of resources allocated to prisons. Confinement of prisoners is unquestionably an expensive proposition: the average direct current expenditure at adult institutions in 1977 was $5,461 per inmate, 3 American Prisons and Jails 115; the average cost of constructing space for an additional prisoner is estimated at $25,000 to $50,000. Id., at 119. Oftentimes, funding for prisons has been dramatically below that required to comply with basic constitutional standards. For example, to bring the Louisiana prison system into compliance required a supplemental appropriation of $18,431,622 for a single year's operating expenditures, and of $105,605,000 for capital outlays. Williams v. Edwards, 547 F. 2d 1206, 1219-1221 (CA5 1977) (Exhibit A).

Over the last decade, correctional resources, never ample, have lagged behind burgeoning prison populations. In Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (SD Tex. 1980), for example, the court stated that an "unprecedented surge" in the number of inmates has "undercut any realistic expectation" of eliminating double and triple celling, despite construction of a new $43 million unit. Id., at 1280-1281. The number of inmates in federal and state correctional facilities has risen 42% since 1975, and last year grew at its fastest rate in three years. Krajick, The Boom Resumes, 7 Corrections Magazine 16-17 (Apr. 1981) (report of annual survey of prison populations).^[6] A major infusion of money would be required merely to keep pace with prison populations.

*358 Public apathy and the political powerlessness of inmates have contributed to the pervasive neglect of the prisons. Chief Judge Henley observed that the people of Arkansas "knew little or nothing about their penal system" prior to the Holt litigation, despite "sporadic and sensational" exposes. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 367 (ED Ark. 1970). Prison inmates are "voteless, politically unpopular, and socially threatening." Morris, The Snail's Pace of Prison Reform, in Proceedings of the 100th Annual Congress of Corrections of the American Correctional Assn. 36, 42 (1970). Thus, the suffering of prisoners, even if known, generally "moves the community in only the most severe and exceptional cases." Ibid. As a result even conscientious prison officials are "[c]aught in the middle," as state legislatures refuse "to spend sufficient tax dollars to bring conditions in out-dated prisons up to minimally acceptable standards." Johnson v. Levine, 450 F. Supp. 648, 654 (Md.), aff'd in part, 588 F. 2d 1378 (CA4 1978).^[7] After extensive exposure to this *359 process, Chief Judge Pettine came to view the "barbaric physical conditions" of Rhode Island's prison system as "the ugly and shocking outward manifestations of a deeper dysfunction, an attitude of cynicism, hopelessness, predatory selfishness, and callous indifference that appears to infect, to one degree or another, almost everyone who comes in contact with the [prison]." Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 984 (RI 1977), remanded, 599 F. 2d 17 (CA1 1979).

Under these circumstances, the courts have emerged as a critical force behind efforts to ameliorate inhumane conditions. Insulated as they are from political pressures, and charged with the duty of enforcing the Constitution, courts are in the strongest position to insist that unconstitutional conditions be remedied, even at significant financial cost. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, then serving on the Court of Appeals, set the tone in Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F. 2d 571, 580 (CA8 1968): "Humane considerations and constitutional requirements are not, in this day, to be measured or limited by dollar considerations . . . ."

Progress toward constitutional conditions of confinement in the Nation's prisons has been slow and uneven, despite judicial pressure. Nevertheless, it is clear that judicial intervention has been responsible, not only for remedying some of the worst abuses by direct order, but also for "forcing the legislative branch of government to reevaluate correction policies and to appropriate funds for upgrading penal systems." 3 American Prisons and Jails 163. A detailed study of four prison conditions cases by the American Bar Association concluded:

"The judicial intervention in each of the correctional *360 law cases studied had impact that was broad and substantial. . . . For the most part, the impact of the judicial intervention was clearly beneficial to the institutions, the correctional systems, and the broader community. Dire consequences predicted by some correctional personnel did not accompany the judicial intervention in the cases studied. Inmates were granted greater rights and protections, but the litigation did not undermine staff authority and control. Institutional conditions improved, but facilities were not turned into `country clubs.' The courts intervened in correctional affairs, but the judges did not take over administration of the facilities." M. Harris & D. Spiller, After Decision: Implementation of Judicial Decrees in Correctional Settings 21 (National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1977).

Even prison officials have acknowledged that judicial intervention has helped them to obtain support for needed reform. GAO, Comptroller General, Report to Congress: The Department of Justice Can Do More to Help Improve Conditions at State and Local Correctional Facilities 12-13 (GGD-80-77, 1980). The Commissioner of Corrections of New York City, a defendant in many lawsuits challenging jail and prison conditions, has stated: "Federal courts may be the last resort for us . . . . If there's going to be change, I think the federal courts are going to have to force cities and states to spend more money on their prisons. . . . I look on the courts as a friend." Gettinger, "Cruel and Unusual" Prisons, 3 Corrections Magazine 3, 5 (Dec. 1977). In a similar vein, the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Corrections testified before a congressional Committee that lawsuits brought on behalf of prison inmates.

"have upgraded correctional institutions and the development of procedural safeguards regarding basic constitutional rights. There is no question in my mind that *361 had such court intervention not taken place, these fundamental improvements would not have occurred.

.....

"While I do not intend to imply here that I sit expectantly at my desk each week awaiting news of another impending suit, I do recognize that unless my agency consistently deals fairly with those incarcerated in our institutions we will be held judicially accountable." Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons, Hearings on S. 1393 before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 409-410 (1977) (testimony of Kenneth F. Schoen).^[8]

II

The task of the courts in cases challenging prison conditions is to "determine whether a challenged punishment comports with human dignity." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 282 (1972) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Such determinations are necessarily imprecise and indefinite, Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100-101 (1958); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130, 135-136 (1879); they require careful scrutiny of challenged conditions, and application of realistic yet humane standards.

In performing this responsibility, this Court and the lower *362 courts have been especially deferential to prison authorities "in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 547 (1979); see also ante, at 351, n. 16; Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U. S. 119, 128 (1977); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319, 321 (1972). Many conditions of confinement, however, including overcrowding, poor sanitation, and inadequate safety precautions, arise from neglect rather than policy. See supra, at 358-359. There is no reason of comity, judicial restraint, or recognition of expertise for courts to defer to negligent omissions of officials who lack the resources or motivation to operate prisons within limits of decency. Courts must and do recognize the primacy of the legislative and executive authorities in the administration of prisons; however, if the prison authorities do not conform to constitutional minima, the courts are under an obligation to take steps to remedy the violations. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S., at 405.^[9]

The first aspect of judicial decisionmaking in this area is scrutiny of the actual conditions under challenge. It is important to recognize that various deficiencies in prison conditions "must be considered together." Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp., at 373. The individual conditions "exist in combination; each affects the other; and taken together they [may] have a cumulative impact on the inmates." Ibid. Thus, a court considering an Eighth Amendment challenge to conditions *363 of confinement must examine the totality of the circumstances.^[10] Even if no single condition of confinement would be unconstitutional in itself, "exposure to the cumulative effect of prison conditions may subject inmates to cruel and unusual punishment." Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 322-323 (NH 1977).

Moreover, in seeking relevant information about conditions in a prison, the court must be open to evidence and assistance from many sources, including expert testimony and studies on the effect of particular conditions on prisoners. For this purpose, public health, medical, psychiatric, psychological, penological, architectural, structural, and other experts have proved useful to the lower courts in observing and interpreting prison conditions. See, e. g., Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp., at 960 (commenting that the court's "task was made easier by the extensive assistance of experts").^[11]

More elusive, perhaps, is the second aspect of the judicial inquiry: application of realistic yet humane standards to the conditions as observed. Courts have expressed these standards in various ways, see, e.g., M. C. I. Concord Advisory Bd. v. Hall, 447 F. Supp. 398, 404 (Mass. 1978) ("contemporary standards of decency"); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, supra, at 979 (conditions so bad as to "shock the conscience of any reasonable citizen"); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 102 (1976) ("`broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency,'" quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F. *364 2d, at 579). Each of these descriptions has its merit, but in the end, the court attempting to apply them is left to rely upon its own experience and on its knowledge of contemporary standards.^[12]Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion).

In determining when pri