American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan
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AMERICAN TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS INSTITUTE, INC., ET AL.
v.
DONOVAN, SECRETARY OF LABOR, ET AL.
Supreme Court of United States.
*492 Robert H. Bork argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With him on the briefs for petitioners American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc., et al. were Neil J. King, A. Stephen Hut, Jr., Robert T. Thompson, Samuel K. Abrams, H. J. Elam III, Neil W. Koonce, Dan M. Byrd, Jr., Thomas A. Evins, Roger L. Tuttle, Lovic A. Brooks, Jr., Richard H. *493 Monk, Jr., and C. Powers Dorsett. Charles M. Crump filed briefs for petitioner National Cotton Council of America.
Deputy Solicitor General Geller argued the cause for the federal respondent in both cases. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Barry Sullivan, Benjamin W. Mintz, Allen H. Feldman, Dennis K. Kade, Diane E. Burkley, and John A. Bryson. George H. Cohen argued the cause for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al., respondents in both cases under this Court's Rule 19.6. With him on the brief were Robert M. Weinberg, Jeremiah A. Collins, Laurence Gold, J. Albert Woll, Elliot Bredhoff, and Arthur M. Goldberg.[]
J. Davitt McAteer and John A. Fillion filed a brief for the Brown Lung Association et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Allen A. Lauterbach and C. David Mayfield for the American Farm Bureau Federation; by Jerome Powell, W. Scott Railton, Barton C. Green, and David Ferber for the American Iron and Steel Institute; by William J. Kilberg, Stephen E. Tallent, and H. Frederick Tepker for ASARCO Inc.; by Edwin H. Seeger and William F. Boyd for Bunker Hill Co.; and by J. Gordon Arbuckle and David B. Robinson for the Chocolate Manufacturers Association.
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Act) "to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions. . . ." § 2 (b), 84 Stat. 1590, 29 U. S. C. § 651 (b). The Act authorizes the Secretary of Labor to establish, after notice and opportunity to comment, mandatory nationwide standards governing health and safety in the workplace. 29 U. S. C. §§ 655 (a), (b). In 1978, the Secretary, acting through the Occupational Safety and Health Administration *494 (OSHA),[1] promulgated a standard limiting occupational exposure to cotton dust, an airborne particle byproduct of the preparation and manufacture of cotton products, exposure to which induces a "constellation of respiratory effects" known as "byssinosis." 43 Fed. Reg. 27352, col. 3 (1978). This disease was one of the expressly recognized health hazards that led to passage of the Act. S. Rep. No. 91-1282, p. 3 (1970), Legislative History of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, p. 143 (Comm. Print 1971) (Leg. Hist.).
Petitioners in these consolidated cases, representing the interests of the cotton industry,[2] challenged the validity of the "Cotton Dust Standard" in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit pursuant to § 6 (f) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (f). They contend in this Court, as they did below, that the Act requires OSHA to demonstrate that its Standard reflects a reasonable relationship between the costs and benefits associated with the Standard. Respondents, the Secretary of Labor and two labor organizations,[3] counter that Congress balanced the costs and benefits in the Act itself, and that the Act should therefore be construed not to require *495 OSHA to do so. They interpret the Act as mandating that OSHA enact the most protective standard possible to eliminate a significant risk of material health impairment, subject to the constraints of economic and technological feasibility. The Court of Appeals held that the Act did not require OSHA to compare costs and benefits. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 199 U. S. App. D. C. 54, 617 F. 2d 636 (1979). We granted certiorari, 449 U. S. 817 (1980), to resolve this important question, which was presented but not decided in last Term's Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S. 607 (1980),[4] and to decide other issues related to the Cotton Dust Standard.[5]
I
Byssinosis, known in its more severe manifestations as "brown lung" disease, is a serious and potentially disabling respiratory disease primarily caused by the inhalation of cotton dust.[6] See 43 Fed. Reg. 27352-27354 (1978); Exhibit *496 6-16, App. 15-22.[7] Byssinosis is a "continuum . . . disease," 43 Fed. Reg. 27354, col. 2 (1978), that has been categorized into four grades.[8] In its least serious form, byssinosis produces both subjective symptoms, such as chest tightness, shortness of breath, coughing, and wheezing, and objective indications of loss of pulmonary functions. Id., at 27352, col. 2. In its most serious form, byssinosis is a chronic and irreversible obstructive pulmonary disease, clinically similar to chronic bronchitis or emphysema, and can be severely disabling. Ibid. At worst, as is true of other respiratory diseases including bronchitis, emphysema, and asthma, byssinosis can create an additional strain on cardiovascular functions and can contribute to death from heart failure. See Exhibit 6-73, App. 72 ("there is an association between mortality and the extent of dust exposure"). One authority has described the increasing seriousness of byssinosis as follows:
"In the first few years of exposure [to cotton dust], symptoms occur on Monday, or other days after absence *497 from the work environment; later, symptoms occur on other days of the week; and eventually, symptoms are continuous, even in the absence of dust exposure." A. Bouhuys, Byssinosis in the United States, Exhibit 6-16, App. 15.[9]
While there is some uncertainty over the manner in which the disease progresses from its least serious to its disabling grades, it is likely that prolonged exposure contributes to the progression. 43 Fed. Reg. 27354, cols. 1 and 2 (1978); Exhibit *498 6-27, App. 25; Exhibit 11, App. 152. It also appears that a worker may suddenly contract a severe grade without experiencing milder grades of the disease. Exhibit 41, App. 192.[10]
Estimates indicate that at least 35,000 employed and retired cotton mill workers, or 1 in 12 such workers, suffer from the most disabling form of byssinosis.[11] 43 Fed. Reg. 27353, col. 3 (1978); Exhibit 124, App. 347. The Senate Report accompanying the Act cited estimates that 100,000 active and retired workers suffer from some grade of the disease. S. Rep. No. 91-1282, p. 3 (1970), Leg. Hist. 143. One study found that over 25% of a sample of active cotton-preparation and yarn-manufacturing workers suffer at least some form of the disease at a dust exposure level common prior to adoption of the current Standard. 43 Fed. Reg. 27355, col. 3 (1978); Exhibit 6-51, App. 44.[12] Other studies confirm these general findings on the prevalence of byssinosis. See, e. g., Ct. of App. J. A. 3683; Ex. 6-56, id., at 376-385.
Not until the early 1960's was byssinosis recognized in the United States as a distinct occupational hazard associated with cotton mills. S. Rep. No. 91-1282, supra, at 3, Leg. *499 Hist. 143.[13] In 1966, the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), a private organization, recommended that exposure to total cotton dust[14] be limited to a "threshold limit value" of 1,000 micrograms per cubic meter of air (1,000 μg/m[3]) averaged over an 8-hour workday. See 43 Fed. Reg. 27351, col. 1 (1978). The United States Government first regulated exposure to cotton dust in 1968, when the Secretary of Labor, pursuant to the Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U. S. C. § 35 (e), promulgated airborne contaminant threshold limit values, applicable to public contractors, that included the 1,000 μg/m[3] limit for total cotton dust. 34 Fed. Reg. 7953 (1969).[15] Following passage of the Act in 1970, the 1,000 μg/m[3] standard was adopted as an "established Federal standard" under § 6 (a) of the Act, 84 Stat. 1593, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (a), a provision designed to guarantee immediate protection of workers for the period between enactment of the statute and promulgation of permanent standards.[16]
In 1974, ACGIH, adopting a new measurement unit of respirable rather than total dust, lowered its previous exposure *500 limit recommendation to 200 μg/m[3] measured by a vertical elutriator, a device that measures cotton dust particles 15 microns or less in diameter. 43 Fed. Reg. 27351, col. 1, 27355, col. 2 (1978).[17] That same year, the Director of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH),[18] pursuant to the Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 669 (a) (3), 671 (d) (2), submitted to the Secretary of Labor a recommendation for a cotton dust standard with a permissible exposure limit (PEL) that "should be set at the lowest level feasible, but in no case at an environmental concentration as high as 0.2 mg lint-free cotton dust/cu m," or 200 μg/m[3] of lint-free respirable dust.[19] Ex. 1, Ct. of App. J. A. 11; 41 Fed. Reg. 56500, col. 1 (1976). Several months later, OSHA published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 39 Fed. Reg. 44769 (1974), requesting comments from interested parties on the NIOSH recommendation and other related matters. Soon thereafter, the Textile Worker's Union *501 of America, joined by the North Carolina Public Interest Research Group, petitioned the Secretary, urging a more stringent PEL of 100 μg/m[3].
On December 28, 1976, OSHA published a proposal to replace the existing federal standard on cotton dust with a new permanent standard, pursuant to § 6 (b) (5) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b) (5). 41 Fed. Reg. 56498. The proposed standard contained a PEL of 200 μg/m[3] of vertical elutriated lint-free respirable cotton dust for all segments of the cotton industry. Ibid. It also suggested an implementation strategy for achieving the PEL that relied on respirators for the short term and engineering controls for the long term. Id., at 56506, cols. 2 and 3. OSHA invited interested parties to submit written comments within a 90-day period.[20]
Following the comment period, OSHA conducted three hearings in Washington, D. C., Greenville, Miss., and Lubbock, Tex., that lasted over 14 days. Public participation was widespread, involving representatives from industry and the work force, scientists, economists, industrial hygienists, and many others. By the time the informal rulemaking procedure had terminated, OSHA had received 263 comments and 109 notices of intent to appear at the hearings. 43 Fed. Reg. 27351, col. 2 (1978). The voluminous record, composed of a transcript of written and oral testimony, exhibits, and posthearing comments and briefs, totaled some 105,000 pages. 199 U. S. App. D. C., at 65, 617 F. 2d, at 647. OSHA issued its final Cotton Dust Standardthe one challenged in the instant caseon June 23, 1978. Along with an accompanying statement of findings and reasons, the Standard occupied 69 pages of the Federal Register. 43 Fed. Reg. 27350-27418 (1978); see 29 CFR § 1910.1043 (1980).
The Cotton Dust Standard promulgated by OSHA establishes *502 mandatory PEL's over an 8-hour period of 200 μg/m[3] for yarn manufacturing,[21] 750 μg/m[3] for slashing and weaving operations, and 500 μg/m[3] for all other processes in the cotton industry.[22] 29 CFR § 1910.1043 (c) (1980). These levels represent a relaxation of the proposed PEL of 200 μg/m[3] for all segments of the cotton industry.
OSHA chose an implementation strategy for the Standard that depend primarily on a mix of engineering controls, such as installation of ventilation systems,[23] and work practice controls, such as special floor-sweeping procedures. Full compliance with the PEL's is required within four years, except to the extent that employers can establish that the engineering and work practice controls are infeasible. § 1910.1043 (e) (1). During this compliance period, and at certain other *503 times, the Standard requires employers to provide respirators to employees. § 1910.1043 (f). Other requirements include monitoring of cotton dust exposure, medical surveillance of all employees, annual medical examinations, employee education and training programs, and the posting of warning signs. A specific provision also under challenge in the instant case requires employers to transfer employees unable to wear respirators to another position, if available, having a dust level at or below the Standard's PEL's, with "no loss of earnings or other employment rights or benefits as a result of the transfer." § 1910.1043 (f) (2) (v).
On the basis of the evidence in the record as a whole, the Secretary determined that exposure to cotton dust represents a "significant health hazard to employees," 43 Fed. Reg. 27350, col. 1 (1978), and that "the prevalence of byssinosis should be significantly reduced" by the adoption of the Standard's PEL's, id., at 27359, col. 3. In assessing the health risks from cotton dust and the risk reduction obtained from lowered exposure, OSHA relied particularly on data showing a strong linear relationship between the prevalence of byssinosis and the concentration of lint-free respirable cotton dust. Id., at 27355-27359; Exhibit 6-51, App. 29-55. See also Ex. 6-17, Ct. of App. J. A. 235-245; Ex. 38D, id., at 1492-1839. Even at the 200 μg/m[3] PEL, OSHA found that the prevalence of at least Grade 1/2 byssinosis would be 13% of all employees in the yarn manufacturing sector. 43 Fed. Reg. 27359, cols. 2 and 3 (1978).
In promulgating the Cotton Dust Standard, OSHA interpreted the Act to require adoption of the most stringent standard to protect against material health impairment, bounded only by technological and economic feasibility. Id., at 27361, col. 3. OSHA therefore rejected the industry's alternative proposal for a PEL of 500 μg/m[3] in yarn manufacturing, a proposal which would produce a 25% prevalence of at least Grade 1/2 byssinosis. The agency expressly found the Standard to be both technologically and economically feasible *504 based on the evidence in the record as a whole. Although recognizing that permitted levels of exposure to cotton dust would still cause some byssinosis, OSHA nevertheless rejected the union proposal for a 100 μg/m[3] PEL because it was not within the "technological capabilities of the industry." Id., at 27359-27360. Similarly, OSHA set PEL's for some segments of the cotton industry at 500 μg/m[3] in part because of limitations of technological feasibility. Id., at 27361, col. 3. Finally, the Secretary found that "engineering dust controls in weaving may not be feasible even with massive expenditures by the industry," id., at 27360, col. 2, and for that and other reasons adopted a less stringent PEL of 750 μg/m[3] for weaving and slashing.
The Court of Appeals upheld the Standard in all major respects.[24] The court rejected the industry's claim that OSHA failed to consider its proposed alternative or give sufficient reasons for failing to adopt it. 199 U. S. App. D. C., at 70-72, 617 F. 2d, at 652-654. The court also held that the Standard was "reasonably necessary and appropriate" within the meaning of § 3 (8) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 652 (8), because of the risk of material health impairment caused by exposure to cotton dust. 199 U. S. App. D. C., at 72-73, and n. 83, 617 F. 2d, at 654-655, and n. 83. Rejecting the industry position that OSHA must demonstrate that the benefits of the Standard are proportionate to its costs, the court instead agreed with OSHA's interpretation that the Standard must protect employees against material health impairment subject only to the limits of technological and economic feasibility. Id., at 80-84, 617 F. 2d, 662-666. The court held that "Congress itself struck the balance between costs and *505 benefits in the mandate to the agency" under § 6 (b) (5) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b) (5), and that OSHA is powerless to circumvent that judgment by adopting less than the most protective feasible standard. 199 U. S. App. D. C., at 81, 617 F. 2d, at 663. Finally, the court held that the agency's determination of technological and economic feasibility was supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Id., at 73-80, 617 F. 2d, at 655-662.
We affirm in part, and vacate in part.[25]
*506 II
The principal question presented in these cases is whether the Occupational Safety and Health Act requires the Secretary, in promulgating a standard pursuant to § 6 (b) (5) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b) (5), to determine that the costs of the standard bear a reasonable relationship to its benefits. Relying on §§ 6 (b) (5) and 3 (8) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 655 (b) (5) and 652 (8), petitioners urge not only that OSHA must show that a standard addresses a significant risk of material health impairment, see Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S., at 639 (plurality opinion), but also that OSHA must demonstrate that the reduction in risk of material health impairment is significant in light of the costs of attaining that reduction. See Brief for Petitioners in No. 79-1429, pp. 38-41.[26] Respondents *507 on the other hand contend that the Act requires OSHA to promulgate standards that eliminate or reduce such risks "to the extent such protection is technologically and economically feasible." Brief for Federal Respondent 38; Brief for Union Respondents 26-27.[27] To resolve this debate, we must *508 turn to the language, structure, and legislative history of the Act.
A
The starting point of our analysis is the language of the statute itself. Steadman v. SEC, 450 U. S. 91, 97 (1981); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 337 (1979). Section 6 (b) (5) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b) (5) (emphasis added), provides:
"The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his working life."[28]
Although their interpretations differ, all parties agree that the phrase "to the extent feasible" contains the critical language in § 6 (b) (5) for purposes of these cases.
The plain meaning of the word "feasible" supports respondents' interpretation of the statute. According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 831 (1976), "feasible" means "capable of being *509 done, executed, or effected." Accord, the Oxford English Dictionary 116 (1933) ("Capable of being done, accomplished or carried out"); Funk & Wagnalls New "Standard" Dictionary of the English Language 903 (1957) ("That may be done, performed or effected"). Thus, § 6 (b) (5) directs the Secretary to issue the standard that "most adequately assures. . . that no employee will suffer material impairment of health," limited only by the extent to which this is "capable of being done." In effect then, as the Court of Appeals held, Congress itself defined the basic relationship between costs and benefits, by placing the "benefit" of worker health above all other considerations save those making attainment of this "benefit" unachievable. Any standard based on a balancing of costs and benefits by the Secretary that strikes a different balance than that struck by Congress would be inconsistent with the command set forth in § 6 (b) (5). Thus, cost-benefit analysis by OSHA is not required by the statute because feasibility analysis is.[29] See Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S., at 718-719 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).
*510 When Congress has intended that an agency engage in cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated such intent on the face of the statute. One early example is the Flood Control Act of 1936, 33 U. S. C. § 701:
"[T]he Federal Government should improve or participate in the improvement of navigable waters or their tributaries, including watersheds thereof, for flood-control purposes if the benefits to whomsoever they may accrue are in excess of the estimated costs, and if the lives and social security of people are otherwise adversely affected." (Emphasis added.)
A more recent example is the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 43 U. S. C. § 1347 (b) (1976 ed., Supp. III), providing that offshore drilling operations shall use
"the best available and safest technologies which the Secretary determines to be economically feasible, wherever failure of equipment would have a significant effect on safety, health, or the environment, except where the Secretary determines that the incremental benefits are clearly insufficient to justify the incremental costs of using such technologies."
These and other statutes[30] demonstrate that Congress uses *511 specific language when intending that an agency engage in cost-benefit analysis. See Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute, supra, at 710, n. 27 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Certainly in light of its ordinary meaning, the word "feasible" cannot be construed to articulate such congressional *512 intent. We therefore reject the argument that Congress required cost-benefit analysis in § 6 (b) (5).
B
Even though the plain language of § 6 (b) (5) supports this construction, we must still decide whether § 3 (8), the general definition of an occupational safety and health standard, either alone or in tandem with § 6 (b) (5), incorporates a cost-benefit requirement for standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical agents. Section 3 (8) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 652 (8) (emphasis added), provides:
"The term `occupational safety and health standard' means a standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment."
Taken alone, the phrase "reasonably necessary or appropriate" might be construed to contemplate some balancing of the costs and benefits of a standard. Petitioners urge that, so construed, § 3 (8) engrafts a cost-benefit analysis requirement on the issuance of § 6 (b) (5) standards, even if § 6 (b) (5) itself does not authorize such analysis. We need not decide whether § 3(8), standing alone, would contemplate some form of cost-benefit analysis. For even if it does, Congress specifically chose in § 6 (b) (5) to impose separate and additional requirements for issuance of a subcategory of occupational safety and health standards dealing with toxic materials and harmful physical agents: it required that those standards be issued to prevent material impairment of health to the extent feasible. Congress could reasonably have concluded that health standards should be subject to different criteria than safety standards because of the special problems presented in regulating them. See Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S., at 649, n. 54 (plurality opinion).
*513 Agreement with petitioners' argument that § 3 (8) imposes an additional and overriding requirement of cost-benefit analysis on the issuance of § 6 (b) (5) standards would eviscerate the "to the extent feasible" requirement. Standards would inevitably be set at the level indicated by cost-benefit analysis, and not at the level specified by § 6 (b) (5). For example, if cost-benefit analysis indicated a protective standard of 1,000 μg/m[3] PEL, while feasibility analysis indicated a 500 μg/m[3] PEL, the agency would be forced by the cost-benefit requirement to choose the less stringent point.[31] We cannot believe that Congress intended the general terms of § 3 (8) to countermand the specific feasibility requirement of § 6 (b) (5). Adoption of petitioners' interpretation would effectively write § 6 (b) (5) out of the Act. We decline to render Congress' decision to include a feasibility requirement nugatory, thereby offending the well-settled rule that all parts of a statute, if possible, are to be given effect. E. g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S., at 339; Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U. S. 609, 633-634 (1973); Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 307-308 (1961). Congress did not contemplate any further balancing by the agency for toxic material and harmful physical agents standards, and we should not " `impute to Congress a purpose to paralyze with one hand what it sought to promote with the other.'" Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., supra, at 631, quoting Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korporation, 332 U. S. 480, 489 (1947).[32]
*514 C
The legislative history of the Act, while concededly not crystal clear, provides general support for respondents' interpretation of the Act. The congressional Reports and debates certainly confirm that Congress meant "feasible" and nothing else in using that term. Congress was concerned that the Act might be thought to require achievement of absolute safety, an impossible standard, and therefore insisted that health and safety goals be capable of economic and technological accomplishment. Perhaps most telling is the absence of any indication whatsoever that Congress intended OSHA to conduct its own cost-benefit analysis before promulgating a toxic material or harmful physical agent standard. The legislative history demonstrates conclusively that Congress was fully aware that the Act would impose real and substantial costs of compliance on industry, and believed that such costs were part of the cost of doing business. We thus turn to the relevant portions of the legislative history.
Neither the original Senate bill, S. 2193, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), introduced by Senator Williams, nor the original House bill, H. R. 16785, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), introduced by Representative Daniels, included specific provisions *515 controlling the issuance of standards governing toxic materials and harmful physical agents, Leg. Hist. 1, 6-7 (Williams bill); 721, 728-732 (Daniels bill), although both contained the definitional section enacted as § 3 (8).[33] The House Committee on Education and Labor, to which the Daniels bill was referred, reported out an amended bill that included the following section:
"The Secretary, in promulgating standards under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately assures, on the basis of the best available professional evidence, that no employee will suffer any impairment of health or functional capacity, or diminished life expectancy even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his working life." H. R. Rep. No. 91-1291, p. 4 (1970) (to accompany H. R. 16785), Leg. Hist. 834.
The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, reporting on the Williams bill, included a provision virtually identical to the House version, except for the additional requirement that the Secretary set the standard "which most adequately and feasibly assures . . . that no employee will suffer any impairment of health." Id., at 242 (the Senate provision was numbered § 6 (b) (5)) (emphasis added). This addition to the Williams bill was offered by Senator Javits, who explained his amendment:
"As a result of this amendment the Secretary, in setting standards, is expressly required to consider feasibility of proposed standards. This is an improvement over the Daniels bill [as reported out of the House Committee], which might be interpreted to require absolute health and safety in all cases, regardless of feasibility, and the Administration bill, which contains no criteria for standards *516 at all." S. Rep. No. 91-1282, p. 58 (1970), Leg. Hist. 197 (emphasis added).[34]
Thus the Senator's concern was that a standard might require "absolute health and safety" without any consideration as to whether such a condition was achievable. The full Senate Committee also noted that standards promulgated under this provision "shall represent feasible requirements," S. Rep. No. 91-1282, at 7, Leg. Hist. 147, and commented that "[s]uch standards should be directed at assuring, so far as possible, that no employee will suffer impaired health . . . ." ibid. (emphasis added).
*517 The final amendments to this Senate provision, resulting in § 6 (b) (5) of the Act, were proposed and adopted on the Senate floor after the Committee reported out the bill. Senator Dominick, who played a prominent role in this amendment process, see 116 Cong. Rec. 37631 (1970), Leg. Hist. 526 (comments of Sen. Javits); 116 Cong. Rec., at 37631, Leg. Hist. 527 (comments of Sen. Williams), continued to be concerned that the Act might be read to require absolute safety. He therefore proposed that the entire first sentence of § 6 (b) (5) be struck, explaining:
"This requirement is inherently confusing and unrealistic. It could be read to require the Secretary to ban all occupations in which there remains some risk of injury, impaired health, or life expectancy. In the case of all occupations, it will be impossible to eliminate all risks to safety and health. Thus, the present criteria could, if literally applied, close every business in this nation. In addition, in many cases, the standard which might most `adequately' and `feasibly' assure the elimination of the danger would be the prohibition of the occupation itself." Leg. Hist. 367 (comments of Sen. Dominick on his proposed amendment No. 1054) (emphasis in original).
In the ensuing floor debate on this issue, Senator Dominick reiterated his concern that "[i]t is unrealistic to attempt. as [the Committee's § 6 (b) (5)] apparently does, to establish a utopia free from any hazards. Absolute safety is an impossibility . . . ." 116 Cong. Rec. 37614 (1970), Leg. Hist. 480.[35] The Senator concluded: "Any administrator responsible *518 for enforcing the statute will be faced with an impossible choice. Either he must forbid employment in all occupations where there is any risk of injury, even if the technical state of the art could not remove the hazard, or he must ignore the mandate of Congress . . . ." 116 Cong. Rec., at 37614, Leg. Hist. 481-482.
Senator Dominick failed in his efforts to have the first sentence of § 6 (b) (5) deleted. However, after working with Senators Williams and Javits, he introduced an amended version of the first sentence which he thought was "agreeable to all" and which became § 6 (b) (5) as it now appears in the Act. 116 Cong. Rec., at 37622, Leg. Hist. 502. This amendment limited the applicability of § 6 (b) (5) to "toxic materials and harmful physical agents," changed "health impairment" to "material impairment of health," and deleted the reference to "diminished life expectancy." Significantly, the feasibility requirement was left intact in the statute. Instead of the phrase "which most adequately and feasibly assures," the amendment merely substituted "which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible," to emphasize that the feasibility requirement operated as a limit on the promulgation of standards under § 6 (b) (5).
Senator Dominick believed that his modifications made clearer that attainment of an absolutely safe working environment could not be achieved through "prohibition of the occupation itself," Leg. Hist. 367, and that toxic material and harmful physical agent standards should not address frivolous harms that exist in every workplace. The feasibility requirement, along with the need for a "material impairment of health," were thus thought to satisfy these two concerns. He explained the effect of the amendment:
"What we were trying to do in the billunfortunately, *519 we did not have the proper wording or the proper drafting was to say that when we are dealing with toxic agents or physical agents, we ought to take such steps as are feasible and practical to provide an atmosphere within which a person's health or safety would not be affected. Unfortunately, we had language providing that anyone would be assured that no one would have a hazard . . . ." 116 Cong. Rec. 37622 (1970), Leg. Hist. 502.
Senator Williams added that the amendment "will provide a continued direction to the Secretary that he shall be required to set the standard which most adequately and to the greatest extent feasible assures" that no employee will suffer any material health impairment. 116 Cong. Rec., at 37622, Leg. Hist. 503. The Senate thereafter passed S. 2193. One week later, the House passed a substitute bill which failed to contain any substantive criteria for the issuance of health standards in place of its original bill. 116 Cong. Rec., at 38716-38717, Leg. Hist. 1094-1096. At the joint House-Senate Conference, however, the House conferees acceded to the Senate's version of § 6 (b) (5).[36]
Not only does the legislative history confirm that Congress meant "feasible" rather than "cost-benefit" when it used the former term, but it also shows that Congress understood that *520 the Act would create substantial costs for employers, yet intended to impose such costs when necessary to create a safe and healthful working environment.[37] Congress viewed the costs of health and safety as a cost of doing business. Senator Yarborough, a cosponsor of the Williams bill, stated: "We know the costs would be put into consumer goods but that is the price we should pay for the 80 million workers in America." 116 Cong. Rec., at 37345, Leg. Hist. 444. He asked:
"One may well ask too expensive for whom? Is it too expensive for the company who for lack of proper safety equipment loses the services of its skilled employees? Is it too expensive for the employee who loses his hand or leg or eyesight? Is it too expensive for the widow trying to raise her children on meager allowance under workmen's compensation and social security? And what about the mana good hardworking mantied to a wheel chair or hospital bed for the rest of his life? That *521 is what we are dealing with when we talk about industrial safety.
.....
"We are talking about people's lives, not the indifference of some cost accountants." 116 Cong. Rec., at 37625, Leg. Hist. 510.
Senator Eagleton commented that "[t]he costs that will be incurred by employers in meeting the standards of health and safety to be established under this bill are, in my view, reasonable and necessary costs of doing business." 116 Cong. Rec., at 41764, Leg. Hist. 1150-1151 (emphasis added).[38]
Other Members of Congress voiced similar views.[39] Nowhere is there any indication that Congress contemplated a different balancing by OSHA of the benefits of worker health and safety against the costs of achieving them. Indeed Congress thought that the financial costs of health and safety problems in the workplace were as large as or larger than the financial costs of eliminating these problems. In its statement *522 of findings and declaration of purpose encompassed in the Act itself, Congress announced that "personal injuries and illnesses arising out of work situations impose a substantial burden upon, and are a hindrance to, interstate commerce in terms of lost production, wage loss, medical expenses, and disability compensation payments." 29 U. S. C. § 651 (a). The Senate was well aware of the magnitude of these costs:
"[T]he economic impact of industrial deaths and disability is staggering. Over $1.5 billion is wasted in lost wages, and the annual loss to the Gross National Product is estimated to be over $8 billion. Vast resources that could be available for productive use are siphoned off to pay workmen's compensation benefits and medical expenses." S. Rep. No. 91-1282, p. 2 (1970), Leg. Hist. 142.
Senator Eagleton summarized: "Whether we, as individuals, are motivated by simple humanity or by simple economics, we can no longer permit profits to be dependent upon an unsafe or unhealthy worksite." 116 Cong. Rec. 41764 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1150-1151.
III
Section 6 (f) of the Act provides that "[t]he determinations of the Secretary shall be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole." 29 U. S. C. § 655 (f). Petitioners contend that the Secretary's determination that the Cotton Dust Standard is "economically feasible" is not supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole. In particular, they claim (1) that OSHA underestimated the financial costs necessary to meet the Standard's requirements; and (2) that OSHA incorrectly found that the Standard would not threaten the economic viability of the cotton industry.
In statutes with provisions virtually identical to § 6 (f) of the Act, we have defined substantial evidence as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, *523 340 U. S. 474, 477 (1951). The reviewing court must take into account contradictory evidence in the record, id., at 487-488, but "the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence," Consolo v. FMC, 383 U. S. 607, 620 (1966). Since the Act places responsibility for determining substantial evidence questions in the courts of appeals, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (f), we apply the familiar rule that "[t]his Court will intervene only in what ought to be the rare instance when the [substantial evidence] standard appears to have been misapprehended or grossly misapplied" by the court below. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, supra, at 491; see Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U. S. 283, 292, 310 (1974); FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U. S. 396, 400-401 (1958). Therefore, our inquiry is not to determine whether we, in the first instance, would find OSHA's findings supported by substantial evidence. Instead we turn to OSHA's findings and the record upon which they were based to decide whether the Court of Appeals "misapprehended or grossly misapplied" the substantial evidence test.
A
OSHA derived its cost estimate for industry compliance with the Cotton Dust Standard after reviewing two financial analyses, one prepared by the Research Triangle Institute (RTI), an OSHA-contracted group, the other by industry representatives (Hocutt-Thomas).[40] The agency carefully *524 explored the assumptions and methodologies underlying the conclusions of each of these studies. From this exercise the agency was able to build upon conclusions from each which it found reliable and explain its process for choosing its cost estimate. A brief summary of OSHA's treatment of the two studies follows.
OSHA rejected RTI's cost estimate of $1.1 billion for textile industry engineering controls for three principal reasons.[41] First, OSHA believed that RTI's estimate should be discounted by 30%, 43 Fed. Reg. 27372, col. 3 (1978), because that estimate was based on the assumption that engineering controls would be applied to all equipment in mills, including those processing pure synthetic fibers, even though cotton dust is not generated by such equipment. RTI had observed that "[e]xclusion of equipment processing man-made fibers only could reduce these costs by as much as 30 percent." Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 585.[42] Since the Standard did not require controls on synthetics-only equipment, OSHA rejected RTI's assumption about application of controls to synthetics-only machines. 43 Fed. Reg. 27371, col. 3 (1978). Second, OSHA concluded that RTI "may have over-estimated compliance costs since some operations are already in compliance with the permissible exposure limit of the new standard." Id., at 27370, cols. 2 and 3. Evidence indicated that some *525 mills had attained PEL's