464 U.S. 238 (1984)

SILKWOOD, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF SILKWOOD
v.
KERR-McGEE CORP. ET AL.

No. 81-2159.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued October 4, 1983 Decided January 11, 1984 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

*239 Michael H. Gottesman argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Arthur R. Angel, Robert M. Weinberg, Jeremiah A. Collins, James A. Ikard, Gerald L. Spence, and Daniel P. Sheehan.

C. Lee Cook, Jr., argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were William G. Paul, L. E. Stringer, *240 Elliott C. Fenton, Larry D. Ottaway, William T. McGrath, Pamela J. Kempin, and Richard R. Wilfong.

John H. Garvey argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee and Deputy Solicitor General Bator.^[*]

A brief of amicus curiae urging affirmance was filed by Harry H. Voigt, Michael F. McBride, and Linda L. Hodge for the Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.

A brief of amicus curiae was filed by Joseph H. Rodriguez and Michael L. Perlin for the New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate.

JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

Last Term, this Court examined the relationship between federal and state authority in the nuclear energy field and concluded that States are precluded from regulating the *241 safety aspects of nuclear energy. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Comm'n, 461 U. S. 190, 211-213 (1983). This case requires us to determine whether a state-authorized award of punitive damages arising out of the escape of plutonium from a federally licensed nuclear facility is pre-empted either because it falls within that forbidden field or because it conflicts with some other aspect of the Atomic Energy Act.

I

Karen Silkwood was a laboratory analyst for Kerr-McGee^[1] at its Cimarron plant near Crescent, Okla. The plant fabricated plutonium fuel pins for use as reactor fuel in nuclear powerplants. Accordingly, the plant was subject to licensing and regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) (then the Atomic Energy Commission) pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U. S. C. § 2011 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V).^[2]

During a 3-day period of November 1974, Silkwood was contaminated by plutonium from the Cimarron plant. On November 5, Silkwood was grinding and polishing plutonium samples, utilizing glove boxes designed for that purpose.^[3] In accordance with established procedures, she checked her hands for contamination when she withdrew them from the *242 glove box. When some contamination was detected, a more extensive check was performed. A monitoring device revealed contamination on Silkwood's left hand, right wrist, upper arm, neck, hair, and nostrils. She was immediately decontaminated, and at the end of her shift, the monitors detected no contamination. However, she was given urine and fecal kits and was instructed to collect samples in order to check for plutonium discharge.

The next day, Silkwood arrived at the plant and began doing paperwork in the laboratory. Upon leaving the laboratory, Silkwood monitored herself and again discovered surface contamination. Once again, she was decontaminated.

On the third day, November 7, Silkwood was monitored upon her arrival at the plant. High levels of contamination were detected. Four urine samples and one fecal sample submitted that morning were also highly contaminated.^[4] Suspecting that the contamination had spread to areas outside the plant, the company directed a decontamination squad to accompany Silkwood to her apartment. Silkwood's roommate, who was also an employee at the plant, was awakened and monitored. She was also contaminated, although to a lesser degree than Silkwood. The squad then monitored the apartment, finding contamination in several rooms, with especially high levels in the bathroom, the kitchen, and Silkwood's bedroom.

The contamination level in Silkwood's apartment was such that many of her personal belongings had to be destroyed. Silkwood herself was sent to the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory to determine the extent of contamination in her vital body organs. She returned to work on November 13. That night, she was killed in an unrelated automobile accident. 667 F. 2d 908, 912 (CA10 1981).

*243 Bill Silkwood, Karen's father, brought the present diversity action in his capacity as administrator of her estate. The action was based on common-law tort principles under Oklahoma law and was designed to recover for the contamination injuries to Karen's person and property. Kerr-McGee stipulated that the plutonium which caused the contamination came from its plant, and the jury expressly rejected Kerr-McGee's allegation that Silkwood had intentionally removed the plutonium from the plant in an effort to embarrass the company. However, there were no other specific findings of fact with respect to the cause of the contamination.

During the course of the trial, evidence was presented which tended to show that Kerr-McGee did not always comply with NRC regulations. One Kerr-McGee witness conceded that the amount of plutonium which was unaccounted for during the period in question exceeded permissible limits.^[5] 485 F. Supp. 566, 586 (WD Okla. 1979). An NRC official testified that he did not feel that Kerr-McGee was conforming its conduct to the "as low as reasonably achievable" standard.^[6]Ibid. There was also some evidence that the level of plutonium in Silkwood's apartment may have exceeded that permitted in an unrestricted area such as a residence. Ibid.

*244 However, there was also evidence that Kerr-McGee complied with most federal regulations. The NRC official testified that there were no serious personnel exposures at the plant and that Kerr-McGee did not exceed the regulatory requirements with respect to exposure levels that would result in significant health hazards. In addition, Kerr-McGee introduced the Commission's report on the investigation of the Silkwood incident in which the Commission determined that Kerr-McGee's only violation of regulations throughout the incident was its failure to maintain a record of the dates of two urine samples submitted by Silkwood.

The trial court determined that Kerr-McGee had not shown that the contamination occurred during the course of Silkwood's employment. Accordingly, the court precluded the jury from deciding whether the personal injury claim was covered by Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Act, which provides the sole remedy for accidental personal injuries arising in the course of employment. Okla. Stat., Tit. 85, §§ 11, 12 (1981). Instead, the court submitted the claims to the jury on alternative theories of strict liability and negligence.^[7]

The court also instructed the jury with respect to punitive damages, explaining the standard by which Kerr-McGee's conduct was to be evaluated in determining whether such damages should be awarded:

"[T]he jury may give damages for the sake of example and by way of punishment, if the jury finds the defendant or defendants have been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed. . . .

"Exemplary damages are not limited to cases where there is direct evidence of fraud, malice or gross negligence. They may be allowed when there is evidence *245 of such recklessness and wanton disregard of another's rights that malice and evil intent will be inferred. If a defendant is grossly and wantonly reckless in exposing others to dangers, the law holds him to have intended the natural consequences of his acts, and treats him as guilty of a willful wrong." 485 F. Supp., at 603 (Appendix).

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Mr. Silkwood, finding actual damages of $505,000 ($500,000 for personal injuries and $5,000 for property damage) and punitive damages of $10 million. The trial court entered judgment against Kerr-McGee in that amount.

Kerr-McGee then moved for judgment n.o.v. or a new trial. In denying that motion, the court rejected Kerr-McGee's contention that compliance with federal regulations precluded an award of punitive damages. The court noted that Kerr-McGee "had a duty under part 20 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations to maintain the release of radiation `as low as reasonably achievable.' Compliance with this standard cannot be demonstrated merely through control of escaped plutonium to within any absolute amount." Id., at 585. Therefore, the court concluded, it is not "inconsistent [with any congressional design] to impose punitive damages for the escape of plutonium caused by grossly negligent, reckless and willful conduct." Ibid.

Kerr-McGee renewed its contentions with greater success before the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. That court, by decision of a split panel, affirmed in part and reversed in part. 667 F. 2d 908 (1981). The court first held that recovery for Silkwood's personal injuries was controlled exclusively by Oklahoma's workers' compensation law. It thus reversed the $500,000 judgment for those injuries. The court then affirmed the property damage portion of the award, holding that the workers' compensation law applied only to personal injuries and that Oklahoma law permitted an award under a theory of strict liability in the circumstances *246 of this case. Finally, the court held that because of the federal statutes regulating the Kerr-McGee plant, "punitive damages may not be awarded in this case," id., at 923.

In reaching its conclusion with respect to the punitive damages award, the Court of Appeals adopted a broad pre-emption analysis. It concluded that "any state action that competes substantially with the AEC (NRC) in its regulation of radiation hazards associated with plants handling nuclear material" was impermissible. Ibid. Because "[a] judicial award of exemplary damages under state law as punishment for bad practices or to deter future practices involving exposure to radiation is not less intrusive than direct legislative acts of the state," the court determined that such awards were pre-empted by federal law. Ibid.

Mr. Silkwood appealed, seeking review of the Court of Appeals' ruling with respect to the punitive damages award. We noted probable jurisdiction and postponed consideration of the jurisdictional issue until argument on the merits. 459 U. S. 1101 (1983).

II

We first address the jurisdictional issue. This Court is empowered to review the decision of a federal court of appeals "by appeal [if] a State statute [is] held by [the] court of appeals to be invalid as repugnant to the Constitution . . . ." 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2). Mr. Silkwood argues that because the Court of Appeals invalidated the punitive damages award on pre-emption grounds and because the basis for that award was a state statute, Okla. Stat., Tit. 23, § 9 (1981),^[8] the Court of Appeals necessarily held that the state statute was unconstitutional, at least as applied in this case. Accordingly, Mr. Silkwood contends, this case falls within the confines of 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2). We disagree.

*247 In keeping with the policy that statutes authorizing appeals are to be strictly construed, Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 43 (1983); Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U. S. 41, 42, n. 1 (1970), we have consistently distinguished between those cases in which a state statute is expressly struck down on constitutional grounds and those in which an exercise of authority under state law is invalidated without reference to the state statute. The former come within the scope of § 1254(2)'s jurisdictional grant. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 497, 499 (1978); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 76, n. 6 (1970). The latter do not. Perry Education Assn., supra, at 42; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235, 244 (1958); Wilson v. Cook, 327 U. S. 474, 482 (1946).^[9] See also County of Arlington v. United States, 669 F. 2d 925 (CA4), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 801 (1982); Minnesota v. Hoffman, 543 F. 2d 1198 (CA8 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Minnesota v. Alexander, 430 U. S. 977 (1977). The present case falls into the second category.

The Court of Appeals held that because of the pre-emptive effect of federal law, "punitive damages may not be awarded in this case." 667 F. 2d, at 923. It did not purport to rule on the constitutionality of the Oklahoma punitive damages statute. The court did not mention the statute, and the parties did not contest or defend the constitutionality of the statute in their appellate briefs. While the award itself was struck down, the statute authorizing such awards was left untouched. Cf. Perry Education Assn., 460 U. S., at 42. Therefore, the present appeal is not within our § 1254(2) appellate jurisdiction.^[10]

*248 Nevertheless, the decision below is reviewable by writ of certiorari. Ibid. The issue addressed by the court below is important; it affects both the States' traditional authority to provide tort remedies to their citizens and the Federal Government's express desire to maintain exclusive regulatory authority over the safety aspects of nuclear power. Accordingly, treating the jurisdictional statement as a petition for certiorari, as we are authorized to do, 28 U. S. C. § 2103, we grant the petition and reach the merits of the Court of Appeals' ruling.

III

As we recently observed in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Comm'n, 461 U. S. 190 (1983), state law can be pre-empted in either of two general ways. If Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given field, any state law falling within that field is pre-empted. Id., at 203-204; Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 153 (1982); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947). If Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over the matter in question, state law is still pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law, that is, when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress, Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941). Pacific Gas & Electric, supra, at 204. Kerr-McGee contends that the award in this case is invalid under either analysis. We consider each of these contentions in turn.

*249 A

In Pacific Gas & Electric, an examination of the statutory scheme and legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act convinced us that "Congress . . . intended that the Federal Government should regulate the radiological safety aspects involved in the construction and operation of a nuclear plant." 461 U. S., at 205. Thus, we concluded that "the Federal Government has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded to the States." Id., at 212.

Kerr-McGee argues that our ruling in Pacific Gas & Electric is dispositive of the issue in this case. Noting that "regulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some form of preventive relief," San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 247 (1959), Kerr-McGee submits that because the state-authorized award of punitive damages in this case punishes and deters conduct related to radiation hazards, it falls within the prohibited field. However, a review of the same legislative history which prompted our holding in Pacific Gas & Electric, coupled with an examination of Congress' actions with respect to other portions of the Atomic Energy Act, convinces us that the pre-empted field does not extend as far as Kerr-McGee would have it.

As we recounted in Pacific Gas & Electric, "[u]ntil 1954. . . the use, control, and ownership of nuclear technology remained a federal monopoly." 461 U. S., at 206. In that year, Congress enacted legislation which provided for private involvement in the development of atomic energy. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Act of Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2011 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V). However, the Federal Government retained extensive control over the manner in which this development occurred. In particular, the Atomic Energy Commission was given "exclusive jurisdiction to license the transfer, *250 delivery, receipt, acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear materials." Pacific Gas & Electric, supra, at 207. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 2014(e), (z), (aa), 2061-2064, 2071-2078, 2091-2099, 2111-2114 (1976 ed. and Supp. V).

In 1959 Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act in order to "clarify the respective responsibilities . . . of the States and the Commission with respect to the regulation of byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials." 42 U. S. C. § 2021(a)(1). See S. Rep. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 8-12 (1959). The Commission was authorized to turn some of its regulatory authority over to any State which would adopt a suitable regulatory program. However, the Commission was to retain exclusive regulatory authority over "the disposal of such . . . byproduct, source, or special nuclear material as the Commission determines . . . should, because of the hazards or potential hazards thereof, not be disposed of without a license from the Commission." 42 U. S. C. § 2021(c)(4). The States were therefore still precluded from regulating the safety aspects of these hazardous materials.^[11]

Congress' decision to prohibit the States from regulating the safety aspects of nuclear development was premised on its belief that the Commission was more qualified to determine what type of safety standards should be enacted in this complex area. As Congress was informed by the AEC, the 1959 legislation provided for continued federal control over the more hazardous materials because "the technical safety considerations are of such complexity that it is not likely that any State would be prepared to deal with them during the foreseeable future." H. R. Rep. No. 1125, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1959). If there were nothing more, this concern over the States' inability to formulate effective standards and *251 the foreclosure of the States from conditioning the operation of nuclear plants on compliance with state-imposed safety standards arguably would disallow resort to state-law remedies by those suffering injuries from radiation in a nuclear plant. There is, however, ample evidence that Congress had no intention of forbidding the States to provide such remedies.

Indeed, there is no indication that Congress even seriously considered precluding the use of such remedies either when it enacted the Atomic Energy Act in 1954 or when it amended it in 1959. This silence takes on added significance in light of Congress' failure to provide any federal remedy for persons injured by such conduct. It is difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct. See Construction Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U. S. 656, 663-664 (1954).

More importantly, the only congressional discussion concerning the relationship between the Atomic Energy Act and state tort remedies indicates that Congress assumed that such remedies would be available. After the 1954 law was enacted, private companies contemplating entry into the nuclear industry expressed concern over potentially bankrupting state-law suits arising out of a nuclear incident. As a result, in 1957 Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act, an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act. Pub. L. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576. That Act established an indemnification scheme under which operators of licensed nuclear facilities could be required to obtain up to $60 million in private financial protection against such suits. The Government would then provide indemnification for the next $500 million of liability, and the resulting $560 million would be the limit of liability for any one nuclear incident.

Although the Price-Anderson Act does not apply to the present situation,^[12] the discussion preceding its enactment *252 and subsequent amendment^[13] indicates that Congress assumed that persons injured by nuclear accidents were free to utilize existing state tort law remedies. The Joint Committee Report on the original version of the Price-Anderson Act explained the relationship between the Act and existing state tort law as follows:

"Since the rights of third parties who are injured are established by State law, there is no interference with the State law until there is a likelihood that the damages exceed the amount of financial responsibility required together with the amount of the indemnity. At that point the Federal interference is limited to the prohibition of making payments through the State courts and to prorating the proceeds available." S. Rep. No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1957).

See also H. R. Rep. No. 435, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1957); S. Rep. No. 1605, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1966).

Congress clearly began working on the Price-Anderson legislation with the assumption that in the absence of some subsequent legislative action, state tort law would apply.^[14] This was true even though Congress was fully aware of the *253 Commission's exclusive regulatory authority over safety matters. As the Joint Committee explained in 1965:

"The Price-Anderson Act also contained provisions to improve the AEC's procedures for regulating reactor licensees . . . . This manifested the continuing concern of the Joint Committee and Congress with the necessity for assuring the effectiveness of the national regulatory program for protecting the health and safety of employees and the public against atomic energy hazards. The inclusion of these provisions . . . also reflected the intimate relationship which existed between Congress' concern for prevention of reactor accidents and the indemnity provisions of the Price-Anderson legislation." S. Rep. No. 650, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 4-5 (1965).

When it enacted the Price-Anderson Act, Congress was well aware of the need for effective national safety regulation. In fact, it intended to encourage such regulation. But, at the same time, "the right of the State courts to establish the liability of the persons involved in the normal way [was] maintained." S. Rep. No. 296, supra, at 22.

The belief that the NRC's exclusive authority to set safety standards did not foreclose the use of state tort remedies was reaffirmed when the Price-Anderson Act was amended in 1966. The 1966 amendment was designed to respond to concerns about the adequacy of state-law remedies. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 650, supra, at 13. It provided that in the event of an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence,"^[15] licensees could be required to waive any issue of fault, any charitable or governmental *254 immunity defense, and any statute of limitations defense of less than 10 years. 42 U. S. C. § 2210(n)(1). Again, however, the importance of the legislation for present purposes is not so much in its substance, as in the assumptions on which it was based.

Describing the effect of the 1966 amendment, the Joint Committee stated:

"By requiring potential defendants to agree to waive defenses the defendants' rights are restricted; concomitantly, to this extent, the rights of plaintiffs are enlarged. Just as the rights of persons who are injured are established by State law, the rights of defendants against whom liability is asserted are fixed by State law. What this subsection does is to authorize the [NRC] to require that defendants covered by financial protection and indemnity give up some of the rights they might otherwise assert." S. Rep. No. 1605, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 26 (1966).

Similarly, when the Committee outlined the rights of those injured in nuclear incidents which were not extraordinary nuclear occurrences, its reference point was again state law. "Absent . . . a determination [that the incident is an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence"], a claimant would have exactly the same rights that he has today under existing law — including, perhaps, benefit of a rule of strict liability if applicable State law so provides." Id., at 12. Indeed, the entire discussion surrounding the 1966 amendment was premised on the assumption that state remedies were available notwithstanding the NRC's exclusive regulatory authority. For example, the Committee rejected a suggestion that it adopt a federal tort to replace existing state remedies, noting that such displacement of state remedies would engender great opposition. Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Proposed Amendments to Price-Anderson Act Relating to Waiver of Defenses, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 31, 75 (1966); S. Rep. No. 1605, supra, at 6-9. If other provisions *255 of the Atomic Energy Act already precluded the States from providing remedies to its citizens, there would have been no need for such concerns. Other comments made throughout the discussion were similarly based on the assumption that state remedies were available.^[16]

Kerr-McGee focuses on the differences between compensatory and punitive damages awards and asserts that, at most, Congress intended to allow the former. This argument, however, is misdirected because our inquiry is not whether Congress expressly allowed punitive damages awards. Punitive damages have long been a part of traditional state tort law. As we noted above, Congress assumed that traditional principles of state tort law would apply with full force unless they were expressly supplanted. Thus, it is Kerr-McGee's burden to show that Congress intended to preclude such awards. See Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U. S. 42, 53 (1979) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in result). Yet, the company is unable to point to anything in the legislative history or in the regulations that indicates that punitive damages were not to be allowed. To the contrary, the regulations issued implementing the insurance provisions of the Price-Anderson Act themselves contemplate that punitive damages might be awarded under state law.^[17]

*256 In sum, it is clear that in enacting and amending the Price-Anderson Act, Congress assumed that state-law remedies, in whatever form they might take, were available to those injured by nuclear incidents. This was so even though it was well aware of the NRC's exclusive authority to regulate safety matters. No doubt there is tension between the conclusion that safety regulation is the exclusive concern of the federal law and the conclusion that a State may nevertheless award damages based on its own law of liability. But as we understand what was done over the years in the legislation concerning nuclear energy, Congress intended to stand by both concepts and to tolerate whatever tension there was between them. We can do no less. It may be that the award of damages based on the state law of negligence or strict liability is regulatory in the sense that a nuclear plant will be threatened with damages liability if it does not conform to state standards, but that regulatory consequence was something that Congress was quite willing to accept.

We do not suggest that there could never be an instance in which the federal law would pre-empt the recovery of damages based on state law. But insofar as damages for radiation injuries are concerned, pre-emption should not be judged on the basis that the Federal Government has so completely occupied the field of safety that state remedies are foreclosed but on whether there is an irreconcilable conflict between the federal and state standards or whether the imposition of a state standard in a damages action would frustrate the objectives of the federal law. We perceive no such conflict or frustration in the circumstances of this case.

*257 B

The United States, as amicus curiae, contends that the award of punitive damages in this case is pre-empted because it conflicts with the federal remedial scheme, noting that the NRC is authorized to impose civil penalties on licensees when federal standards have been violated. 42 U. S. C. § 2282 (1976 ed. and Supp. V). However, the award of punitive damages in the present case does not conflict with that scheme. Paying both federal fines and state-imposed punitive damages for the same incident would not appear to be physically impossible. Nor does exposure to punitive damages frustrate any purpose of the federal remedial scheme.

Kerr-McGee contends that the award is pre-empted because it frustrates Congress' express desire "to encourage widespread participation in the development and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes." 42 U. S. C. § 2013(d). In Pacific Gas & Electric, we observed that "[t]here is little doubt that a primary purpose of the Atomic Energy Act was, and continues to be, the promotion of nuclear power." 461 U. S., at 221. However, we also observed that "the promotion of nuclear power is not to be accomplished `at all costs.' " Id., at 222. Indeed, the provision cited by Kerr-McGee goes on to state that atomic energy should be developed and utilized only to the extent it is consistent "with the health and safety of the public." 42 U. S. C. § 2013(d). Congress therefore disclaimed any interest in promoting the development and utilization of atomic energy by means that fail to provide adequate remedies for those who are injured by exposure to hazardous nuclear materials. Thus, the award of punitive damages in this case does not hinder the accomplishment of the purpose stated in § 2013(d).

We also reject Kerr-McGee's submission that the punitive damages award in this case conflicts with Congress' express intent to preclude dual regulation of radiation hazards. See S. Rep. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1959). As we *258A explained in Part A, Congress did not believe that it was inconsistent to vest the NRC with exclusive regulatory authority over the safety aspects of nuclear development while at the same time allowing plaintiffs like Mr. Silkwood to recover for injuries caused by nuclear hazards. We are not authorized to second-guess that conclusion.^[18]

IV

We conclude that the award of punitive damages in this case is not pre-empted by federal law. On remand Kerr-McGee is free to reassert any claims it made before the Court of Appeals which were not addressed by that court or by this opinion, including its contention that the jury's findings with respect to punitive damages were not supported by sufficient evidence and its argument that the amount of the punitive damages award was excessive. The judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to punitive damages is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

*258B JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, dissenting.

I join JUSTICE POWELL's opinion in dissent and add comments of my own that, I believe, demonstrate (a) the incompatibility between the Court's opinion last Term in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Comm'n, 461 U. S. 190 (1983), *259 and its opinion in the present case, and (b) the fact that the Court is by no means compelled to reach the result it espouses today.

JUSTICE POWELL's dissent well explains the fundamental incongruity of the Court's result. The Court acknowledges that Congress pre-empted state regulation of safety aspects of nuclear operations largely out of concern that States were without the technological expertise necessary to regulate them. Ante, at 250-251. Yet the Court concludes that Congress intended to allow a jury to impose substantial penalties upon a nuclear licensee for failure to follow what the jury regards as adequate safety procedures. The Court recognizes the paradox of its disposition, but blames the irrationality on Congress. Then, with humility, the Court explains that it is duty-bound to follow the dictates of Congress. But such institutional modesty cannot transfer the blame for the tension that today's decision injects into the regulation of nuclear power. The Court, in my view, tortures its earlier decisions and, more importantly, wreaks havoc with the regulatory structure that Congress carefully created.

I

The Court recognizes that the analytic framework for this case was established less than a year ago in Pacific Gas. The precise issue in that case was whether the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, 68 Stat. 921, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2011 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), pre-empted California's authority to condition the construction of a nuclear facility in California on the State's finding that adequate means of disposal were available for the plant's nuclear wastes. Two aspects of that decision control the proper disposition of the case today.

First, the Court concluded that federal pre-emption of nuclear safety regulation was full and complete:

"State safety regulation is not pre-empted only when it conflicts with federal law. Rather, the Federal Government *260 has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded to the States. When the Federal Government completely occupies a given field or an identifiable portion of it, as it has done here, the test of pre-emption is whether `the matter on which the State asserts the right to act is in any way regulated by the Federal Act,' " 461 U. S., at 212-213 (footnote omitted).

The second important aspect of Pacific Gas was its analysis of the California statute. Despite the broad federal pre-emption of nuclear safety concerns, the Court upheld the state statute. The Court recognized that the statute clearly had an effect on the safety of nuclear plant operations, id., at 196-197, but it upheld the statute because its purpose was economic. The Court concluded that the State had adopted the regulation to prevent investments in powerplants that were likely to become white elephants due to inadequate nuclear waste storage facilities. Ibid. Because Congress had not meant the Atomic Energy Act to deprive States of the right to make economic decisions concerning nuclear power, the Court concluded that the regulation was not pre-empted. Thus, the fundamental teaching of Pacific Gas is that state regulation of nuclear power is pre-empted to the extent that its purpose is to regulate safety.

The principles set forth in Pacific Gas compel the conclusion that the punitive damages awarded in this case, and now upheld, are pre-empted. The prospect of paying a large fine — in this case a potential $10 million — for failure to operate a nuclear facility in a particular manner has an obvious effect on the safety precautions that nuclear licensees will follow. The Court does not dispute, moreover, that punitive damages are expressly designed for this purpose. Punitive damages are "private fines levied by civil juries." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 350 (1974). See Smith v. Wade, 461 U. S. 30, 49 (1983) ("[D]eterrence of future egregious *261 conduct is a primary purpose . . . of punitive damages"). The trial court's instructions to the jury in this case explained the purpose of punitive damages:

"The basis for allowance of punitive damages rests upon the principle that they are allowed as a punishment to the offender for the general benefit of society, both as a restraint upon the transgressor and as a warning and example to deter the commission of like offenses in the future." App. to Juris. Statement 112a.

The conduct that the jury's punitive damages award sought to regulate was the day-to-day safety procedures of nuclear licensees. There was no factual finding as to how the contamination of Karen Silkwood occurred; the trial judge expressly refused to give an instruction on intentional infliction, and the jury rejected Kerr-McGee's suggestion that Silkwood intentionally contaminated herself. See ante, at 243; 667 F. 2d 908, 915 (CA10 1981). It is abundantly clear, therefore, that the punitive damages award in this case deters a nuclear facility from operating in the same manner as Kerr-McGee. Authority for a State to do so, however, is precisely what the Court held to be pre-empted in Pacific Gas.^[1] Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations covered virtually every aspect of the incident in which Silkwood was contaminated.^[2] The *262 Atomic Energy Act provides a full enforcement arsenal — including criminal sanctions — to police compliance with federal standards.^[3] Indeed, the Commission conducted a complete investigation into the Silkwood contamination, and found no material violation of federal regulations that could justify imposing a fine.^[4] The District Court nevertheless instructed the jury to fashion a fine to encourage Kerr-McGee and other nuclear licensees to meet in the future whatever safety standard the jury considered appropriate for plutonium.^[5]

*263 The $10 million fine that the jury imposed is 100 times greater than the maximum fine that may be imposed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for a single violation of federal standards. The fine apparently is more than 10 times greater than the largest single fine that the Commission has ever imposed.^[6] The complete federal occupation of safety regulation compels the conclusion that such an award is pre-empted.

It