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Full Opinion
WILSON ET AL.
v.
GARCIA
Supreme Court of United States.
*262 Bruce Hall argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Diane Fisher and Ben M. Allen.
Steven G. Farber, by appointment of the Court, 469 U. S. 1069, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Richard Rosenstock.[*]
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we must determine the most appropriate state statute of limitations to apply to claims enforceable under ยง 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,[1] which is codified in its present form as 42 U. S. C. ยง 1983.
*263 On January 28, 1982, respondent brought this ยง 1983 action in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico seeking "money damages to compensate him for the deprivation of his civil rights guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and for the personal injuries he suffered which were caused by the acts and omissions of the [petitioners] acting under color of law." App. 4. The complaint alleged that on April 27, 1979, petitioner Wilson, a New Mexico State Police officer, unlawfully arrested the respondent, "brutally and viciously" beat him, and sprayed his face with tear gas; that petitioner Vigil, the Chief of the New Mexico State Police, had notice of Officer Wilson's allegedly "violent propensities," and had failed to reprimand him for committing other unprovoked attacks on citizens; and that Vigil's training and supervision of Wilson was seriously deficient. Id., at 6-7.
The respondent's complaint was filed two years and nine months after the claim purportedly arose. Petitioners moved to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by the 2-year statute of limitations contained in ยง 41-4-15(A) of the New Mexico Tort Claims Act.[2] The petitioners' motion was supported by a decision of the New Mexico Supreme Court which squarely held that the Tort Claims Act provides "the most closely analogous state cause of action"[3] to ยง 1983, and that its 2-year statute of limitations is therefore applicable *264 to actions commenced under ยง 1983 in the state courts. DeVargas v. New Mexico, 97 N. M. 563, 642 P. 2d 166 (1982). In addition to the 2-year statute of limitations in the Tort Claims Act, two other New Mexico statutes conceivably could apply to ยง 1983 claims: ยง 37-1-8, which provides a 3-year limitation period for actions "for an injury to the person or reputation of any person";[4] and ยง 37-1-4, which provides a 4-year limitation period for "all other actions not herein otherwise provided for."[5] If either of these longer statutes applies to the respondent's ยง 1983 claim, the complaint was timely filed.
In ruling on the petitioners' motion to dismiss, the District Court concluded that the New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in DeVargas was not controlling because "the characterization of the nature of the right being vindicated under ยง 1983 is a matter of federal, rather than state, law."[6] After reviewing various approaches to the question, the District Court concluded that "ยง 1983 actions are best characterized as actions based on statute."[7] Because there is no specific New Mexico statute of limitations governing such claims, the District Court held that ยง 37-1-4, the residual 4-year statute, applied to ยง 1983 actions brought in New Mexico. The court denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss and certified an interlocutory appeal under 28 U. S. C. ยง 1292(b).[8]
*265 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit accepted the appeal. App. 2. After argument before a three-judge panel, the case was set for reargument before the entire court. In a unanimous en banc opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's order denying the motion to dismiss the complaint. 731 F. 2d 640 (1984).
The Court of Appeals' reasoning was slightly different from the District Court's. It agreed that the characterization of a ยง 1983 claim is a matter of federal law, and that the New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in DeVargas was therefore not conclusive on the question. 731 F. 2d, at 643, 651, n. 5. The opinion reviewed the varying approaches of the United States Courts of Appeals,[9] and concluded that even though ยง 1983 actions encompass a wide variety of fact situations and legal theories, "[a]ll of the federal values at issue in selecting a limitations period for section 1983 claims are best served by articulating one uniform characterization describing the essential nature underlying all such claims." Id., at 650. Distilling the essence of the ยง 1983 cause of action, the court held that every claim enforceable under the statute is, in reality, "an action for injury to personal rights," and that "[h]enceforth, all ยง 1983 claims in [the] circuit will be uniformly so characterized for statute of limitations purposes." Id., at 651. Accordingly, the appropriate statute of limitations for ยง 1983 actions brought in New Mexico was the 3-year statute applicable to personal injury actions.[10] It followed that the respondent had filed his complaint in time.
*266 The Court of Appeals acknowledged that its holding is at odds with the New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in DeVargas. It also commented on the extensive conflict in the Federal Courts of Appeals: "the courts vary widely in the methods by which they characterize a section 1983 action, and in the criteria by which they evaluate the applicability of a particular state statute of limitations to a particular claim. The actual process used to select an appropriate state statute varies from circuit to circuit and sometimes from panel to panel." 731 F. 2d, at 643. "Few areas of the law stand in greater need of firmly defined, easily applied rules than does the subject of periods of limitations." Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U. S. 650, 667 (1983) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). Thus, the conflict, confusion, and uncertainty concerning the appropriate statute of limitations to apply to this most important, and ubiquitous, civil rights statute provided compelling reasons for granting certiorari. 469 U. S. 815 (1984). We find the reasoning in the Court of Appeals' opinion persuasive, and affirm.
I
The Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts do not contain a specific statute of limitations governing ยง 1983 actions[11] ย "a void which is commonplace in federal statutory law." Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U. S. 478, 483 (1980). When Congress has not established a time limitation for a federal cause of action, the settled practice has been to adopt a local time limitation as federal law if it is not inconsistent with federal *267 law or policy to do so.[12] In 42 U. S. C. ยง 1988, Congress has implicitly endorsed this approach with respect to claims enforceable under the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts.
The language of ยง 1988,[13] directs the courts to follow "a three-step process" in determining the rules of decision applicable to civil rights claims:
"First, courts are to look to the laws of the United States `so far as such laws are suitable to carry [the civil and criminal civil rights statutes] into effect.' [42 U. S. C. ยง 1988.] If no suitable federal rule exists, courts undertake the second step by considering application of state `common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes' of the forum state. Ibid. A third step asserts the predominance of the federal interest: courts are to apply state law only if it is not `inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.' Ibid." Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U. S. 42, 47-48 (1984).
*268 This case principally involves the second step in the process: the selection of "the most appropriate,"[14] or "the most analogous"[15] state statute of limitations to apply to this ยง 1983 claim.
In order to determine the most "most appropriate" or "most analogous" New Mexico statute to apply to the respondent's claim, we must answer three questions. We must first consider whether state law or federal law governs the characterization of a ยง 1983 claim for statute of limitations purposes. If federal law applies, we must next decide whether all ยง 1983 claims should be characterized in the same way, or whether they should be evaluated differently depending upon the varying factual circumstances and legal theories presented in each individual case. Finally, we must characterize the essence of the claim in the pending case, and decide which state statute provides the most appropriate limiting principle. Although the text of neither ยง 1983 nor ยง 1988 provides a pellucid answer to any of these questions, all three parts of the inquiry are, in final analysis, questions of statutory construction.
II
Our identification of the correct source of law properly begins with the text of ยง 1988.[16] Congress' first instruction in the statute is that the law to be applied in adjudicating civil rights claims shall be in "conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable." This mandate implies that resort to state law ย the second step in the process ย should not be undertaken before principles of federal law are exhausted. The characterization of ยง 1983 for statute of limitations purposes is derived from the elements of the cause of action, and Congress' purpose in providing it. These, of course, are matters of federal law. Since federal law is available to decide the question, the language of ยง 1988 *269 directs that the matter of characterization should be treated as a federal question. Only the length of the limitations period, and closely related questions of tolling and application,[17] are to be governed by state law.
This interpretation is also supported by Congress' third instruction in ยง 1988: state law shall only apply "so far as the same is not inconsistent with" federal law. This requirement emphasizes "the predominance of the federal interest" in the borrowing process, taken as a whole. Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U. S., at 48.[18] Even when principles of state law are borrowed to assist in the enforcement of this federal remedy, the state rule is adopted as "a federal rule responsive to the need whenever a federal right is impaired." Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 240 (1969). The importation of the policies and purposes of the States on matters of civil rights is not the primary office of the borrowing provision in ยง 1988; rather, the statute is designed to assure that neutral rules of decision will be available to enforce the civil rights actions, among them ยง 1983. Congress surely did not intend to assign to state courts and legislatures a conclusive role in the formative function of defining and characterizing the essential elements of a federal cause of action.
In borrowing statutes of limitations for other federal claims,[19] this Court has generally recognized that the problem *270 of characterization "is ultimately a question of federal law." Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U. S. 696, 706 (1966) (ยง 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U. S. C. ยง 185).[20] In DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U. S. 151 (1983), for example, we recently declined to apply a state statute of limitations when we were convinced that a federal statute of limitations for another cause of action better reflected the balance that Congress would have preferred between the substantive policies underlying the federal claim and the policies of repose.[21] So here, the federal interest in uniformity and the interest in having "firmly defined, easily applied rules," see Chardon, 462 U. S., at 667 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting), support the conclusion that Congress intended the characterization of ยง 1983 to be measured by federal rather than state standards.[22] The Court of Appeals was *271 therefore correct in concluding that it was not bound by the New Mexico Supreme Court's holding in DeVargas.
III
A federal cause of action "brought at any distance of time" would be "utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws." Adams v. Woods, 2 Cranch 336, 342 (1805). Just determinations of fact cannot be made when, because of the passage of time, the memories of witnesses have faded or evidence is lost. In compelling circumstances, even wrongdoers are entitled to assume that their sins may be forgotten.
The borrowing of statutes of limitations for ยง 1983 claims serves these policies of repose. Of course, the application of any statute of limitations would promote repose. By adopting the statute governing an analogous cause of action under state law, federal law incorporates the State's judgment on the proper balance between the policies of repose and the substantive policies of enforcement embodied in the state cause of action. However, when the federal claim differs from the state cause of action in fundamental respects, the State's choice of a specific period of limitation is, at best, only a rough approximation of "the point at which the interests in favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones." Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454, 463-464 (1975).
Thus, in considering whether all ยง 1983 claims should be characterized in the same way for limitations purposes, it is useful to recall that ยง 1983 provides "a uniquely federal remedy *272 against incursions under the claimed authority of state law upon rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the Nation." Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 239 (1972). The high purposes of this unique remedy make it appropriate to accord the statute "a sweep as broad as its language."[23] Because the ยง 1983 remedy is one that can "override certain kinds of state laws," Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 173 (1961), and is, in all events, "supplementary to any remedy any State might have," McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668, 672 (1963), it can have no precise counterpart in state law. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S., at 196, n. 5 (Harlan, J., concurring). Therefore, it is "the purest coincidence," ibid., when state statutes or the common law provide for equivalent remedies; any analogies to those causes of action are bound to be imperfect.[24]
In this light, practical considerations help to explain why a simple, broad characterization of all ยง 1983 claims best fits the statute's remedial purpose. The experience of the courts that have predicated their choice of the correct statute of limitations on an analysis of the particular facts of each claim demonstrates that their approach inevitably breeds uncertainty and time-consuming litigation that is foreign to the central purposes of ยง 1983.[25] Almost every ยง 1983 claim can be favorably analogized to more than one of the ancient *273 common-law forms of action, each of which may be governed by a different statute of limitations. In the case before us, for example, the respondent alleges that he was injured by a New Mexico State Police officer who used excessive force to carry out an unlawful arrest. This ยง 1983 claim is arguably analogous to distinct state tort claims for false arrest, assault and battery, or personal injuries. Moreover, the claim could also be characterized as one arising under a statute, or as governed by the special New Mexico statute authorizing recovery against the State for the torts of its agents.
A catalog of other constitutional claims that have been alleged under ยง 1983 would encompass numerous and diverse topics and subtopics: discrimination in public employment on the basis of race or the exercise of First Amendment rights,[26] discharge or demotion without procedural due process,[27] mistreatment of schoolchildren,[28] deliberate indifference to the medical needs of prison inmates,[29] the seizure of chattels without advance notice or sufficient opportunity to be heard[30] ย to identify only a few.[31] If the choice of the statute *274 of limitations were to depend upon the particular facts or the precise legal theory of each claim, counsel could almost always argue, with considerable force, that two or more periods of limitations should apply to each ยง 1983 claim. Moreover, under such an approach different statutes of limitations would be applied to the various ยง 1983 claims arising in the same State,[32] and multiple periods of limitations would often apply to the same case.[33] There is no reason to believe *275 that Congress would have sanctioned this interpretation of its statute.
When ยง 1983 was enacted, it is unlikely that Congress actually foresaw the wide diversity of claims that the new remedy would ultimately embrace. The simplicity of the admonition in ยง 1988 is consistent with the assumption that Congress intended the identification of the appropriate statute of limitations to be an uncomplicated task for judges, lawyers, and litigants, rather than a source of uncertainty, and unproductive and ever-increasing litigation. Moreover, the legislative purpose to create an effective remedy for the enforcement of federal civil rights is obstructed by uncertainty in the applicable statute of limitations, for scarce resources must be dissipated by useless litigation on collateral matters.[34]
Although the need for national uniformity "has not been held to warrant the displacement of state statutes of limitations for civil rights actions," Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U. S., at 489, uniformity within each State is entirely consistent with the borrowing principle contained in ยง 1988.[35] We conclude that the statute is fairly construed as a directive to select, in each State, the one most appropriate statute of limitations for all ยง 1983 claims. The federal interests in uniformity, certainty, and the minimization of unnecessary litigation all support the conclusion that Congress favored this simple approach.
*276 IV
After exhaustively reviewing the different ways that ยง 1983 claims have been characterized in every Federal Circuit, the Court of Appeals concluded that the tort action for the recovery of damages for personal injuries is the best alternative available. 731 F. 2d, at 650-651. We agree that this choice is supported by the nature of the ยง 1983 remedy, and by the federal interest in ensuring that the borrowed period of limitations not discriminate against the federal civil rights remedy.
The specific historical catalyst for the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was the campaign of violence and deception in the South, fomented by the Ku Klux Klan, which was denying decent citizens their civil and political rights. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U. S. 325, 336-340 (1983). The debates on the Act chronicle the alarming insecurity of life, liberty, and property in the Southern States, and the refuge that local authorities extended to the authors of these outrageous incidents:
"While murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while whippings and lynchings and banishing have been visited upon unoffending American citizens, the local administrations have been found inadequate or unwilling to apply the proper corrective. Combinations, darker than the night that hides them, conspiracies, wicked as the worst of felons could devise, have gone unwhipped of justice. Immunity is given to crime, and the records of public tribunals are searched in vain for any evidence of effective redress." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong, 1st Sess., 374 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Lowe).[36]
*277 By providing a remedy for the violation of constitutional rights, Congress hoped to restore peace and justice to the region through the subtle power of civil enforcement.
The atrocities that concerned Congress in 1871 plainly sounded in tort. Relying on this premise we have found tort analogies compelling in establishing the elements of a cause of action under ยง 1983, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S., at 187, and in identifying the immunities available to defendants, Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U. S., at 330; City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U. S. 247, 258 (1981); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 553-557 (1967). As we have noted, however, the ยง 1983 remedy encompasses a broad range of potential tort analogies, from injuries to property to infringements of individual liberty.
Among the potential analogies, Congress unquestionably would have considered the remedies established in the Civil Rights Act to be more analogous to tort claims for personal injury than, for example, to claims for damages to property or breach of contract. The unifying theme of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 is reflected in the language of the Fourteenth Amendment[37] that unequivocally recognizes the equal status of every "person" subject to the jurisdiction of any of the several States. The Constitution's command is that all "persons" shall be accorded the full privileges of citizenship; no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or be denied the equal protection of the laws. A violation of that command is an injury to the individual rights of the person.
*278 Relying on the language of the statute, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has succinctly explained why this analogy is persuasive:
"In essence, ยง 1983 creates a cause of action where there has been injury, under color of state law, to the person or to the constitutional or federal statutory rights which emanate from or are guaranteed to the person. In the broad sense, every cause of action under ยง 1983 which is well-founded results from `personal injuries.' " Almond v. Kent, 459 F. 2d 200, 204 (1972).[38]
Had the 42d Congress expressly focused on the issue decided today, we believe it would have characterized ยง 1983 as conferring a general remedy for injuries to personal rights.
The relative scarcity of statutory claims when ยง 1983 was enacted makes it unlikely that Congress would have intended to apply the catchall periods of limitations for statutory claims that were later enacted by many States. Section 1983, of course, is a statute, but it only provides a remedy and does not itself create any substantive rights. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600, 617-618 (1979). Although a few ยง 1983 claims are based on statutory rights, Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1, 4-8 (1980), most involve much more. The rights enforceable under ยง 1983 include those guaranteed by the Federal Government in the Fourteenth Amendment: that every person within the United States is entitled to equal protection of the laws and to those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice" that are contained in the Bill of Rights and "lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions."[39] These guarantees of *279 liberty are among the rights possessed by every individual in a civilized society, and not privileges extended to the people by the legislature.[40]
Finally, we are satisfied that Congress would not have characterized ยง 1983 as providing a cause of action analogous to state remedies for wrongs committed by public officials. It was the very ineffectiveness of state remedies that led Congress to enact the Civil Rights Acts in the first place.[41] Congress therefore intended that the remedy provided in ยง 1983 be independently enforceable whether or not it duplicates a parallel state remedy. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S., at 173. The characterization of all ยง 1983 actions as involving claims for personal injuries minimizes the risk that the choice of a state statute of limitations would not fairly serve the federal interests vindicated by ยง 1983. General personal injury actions, sounding in tort, constitute a major part of the total volume of civil litigation in the state courts today,[42] and probably did so in 1871 when ยง 1983 was enacted. It is most unlikely that the period of limitations applicable to such claims ever was, or ever would be, fixed in a way that would discriminate against federal claims, or be inconsistent with federal law in any respect.
*280 V
In view of our holding that ยง 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury actions, the Court of Appeals correctly applied the 3-year statute of limitations governing actions "for an injury to the person or reputation of any person." N. M. Stat. Ann. ยง 37-1-8 (1978). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting.
Citing "practical considerations," the Court today decides to jettison a rule of venerable application and adopt instead one "simple, broad characterization of all ยง 1983 claims." Ante, at 272. Characterization of ยง 1983 claims is, I agree, a matter of federal law. But I see no justification, given our longstanding interpretation of 42 U. S. C. ยง 1988 and Congress' awareness of it, for abandoning the rule that courts must identify and apply the statute of limitations of the state claim most closely analogous to the particular ยง 1983 claim. In declaring that all ยง 1983 claims, regardless of differences in their essential characteristics, shall be considered most closely analogous to one narrow class of tort, the Court, though purporting to conform to the letter of ยง 1988, abandons the policies ยง 1988 embodies. I respectfully dissent.
I
The rule that a federal court adjudicating rights under ยง 1983 will adopt the state statute of limitations of the most closely analogous state-law claim traces its lineage to M'Cluny v. Silliman, 3 Pet. 270 (1830), Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U. S. 610 (1895), and O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U. S. 318 (1914). These opinions held that where "Congress . . . could have, by specific provision, prescribed a limitation, but no specific provision [was] adduced," O'Sullivan v. Felix, *281 supra, at 322, "Congress . . . intended to subject such action to the general laws of the State applicable to actions of a similar nature" and "intended that the remedy should be enforced in the manner common to like actions within the same jurisdiction," Campbell v. Haverhill, supra, at 616. With respect to the borrowing of state law in ยง 1983 claims, Congress explicitly provided that, absent a suitable federal law provision,
"the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction . . . is held . . . shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause." 42 U. S. C. ยง 1988.
This Court has consistently interpreted ยง 1988 as instructing that the rule applicable to the analogous state claim shall furnish the rule of decision "so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws of the United States." Ibid. See, e. g., Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U. S. 478 (1980); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U. S. 584 (1978); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454 (1975). Cf. Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U. S. 696 (1966).
In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, supra, the Court described the policies behind Congress' decision to borrow the most appropriate state limitations period:
"Although any statute of limitations is necessarily arbitrary, the length of the period allowed for instituting suit inevitably reflects a value judgment concerning the point at which the interests in favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting prosecution of stale ones. . . . In borrowing a state period of limitation for application to a federal cause of action, a federal court is relying on the State's wisdom in setting a limit . . . on the prosecution of a closely analogous claim." 421 U. S., at 463-464.
*282 See also Board of Regents v. Tomanio, supra; Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351, 360 (1828) (Story, J.) (statutes of limitations guard against "stale demands, after the true state of the transaction may have been forgotten"). Plainly the legislative judgment to which this Court has traditionally deferred is not some purely arbitrary imposition of a conveniently uniform time limit. For example, a legislature's selection of differing limitations periods for a claim sounding in defamation and one based on a written contract is grounded in its evaluation of the characteristics of those claims relevant to the realistic life expectancy of the evidence and the adversary's reasonable expectations of repose. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U. S. 111, 117 (1979); Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 U. S. 424, 426-427 (1965). See, e. g., 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, vol. covering ยงยง 101-1700, 1981), pp. xvi-xvii (limitations periods revised "to conform to the modern principle that claims based on conduct, and hence heavily relying on unwritten evidence, bring them to trial . . . before memories have faded").
Despite vocal criticism of the "confusion" created by individualized statutes of limitations, most Federal Courts of Appeals and state courts have continued the settled practice of seeking appropriate factual analogies for each genus of ยง 1983 claim. See, e. g., Gashgai v. Leibowitz, 703 F. 2d 10 (CA1 1983); McClam v. Barry, 225 U. S. App. D. C. 124, 697 F. 2d 366 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Brown v. United States, 239 U. S. App. D. C. 345, 742 F. 2d 1498 (1984); Blake v. Katter, 693 F. 2d 677 (CA7 1982); White v. United Parcel Service, 692 F. 2d 1 (CA5 1982); Kilgore v. City of Mansfield, Ohio, 679 F. 2d 632 (CA6 1982); Polite v. Diehl, 507 F. 2d 119 (CA3 1974) (en banc); Miller v. City of Overland Park, 231 Kan. 557, 646 P. 2d 1114 (1982); Sena School Bus Co. v. Santa Fe Board of Education, 677 P. 2d 639 (N. M. App. 1984); Arquette v. Hancock, 656 S. W. 2d 627 (Tex. App. 1983); Moore v. McComsey, 313 Pa. Super. *283 264, 459 A. 2d 841 (1983); Leese v. Doe, 182 N. J. Super, 318, 440 A. 2d 1166 (1981). As these courts have recognized:
"The variety of possible claims that might be brought under section 1983 is unlimited, ranging from simple police brutality to school desegregation cases. To impose one statute of limitations for actions so diverse would be to disregard the unanimous judgments of the states that periods of limitations should vary with the subject matter of the claim. While the present system of reference to these many state limits is not perfect in operation, it surely preserves some of the judgments that have been made about what appropriate periods of limitation should be for causes of action diverse in nature." Note, Choice of Law Under Section 1983, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 494, 504 (1970).
II
The majority concedes that "[b]y adopting the statute governing an analogous cause of action under state law, federal law incorporates the State's judgment on the proper balance between the policies of repose and the substantive policies of enforcement embodied in the state cause of action." Ante, at 271. Yet the Court posits, without any serious attempt at explanation, that a ยง 1983 claim differs so fundamentally from a state-law cause of action that "any analogies to those causes of action are bound to be imperfect." Ante, at 272. The only fundamental differences the Court identifies ย ยง 1983's "uniqueness," its "high purposes," its "supplementary" nature ย in no way explain the determination that a single inflexible analogy should govern what the Court concedes is the "wide diversity" of claims the ยง 1983 remedy embraces. Ante, at 275.
Thus with hardly a backward look, the majority leaves behind a century of precedent. See, e. g., Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U. S. 610 (1895). Inspired by "the federal interests in uniformity, certainty, and the minimization of unnecessary *284 litigation," the Court suddenly discovers that ยง 1988 "is fairly construed as a directive to select, in each State, the one most appropriate statute of limitations for all ยง 1983 claims." Ante, at 275. This fact, of course, escaped the drafters of the Civil Rights Acts, who referred the courts only to general state-law principles. Groping to discern what the 42d Congress would have done had it "expressly focused on the issue decided today," the Court "believes" that "the 42d Congress. . . would have characterized ยง 1983 as conferring a general remedy for injuries to personal rights." Ante, at 278.
The Court's all-purpose analogy is appealing; after all, every compensable injury, whether to constitutional or statutory rights, through violence, deception, or broken promises, to the person's pocketbook, person, or dignity, might plausibly be described as a "personal injury." But so sweeping an analogy is no analogy at all. In all candor, the Court has perceived a need for uniformity and has simply seized the opportunity to legislate it. The Court takes this step even though a number of bills proposed to recent Congresses to standardize ยง 1983 limitations periods have failed of enactment, see, e. g., S. 436, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 1983, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H. R. 12874, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), a fact that the Court would normally interpret as a persuasive indication that Congress does not agree that concerns for uniformity dictate a unitary rule. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U. S. 555, 565 (1980) ("[C]aution must temper judicial creativity in the face of . . . legislative silence"); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U. S., at 593, and n. 11; Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U. S., at 704.
As well as co-opting federal legislation, the Court's decision effectively forecloses legislative creativity on the part of the States. Were a State now to formulate a detailed statutory scheme setting individualized limitations periods for various ยง 1983 claims, drawing upon policies regarding the timeliness of suits for assault, libel, written contract, em