509 U.S. 502 (1993)

ST. MARY'S HONOR CENTER et al.
v.
HICKS

No. 92-602.

United States Supreme Court.

Argued April 20, 1993. Decided June 25, 1993. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

*504 Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which White, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 525.

Gary L. Gardner, Assistant Attorney General of Missouri, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Jeremiah W. Nixon, Attorney General, and Don M. Downing, Deputy Attorney General.

Charles R. Oldham argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Elaine R. Jones, Charles Stephen Ralston, Eric Schnapper, and Louis Gilden.

Edward C. DuMont argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Turner, Edwin S. Kneedler, *504 David K. Flynn, Rebecca K. Troth, Donald R. Livingston, and Gwendolyn Young Reams.^[*]

Justice Scalia, delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to determine whether, in a suit against an employer alleging intentional racial discrimination in violation of § 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 255, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), the trier of fact's rejection of the employer's asserted reasons for its actions mandates a finding for the plaintiff.

I

Petitioner St. Mary's Honor Center (St. Mary's) is a halfway house operated by the Missouri Department of Corrections and Human Resources (MDCHR). Respondent Melvin Hicks, a black man, was hired as a correctional officer at St. Mary's in August 1978 and was promoted to shift commander, one of six supervisory positions, in February 1980.

In 1983 MDCHR conducted an investigation of the administration of St. Mary's, which resulted in extensive supervisory changes in January 1984. Respondent retained his position, but John Powell became the new chief of custody (respondent's immediate supervisor) and petitioner Steve *505 Long the new superintendent. Prior to these personnel changes respondent had enjoyed a satisfactory employment record, but soon thereafter became the subject of repeated, and increasingly severe, disciplinary actions. He was suspended for five days for violations of institutional rules by his subordinates on March 3, 1984. He received a letter of reprimand for alleged failure to conduct an adequate investigation of a brawl between inmates that occurred during his shift on March 21. He was later demoted from shift commander to correctional officer for his failure to ensure that his subordinates entered their use of a St. Mary's vehicle into the official logbook on March 19, 1984. Finally, on June 7, 1984, he was discharged for threatening Powell during an exchange of heated words on April 19.

Respondent brought this suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, alleging that petitioner St. Mary's violated § 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and that petitioner Long violated Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, by demoting and then discharging him because of his race. After a full bench trial, the District Court found for petitioners. 756 F. Supp. 1244 (ED Mo. 1991). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, 970 F. 2d 487 (1992), and we granted certiorari, 506 U. S. 1042 (1993).

II

Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides in relevant part:

"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—

"(1) . . . to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race . . . ." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a). *506 With the goal of "progressively . . . sharpen[ing] the inquiry into theelusive factual question of intentional discrimination," Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v.Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 255, n. 8 (1981), our opinion in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), established an allocation of the burden of production and an order for the presentation of proof in Title VII discriminatory-treatment cases.^[1] The plaintiffin such a case, we said, must first establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, a "prima facie" case of racial discrimination. Burdine, supra, at 252-253. Petitioners do not challenge the District Court's finding that respondent satisfied the minimal requirements of such a prima facie case (set out in McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 802) by proving (1) that he is black, (2) that he was qualified for the position of shift commander, (3) that he was demoted from that position and ultimately discharged, and (4) that the position remained open and was ultimately filled by a white man. 756 F. Supp., at 1249-1250.

Under the McDonnell Douglas scheme, "[e]stablishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee." Burdine, supra, at 254. To establish a "presumption" is to say that a finding of the predicate fact (here, the prima facie case) produces "a required conclusion in the absence of explanation" (here, the finding of unlawful discrimination). 1 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 67, p. 536 (1977). Thus, the McDonnell Douglas presumption places upon the defendant the burden of producing an explanation *507 to rebut the prima facie case—i. e., the burden of "producing evidence" that the adverse employment actions were taken "for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason." Burdine, 450 U. S., at 254. "[T]he defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence," reasons for its actions which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action. Id., at 254-255, and n. 8. It is important to note, however, that although the McDonnell Douglas presumption shifts the burden of production to the defendant, "[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." 450 U. S., at 253. In this regard it operates like all presumptions, as described in Federal Rule of Evidence 301:

"In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast." Respondent does not challenge the District Court's finding that petitioners sustained their burden of production by introducing evidence of two legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions: the severity and the accumulation of rules violations committed by respondent. 756 F. Supp., at 1250. Our cases make clear that at that point the shifted burden of production became irrelevant: "If the defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted," Burdine, 450 U. S., at 255, and "drops from the case," id., at 255, n. 10. The plaintiff then has "the full and fair opportunity to demonstrate," *508 through presentation of his own case and through crossexamination of the defendant's witnesses, "that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision," id., at 256, and that race was. He retains that "ultimate burden of persuading the [trier of fact] that [he] has been the victim of intentional discrimination." Ibid.

The District Court, acting as trier of fact in this bench trial, found that the reasons petitioners gave were not the real reasons for respondent's demotion and discharge. It found that respondent was the only supervisor disciplined for violations committed by his subordinates; that similar and even more serious violations committed by respondent's co-workers were either disregarded or treated more leniently; and that Powell manufactured the final verbal confrontation in order to provoke respondent into threatening him. 756 F. Supp., at 1250-1251. It nonetheless held that respondent had failed to carry his ultimate burden of proving that his race was the determining factor in petitioners' decision first to demote and then to dismiss him.^[2] In short, the District Court concluded that "although [respondent] has proven the existence of a crusade to terminate him, he has not proven that the crusade was racially rather than personally motivated." Id., at 1252.

The Court of Appeals set this determination aside on the ground that "[o]nce [respondent] proved all of [petitioners'] proffered reasons for the adverse employment actions to be pretextual, [respondent] was entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 970 F. 2d, at 492. The Court of Appeals reasoned:

*509 "Because all of defendants' proffered reasons were discredited, defendants were in a position of having offered no legitimate reason for their actions. In other words, defendants were in no better position than if they had remained silent, offering no rebuttal to an established inference that they had unlawfully discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of his race." Ibid.

That is not so. By producing evidence (whether ultimately persuasive or not) of nondiscriminatory reasons, petitioners sustained their burden of production, and thus placed themselves in a "better position than if they had remained silent."

In the nature of things, the determination that a defendant has met its burden of production (and has thus rebutted any legal presumption of intentional discrimination) can involve no credibility assessment. For the burden-of-production determination necessarily precedes the credibility-assessment stage. At the close of the defendant's case, the court is asked to decide whether an issue of fact remains for the trier of fact to determine. None does if, on the evidence presented, (1) any rational person would have to find the existence of facts constituting a prima facie case, and (2) the defendant has failed to meet its burden of production—i. e., has failed to introduce evidence which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. In that event, the court must award judgment to the plaintiff as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a)(1) (in the case of jury trials) or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c) (in the case of bench trials). See F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure § 7.9, p. 327 (3d ed. 1985); 1 Louisell & Mueller, Federal Evidence § 70, at 568. If the defendant has failed to sustain its burden but reasonable minds could differ as to whether a preponderance of the evidence establishes the facts of a prima facie *510 case, then a question of fact does remain, which the trier of fact will be called upon to answer.^[3]

If, on the other hand, the defendant has succeeded in carrying its burden of production, the McDonnell Douglas framework—with its presumptions and burdens—is no longer relevant. To resurrect it later, after the trier of fact has determined that what was "produced" to meet the burden of production is not credible, flies in the face of our holding in Burdine that to rebut the presumption "[t]he defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons." 450 U. S., at 254. The presumption, having fulfilled its role of forcing the defendant *511 to come forward with some response, simply drops out of the picture. Id., at 255. The defendant's "production" (whatever its persuasive effect) having been made, the trier of fact proceeds to decide the ultimate question: whether plaintiff has proved "that the defendant intentionally discriminated against [him]" because of his race, id., at 253. The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination,^[4] and the Court of Appeals was correct when it noted that, upon such rejection, "[n]o additional proof of discrimination is required, " 970 F. 2d, at 493 (emphasis added). But the Court of Appeals' holding that rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons compels judgment for the plaintiff disregards the fundamental principle of Rule 301 that a presumption does not shift the burden of proof, and ignores our repeated admonition that the Title VII plaintiff at all times bears the "ultimate burden of persuasion." See, e. g., Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711, 716 (1983) (citing Burdine, supra, at 256); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 187 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228, 245-246 (1989) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.); id., at 260 (White, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 270 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); *512 id., at 286-288 (Kennedy, J., joined by The Chief Justice and Scalia, J., dissenting); Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U. S. 867, 875 (1984); cf. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U. S. 642, 659-660 (1989); id., at 668 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U. S. 977, 986 (1988).

III

Only one unfamiliar with our case law will be upset by the dissent's alarum that we are today setting aside "settled precedent," post, at 525, "two decades of stable law in this Court," ibid., "a framework carefully crafted in precedents as old as 20 years," post, at 540, which "Congress is [aware]" of and has implicitly approved, post, at 542. Panic will certainly not break out among the courts of appeals, whose divergent views concerning the nature of the supposedly "stable law in this Court" are precisely what prompted us to take this case—a divergence in which the dissent's version of "settled precedent" cannot remotely be considered the "prevailing view." Compare, e. g., EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F. 2d 1312, 1321 (CA10 1992) (finding of pretext does not mandate finding of illegal discrimination); Galbraith v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 944 F. 2d 275, 282-283 (CA6 1991) (same) (opinion of Boggs, J.), cert. denied, 503 U. S. 945 (1992); 944 F. 2d, at 283 (same) (opinion of Guy, J., concurring in result); Samuels v. Raytheon Corp., 934 F. 2d 388, 392 (CA1 1991) (same); Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F. 2d 823, 827-828 (CA4 1989) (same); Benzies v. Illinois Dept. of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, 810 F. 2d 146, 148 (CA7) (same) (dictum), cert. denied, 483 U. S. 1006 (1987); Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. of Ed., 717 F. 2d 525, 529 (CA11 1983) (same) (dictum), with Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Center, 970 F. 2d, at 492-493 (case below) (finding of pretext mandates finding of illegal discrimination), cert. granted, 506 U. S. 1042 (1993); Tye v. Board of Ed. of Polaris Joint Vocational School Dist., 811 F. 2d 315, 320 (CA6) (same), cert. *513 denied, 484 U. S. 924 (1987); King v. Palmer, 250 U. S. App. D. C. 257, 260, 778 F. 2d 878, 881 (1985) (same); Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F. 2d 1393, 1395-1396 (CA3) (same), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1087 (1984); Lopez v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 930 F. 2d 157, 161 (CA2) (same) (dictum), cert. denied, 502 U. S. 880 (1991); Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 904 F. 2d 1549, 1554 (CA11 1990) (same) (dictum); Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R. Co., 760 F. 2d 633, 639-640, 646-647 (CA5 1985) (same) (dictum). We mean to answer the dissent's accusations in detail, by examining our cases, but at the outset it is worth noting the utter implausibility that we would ever have held what the dissent says we held.

As we have described, Title VII renders it unlawful "for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e2(a)(1). Here (in the context of the now-permissible jury trials for Title VII causes of action) is what the dissent asserts we have held to be a proper assessment of liability for violation of this law: Assume that 40% of a business' work force are members of a particular minority group, a group which comprises only 10% of the relevant labor market. An applicant, who is a member of that group, applies for an opening for which he is minimally qualified, but is rejected by a hiring officer of that same minority group, and the search to fill the opening continues. The rejected applicant files suit for racial discrimination under Title VII, and before the suit comes to trial, the supervisor who conducted the company's hiring is fired. Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff has a prima facie case, see 411 U. S., at 802, and under the dissent's interpretation of our law not only must the company come forward with some explanation for the refusal to hire (which it will have to try to confirm out of the *514 mouth of its now antagonistic former employee), but the jury must be instructed that, if they find that explanation to be incorrect, they must assess damages against the company, whether or not they believe the company was guilty of racial discrimination. The disproportionate minority makeup of the company's work force and the fact that its hiring officer was of the same minority group as the plaintiff will be irrelevant, because the plaintiff's case can be proved "indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."^[5] 450 U. S., at 256. Surely nothing short of inescapable prior holdings (the dissent does not pretend there are any) should make one assume that this is the law we have created.

We have no authority to impose liability upon an employer for alleged discriminatory employment practices unless an appropriate factfinder determines, according to proper procedures, that the employer has unlawfully discriminated. We may, according to traditional practice, establish certain modes and orders of proof, including an initial rebuttable presumption of the sort we described earlier in this opinion, which we believe McDonnell Douglas represents. But nothing in law would permit us to substitute for the required finding that the employer's action was the product of unlawful discrimination, the much different (and much lesser) finding *515 that the employer's explanation of its action was not believable. The dissent's position amounts to precisely this, unless what is required to establish the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is a degree of proof so high that it would, in absence of rebuttal, require a directed verdict for the plaintiff (for in that case proving the employer's rebuttal noncredible would leave the plaintiff's directed-verdict case in place, and compel a judgment in his favor). Quite obviously, however, what is required to establish the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is infinitely less than what a directed verdict demands. The dissent is thus left with a position that has no support in the statute, no support in the reason of the matter, no support in any holding of this Court (that is not even contended), and support, if at all, only in the dicta of this Court's opinions. It is to those that we now turn—begrudgingly, since we think it generally undesirable, where holdings of the Court are not at issue, to dissect the sentences of the United States Reports as though they were the United States Code.

The principal case on which the dissent relies is Burdine. While there are some statements in that opinion that could be read to support the dissent's position, all but one of them bear a meaning consistent with our interpretation, and the one exception is simply incompatible with other language in the case. Burdine describes the situation that obtains after the employer has met its burden of adducing a nondiscriminatory reason as follows: "Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." 450 U. S., at 253. The dissent takes this to mean that if the plaintiff proves the asserted reason to be false, the plaintiff wins. But a reason cannot be proved to be "a pretext for discrimination " unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason. Burdine `s later allusions to *516 proving or demonstrating simply "pretext," e. g., id., at 258, are reasonably understood to refer to the previously described pretext, i. e., "pretext for discrimination."^[6]

Burdine also says that when the employer has met its burden of production "the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity." Id., at 255. The dissent takes this to mean that the factual inquiry reduces to whether the employer's asserted reason is true or false—if false, the defendant loses. But the "new level of specificity" may also (as we believe) refer to the fact that the inquiry now turns from the few generalized factors that establish a prima facie case to the specific proofs and rebuttals of discriminatory motivation the parties have introduced.

In the next sentence, Burdine says that "[p]lacing this burden of production on the defendant thus serves . . . to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext." Id., at 255-256. The dissent thinks this means that the only factual issue remaining in the case is whether the employer's reason is false. But since in our view "pretext" means "pretext for discrimination," we think the sentence must be understood as addressing the form rather than the substance of the defendant's production burden: The requirement that the employer "clearly set forth" its reasons, id., at 255, gives the plaintiff a "full and fair" rebuttal opportunity.

A few sentences later, Burdine says: "[The plaintiff] now must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision. This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional *517 discrimination." Id., at 256. The dissent takes this "merger" to mean that "the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination" is replaced by the mere burden of "demonstrat[ing] that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision." But that would be a merger in which the little fish swallows the big one. Surely a more reasonable reading is that proving the employer's reason false becomes part of (and often considerably assists) the greater enterprise of proving that the real reason was intentional discrimination.

Finally, in the next sentence Burdine says: "[The plaintiff] may succeed in this [i. e., in persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination] either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U. S., at 804-805." Ibid. We must agree with the dissent on this one: The words bear no other meaning but that the falsity of the employer's explanation is alone enough to compel judgment for the plaintiff. The problem is that that dictum contradicts or renders inexplicable numerous other statements, both in Burdine itself and in our later case law—commencing with the very citation of authority Burdine uses to support the proposition. McDonnell Douglas does not say, at the cited pages or elsewhere, that all the plaintiff need do is disprove the employer's asserted reason. In fact, it says just the opposite: "[O]n the retrial respondent must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision. " 411 U. S., at 805 (emphasis added). "We . . . insist that respondent under § 703(a)(1) must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that whatever the stated reasons for his rejection, the decision was in reality *518 racially premised. " Id., at 805, n. 18 (emphasis added). The statement in question also contradicts Burdine `s repeated assurance (indeed, its holding) regarding the burden of persuasion: "The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." 450 U. S., at 253. "The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion." Id., at 256.<sup>[7]</sup> And lastly, the statement renders inexplicable Burdine `s explicit reliance, in describing the shifting burdens of McDonnell Douglas, upon authorities setting forth the classic law of presumptions we have described earlier, including Wigmore's Evidence, 450 U. S., at 253, 254, n. 7, 255, n. 8, James' and Hazard's Civil Procedure, id., at 255, n. 8, Federal Rule of Evidence 301, ibid., Maguire's Evidence, Common Sense and Common Law, ibid., and Thayer's Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, id., at 255, n. 10. In light of these inconsistencies, we think that the dictum at issue here must be regarded as an inadvertence, to the extent that it describes disproof of the defendant's reason as a totally independent, rather than an auxiliary, means of proving unlawful intent.

In sum, our interpretation of Burdine creates difficulty with one sentence; the dissent's interpretation causes many portions of the opinion to be incomprehensible or deceptive. But whatever doubt Burdine might have created was eliminated by Aikens. There we said, in language that cannot reasonably be mistaken, that "the ultimate question [is] discrimination vel non. " 460 U. S., at 714. Once the defendant *519 "responds to the plaintiff's proof by offering evidence of the reason for the plaintiff's rejection, the factfinder must then decide" not (as the dissent would have it) whether that evidence is credible, but "whether the rejection was discriminatory within the meaning of Title VII." Id., at 714-715. At that stage, we said, "[t]he District Court was . . . in a position to decide the ultimate factual issue in the case," which is "whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff." Id., at 715 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). The McDonnell Douglas methodology was "`never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.' " 460 U. S., at 715 (quoting Furnco, 438 U. S., at 577). Rather, once the defendant has responded to the plaintiff's prima facie case, "[t]he district court has before it all the evidence it needs to decide" not (as the dissent would have it) whether defendant's response is credible, but "whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff." 460 U. S., at 715 (internal quotation marks omitted). "On the state of the record at the close of the evidence, the District Court in this case should have proceeded to this specific question directly, just as district courts decide disputed questions of fact in other civil litigation." Id., at 715-716. In confirmation of this (rather than in contradiction of it), the Court then quotes the problematic passage from Burdine, which says that the plaintiff may carry her burden either directly "`or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.' " 460 U. S., at 716. It then characterizes that passage as follows: "In short, the district court must decide which party's explanation of the employer's motivation it believes." Ibid. It is not enough, in other words, to dis believe the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimination. It is noteworthy that Justice Blackmun, although joining the Court's opinion in Aikens, wrote a separate concurrence for the sole purpose of saying that