Konno v. County of Hawai'i

The central issue addressed in these cases 1 is the privatization of public services. The United Public Workers and its officers (collectively the UPW) challenge the validity of a contract entered into by the County of Hawai'i (the County) to privatize the operation of a landfill at Pu'uanahulu on the island of Hawai'i. In No. 18203, the UPW argues that the County violated civil service laws and merit principles by privatizing the landfill worker positions in question. In No. 18236, the UPW argues that the County violated collective bargaining laws by privatizing without participating in mandatory negotiations with the UPW. For the reasons discussed below, we hold that the County violated civil service laws and merit principles but did not violate collective bargaining laws. The contract between the County and Waste Management of Hawai'i, Inc. (WMI) is void as a violation of public policy to the extent that it provides for the private operation of the Pu'uanahulu landfill. We vacate the circuit court’s award of summary judgment in favor of the County in No. 18203 and remand for entry of summary judgment in favor of the UPW. We instruct the circuit court to grant the UPW a declaratory judgment. We further instruct the circuit court to fashion injunctive relief requiring the landfill to be transferred from private operation to County operation as rapidly as possible but consistent with practical and public interest concerns. The circuit court shall also monitor the transition and may impose sanctions for non-compliance. Finally, the circuit court is to determine whether the additional relief requested by the UPW is appropriate. We affirm the circuit court’s judgment in No. 18236.

I. FACTS

A. Common Fads

Prior to the events at issue in this opinion, the County owned and operated two landfills *65 on the island of Hawai'i: one in Kealakehe, Kona, and the other in Hilo. The Department of Public Works employed thirty-eight workers, consisting of equipment operators, landfill attendants, and transfer station attendants, to operate the landfills. These workers were traditionally recruited and employed through the merit system pursuant to civil service laws. The UPW is a labor union and has long been the exclusive representative of landfill workers in the state of Ha-wai'i.

In 1991, Mayor Lorraine Inouye began to consider the possibility of having a private contractor construct and operate a new landfill at Pu'uanahulu. The new landfill would be a replacement for the Kealakehe landfill, which had reached capacity and was plagued by subterranean fires. Another concern was that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had issued new federal regulations on solid waste management that contained strict standards for landfill construction. Mayor Inouye met with UPW officials to discuss the privatization proposal. The UPW did not oppose the private construction of the new landfill but did strenuously object to the private operation of the landfill. In the summer of 1992, Mayor Inouye agreed not to privatize the operation of the landfill.

Subsequent to her decision not to privatize the landfill, Mayor Inouye won the endorsement of the UPW in the 1992 primary election. This was an extremely close race, and Mayor Inouye lost to Stephen Yamashiro by a thin margin. Shortly after assuming office in December 1992, Mayor Yamashiro announced that the County would be privatizing not only the construction of the Pu'uanahulu landfill, but its operation as well. In March 1993, bids were received from WMI and Browning Ferris Industries. On March 25, 1993, County officials informed WMI that the County intended to award WMI the contract.

County officials did not seek any form of certification from the county personnel director or the civil service commission that the landfill worker positions were unique or that they could not be filled through normal civil service procedures. Furthermore, May- or Yamashiro did not consider the decision to privatize the landfill to be subject to mandatory bargaining. The County did inform the UPW, in February 1993, that bids were being accepted from private contractors and also sent a letter to the UPW, on April 1, 1993, offering to “consult” with it. However, the UPW responded by demanding full “bargaining in good faith as required by law.” Mayor Yamashiro then refused the UPW’s demand for full bargaining.

A contract with WMI, dated April 21,1993, was executed by Mayor Yamashiro on April 30, 1993. Under the terms of the contract, WMI assumed responsibility for the construction, operation, and closure of the new landfill. The County was to pay WMI based on the amount of waste received. WMI also agreed to assume liability for claims arising from the landfill and to carry environmental and liability insurance.

Although the County refused to bargain with the UPW over the decision itself, by letter dated September 2, 1993, the County offered to bargain over the effects of privatization. There is no indication in the record that the UPW responded to the County’s offer.

Ten workers at the Kealakehe landfill were directly affected by the County’s privatization efforts. Workers at Kealakehe were given the option of relinquishing their civil service status and working for WMI at Pu'uanahulu or being reassigned to other civil service positions. The actual work performed by the workers at the new landfill is virtually identical to the work performed at the old landfill. The only difference is that equipment operators who formerly spent half their time trucking and half bulldozing waste now spend their entire time trucking waste.

B. No. 18203

On May 6,1993, the UPW filed a complaint in the Third Circuit Court, claiming, inter alia, that the County had violated constitutionally mandated merit principles and civil service statutes. The complaint requested damages, as well as declaratory and injunc-tive relief. WMI was subsequently allowed to intervene in the action. An amended complaint was filed on May 27, 1993, reasserting the above-mentioned claims. The County *66 moved for summary judgment on July 26, 1993. After holding hearings on August 4 and December 27, 1993, the circuit court granted the motion. In its order dated February 4,1994, the court ruled:

The contract with Waste Management Inc. is for disposal of solid waste and other services related to operation of Kona and Hilo landfills. Haw.Rev.Stat. § 46-85 authorizes such a contract. There will be no elimination of jobs currently held by civil servants, and thus there is no violation of Civil Service laws. The contract was legally executed in accordance with the Hawaii County Charter; specifically §§ 13-13 and 10-11. The motivation of Defendants in undertaking this contract is hotly challenged. However, this does not constitute a material fact in relation to the legal issues in this case. Therefore, there is no dispute of material facts and summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendants. This decision represents a ruling on the sole issue of the legality of the contract between the County of Hawaii and Waste Management.

The court entered final judgment on June 30, 1994. This timely appeal followed.

C. No. 18236

On May 4,1993, the UPW filed a prohibited practice complaint with the Hawaii Labor Relations Board (HLRB) against Mayor Ya-mashiro and other officials of Hawaii County (collectively the County). The HLRB allowed WMI to intervene on July 14, 1993. On September 7, 1993, the UPW filed an amended complaint containing the following claims: (1) Count I—that the County violated an agreement negotiated by former May- or Inouye that the County would not privatize operation of the new landfill; (2) Count II—that the County’s actions violated section 1.05 of the existing collective bargaining agreement; (3) Count III—that Mayor Ya-mashiro’s decision to privatize was in retaliation for the UPW’s support of former Mayor Inouye in the 1992 primary election; and (4) Count IV—that the County violated HRS § 89-13(a) in refusing to bargain with the UPW because privatization is subject to mandatory collective bargaining.

Hearings were held in Honolulu and Hilo from August 10 to September 28, 1993. On February 1, 1994, the HLRB delivered an extensive written decision. Regarding Count I of the amended complaint, the HLRB found that former Mayor Inouye had agreed with the UPW that she personally would not privatize the operation of the new landfill. However, the HLRB ruled that her actions did not constitute a negotiated settlement of a grievance or a mid-term agreement that was binding on the County. Therefore, the HLRB deemed Count I meritless.

As for Count II of the amended complaint, the HLRB ruled that section 1.05 of the collective bargaining agreement had not been violated. 2 The HLRB decided that the County had fulfilled its duty to consult over personnel policies, practices, and matters affecting working conditions when it informed the UPW, in February 1993, that it would be accepting bids from private contractors and when it offered to consult with the UPW in its letter dated April 1, 1993. The HLRB further decided that section 1.05 only requires mutual consent when contract provisions pertaining to wages, hours, and working conditions are altered and that privatization did not change these specific provisions. Therefore, the HLRB also determined that Count II was meritless.

As for Count III, the HLRB found that there was insufficient evidence to support the UPW’s allegations of political motivation. Accordingly, the HLRB ruled that the allegations were speculative and without merit.

Regarding Count IV, the HLRB noted that although all matters affecting wages, hours, and the terms and conditions of employment are subject to negotiation and bargaining, certain management rights enumer *67 ated in HRS § 89-9(d) are nonnegotiable. 3 The HLRB ruled that the decision to privatize the landfill at Pu'uanahulu was a valid exercise of management rights and was therefore not subject to mandatory bargaining. However, the HLRB went on to rule that the secondary impact of managerial decisions on conditions of employment must be negotiated before the decision may be implemented. The HLRB found that, although no employees were laid-off or transferred by the decision to privatize, there was a substantial impact on the terms and conditions of employment due to the loss of job opportunities (in the form of promotions, transfers, and temporary assignments for bargaining unit members) and the denial of the opportunity for bargaining unit expansion. Thus, the County was obligated to negotiate over the effects of the decision to privatize. Because the County refused to bargain over these effects, the HLRB ruled that the County had violated HRS § 89-13(a)(5). 4 The HLRB then ordered the parties to meet and bargain over the impact of the County’s decision to privatize. If the parties could not reach an agreement, the contract would be terminated and the County would assume full responsibility for the operation of the landfill.

The County filed a notice of appeal to the Third Circuit Court on February 8,1994, and the UPW filed a notice of cross-appeal on March 1,1994. Oral argument was heard on May 20, 1994. In its order dated July 5, 1994, the circuit court first ruled that the HLRB had erroneously allowed WMI to intervene in the ease when WMI was not a proper party; however, the court found that the substantial rights of the UPW had not been prejudiced by WMI’s intervention and that reversal was not justified on that basis. The court further ruled that the HLRB’s reasoning as to Counts I, II, and III of the amended complaint was sound and therefore affirmed the HLRB’s decision as to those counts.

As for Count IV, however, the court reversed the HLRB. The court held:

The Court finds, except as noted below, that the HLRB’s conclusions and determinations with regard to effects bargaining are clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. The reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record establishes that the UPW sought to have the County negotiate as to the decision to privatize and not its effects. The County’s beliefs as to non-negotiability went to the issue of decision bargaining, not effects bargaining. As set forth at page 23 of the HLRB Final Order, the County acknowledged a legal requirement to participate in effects bargaining, and Mr. [Michael] Ben[, Personnel Director for the County,] admitted that the effects of contracting out required consultation with the Union. There is no evidence to support a finding that the County ever refused after a request from the UPW to participate in effects bargaining. In fact, the evidence is that the County’s efforts to negotiate effects were rebuffed by the UPW. Thus, the HLRB’s decision that the County committed a prohibited practice is REVERSED and the entire “Order” of the HLRB set forth on page 32 of the HLRB Final Order is REVERSED.

The court entered final judgment on July 5, 1994. This timely appeal followed.

*68 II. DISCUSSION

A. Whether the County Violated Civil Service Laws and Merit Principles (No. 18203)

1. Background Information

Before addressing the County’s privatization effort in the present dispute, useful background information can be obtained by examining the pobcies behind privatization, the policies behind the civil service, and the approaches taken by other states.

The term “privatization” is a broad term that has been used to describe a wide range of activity. See generally Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 Marq. L.Rev. 449, 451 (1988). “Privatization refers to the shift from government provision of functions and services to provision by the private sector.” George L. Priest, Introduction: The Aims of Privatization, 6 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 1, 1 (1988). In countries other than the United States, privatization usually refers to the selling of government owned and operated businesses to private enterprise. Cass, supra, at 450. However, another type of privatization, which is at issue in the present dispute, is known as “contracting out.” This activity can be defined as “the transfer by governmental entities of responsibility for the performance of desired functions, mostly of a personal service (ie. administrative) nature, to private institutions” or “the replacement of members of [a] bargaining unit by the employees of an independent contractor performing the same work under similar conditions of employment.” Timothy P. Dowling, Note, Civil Service Restrictions on Contracting Out by State Agencies, 55 Wash. L.Rev. 419, 419 n.3 (1980).

The purported policy behind privatization is to increase governmental efficiency. Id. at 425-26. Services can often be provided more efficiently by private entities than by civil servants. Id. The productivity of civil servants can be enhanced in that the threat of privatization serves as an incentive to improve performance. Id. at 426. Privatization may also give public employers increased leverage in labor negotiations, thus avoiding costly labor disputes. Id.

In contrast to privatization, the purpose of the civil service is not just to foster efficiency but to implement other policies as well. Craig Becker, With Whose Hands: Privatization, Public Employment, and Democracy, 6 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 88, 94-99 (1988). One obvious policy is the elimination of the “spoils system,” which awarded jobs based on political loyalty. Id. at 95. The civil service also embodies positive principles of public administration such as openness, merit, and independence. Id. at 95-96. Openness is served through public announcement of job vacancies, clear articulation of qualifications, open application to all persons, and selection according to objective criteria. Id. at 96. Merit is served through a system of competitive examinations and qualification standards aimed at identifying competent candidates. Id. Independence is served through the job security provided by civil service laws; because civil servants can be terminated only for just cause, they are more likely to speak out against unlawful activities occurring in their agencies. Id. at 98. 5 Justice William *69 O. Douglas called the civil service system ‘“the one great political invention’ of nineteenth century democracy.” United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 121, 67 S.Ct. 556, 580, 91 L.Ed. 754 (1947) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (quoting G. Wallas, Human Nature in Politics 263 (2d ed.)).

Insofar as a job position that is privatized is, by definition, removed from the civil service system, there is a tension between privatization and the civil service. There are three basic approaches that other states have taken in dealing with this tension. See Becker, supra, at 99-103. The first approach has been called the “nature of the services” test. According to this approach, services that have been “customarily and historically provided by civil servants” cannot be privatized, absent a showing that civil servants cannot provide those services. Washington Fed’n of State Employees, AFL-CIO v. Spokane Community College, 90 Wash.2d 698, 585 P.2d 474, 477 (1978) (en banc). In Spokane, a state community college attempted to contract out custodial services for a new administration building. Id. 585 P.2d at 476. Custodial services had been historically provided by civil service employees of the college. Id. Despite the fact that the contract would have reduced the cost of custodial services sub-stantiaUy, the Washington Supreme Court held that the contract violated state civil service statutes. Id. The court noted that privatization contravenes the basic policy and purpose of the civil service statutes and held the contract to be void. Id. 585 P.2d at 476-77. See also State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Riley, 9 Cal.2d 126, 69 P.2d 985 (1937); Burum v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 30 Cal.2d 575, 184 P.2d 505 (1947); 6 Jack A. Parker & Assoc., Inc. v. State, 454 So.2d 162 (La.Ct.App.), cert. denied, 459 So.2d 538 (La.1984); Joint Crafts Council and Teamsters Union Local 117 v. King County, 76 Wash.App. 18, 881 P.2d 1059 (1994).

The second approach is known as the “functional inquiry” test. Under this test, the focus shifts from the type of services to be performed to the particular state program or function involved. New state programs performing new functions are not constrained by civil service laws. Thus, new programs may contract out services even if those services are of a type that can be performed by civil servants. See Department of Transp. v. Chavez, 7 Cal.App.4th 407, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 176 (1992); California State Employees’ Ass’n v. Williams, 7 Cal.App.3d 390, 86 Cal.Rptr. 305, reh’g denied, 86 Cal.Rptr. 312 (Cal.Ct.App.1970). 7

*70 The third approach can be called the “bad faith” test. Under this approach, privatization violates civil service laws only if the employer acts in “bad faith” or with intent to circumvent the civil service laws. This test reduces the protection of civil service laws to its narrowest degree. Under this approach, a public employer whose motive is economic efficiency is generally considered to act in “good faith.” However, efficiency is almost always the justification given for privatization. Therefore, civil service laws are effective against privatization only in the rare instances in which there is actual proof of improper intent/motive. See Ball v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges, 251 Md. 685, 248 A.2d 650 (1968); Michigan State Employees Ass’n v. Civil Service Comm’n, 141 Mich.App. 288, 367 N.W.2d 850 (1985); University of Nevada v. State Employees Ass’n, Inc. 90 Nev. 105, 520 P.2d 602 (1974); Collins v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth., 62 N.Y.2d 361, 477 N.Y.S.2d 91, 465 N.E.2d 811 (1984).

2. Analysis

Due to the procedural history of No. 18203, we apply the following standard of review:

We review [a] circuit court’s award of summary judgment de novo under the same standard applied by the circuit court. Amfac, Inc. v. Waikiki Beachcomber Inv. Co., 74 Haw. 85, 104, 839 P.2d 10, 22, reconsideration denied, 74 Haw. 650, 843 P.2d 144 (1992) (citation omitted). As we have often articulated:

[s]ummary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 56(c) (1990). “A fact is material if proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of a cause of action or defense asserted by the parties.” Hulsman v. Hemmeter Dev. Corp., 65 Haw. 58, 61, 647 P.2d 713, 716 (1982) (citations omitted).

Dunlea v. Dappen, 83 Hawai'i 28, 36, 924 P.2d 196, 204 (1996) (quoting Hays v. City & County of Honolulu, 81 Hawai'i 391, 392-93, 917 P.2d 718, 719-20 (1996)) (alterations in original) (emphasis and parenthetical comment omitted).

On appeal, the UPW argues that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment because: (1) the County violated constitutionally mandated merit principles in privatizing the Pu'uanahulu landfill; (2) the County violated civil service statutes in privatizing the landfill; and (3) Mayor Yamashi-ro’s alleged political motivation behind his privatization decision was a genuine issue of material fact.

Regarding constitutionally mandated merit principles, article XVI, section 1 of the Hawaii Constitution provides: “The employment of persons in the civil service, as defined by law, of or under the State, shall be governed by the merit principle.” By its express terms, this provision simply means that the civil service, however defined, is to be governed by merit principles. It does not define the precise scope of the civil service, i.e., the particular job positions that are within the civil service. Instead, article XVI, section 1 expressly refers to other sources for a definition of “civil service.” It states: “civil service, as defined by law ....” (Emphasis added.) Thus, in order to determine the scope of the term “civil service,” we must examine statutory law and case law. For these reasons, we hold that the Hawaii Constitution does not establish an independently enforceable right to the protection of merit principles.

In defining “civil service,” the statute most relevant is HRS § 76-77:

*71 Civil service and exemptions. The civil service to which this part applies comprises all positions in the public service of each county, now existing or hereafter established, and embraces all personal services performed for each county, except the following:

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(7) Positions filled by persons employed by contract where the personnel director has certified and where the certification has received the approval of the commission that the service is special or unique, is essential to the public interest, and that because of the circumstances surrounding its fulfillment, personnel to perform the service cannot be recruited through normal civil service procedures; provided that no contract pursuant to this paragraph shall be for any period exceeding one year;

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(10) Positions specifically exempted from this part by any other state statutes[.]

HRS § 76-77 (1993).

In interpreting statutes, this court has long held that

the fundamental starting point is the language of the statute itself. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law which this court reviews de novo. Moreover, where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, our only duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning. When construing a statute, our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. And we must read statutory language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose.

When there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an ambiguity exists. Put differently, a statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed people in two or more different senses.

In construing an ambiguous statute, the meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning. Moreover, the courts may resort to extrinsic aids in determining the legislative intent. One avenue is the use of legislative history as an interpretive tool.

State v. Toyomura, 80 Hawai'i 8, 18-19, 904 P.2d 893, 903-04 (1995) (quoting Housing Finance & Dev. Corp. v. Castle, 79 Hawai'i 64, 76-77, 898 P.2d 576, 588-89 (1995)) (internal quotation marks, citations, ellipses, and brackets omitted). Furthermore, “[statutory construction dictates that an interpreting court should not fashion a construction of statutory text that effectively renders the statute a nullity or creates an absurd or unjust result.” Dines v. Pacific Ins. Co., Ltd., 78 Hawai'i 325, 337, 893 P.2d 176, 188 (1995) (Ramil, J., dissenting) (citing Richardson v. City & County of Honolulu, 76 Hawai'i 46, 60, 868 P.2d 1193, 1207, reconsideration denied, 76 Hawai'i 247, 871 P.2d 795 (1994)).

HRS § 76-77 states that the civil service encompasses “all positions in the public service of each county, now existing or hereafter established, and embraces all personal services performed for each county.” Clearly, the language “all positions” and “all personal services” indicates that “civil service” was meant to be read- broadly. (Emphases added.) Nevertheless, we must not read the term so broadly as to lead to absurdity. For example, one could read “all positions in the public service” as literally meaning any position that provides a service to the public. However, such an interpretation would encompass employees of businesses such as Hawaiian Electric (electrical service), GTE Hawaiian Tel (telephone service), or even Bank of Hawai'i (financial services). It would clearly be absurd to suddenly and radically expand the civil service system to include employees of these organizations. Furthermore, we cannot read “civil service” as only including those employees who are paid regular salaries by the government. Such an interpretation would allow the state *72 or the counties to avoid civil service coverage simply by reducing the size of their official payroll. This would elevate form over substance and effectively render HRS § 76-77 a nullity. Because of these difficulties in interpreting the statute, we look to the three approaches utilized by other states for guidance.

Under the nature of the services test, the protection of civil service laws extends to those services that have been customarily and historically provided by civil servants. This approach has a number of advantages. First, it is the broadest of the three approaches and is therefore consistent with the broad coverage suggested by the language of the statute. Second, by limiting coverage to those types of services that have been customarily and historically performed by civil servants, it does not risk being applied so broadly as to lead to absurdity. Third, and most importantly, the nature of the services test focuses on the types of services performed rather than the particular programs or governmental functions involved or the intent or motive underlying the decision. This focus on services is consistent with the statutory language “all personal services performed in each county.” (Emphasis added.)

Under the functional inquiry test, new state programs performing new functions are not subject to civil service laws. The problem with this approach is that it is inconsistent with the statutory language of HRS § 76-77. The statute provides that the civil service includes “all positions ... now existing or hereafter established.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the Hawai'i statute clearly encompasses new programs as well as old.

Under the bad faith test, civil service laws are violated only if the employer acts in bad faith or with intent to circumvent the civil service laws. The problem with this approach is that it is very narrow and therefore inconsistent with the broad statutory language of HRS § 76-77. Furthermore, the test focuses on the intent or motive underlying the privatization effort. Nothing in HRS § 76-77 indicates that intent or motive is relevant to civil service coverage at all.

Therefore, we deem the nature of the services test to be most consistent with the language of our statute. We hold that the civil service, as defined by HRS § 76-77, encompasses those services that have been customarily and historically provided by civil servants.

In the present dispute, the landfill worker positions at Pu'uanahulu are essentially the same positions as at Kealakehe. The actual work performed is basically the same except for a minor change in the duties of equipment operators. At Kealakehe, these positions were civil service positions, and Pu'uanahulu is a replacement landfill for Kealakehe. Furthermore, the landfill workers at Hilo also held civil service positions. Thus, the landfill workers at Pu'uanahulu are performing a service that has been customarily and historically provided by civil servants. 8 They are therefore within the civil service unless one of the exceptions enumerated in HRS § 76-77 applies.

Only two of the exceptions in HRS § 76-77 even remotely apply to the facts of the present dispute. Under HRS § 76-77(7), persons employed by contract are not within the civil service if the county personnel director certifies (with the approval of the civil service commission) that the service is special or unique, is essential the public interest, and that personnel cannot be recruited through normal civil service procedures. However, in the present dispute, the County made no effort to seek certification.

HRS § 76-77(10) provides that positions are not within the civil service if they are *73 specifically exempted by other state statutes. The County and WMI rely on HRS § 46-85 as one such statute. If HRS § 46-85 does indeed include a specific exemption to civil service coverage, then clearly HRS § 76-77(10) would require us to hold that the landfill worker positions are not within the civil service.

HRS § 46-85 provides:

Contracts for solid waste disposal.

Any other law to the contrary notwithstanding, a county is authorized from time to time to contract with users or operators of a project for the abatement, control, reduction, treatment, elimination, or disposal of solid waste, whether established or to be established under chapter 48E or as a public undertaking, improvement, or system under chapter 47 or 49, or otherwise^ 9 ] The contract may be included in an agreement, may be for such periods as agreed upon by the parties, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, may include:

(1) Provisions for the delivery to the project of minimum amounts of solid waste and payments for the use of the project based on the delivery of the minimum amounts (which payments the political subdivision may be obligated to make, whether or not such minimum amounts are actually delivered to the project);

(2) Unit prices, which may be graduated; and

(3) Adjustments of the minimum amounts and the unit price.

The payments, unit prices, or adjustments need not be specifically stated in the contract but may be determined by formula if set forth in the contract. The contract may include provisions for the arbitration and reasonable restrictions against other disposal by the county or by other public or private entities or persons over which the county shall have jurisdiction of the substances covered by the contract while the contract is in force and disposal under the contract is practicable.

HRS § 46-85 (1993). This statute clearly authorizes the County to enter into contracts relating to disposal of solid waste; however, it mentions nothing about the civil service. HRS § 76-77(10) expressly states that to avoid civil service coverage, the positions must be “specifically exempted” by another state statute. (Emphasis added.) Inasmuch as HRS § 46-85 mentions nothing about civil service positions, it does not include a specific exemption. Therefore, under the plain meaning of HRS §§ 76-77(10) and 46-85, the landfill worker positions are still within the civil service.

Even assuming arguendo that HRS § 46-85 is ambiguous as to whether it contains an exemption to civil service coverage, the legislative history underlying the statute does not support the argument asserted by the County and WMI. The legislative history of HRS § 46-85 indicates that it was enacted as part of a bill intended to help finance the construction of garbage-to-energy plants through the issuance of special purpose revenue bonds. House Standing Committee Report No. 67 states: “This bill will assist in the development of a facility that will dispose of solid waste, as well as generate electricity.” Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 67, in 1983 House Journal, at 862. Senate Standing Committee Report No. 671 states:

The purpose of this bill is to establish á means whereby pollution control projects for the disposal of solid waste can be financed by the counties through the issuance of special purpose revenue bonds.

Your Committee finds that sanitary landfills are a costly and inefficient method of disposing of the ever-increasing amounts of solid waste and that alternative methods of disposal must be pursued. The success of pollution control projects which also provide for waste recovery and cogen-eration of electricity has been proven; however, the high costs of design and installation require financial assistance in the form of tax-exempt financing.

Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 671, in 1983 Senate Journal, at 1342. Therefore, the authorization to contract given to counties in *74 HRS § 46-85 was intended to be used for garbage-to-energy plants, not landfills. Nothing in the legislative history of HRS § 46-85 indicates that the statute was intended to authorize privatization of landfills or to exempt landfill workers from civil service coverage. Thus, neither HRS § 76-77(7) nor HRS § 76-77(10) apply to the present dispute.

In summary, under HRS § 76-77, the landfill worker positions at Pu'uanahulu are within the civil service. Accordingly, they are governed by merit principles under article XVI, section 1 of the 1-Iawai‘i Constitution. As civil service positions, they are also