11 Cal.4th 50 (1995) 900 P.2d 648 44 Cal. Rptr.2d 399

THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA ex rel. STATE LANDS COMMISSION, Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY, Respondent; RICHARD K. LOVELACE et al., Real Parties in Interest.

Docket No. S037729.

Supreme Court of California.

August 31, 1995.

*55 COUNSEL

John K. Van de Kamp and Daniel E. Lungren, Attorneys General, Roderick E. Walston, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jan S. Stevens, Assistant Attorney General, Richard M. Frank, Dennis M. Eagan, Joseph Barbieri, Kenneth R. Williams and Michael L. Crow, Deputy Attorneys General, for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

McDonough, Holland & Allen, Stuart Somach, Virginia A. Cahill and Sandra K. Dunn for Real Parties in Interest.

Washburn, Briscoe & McCarthy, Edgar B. Washburn, Sean E. McCarthy, David M. Ivester, Louis F. Claiborne and Lyn Jacobs for Real Parties in Interest and as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Parties in Interest.

Zumbrun, Best & Findley, Ronald A. Zumbrun, Robert K. Best, R. Prescott Jaunich and James S. Burling as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Parties in Interest.

OPINION

ARABIAN, J.

Beginning in 1848, and accelerating rapidly in 1849, gold lured fortune seekers to California. Hordes of prospectors panning or using other primitive methods quickly snatched up the wealth lying on the surface and in riverbeds. Soon, more advanced and environmentally intrusive techniques were utilized to reach the more inaccessible treasure hiding within the California hills. The era of hydraulic mining began. Miners washed the land away with water, extracting gold in the process.

Before being halted over 100 years ago, hydraulic mining caused enormous quantities of silt and other debris to be deposited into water systems, including the Sacramento River and its tributaries. This silt and debris then flowed downstream. Some came to rest along river banks far from the locale of the mining, changing forever the landscape of California. These events, *56 and possibly human activities such as river dredging and the construction of wing dams and levees, contributed over many years to the imperceptible accumulation, or "accretion," of 12 acres of dry land that used to be riverbed in a spot in Sacramento called Chicory Bend. The Sacramento River there is navigable and, even that far inland, is affected by the tides, making its shores tidelands. The river and tidelands belong to the state, as did the 12 acres when they were riverbed. The adjacent land, at least that not including the 12 acres, belongs to private parties. The question we address is who owns the 12 acres now.

We trace the underlying factual history to the 19th century, but the relevant law dates back to the time of the Byzantine Emperor Justinian, who gave the world the Justinian Code, and the first known law of accretion. The general California rule is easy to state. If the accretion was natural, the private landowners own it; if it was artificial, the state owns it. But the specific application is far from easy. Is the accretion natural any time it is caused by the flow of the river, as the majority below found? Or is it artificial if caused by the hydraulic mining and by other human activities nearer the accreted land, as the state contends?

We conclude, as did the concurring justice of the Court of Appeal, that to adopt the test of the majority would effectively abandon California's long-standing "artificial accretion" rule. Instead, we reaffirm that rule. As between the state and private upland owners, land along tidelands and navigable rivers that accretes by artificial means, such as local dredging and construction of wing dams and levees, remains in state ownership, and does not go to the upland owner. We also conclude, however, that we should narrowly construe what is artificial under the California rule. Accretion is artificial if directly caused by human activities in the immediate vicinity of the accreted land. But accretion is not artificial merely because human activities far away and, in the case of hydraulic mining, long ago contributed to it.

We thus disagree with much of the analysis of the majority below. However, we agree with its result, which is to deny a petition for writ of mandate. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal while rejecting the basis upon which it reached that judgment.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Proceedings in Superior Court

Real parties in interest, Richard K. Lovelace et al. (hereafter private landowners or, simply, landowners), own property along the Sacramento *57 River in Sacramento. In the underlying action in superior court to quiet title, the landowners and petitioner, the State of California ex rel. State Lands Commission (hereafter the state), both claim ownership of a 12-acre parcel between the river and the landowners' property on the west end of Seamas Avenue at a place commonly called Chicory Bend. The landowners claim title to the property to the high-tide line of the river under a deed received from their predecessor in interest.

The state claims ownership under the following theory. In 1850, when California became a state, the disputed property was under water and part of the bed of the Sacramento River. Because the river there is navigable and tidal, the state acquired ownership of the riverbed upon admission to the Union. Thereafter, the course of the river shifted westward as the result of "artificial accretive influences," creating the disputed acreage. Because the accretion was artificial, the state contends, it retains ownership of the property. In response to an interrogatory propounded by the private landowners, the state listed four artificial influences it claims caused the accretion: (1) "Debris from hydraulic mining activities in the American River and Feather River watersheds," (2) "Wing dams erected in the river channel at or near the location of the subject property," (3) "Levees constructed at or near the location of the subject property," and (4) "Dredging of the river channel in the vicinity of the subject property."

The landowners moved under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c as it then read (it has since been amended) for summary adjudication that "any gradual accumulations of land along the Sacramento River at Chicory Bend consisting, in part, of sediments washed into upstream tributaries in the Feather River and American River watersheds by hydraulic mining, and not caused by any artificial structures or activities at Chicory Bend, are natural accretions that belong to the riparian landowner." They expressly did not seek summary adjudication regarding the wing dams, levees, and dredging. Although disputing that these latter activities contributed to the accretion, they recognized that this presented a factual question not susceptible of summary adjudication, and conceded "that any deposits of land caused by these three activities, in the vicinity of Chicory Bend, would be artificial accretions under California law."

The parties agree that the Feather River and the American River empty into the Sacramento River north of Chicory Bend. The landowners' statement of undisputed material facts alleged: "During an approximately 25-year period prior to 1884, hydraulic mining operations in the American River and Feather River watersheds washed great quantities of earth into natural *58 streams and watercourses tributary to the American River and Feather River. Some of the mud and silt, in combination with materials that entered the streams as the product of natural erosion, were transported as suspended sediments and eventually deposited in the bed of the Sacramento River."

The state disputed this statement to the extent that it "grossly understates the effect of hydraulic mining debris on the Sacramento River," and alleged: "The hydraulic mining occurred over a 32-year period between 1852 and 1884. Its effects lasted much longer. It had the effect of quintupling for about 100 years the average annual amounts of sediment that would have passed from the Sacramento Basin into the bay under natural conditions. Prior to hydraulic mining, the Sacramento River in the vicinity of Chicory Bend was clear and deep flowing, without islands or bars. The river supported navigation by large steamers and seagoing craft. The hydraulic mining debris had enormous [effects] on the Sacramento River in the vicinity of Chicory Bend. Shoals and sand bars emerged, blocking or hindering navigation. At Chicory Bend, the bed of the river rose 12 to 15 feet between 1872 and 1882. Levees, wing dams and dredging were direct responses to the problems of flooding and hindrance of navigation caused by hydraulic mining debris."

The superior court granted the motion for summary adjudication, ruling: "Civil Code § 1014 provides that accretions from natural causes belong to the adjacent landowner. While there can be no doubt that enormous quantities of silt found their way into the Sacramento River system after having been dislodged by hydraulic mining, the materials were transported to Chicory Bend by natural causes, the flow of the River. In many ways, very little remains natural in the strictest sense as to most California rivers. Dams regulate the flow and alter the extent to which banks are eroded, for example. But to consider the entire system an artificial one would be inappropriate. Given the great passage of time since mining dislodged these materials and the distance from the source of the materials, and the time the accretions have existed, it would be unreasonable to interpret § 1014 to require tracing these accretions to their sources. This would place an inappropriate burden on the parties and the courts."

B. Appellate Proceedings

The state filed the instant original writ proceeding in the Court of Appeal seeking to have the order granting summary adjudication vacated. That court issued an alternative writ of mandate, and the matter was briefed. The state argued that the challenged order "is contrary to well-established controlling *59 case authority which recognizes that deposition of materials washed into the water by human activities but deposited by the natural flow of the water constitute artificial accretion belonging to the state." The private landowners defended the trial court order, arguing that accretion is artificial only if "some man-made structure impedes the flow of water causing accumulation of sediment."

The California Land Title Association (CLTA) filed an amicus curiae brief in the Court of Appeal urging a far narrower interpretation of what constitutes artificial accretion. Although professing to be "in general agreement with the position" of the landowners, it did "not agree with them on the point that only accretions resulting from hydraulic mining are to be treated as `natural,' inuring to the benefit of the upland owners, and that accretions resulting from wing dams, levees and other structures must be viewed as `artificial' and not attached to the uplands." The CLTA argued that "accretions resulting from any of these activities belong to the uplands, so long as the accretions were deposited gradually and imperceptibly through the action of the river's water."

The majority of the Court of Appeal agreed with the CLTA. In an exhaustive analysis, it found that in most jurisdictions, accreted land belongs to the upland owner whether or not the accretion is artificial, and concluded that California has deviated from this general rule "through a misapplication of judicial precedent." It argued that the decision commonly considered to be the genesis of the California rule, Dana v. Jackson Street Wharf Co. (1866) 31 Cal. 118, has been misapplied ever since without critical analysis. "It is," the majority stated, "as if the post-Dana decisions have artificially accreted themselves on this point."

Based upon its historical review, and "principles of fairness and practical application ..., recognizing that little in the California landscape or its significant waterways remains in a completely natural state," the majority concluded that "a fair, workable and legally supportable rule of accretion, for both [Civil Code] section 1014 and the tideland context, is that of a gradual and imperceptible accumulation of material that results from the action of the water, even if artificially influenced." Accordingly, it held that "to the extent that the land at Chicory Bend was once tideland but has now been covered by a gradual and imperceptible accumulation of material that has resulted from the action of the waters, even if artificially influenced, that land remains in private ownership — subject to new tideland at the water boundary of the accreted land (at the ordinary high-water mark) that is owned by the state in trust for the public." It therefore denied the state's petition for writ of mandate.

*60 In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Scotland agreed with the result — denying the mandate petition — but disagreed with the majority's analysis. He believed that "[w]hile the statutory construction adopted by the majority is logical, fair and arguably preferable, it does not wash because the majority's effort to avoid California Supreme Court precedent is unconvincing." He urged the rule "that alluvion belongs to the riparian owner except when accretion results from the placement in public waters of a structure or other artificial obstruction which alters the natural flow of the water and causes the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of land proximate to the obstruction. Under California's narrow artificial-accretion exception, it is the artificial nature of the ultimate cause of the accretion, not the artificial nature of the source of the resulting alluvion, which determines whether the alluvion inures to the benefit of the state or the riparian owner. Accordingly, although enormous quantities of debris were deposited artificially into the Sacramento River system after having been dislodged by hydraulic mining, any alluvion resulting from the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of mining debris transported to, and lodged at, Chicory Bend by the flow of the water was formed by `natural causes' within the meaning of section 1014 assuming the accumulation was not caused by artificial structures placed in the water at Chicory Bend."

Justice Scotland thus agreed with the trial court's ruling, which "simply provides that, assuming any gradual and imperceptible accumulation of land at Chicory Bend consists of hydraulic mining debris carried by river water to that location, and not caused by any artificial obstruction in the water at or near Chicory Bend, it is accretion from `natural causes' which inures to the benefit of the riparian owner."

We granted the state's petition for review.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Joint Motion to Dismiss

(1) After we granted review, the parties conditionally settled the case, and filed a "joint motion to dismiss upon stipulation of the parties." The settlement and joint motion were both conditioned upon this court ordering that the Court of Appeal opinion "shall remain unpublished." We issued an order denying the motion "due to the public interest in having the important and continuing legal issues decided." Because the order did not set out in full our reasoning, and cannot serve as precedent in other cases, we believe it appropriate to explain the basis for the order. (See California Assn. of Psychology Providers v. Rank (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1, 9 [270 Cal. Rptr. 796, 793 P.2d 2].)

*61 In the petition for review, the Attorney General, representing the state, declared that review "is necessary to settle an important question of law affecting a longstanding rule of property designed to protect the public trust title to thousands of acres along the shorelines of California's tide and submerged lands," and that "the respective title interests of the State and thousands of persons owning property bordering on navigable waterways is at stake." "Unless resolved by this Court," the petition stated, "these conflicts and uncertainties present an untenable situation for the State Lands Commission in the carrying out of its statutory mandate to protect and administer the public trust title in California's sovereign tide and submerged lands and navigable waters in an equitable statewide fashion." We granted review partly due to these representations.

The papers submitted to this court with the motion to dismiss did not suggest that the compelling reasons the Attorney General stated for us to resolve the issue had evaporated. The Attorney General did not indicate, for example, that the state was modifying the position that caused it to bring the underlying mandate action in the first place: that accretion caused by 19th century hydraulic mining was artificial. There appeared no reason to believe that similar disputes would not arise in other cases. Indeed, the settlement and motion to dismiss were expressly conditioned on there being no precedent-establishing appellate decision in this case, even though there had been one. For these reasons, we denied the motion to dismiss.

In Lundquist v. Reusser (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1193, 1202, footnote 8 [31 Cal. Rptr.2d 776, 875 P.2d 1279], the case had become moot by settlement before oral argument. We decided it nonetheless, invoking "the well-established line of judicial authority recognizing an exception to the mootness doctrine, and permitting the court to decline to dismiss a case rendered moot by stipulation of the parties where the appeal raises issues of continuing public importance." (Ibid., citing several cases including Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fales (1973) 8 Cal.3d 712, 715-716 [106 Cal. Rptr. 21, 505 P.2d 213], and D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 60 Cal.2d 723, 731-732, fn. 5 [36 Cal. Rptr. 468, 388 P.2d 700] [after we granted hearing, the petitioner made the issue moot by compliance with the challenged court order and then moved to dismiss; motion denied].)

In urging us to grant the motion to dismiss, the Attorney General relied heavily on Neary v. Regents of University of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 273 [10 Cal. Rptr.2d 859, 834 P.2d 119] (Neary), where we held that "when the parties to an action agree to settle their dispute and as part of their settlement stipulate to a reversal of the trial court judgment, the Court of Appeal should *62 grant their request for the stipulated reversal absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances that warrant an exception to this general rule." (Id. at p. 284.) Nothing in Neary, however, is contrary to our refusing to dismiss this case.

As the Court of Appeal recognized in Lucich v. City of Oakland (1993) 19 Cal. App.4th 494, 500-503 [23 Cal. Rptr.2d 450], Neary considered only the factors relevant to whether a stipulated reversal of a trial court judgment should be honored. One such consideration was that a trial court judgment does not establish precedent. The factors relevant to whether an appellate judgment should be vacated or an opinion remain or be ordered unpublished pursuant to stipulation were not addressed.

There are two critical differences between the stipulated reversal of a trial judgment in Neary and the dismissal motion here. First, in Neary, we stressed the efficiency of effectuating settlements and thereby avoiding further litigation. (Neary, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 277-278.) As the case proceeds further into the appellate process, however, especially after an appellate decision is actually rendered, more is eradicated by a settlement, and less is gained by the avoidance of further litigation. Second, stipulating that the Court of Appeal opinion not be published and that we not render our own decision would effectively eliminate a precedent-setting appellate decision. As Neary itself stressed, "`[T]rial courts make no binding precedents.'" (Id. at p. 282.) Published appellate decisions do. The court in Lucich v. City of Oakland, supra, 19 Cal. App.4th at pages 502-503, correctly recognized that the decisions in which we refused to dismiss the case after we accepted it apply here, not Neary.

Moreover, even in cases governed by Neary, an appellate court may refuse to accept a stipulated reversal if the refusal would further a "specific, demonstrable, well established, and compelling" public interest. (Neary, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 283.) Here, either the judgment or the stipulation would bind the state, which is acting as the public's trustee of the land whose ownership is in dispute. Thus, the public interest in the legal issue presented and in the outcome of this case is a compelling reason for our refusal to accept the parties' stipulation.

This is not to say that appellate courts, including this one, do not have discretion to agree to dismiss a case at any stage of the proceeding. Obviously, they do. But, for the reasons stated, we have exercised our discretion in favor of deciding this important legal issue of statewide importance.

*63 B. The Merits

1. Background^[1]

The river at Chicory Bend is both navigable and affected by the tides, making its shores tidelands. The following principles generally apply. The state owns all tidelands below the ordinary high-water mark. (Civ. Code, § 670.) Tidelands within two miles of any incorporated city, such as Sacramento, "shall be withheld from grant or sale to private persons, partnerships, or corporations...." (Cal. Const., art. X, § 3.) The state also owns all land below the water of a navigable lake or stream. (Civ. Code, § 670.) Owners of upland bordering on tidewater take to the ordinary high-water mark. Owners of upland bordering on nontidal navigable water take to the low-water mark. Other upland owners take to the middle of the lake or stream. (Civ. Code, § 830.)

(2) Both tidelands and the beds of navigable rivers are owned by the state in trust for the public. (State of California v. Superior Court (Lyon) (1981) 29 Cal.3d 210, 214, 231 [172 Cal. Rptr. 696, 625 P.2d 239]; People v. California Fish Co. (1913) 166 Cal. 576 [138 P. 79].) The United States Supreme Court has explained that this trust is "for the people of the State that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties. The interest of the people in the navigation of the waters and in commerce over them may be improved in many instances ... for which purpose the State may grant parcels of the submerged lands; and, so long as their disposition is made for such purpose, no valid objections can be made to the grants.... The trust devolving upon the State for the public, and which can only be discharged by the management and control of property in which the public has an interest, cannot be relinquished by a *64 transfer of the property. The control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.... The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as to leave them entirely under the use and control of private parties, except in the instance of parcels mentioned for the improvement of the navigation and use of the waters, or when parcels can be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what remains, than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace." (Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois (1892) 146 U.S. 387, 452-453 [36 L.Ed. 1018, 1042-1043, 13 S.Ct. 110]; see also City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 521.)

Under this doctrine, the "state holds [tidelands] in trust for the people for their use for commerce, navigation, fishing and other purposes...." (State of California v. Superior Court (Lyon), supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 214.) Moreover, "the same incidents of the trust applicable to tidelands also apply to nontidal navigable waters and that the public's interest is not confined to the water, but extends also to the bed of the water." (Id. at p. 231.)

What this means here is that the state owns the land under the Sacramento River and adjacent tidelands to the ordinary line of high tide in trust for the public; the upland private landowners own the landward side of the ordinary line of high tide. The 12 acres in dispute used to be under the river, and thus originally were owned by the state. They are now dry land. Did ownership shift to the upland owners?

The parties agree that the property was created by accretion rather than avulsion, that is, that it formed gradually and imperceptibly over time. A statute enacted in 1872, and unchanged since, concerns accretion along rivers or streams. "Where, from natural causes, land forms by imperceptible degrees upon the bank of a river or stream, navigable or not navigable, either by accumulation of material or by the recession of the stream, such land belongs to the owner of the bank, subject to any existing right of way over the bank." (Civ. Code § 1014, italics added.)^[2] California has no comparable statute relating to tidelands although, as we will see, there is a substantial body of case law.

*65 The general rule that accretion belongs to the upland owner is venerable. Over a century ago, the United States Supreme Court, in resolving a dispute over property in Illinois, traced it to the Emperor Justinian: "In the Institutes of Justinian it is said: `Moreover, the alluvial soil added by a river to your land becomes yours by the law of nations. Alluvion is an imperceptible increase, and that is added by alluvion which is added so gradually that no one can perceive how much is added at any one moment of time.'" (County of St. Clair v. Lovingston (1874) 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46, 66 [23 L.Ed. 59, 63].) The rule is also found in the Code Napoleon. (Id. at pp. 66-67 [23 L.Ed. at p. 63].)

Blackstone stated, "the rule of the common law: [¶] `And as to lands gained from the sea, either by alluvion, by the washing up of land and earth, so as in time to make terra firma, or by dereliction, as when the sea shrinks below the usual water-marks; in these cases the law is held to be that if the gain be by little and little, by small and imperceptible degrees, it shall go to the owner of the land adjoining. For de minimis non curat lex; and besides, these owners being often losers by the breaking in of the sea, or at charges to keep it out, this possible gain is, therefore, a reciprocal consideration for such possible charge or loss. But if the alluvion be sudden or considerable, in this case it belongs to the king; for, as the king is lord of the sea, and so owner of the soil while it is covered with water, it is but reasonable he should have the soil when the water has left it dry.'" (County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, supra, 90 U.S. at p. 67 [23 L.Ed. at p. 63].)

In the common law, as stated by the high court, it did not matter whether the accretion was natural or artificial (unless, possibly, the claimant caused the accretion). "It is insisted ... that the accretion was caused wholly by obstructions placed in the river above, and that hence the rules upon the subject of alluvion do not apply. If the fact be so, the consequence does not follow.... The proximate cause was the deposits made by the water. The law looks no further. Whether the flow of the water was natural or affected by artificial means is immaterial." (County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, supra, 90 U.S. at p. 66 [23 L.Ed. at p. 63]; see also Annot., Riparian Owner's Right to New Land Created by Reliction or by Accretion Influenced by Artificial Condition Not Produced by Such Owner (1975) 63 A.L.R.3d 249, 255-256 ["[I]t is ... a widely accepted proposition that the fact that such processes were initiated, accelerated, or otherwise influenced by artificial, manmade structures has no effect on the general rule of accretion and reliction."].)

In California, the law regarding artificial accretion developed quite differently.

*66 2. California's Artificial Accretion Rule

(3a) The state argues that in California, unlike most jurisdictions, it does matter whether accretion is natural or artificial, and that as to tidelands and navigable bodies of water, accretion that is not "from natural causes" but instead is artificial remains in the possession of the state. It further contends that, because "California acquired title to the navigable waterways and tidelands by virtue of her sovereignty when admitted to the Union in 1850" (Marks v. Whitney (1971) 6 Cal.3d 251, 258, fn. 5 [98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 491 P.2d 374]), its own law applies. The private landowners urge the position the CLTA took in the Court of Appeal and adopted by the majority of that court. Resolving this question requires a historical review of the California rule.

The 1866 case of Dana v. Jackson Street Wharf Co., supra, 31 Cal. 118 (Dana), predated by six years the adoption of Civil Code section 1014. There, the landowner owned a waterfront lot in San Francisco. He built a wharf adjacent to the property that caused the disputed land to be "entirely reclaimed from the water," and to become "a permanent accretion by artificial and natural causes" to the lot. (Id. at p. 120.) We held that the common law rule that land gained by accretion belongs to the upland owner did not apply because the case was one of "purpresture, or encroachment, by the erection of a wharf in a public harbor, and not a case of marine increase by alluvion...." (Ibid.) Moreover, the boundary in question had been fixed by a specific statute, making it permanent, rather than "ever-shifting." (Id. at p. 121.)

In 1872, as noted, Civil Code section 1014 was adopted. It was applied in Fillmore v. Jennings (1889) 78 Cal. 634, 636 [21 P. 536], to land that formed along a river "as the result of natural accretion." Finding that the "case falls exactly within the terms of section 1014 of the Civil Code, which is merely declaratory of the law as it has always been," we held the accreted property belonged to the upland owner. (Ibid.) There was no mention of artificial accretion.

Then came an early appellate court decision. (Forgeus v. County of Santa Cruz (1914) 24 Cal. App. 193 [140 P. 1092].) Forgeus has been characterized as "[t]aking the position that where the proximate cause of a deposit of alluvion is gradual accretion caused by a flow of water, the question whether that flow was natural or affected by artificial means is immaterial" (Annot., Riparian Owner's Right to New Land Created by Reliction or by Accretion Influenced by Artificial Condition Not Produced by Such Owner, supra, 63 A.L.R.3d at p. 298), but this is not entirely clear. The court held that *67 accretions due to the county's act in raising a roadbed along a right of way owned by the county over land fronting on Monterey Bay belonged to the upland owner and not the county. "[I]f any accretion or reliction was formed it was not caused by any act of [the private upland owners], but it was due to the act of the county in raising the roadbed along said right of way. It could hardly be contended that the county by such artificial means could secure the fee to the alluvion as an addition to its right of way." (Forgeus v. County of Santa Cruz, supra, 24 Cal. App. at p. 199.) The Forgeus court quoted approvingly the language from County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, supra, 90 U.S. at page 66 [23 L.Ed. at page 63], that it is immaterial whether the flow of water was natural or artificially affected (24 Cal. App. at p. 199), but also stated: "Clearly, there is a distinction between this case and that where a structure is erected, by the state or municipality, on land below the line of ordinary high water. In the latter case the deposit of alluvion caused by such structure would not inure to the benefit of the riparian owner." (Id. at p. 200, citing Dana, supra, 31 Cal. 118.)

A year after Forgeus, this court spoke again in Patton v. City of Los Angeles (1915) 169 Cal. 521 [147 P. 141], a case involving seven acres of land in San Pedro Bay that accreted because of a railroad embankment across part of the bay. We held that the accreted property belonged to the state's successor in interest, the City of Los Angeles, and not the upland owner. Because the property was once tideland, "it was reserved from sale, and was not alienable by any state officer ... and, therefore, no artificial embankment, made by third persons, or made or suffered by state officers or agents, nor any accretion to the adjacent upland caused thereby, could operate to divest the state of its title to the tide land so reserved.... We can see no plausible reason for the contention that the making of such embankments, or accretions caused thereby, would operate in favor of third persons to divest the state of its title to tide lands covered by the embankment and accretions extending out over it from the adjacent upland, and transfer the title to the owner of the upland." (Id. at p. 525.)

Another year later came Strand Improvement Co. v. Long Beach (1916) 173 Cal. 765, 766 [161 P. 975], a dispute over accreted oceanfront property in Long Beach. We confronted the question "whether or not the doctrine that land added to the upland by accretion, or alluvion, applies to land bordering upon the ocean." Relying on the "practically ... universal rule" as stated by Blackstone (and also citing County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, supra, 90 U.S. 46), we concluded that the accreted property belongs to the upland owner. (173 Cal. at p. 771.) We rejected the argument that because Civil Code section 1014 expressly covers only rivers and streams, the rule is impliedly *68 different for property on the ocean, which has no comparable statute. Citing Dana, supra,