12 Cal.4th 1143 (1996) 913 P.2d 909 51 Cal. Rptr.2d 700

EVELYN SMITH, Petitioner,
v.
FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING COMMISSION, Respondent; KENNETH C. PHILLIPS et al., Real Parties in Interest.

Docket No. S040653.

Supreme Court of California.

April 9, 1996.

*1149 COUNSEL

Jordan W. Lorence, Cimron Campbell, Jane E. Hadro, Wendell R. Bird, Mark N. Troobnick and Jay Alan Sekulow for Petitioner.

Loy Watkins, John G. Tulio, Alan J. Reinach, Boothby & Yingst, Lee Boothby, Oliver Thomas, Marc D. Stern, Jaffe, Trutanich, Scatena & Blum, Fred Blum, Proskauer, Rose, Getz & Mendelsohn, Jeffrey A. Berman, *1150 Steven G. Drapkin and Lee W. Rierson as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

John K. Van de Kamp and Daniel E. Lungren, Attorneys General, Andrea Sheridan Ordin, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Carole R. Kornblum, Assistant Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, Louis Verdugo, Jr., Kathleen W. Mikkelson, Deputy Attorneys General, Steven C. Owyang, Prudence Kay Poppink, Eisen & Johnston Law Corporation, Jay-Allen Eisen, Marian M. Johnston and Ann Perrin Farina for Respondent.

Arlo Smith, District Attorney (San Francisco), David C. Moon, Assistant District Attorney, Steven K. Green, Edward Tabash, John Beattie, Greenberg, Glusker, Fields, Claman & Machtinger and Roger L. Funk as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent.

David Link and Thomas F. Coleman for Real Parties in Interest.

James K. Hahn, City Attorney (Los Angeles), Charles I. Goldenberg, Assistant City Attorney, and Maria Perez Manning, Deputy City Attorney, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Parties in Interest.

Marsha Jones Moutrie, City Attorney (Santa Monica), Joseph Lawrence, Assistant City Attorney, Martin T. Tachiki, Barry A. Rosenbaum and Kimery A. Shelton, Deputy City Attorneys, Jon W. Davidson, Carol A. Sobel, Paul L. Hoffman, Mark D. Rosenbaum, Matthew A. Coles, Margaret C. Crosby, Tzivia Schwartz, Barbara H. Bergen, Margalynne Armstrong, James D. Smith, Ameila A. Craig, Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati and Clyde J. Wadsworth as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent and Real Parties in Interest.

OPINION

WERDEGAR, J.

The California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) (FEHA) declares it to be "unlawful [¶] ... [f]or the owner of any housing accommodation to discriminate against any person because of the ... marital status ... of that person" (id., § 12955, subd. (a)). The Fair Employment and Housing Commission (commission) ruled that a landlord violated the statute by refusing to rent an apartment to an unmarried couple. The Court of Appeal reversed, believing the state may not constitutionally apply FEHA to a landlord whose religious beliefs make it sinful to rent to an unmarried couple. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeal.

*1151 I. FACTS

The relevant facts set out below are as found by the commission in its final decision.

"Respondent [Evelyn Smith] owns and leases four rental units located [in two duplexes] at 675, 677, 683 and 685 Eastwood Avenue, Chico, California. They are operated exclusively for business and commercial purposes, with income generated from the rentals reported as business income. The business is not organized or classified as a religious, charitable or other nonprofit concern. Respondent does not reside in any of the four units and visits the units occasionally to maintain them.

"When a vacancy occurs in one of the units, the unit is advertised for rent in local newspapers and is otherwise available to the general public. When prospective tenants inquire about a vacant unit, respondent tells them she prefers married couples. She prefers married couples because, for religious reasons, she opposes sex outside of marriage. However, since she has received so many calls from unmarried couples seeking to rent her units, she simply tells prospective tenants that she prefers to rent to married couples.

"Respondent is a Christian. She is a member of Bidwell Presbyterian Church in Chico and has attended there for approximately 25 years. Respondent believes that sex outside of marriage is sinful, and that it is a sin for her to rent her units to people who will engage in nonmarital sex on her property. Respondent believes that God will judge her if she permits people to engage in sex outside of marriage in her rental units and that if she does so, she will be prevented from meeting her deceased husband in the hereafter.

"Respondent has rented her units to single, divorced and widowed persons. Respondent has no religious objection to renting to people who are single, divorced, widowed or married. Respondent would not rent to anyone who engages in sex outside of marriage, whether they are single, divorced, widowed or married. Respondent rents her units to people without regard to their race, color, national origin, ancestry, or physical handicap. Respondent rents her units without regard to the religious beliefs of tenants. She does not know the religious background of most of her tenants because she never asks them and only knows if they volunteer the information. Respondent has rented her units to males and females and does not discriminate on the basis of sex.

"From on or about March 29, 1987, to April 13, 1987, respondent advertised the availability of one of her units in the Chico Enterprise Record. *1152 Complainants [real parties in interest Gail Randall and Kenneth Phillips] saw the advertisement on April 1, 1987, and drove by the unit that night. Because of the particular location, attractive architecture, convenient location and well maintained premises, complainants took a special interest in the unit and the next morning called respondent and arranged to see it. During this telephone conversation respondent stated that she preferred to rent to married couples.

"On or about April 2, 1987, complainants met with respondent and were shown the premises, which they liked very much. Respondent told complainants that she would not rent to unmarried couples, and she asked complainants how long they had been married. Complainant Phillips falsely represented to respondent that he and complainant Randall were married. Complainants made no commitment to rent at that time and filled out an informal application for respondent. Complainant Randall signed her name, `Gail Phillips' on that document.

"Later, complainants called respondent and told respondent they were interested in renting the unit. They met with respondent on or about April 7, 1987. A lease agreement was executed between the parties on that date for the unit located at 677 Eastwood Avenue. It was for a month-to-month tenancy commencing May 1, 1987 at a rent of $325 per month. Complainants also paid respondent a security deposit of $150 for which a receipt was given. Complainant Randall signed the lease agreement, `Gail Phillips'. During this meeting respondent told complainants again that she would not rent to unmarried couples.

"Later in the day on April 7, 1987, complainant Randall called respondent and asked if respondent doubted that Randall and Phillips were married. Randall asked respondent if she wanted to see their marriage license. Respondent said, `No.' Still later on the same day, complainant Phillips called respondent and told her that he and Randall were not married. Respondent told him that she could not rent to an unmarried cohabiting couple because that would violate her religious beliefs. Respondent said that she would return their deposit. She sent them a check for $150."

Randall and Phillips filed separate complaints against Smith with the commission. Based on the complaints, the commission issued two accusations. As subsequently amended, the accusations alleged Smith had violated Government Code section 12955, subdivisions (a), (b), (c) and (d),^[1] Civil *1153 Code section 51 (the Unruh Civil Rights Act),^[2] and Government Code section 12948.^[3]

A hearing before an administrative law judge ensued. Smith defended the accusations on two grounds that are relevant here: first, the relevant provisions of FEHA (Gov. Code, § 12955, subd. (a)) and the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51) do not prohibit discrimination against unmarried couples; second, to require her to rent to an unmarried couple over her religious objections would violate the free exercise clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. (U.S. Const., 1st Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 4.) The judge rejected both arguments and issued a proposed decision in favor of Randall and Phillips.

The commission subsequently exercised its power not to adopt the proposed decision and to hear the case itself on the existing record. (Gov. Code, § 11517, subd. (c).) After additional briefing, the commission issued its decision in favor of Randall and Phillips. In its decision, the commission found that Smith had violated Government Code sections 12955, subdivisions (a) and (d), Civil Code section 51, and Government Code section 12948. More particularly, the commission decided that FEHA's prohibition of discrimination based on "marital status" did encompass discrimination against unmarried couples, and that the Unruh Civil Rights Act prohibited all forms of arbitrary discrimination by business establishments, including discrimination against unmarried couples. The commission concluded it had no *1154 power to address Smith's constitutional arguments in view of article III, section 3.5, of the California Constitution.^[4] (1a) (See fn. 5.) As relief, the commission ordered Smith to cease and desist from discriminating on the basis of marital status; to post and give to prospective tenants various notices setting out the provisions of FEHA, the outcome of this case, and the statement that Smith practices equal housing opportunity; and to pay Randall and Phillips a total of $454 in compensatory damages and $500 in damages for emotional distress.^[5] The commission dismissed the remaining claims as untimely.

Smith sought review of the commission's decision by petition for writ of mandate. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.) The Court of Appeal reversed. The court held the state could not prevent Smith from discriminating against unmarried couples, in view of the free exercise clauses of the federal and state Constitutions (U.S. Const., 1st Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 4) and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.). The court also concluded that Smith's inquiry into her tenants' marital status did not violate their right to privacy under the state Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.)^[6] The court did not address Smith's argument that FEHA (Gov. Code, § 12955, subd. (a)) and the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51; see also Gov. Code, § 12948) do not prohibit discrimination against unmarried couples.

We granted review.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Does FEHA Prohibit Housing Discrimination Against Unmarried Couples?

In FEHA, the Legislature declared it "unlawful [¶] ... [f]or the owner of any housing accommodation to discriminate against any person because of *1155 the ... marital status ... of that person" (Gov. Code, § 12955, subd. (a)) or "to cause to be made any written or oral inquiry concerning the ... marital status ... of any person seeking to ... rent or lease any housing accommodation" (id., subd. (b)). The commission found Smith violated FEHA by refusing to rent to Randall and Phillips upon learning they were not married.

(2a) Smith argues "the statutory ban on marital status discrimination does not include [unmarried] cohabiting couples."

(3a) The argument lacks merit. To determine what a statute means, "we first consult the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning." (DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 601 [7 Cal. Rptr.2d 238, 828 P.2d 140].) (2b) The usual and ordinary meaning of the words "marital status," as applied to two prospective tenants,^[7] is that a landlord may not ask them whether they are married or refuse to rent to them because they are, or are not. Smith asked whether Randall and Phillips were married and refused to rent to them because they were not. The conclusion that she thereby violated FEHA seems unavoidable.^[8]

Various amici curiae argue that Smith's refusal to rent to Randall and Phillips does not violate FEHA because it was based on Smith's assumptions about their sexual conduct rather than their marital status. The high courts of Alaska and Massachusetts recently rejected similar arguments. (Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Com'n (Alaska 1994) 874 P.2d 274, 278, fn. 4 [874 P.2d 274] [interpreting Alaska Stat. § 18.80.240]; Attorney General v. Desilets (1994) 418 Mass. 316, 320 [636 N.E.2d 233, 235] [interpreting Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151B, § 4(6)].) Interpreting a statute analogous to FEHA, the court in Swanner, supra, explained its conclusion in this way: a landlord "cannot reasonably claim that he does not rent or show property to cohabiting couples based on their conduct (living together outside of marriage) and not their marital status when their marital status (unmarried) is what makes their conduct immoral in his opinion." (Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Com'n, supra, 874 P.2d at p. 278, fn. 4.) The opinion of the *1156 Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Attorney General v. Desilets, supra, is to the same effect.^[9]

Smith argued before the commission, and various amici curiae argue here, that Government Code section 12955 can be read as protecting single, married, widowed, and divorced individuals rather than unmarried couples. However, to acknowledge the statute protects the former, as it undoubtedly does, in no way tends to show it does not also protect the latter. The statutory language banning discrimination based on "marital status" naturally carries both meanings.

Our own Legislature's use of the words "marital status" in other statutes confirms this. Where the Legislature has, in some particular context, wished to treat married and unmarried couples identically, it has chosen to convey that idea by requiring equal treatment regardless of "marital status." In Family Code section 7602, for example, the Legislature declared that "[t]he parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents." (Italics added.) In Family Code section 1830, the Legislature gave jurisdiction to the family conciliation court over child custody controversies "between parents regardless of their marital status. ..." (Italics added.) In Probate Code section 6450, subdivision (a), the Legislature declared, for purposes of determining intestate succession, that "[t]he relationship of parent and child exists between a person and the person's natural parents, regardless of the marital status of the natural parents." (Italics added.)

The commission has interpreted Government Code section 12955 to protect unmarried couples since 1980, when FEHA was enacted. (See Dept. of Fair Empl. & Hous. v. Smith (1989) FEHC Dec. No. 89-11, at pp. 5-6, revd. on other grounds Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Com.^[*] (Cal. App.); Dept. of Fair Empl. & Hous. v. Donahue (1989) FEHC Dec. No. 89-10, at pp. 4-5, revd. on other grounds Donahue v. Fair Employment and Housing Com.^[*] (Cal. App.); Dept. of Fair Empl. & Hous. v. Andrews (1984) FEHC *1157 Dec. No. 84-14, pp. 4-5; Dept. of Fair Empl. & Hous. v. Helfrich (1981) FEHC Dec. No. 81-08, at pp. 5-6; Dept. of Fair Empl. & Hous. v. Bequette (1980) FEHC Dec. No. 80-29, pp. 3-5; Dept. of Fair Empl. & Hous. v. Hess (1980) No. 80-10, FEHC Precedential Decs. 1980-1981, CEB 3, p. 2.)

(4a) Final responsibility for interpreting the law rests with the courts rather than with administrative agencies. (Whitcomb Hotel, Inc. v. Cal. Emp. Com. (1944) 24 Cal.2d 753, 757 [151 P.2d 233, 155 A.L.R. 405].) Still, the commission's interpretation of FEHA is entitled to consideration because the commission is the agency charged with the statute's administration. (Gov. Code, § 12930.) It has been said the responsible agency's interpretation is entitled to "great weight" when, as here, it is substantially contemporaneous with the statute's enactment. This is because such interpretations "`are highly relevant and material evidence of the probable general understanding of the times and of the opinions of men [and women] who probably were active in the drafting of the statute.'" (Whitcomb Hotel, Inc. v. Cal. Emp. Com., supra, 24 Cal.2d at pp. 756-757, quoting White v. Winchester Club (1942) 315 U.S. 32, 41 [86 L.Ed. 619, 626, 62 S.Ct. 425]; see also Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1388 [241 Cal. Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323].) (2c) The commission first interpreted Government Code section 12955 to bar discrimination against unmarried persons less than two months after the Governor signed it into law. (See Dept. of Fair Empl. & Hous. v. Bequette, supra, FEHC Dec. No. 80-29, pp. 3-5 [dated Nov. 6, 1980]; Stats. 1980, ch. 992, § 2, p. 3154 [reflecting Governor's approval on Sept. 19, 1980].) (4b) The weight due the responsible agency's interpretation of a statute increases when, as here, the agency's interpretation is uniform and of long standing. (Whitcomb Hotel, Inc. v. Cal. Emp. Com., supra, 24 Cal.2d at p. 757; see also Hoyt v. Board of Civil Service Commrs. (1942) 21 Cal.2d 399, 402 [132 P.2d 804]; Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1941) 17 Cal.2d 707, 712 [112 P.2d 10].)

(2d) Nothing in the legislative history of Government Code section 12955 contradicts the established interpretation. If the history sheds any light on the matter, it tends to support that interpretation.

The language prohibiting discrimination in housing accommodations "because of ... marital status" derives from the Rumford Fair Housing Act of 1963 (Rumford Act) (former Health & Saf. Code, § 35720), which FEHA superseded. As originally enacted, the Rumford Act did not refer to "marital status." (Stats. 1963, ch. 1853, § 2, p. 3824.) The Legislature added those words in 1975. (Stats. 1975, ch. 1189, § 3, pp. 2943-2944.)

While the 1975 amendment was under consideration, representatives of the Attorney General's Office advised the Legislature in hearings that one of *1158 its effects would be to override prior law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 125.6), which the Attorney General had interpreted as permitting licensed realtors acting as property managers to select tenants "on the basis of a blood or marital relationship between the prospective occupants or a lack of such relationship...." (Letter from Attorney General to Assemblyman Dixon (Aug. 26, 1974) quoted in 9 Assem. J. (1973-1974 Reg. Sess.) p. 17400.)

That the Legislature understood the 1975 amendment would protect unmarried cohabitants can also be inferred from the text of the amendment. An exception to the amendment, which continues in FEHA (Gov. Code, § 12995, subd. (a)(2)), expressly permitted "any postsecondary educational institution" to provide "housing accommodations reserved for either male or female students ... or ... married students...." (Former Health & Saf. Code, § 35741.5, added by Stats. 1975, ch. 1189, § 6, p. 2947.) The exception had no apparent purpose unless the amendment, without the exception, would have required educational institutions to permit unmarried male and female students to live together, or prevented discrimination in favor of married students.

Soon after the Governor signed the 1975 amendment into law, the court in Atkisson v. Kern County Housing Authority (1976) 59 Cal. App.3d 89, 99-100 [130 Cal. Rptr. 375] interpreted the amendment as "a general policy statement" making "unlawful" a public housing authority's policy of forbidding a tenant to live with persons of the opposite sex not related to the tenant by blood, marriage, or adoption. Atkisson was the only judicial interpretation of the statutory language barring housing discrimination because of "marital status" in 1980, when the Legislature decided to reuse the language in the new FEHA. (5a) It is frequently said that "[w]hen a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing the interpretation put on that statute by the courts, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the courts' construction of that statute." (People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 475 [279 Cal. Rptr. 847, 807 P.2d 1076]; see also Wilkoff v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 345, 353 [211 Cal. Rptr. 742, 696 P.2d 134]; People v. Hallner (1954) 43 Cal.2d 715, 719 [277 P.2d 393]; People v. Fox (1977) 73 Cal. App.3d 178, 181 [140 Cal. Rptr. 615].)

(2e) The new FEHA received the same interpretation as did the old Rumford Act. In 1982, the court in Hess v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1982) 138 Cal. App.3d 232 [187 Cal. Rptr. 712] upheld the commission's finding that the owners of a duplex had violated Government Code section 12955 by rescinding a rental agreement with a man and a woman upon learning they were not married. The court relied on Atkisson v. Kern *1159 County Housing Authority, supra, 59 Cal. App.3d 89, in holding that the language of FEHA "prohibits discrimination based on marital status, including that against unmarried couples." (Hess v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 138 Cal. App.3d at p. 235.) In the ensuing 13 years, no court has suggested the statute should be interpreted differently.

Smith gives the question of FEHA's interpretation cursory treatment in her brief. As mentioned, she takes the position Government Code section 12955 does not protect unmarried cohabitants. Her argument consists of acknowledging that the decisions in Hess v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 138 Cal. App.3d 232, and Atkisson v. Kern County Housing Authority, supra, 59 Cal. App.3d 89, are to the contrary, and citing without discussion opinions from other states interpreting differently statutes similar to FEHA. Smith does not cite other, more recent decisions contrary to her position. (Attorney General v. Desilets, supra, 418 Mass. at p. 320 [636 N.E.2d at p. 235]; Worcester Hous. Auth. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination (1989) 406 Mass. 244 [547 N.E.2d 43]; Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Com'n, supra, 874 P.2d at p. 278; Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Com'n (Alaska 1989) 779 P.2d 1199, 1201-1203.)

Some of the cases Smith cites are of little value for our purposes. The courts in Illinois, Minnesota, and Washington had the burden of reconciling statutes barring discrimination because of "marital status" with other statutes criminalizing private sexual conduct between consenting adults. (Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership (1990) 197 Ill. App.3d 105, 113-114 [143 Ill.Dec. 166, 553 N.E.2d 1152, 1157]; State by Cooper v. French (Minn. 1990) 460 N.W.2d 2, 5-6; McFadden v. Elma Country Club (1980) 26 Wn.App. 195, 201-202 [613 P.2d 146, 150].) We do not labor under the same burden.^[10] In 1975, a few months before the Legislature amended the Rumford Act to prohibit housing discrimination because of "marital status," the Legislature repealed the laws criminalizing private, sexual conduct between consenting adults. (See Stats. 1975, ch. 71, § 7, p. 133; see generally Note, California "Consenting Adults" Law: The Sex Act in Perspective (1976) 13 San Diego L.Rev. 439.)

Smith also cites an opinion by the high court of Wisconsin, in which the court declared a county ordinance similar to FEHA "invalid to the extent that it [sought] to protect `cohabitants'...." (County of Dane v. Norman *1160 (1993) 174 Wis.2d 683, 688 [497 N.W.2d 714, 716].) The court reasoned the county had no power to enact statutes "inconsistent with the public policy of [Wisconsin,] which seeks to promote the stability of marriage and family." (Ibid.) We have no analogous power to invalidate a state statute, such as Government Code section 12955, on nonconstitutional grounds. The argument is illogical in any event: one can recognize marriage as laudable, or even as favored, while still extending protection against housing discrimination to persons who do not enjoy that status.

An opinion by the high court of New York (Hudson View Properties v. Weiss (1983) 59 N.Y.2d 733 [463 N.Y.S.2d 48, 450 N.E.2d 234]) is not on point. Without expressly deciding whether or not a statute barring discrimination because of "marital status" applied to unmarried couples, the court held that "the issue arises not because the tenant is unmarried, but because the lease restricts occupancy of her apartment ... to the tenant and the tenant's immediate family." (Id., at p. 735 [463 N.Y.S.2d at p. 429, 450 N.E.2d at p. 235] [interpreting N.Y. Exec. Law, § 296, subd. 5(a).].) One can argue from the result that New York courts would not interpret their statute as applying to unmarried couples. But the cursory opinion offers no real assistance on the issue.

A lower court in Maryland (Prince George's County v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc. (1981) 49 Md. App. 314 [431 A.2d 745]) did interpret a statutory ban on "marital status" discrimination as not protecting unmarried couples. The court permitted a housing association to refuse to approve the sale of a house to an unmarried couple. The court reasoned that "neither complainant (each of whom was `single,' `unmarried') was denied membership individually because of his or her individual marital status. While each separately had a marital status, collectively they did not." (Id., at p. 319 [431 A.2d at pp. 747-748], italics omitted.) The Maryland court's reasoning cannot easily be applied to California law. Our Legislature, as mentioned, has used the words "marital status" to refer to the presence or absence of the marital relationship between two individuals. (E.g., Fam. Code, §§ 1830, 7602; Prob. Code, § 6450.)

Ultimately, the question must be answered as a matter of California law. In view of Government Code section 12955's language, its uniform and long-standing interpretation by the commission and the courts, and its legislative history, we conclude that FEHA does protect unmarried cohabitants against housing discrimination.^[11]

*1161 B. Does Federal or State Law Require the State to Exempt Smith From FEHA to Avoid Burdening Her Religious Exercise?

Having concluded that Smith violated FEHA, we must now determine whether the state is required to exempt her from that law to avoid burdening her exercise of religious freedom. Although the question has arisen in three other states, only the Supreme Court of Alaska has decided it. That court rejected the landlord's claim to an exemption. (Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Com'n, supra, 874 P.2d at pp. 279-280, cert. den. (1994) ___ U.S. ___ [130 L.Ed.2d 368, 115 S.Ct. 460].) The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found the question inappropriate for resolution by summary judgment and remanded for further evidentiary proceedings. (Attorney General v. Desilets, supra, 418 Mass. at pp. 320-334 [636 N.E.2d at pp. 235-243].) The Supreme Court of Minnesota, which interpreted Minnesota law as permitting discrimination against unmarried couples, for that reason did not address the landlord's claim to an exemption. (State by Cooper v. French, supra, 460 N.W.2d at p. 11.)

Smith's claim to an exemption implicates three areas of law: the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.), and article I, section 4, of the California Constitution. We consider each in turn.

1. The First Amendment.

(6a) The First Amendment does not support Smith's claim. Her religion may not permit her to rent to unmarried cohabitants, but "the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a `valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).'" (Employment Div., Ore. Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith (1990) 494 U.S. 872, 879 [108 L.Ed.2d 876, 886, 110 S.Ct. 1595], quoting United States v. Lee (1982) 455 U.S. 252, 263, fn. 3 [71 L.Ed.2d 127, 136, 102 S.Ct. 1051].) The statutory prohibition against discrimination because of marital status (Gov. Code, § 12955) is a law both generally applicable and neutral towards religion. The law is generally applicable in that it prohibits all discrimination without reference to motivation. The law is neutral in that its object is to prohibit discrimination irrespective of reason — not because it is *1162 undertaken for religious reasons. (See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah (1993) 508 U.S. 520, 566 [124 L.Ed.2d 472, 512, 113 S.Ct. 2217].) Consequently, section 12955 does not violate the free exercise clause as interpreted in Employment Div., Ore. Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, supra.

The foregoing principles reflect the latest evolution in the United States Supreme Court's understanding of the free exercise clause. While they bar Smith's claim under the federal Constitution to an exemption from FEHA, to assist in understanding her claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the California Constitution we review how the free exercise clause was interpreted in the past and how the high court arrived at the current understanding articulated in Employment Div., Ore. Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, supra, 494 U.S. 872.

In the earliest cases arising under the free exercise clause, the high court held that, while freedom of religious belief was absolutely protected, the government might regulate conduct. That a generally applicable law incidentally burdened a person's right to freely exercise his or her religion was not considered a valid objection to the law's enforcement. (E.g., Reynolds v. United States (1878) 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145, 167 [25 L.Ed. 244, 250-251] [upholding application of polygamy statute to person whose religious beliefs required polygamous marriages].)

The court later came to view the distinction between belief and conduct as an insufficient basis for resolving conflicts between religious exercise and generally applicable laws. (Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) 406 U.S. 205, 220 [32 L.Ed.2d 15, 28, 92 S.Ct. 1526] ["in this context belief and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compartments"].) Thereafter, instead of simply distinguishing between belief and conduct, the court weighed the burden on religious exercise against the government's interest in applying the law. If the burden was substantial and outweighed the government's interest, the government was required to accommodate the religiously motivated conduct by exempting it from the law.^[12] If, on the other hand, the government's interest was of sufficient importance to outweigh the