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Full Opinion
Armando RUIZ, Linda Aguirre, John Philip Evans, Rosie Garcia, Candido Mercado, Manuel Pena, Jr., Peter Rios, Jr., Macario Saldate IV, Federico Sanchez and Victor Soltero, Plaintiffs/Appellants/ Cross-Appellees,
v.
Jane Dee HULL, Governor of Arizona; Grant Woods, Attorney General of Arizona; State of Arizona; Arizonans for Official English and Robert D. Park, Intervenors, Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc.
*985 Grant Woods, Attorney General by Rebecca White Berch, Assistant Attorney General, Paula S. Bickett, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas I. McClory, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, for Jane Dee Hull, Grant Woods, and The State of Arizona.
Stephen G. Montoya and Albert M. Flores, Phoenix, for Appellant Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
*986 Morrison & Hecker, L.L.P. by James F. Henderson, Tyler Q. Swensen, Phoenix, for Arizonans for Official English and Robert D. Park.
Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Los Angeles, CA, by Irma Rodriguez and Legal Aid Society of San Francisco Employment Law Center, San Francisco, CA, and American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, Inc., San Francisco, CA, and Ortega & Associates, P.C. by Daniel R. Ortega, Jr., Phoenix, for Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund.
Hanson, Bridgett, Marcus, Vlahos & Rudy by Robert L. Rusky, San Francisco, CA, for American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California and Legal Aid Society of San Francisco, Employment Law Center.
Brown & Bain, P.A. by Antonio T. Viera, Phoenix, for Arizona Civil Liberties Union; Los Abogados Hispanic Bar Association; League of United Latin American Citizens; Arizona Hispanic Coalition; Arizona Hispanic Chamber of Commerce; Arizona Hispanic Community Forum; Chicanos Por La Causa.
Roderick G. McDougall, Phoenix City Attorney by Paul L. Badalucco, Assistant Phoenix City Attorney, Phoenix, for City of Phoenix.
Perez & Choi by Hyung S. Choi, Phoenix, Karen K. Narasaki, Washington, D.C., Sandra Del Valle, New York, N.Y., for Puerto Rican Legal Defense & Education Fund; National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium, et al.
Herb Yazzie, Attorney General, Navajo Nation by Kimberly A. Rozak, Navajo National Department of Justice, Window Rock, for the Navajo Nation.
Dominguez & Associates, P.C. by Antonio Dominguez, Phoenix, and Steven R. Shapiro, Marjorie Heins, New York, N.Y., and Edward M. Chen and Hanson, Bridgett, Marcus, Vlahos & Rudy by Robert L. Rusky, San Francisco, CA, for American Civil Liberties Union and American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California.
Jennings & Haug by Robert O. Dyer, Stacy A. Dowdell, Phoenix, and Ginsburg, Feldman & Bress by Leonard J. Henzke, Jr., Washington, D.C., for U.S. English, Inc.
Brown & Bain, P.A. by Stephen E. Lee and Peter M. Tiersma, Loyola Law School, Phoenix, for Linguistic Society of America.
Donald W. Jansen, Arizona House of Representatives, Phoenix, for Arizona Legislators.
Ortega & Associates, P.C. by Daniel R. Ortega, Jr., Phoenix, and Christopher Ho, Legal Aid Society of San Francisco Employment Law Center and Hanson, Bridgett, Marcus, Vlahos & Rudy by Robert L. Rusky, San Francisco, CA, and Theresa Fay-Bustillos, Mexican American Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Los Angeles, CA, for Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund and Employment Law Center.
Osborn Maledon, P.A. by Andrew D. Hurwitz, Phoenix, and Crowell & Moring, L.L.P. by Joseph N. Onek, William D. Wallace, Javier M. Guzman, Scott E. Gant, Washington, D.C., for National Council of La Raza; Ayuda, Inc.; Arizona Hispanic Chamber of Commerce Foundation; Centro de Amistad, Inc.; Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc; Friendly House, Inc.; Housing for Mesa, Inc.; Valle Del Sol, Inc.
Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P. by Martha E. Gibbs, Phoenix, and Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison by Jodi A. Danzig, Allan Blumstein, New York, N.Y., for Human Rights Watch.
Steptoe & Johnson, L.L.P. by Bennett Evan Cooper, Phoenix, Richard K. Willard and Washington Legal Foundation by Daniel J. Popeo, Richard A. Samp, Washington, D.C., for Washington Legal Foundation; Claremont Institute for the Study of Statesmanship and Political Philosophy; Allied Educational Foundation; United States Representatives Charles T. Canady; Matt Salmon; Bob Stump; Bob Barr; Bill Barrett; Doug Bereuter; Chris Cannon; Jon Christensen; John T. Doolittle; Bob Goodlatte; Doc Hastings; Asa Hutchinson; Peter King; William Lipinski; Ron Paul; Ed Royce; F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.; Gerald B. Solomon.
*987 OPINION
MOELLER, Justice.
SUMMARY
¶ 1 This opinion addresses the constitutionality of Article XXVIII of the Arizona Constitution (the "Amendment"), which was adopted in 1988 and which provides, inter alia, that English is the official language of the State of Arizona and that the state and its political subdivisionsincluding all government officials and employees performing government businessmust "act" only in English.
¶ 2 We hold that the Amendment violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution because it adversely impacts the constitutional rights of non-English-speaking persons with regard to their obtaining access to their government and limits the political speech of elected officials and public employees. We also hold that the Amendment violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it unduly burdens core First Amendment rights of a specific class without materially advancing a legitimate state interest.
¶ 3 In making these rulings, we express no opinion concerning the constitutional validity of less restrictive English-only provisions discussed in this opinion. We also emphasize that nothing in this opinion compels any Arizona governmental entity to provide any service in a language other than English.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. The Amendment
¶ 4 In October 1987, Arizonans for Official English ("AOE") initiated a petition drive to amend Arizona's constitution to designate English as the state's official language and to require state and local governments in Arizona to conduct business only in English. As a result of the general election in November 1988, the Amendment was added to the Arizona Constitution, receiving affirmative votes from 50.5% of Arizona citizens casting ballots. See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English ("AOE"), 69 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir.1995) (en banc).[1] The Amendment, entitled "English as the Official Language," is set forth in full in the Appendix and provides that "[t]he State and all political subdivisions of [the] State shall act in English and in no other language." The Amendment binds all government officials and employees in Arizona during the performance of all government business, and provides that any "person who resides in or does business in this State shall have standing to bring suit to enforce this article in a court of record of the State."
II. Yniguez v. Mofford
¶ 5 Two days after the voters passed the Amendment, Maria-Kelley F. Yniguez sued the State of Arizona, the Governor, and various parties pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Amendment and to have it declared unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. She also contended that it violated federal civil rights laws. Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F.Supp. 309 (D.Ariz. 1990). When she filed her action, Yniquez was employed by the Arizona Department of Administration and handled medical malpractice claims asserted against the state. Yniguez was bilingual, fluent and literate in both Spanish and English, and, prior to the Amendment's passage, she communicated in Spanish with monolingual Spanish-speaking claimants and in a combination of English and Spanish with bilingual claimants. Id. at 310.
¶ 6 By the time the district court ruled, only the Governor remained as a defendant. Id. The district court granted declaratory *988 relief, finding that the Amendment was facially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. Id. at 313. Injunctive relief, however, was denied because there was no enforcement action pending against Yniguez. Id. at 317. The Governor did not appeal the decision. The Attorney General of Arizona, AOE, and Robert D. Park, a principal sponsor of the Amendment, then moved to intervene for purposes of pursuing an appeal. The district court denied the motion. Yniguez v. Mofford, 130 F.R.D. 410 (D.Ariz. 1990).
¶ 7 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's denial and also allowed Arizonans Against Constitutional Tampering, the principal opponent of the Amendment, to intervene as plaintiffs-appellees. Yniguez v. AOE, 42 F.3d 1217, 1223-24 (9th Cir.1994). The intervention of the Arizona Attorney General was permitted for the limited purpose of urging adoption of his narrow interpretation of the Amendment discussed below or, alternatively, to urge the certification of the interpretation of the Amendment to this court pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated ("A.R.S.") § 12-1861.[2]
¶ 8 The State of Arizona filed a suggestion of mootness because Yniguez was no longer employed by the State of Arizona. The court of appeals rejected the suggestion of mootness, reasoning that Yniguez had a right to appeal the district court's failure to award nominal damages to her and, therefore, had a sufficient concrete interest in the outcome of the litigation to confer standing to pursue declaratory relief. Yniguez v. Arizona, 975 F.2d 646, 647 (9th Cir.1992) (citations omitted).
¶ 9 AOE appealed the district court's judgment that declared the Amendment unconstitutional and Yniguez cross-appealed the denial of nominal damages. A panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that the Amendment is unconstitutionally overbroad and also held that Yniguez was entitled to nominal damages. Yniguez v. AOE, 42 F.3d at 1229, 1243. The Ninth Circuit then reheard the case en banc and affirmed. Yniguez v. AOE, 69 F.3d at 947.
¶ 10 AOE petitioned for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, which granted the petition and ordered additional briefing on whether the petitioners had standing to maintain the action and whether there remained a federal case or controversy with respect to Yniguez, in light of the fact that she was no longer employed by the State of Arizona. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit opinion and remanded to that court with directions that the action be dismissed. AOE v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 1075, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997). The Court held there was no case or controversy to support federal court jurisdiction and determined that the lower court decisions should be vacated because the Ninth Circuit should have certified the construction of the Amendment to this court. Id., 117 S.Ct. at 1074. In doing so, the Court expressed no opinion on the constitutionality of the Amendment. Id. at 1060.
III. This Litigation
¶ 11 In November 1992, the ten plaintiffs in this case brought an action in superior court against then-Governor J. Fife Symington, III and the Attorney General. On September 5, 1997, Governor Symington resigned and was succeeded by Jane Dee Hull, who has been substituted pursuant to Rule 27(c)(1) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the Amendment violates the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs are four elected officials,[3]*989 five state employees, and one public school teacher. They are all bilingual and regularly communicate in both Spanish and English as private citizens and during the performance of government business. Plaintiffs allege that they speak Spanish during the performance of their government jobs and that they "fear communicating in Spanish `during the performance of government business' in violation of Article XXVIII of the Arizona Constitution."
¶ 12 The principal sponsors of the Amendment, AOE and Robert D. Park, AOE's spokesperson, intervened as defendants. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the superior court ruled that the Amendment is constitutional, finding that it (1) is a content-neutral regulation that does not violate the First Amendment; (2) does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because there is no proof of discriminatory intent; and (3) does not violate the Ninth Amendment because it does not protect choice of language.[4] The trial court denied AOE's request for attorneys' fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2030, and AOE appealed that denial. Under this opinion, AOE is no longer a prevailing party so we do not discuss its request for attorneys' fees further.
¶ 13 On appeal, the court of appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part. Ruiz v. AOE, 218 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 9 (App.1996). Citing the principle of judicial comity, the court held that "it is appropriate for us to exercise our discretion and defer to the federal litigation and thereby accept the construction of Article [XXVIII] and the analysis that was set forth by the Ninth Circuit." 1996 WL 309512 at *4, 218 Ariz. Adv. Rep. at 12. The state defendants petitioned this court for review, which we granted. In 1996, we stayed all proceedings pending the Supreme Court's decision in AOE v. Arizona.
¶ 14 As already noted, in 1997 the United States Supreme Court held that Yniguez' federal court claim was moot and remanded with directions that it be dismissed. Plaintiffs then filed a motion in this court to lift the stay and requested leave to submit supplemental briefs and for oral argument. AOE filed a motion to vacate our order granting review. AOE maintained, in essence, that there was no court of appeals decision for this court to review because the court of appeals had adopted the Ninth Circuit's construction and analysis of the Amendment, see Yniguez v. AOE, 69 F.3d at 947, and the United States Supreme Court had vacated the Ninth Circuit's opinion. The result, AOE argued, was that the court of appeals' opinion was "eradicated." Thus, AOE requested us to either affirm the trial court's judgment or to return the matter to the court of appeals for consideration. We denied AOE's motion to vacate the order granting review and granted plaintiffs' motion to lift the stay.
¶ 15 This court then received supplemental briefing and heard oral argument from the parties. In addition, numerous amici curiae briefs were filed on behalf of a host of organizations and individuals. We reviewed, considered, and appreciate the many amici briefs which advanced varying positions in this case. However, in accordance with our practice, we base our opinion solely on legal issues advanced by the parties themselves. See Town of Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 131 Ariz. 78, 84, 638 P.2d 1324, 1330 (1981), appeal dismissed, 457 U.S. 1101, 102 S.Ct. 2897, 73 L.Ed.2d 1310, reh. denied, 459 U.S. 899, 103 S.Ct. 199, 74 L.Ed.2d 160 (1982), citing City of Tempe v. Prudential Ins. Co., 109 Ariz. 429, 510 P.2d 745 (1973) (holding that amici curiae are not permitted to create, extend, or enlarge issues beyond those raised and argued by the parties). Because we resolve the case on the merits as presented by the parties, we do not discuss the concerns referred to in the special concurrence because, as the special concurrence itself observes, the parties have not raised, briefed, or argued any matter referred to by the special concurrence.
¶ 16 We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-102.21.
ISSUES
¶ 17 1. Whether the trial court erred by ruling that the Amendment did not violate *990 the First Amendment to the United States Constitution because it was content-neutral, did not reach constitutionally-protected free speech rights, and was thus not fatally overbroad.
¶ 18 2. Whether the trial court erred by concluding that the Amendment did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because there was no proof of discriminatory intent.
DISCUSSION
I. Introduction
¶ 19 Plaintiffs contend that the Amendment is a blanket prohibition against all publicly elected officials and government employees using any language other than English in the performance of any government business. Therefore, they reason that the Amendment is a content-based regulation of speech contrary to the First Amendment. Plaintiffs also argue that the Amendment constitutes discrimination against non-English-speaking minorities, thereby violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. AOE and the state defendants respond that the Amendment should be narrowly read and should be construed as requiring the use of English only with regard to "official, binding government acts." They argue that this narrow construction renders the Amendment constitutional.
¶ 20 At the outset, we note that this case concerns the tension between the constitutional status of language rights and the state's power to restrict such rights. On the one hand, in our diverse society, the importance of establishing common bonds and a common language between citizens is clear. Yniguez v. AOE, 69 F.3d at 923, citing Guadalupe Organization, Inc. v. Tempe Elementary Sch. Dist., 587 F.2d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir.1978). We recognize that the acquisition of English language skills is important in our society. For instance, as a condition to Arizona's admission to the Union, Congress required Arizona to create a public school system and provided that "said schools shall always be conducted in English." Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, § 20(4). That same Act requires all state officers and members of the Legislature to have the "ability to read, write, speak and understand the English language sufficiently well to conduct the duties of the office without the aid of an interpreter." Id., § 20(5). Also, the Sixth Amendment permits an English language requirement for jurors. United States v. Benmuhar, 658 F.2d 14, 18-20 (1st Cir.1981) (noting that state's significant interest in having branch of national court system operate in national language rebutted defendant's prima facie showing that English proficiency requirement for jurors resulted in underrepresentation). Congress has recognized the importance of understanding English in such matters as naturalization legislation, 8 U.S.C. § 1423, and the need for the education of non-English-speaking students, Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758. Indeed, Arizona law mandates that school districts in which there are pupils who have limited English proficiency[5] shall provide programs of bilingual instruction or English as a second language with a primary goal of allowing the pupils to become proficient in English in order to succeed in classes taught in English. A.R.S. § 15-752. Finally, the importance of acquiring English skills is emphasized in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(b)(1)(D), which legalizes resident status of illegal immigrants who demonstrate progress toward learning English, and terminates legal residence for those who make little or no progress, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(b)(2)(C).
¶ 21 Indeed, English is also the language of political activity through initiative petition. See Montero v. Meyer, 861 F.2d 603 (10th Cir.1988) (providing that initiative petitions that are printed only in English are not covered by and do not offend provisions of *991 the Voting Rights Act); accord Delgado v. Smith, 861 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir.1988).
¶ 22 However, the American tradition of tolerance "recognizes a critical difference between encouraging the use of English and repressing the use of other languages." Yniguez v. AOE, 69 F.3d at 923. We agree with the Ninth Circuit's statement that Arizona's rejection of that tradition by enacting the Amendment has severe consequences not only for Arizona's public officials and employees, but also for the many thousands of persons who would be precluded from receiving essential information from government employees and elected officials in Arizona's governments. Id. If the wide-ranging language of the prohibitions contained in the Amendment were to be implemented as written, the First Amendment rights of all those persons would be violated, id., a fact now conceded by the proponents of the Amendment, who, instead, urge a restrictive interpretation in accordance with the Attorney General's narrow construction discussed below.
¶ 23 By this opinion, we do not imply that the intent of those urging passage of the Amendment or of those who voted for it stemmed from linguistic chauvinism or from any other repressive or discriminatory intent.[6] Rather we assume, without deciding, that the drafters of the initiative urged passage of the Amendment to further social harmony in our state by having English as a common language among its citizens.
¶ 24 This court must interpret the Amendment as a whole and in harmony with other portions of the Arizona Constitution. State ex rel. Nelson v. Jordan, 104 Ariz. 193, 196, 450 P.2d 383, 386 (1969); State ex rel. Jones v. Lockhart, 76 Ariz. 390, 398, 265 P.2d 447, 453 (1953). And, if possible, we must construe the Amendment to avoid conflict with the United States Constitution. AOE v. Arizona, 117 S.Ct. at 1074.
¶ 25 Every duly enacted state and federal law is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality. Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action at Local Level, Inc., 430 U.S. 259, 272-73, 97 S.Ct. 1047, 1055-56, 51 L.Ed.2d 313 (1977); Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 580, 570 P.2d 744, 748 (1977). The presumption applies equally to initiatives as well as statutes, and where alternative constructions are available, the court should choose the one that results in constitutionality. Slayton v. Shumway, 166 Ariz. 87, 92, 800 P.2d 590, 595 (1990); Hernandez v. Frohmiller, 68 Ariz. 242, 249, 204 P.2d 854, 859 (1949). However, as discussed more fully below, where the regulation in question impinges on core constitutional rights, the standards of strict scrutiny apply and the burden of showing constitutionality is shifted to the proponent of the regulation. See generally Rosen v. Port of Portland, 641 F.2d 1243, 1246, 1249 (9th Cir.1981) (laws restricting speech face a heavy presumption against their constitutional validity and proponents bear burden of establishing that they are "narrowly tailored" to further a "compelling" government interest); see also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 576, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). Mindful of these principles, we turn now to an analysis of the constitutionality of the Amendment.
II. Attorney General's Opinion
¶ 26 On its face, the Amendment provides that, except for some enumerated narrow exceptions, English is the official language of the State of Arizona, of all political *992 subdivisions, of the ballot, the public schools, and government functions and actions. The exceptions pertain to the teaching of English as a second language, matters required by federal law, any matter pertaining to the protection of public health or safety, or of the rights of criminal defendants or victims of crime. See Appendix. Before making a facial analysis of the Amendment, however, we must first determine the propriety of adopting the Attorney General's proposed narrowing construction.
¶ 27 In 1989, shortly after the Amendment was passed, Robert Corbin, then Attorney General, issued an opinion upholding the constitutionality of the Amendment, based upon a narrow construction of the Amendment. Ariz. Att'y Gen. Op. I89-009 (1989); see also Ariz. Att'y Gen. Ops. I89-013 and -014 (1989).
¶ 28 Opinions of the Attorney General are advisory. Green v. Osborne, 157 Ariz. 363, 365, 758 P.2d 138, 140 (1988), and are not binding. Marston's Inc. v. Roman Catholic Church, 132 Ariz. 90, 94, 644 P.2d 244, 248 (1982) (in division). However, the reasoned opinion of a state attorney general should be accorded respectful consideration. See AOE v. Arizona, 117 S.Ct. at 1073 n. 30, citing Huggins v. Isenbarger, 798 F.2d 203, 207-10 (7th Cir.1986) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
¶ 29 While we duly consider the Attorney General's proposed narrowing construction, we reject that construction for three substantive reasons, each of which we discuss in turn. First, the proffered narrowing construction does not comport with the plain wording of the Amendment, and hence, with the plain meaning rule guiding our construction of statutes and provisions in the Arizona Constitution. Second, it does not comport with the stated intent of the drafters of the Amendment. Third, it suffers from both ambiguity and implausibility. Therefore, the narrowing construction is rejected because the Amendment's clear terms are not "readily susceptible" to the constraints that the Attorney General attempts to place on them. Yniguez v. AOE, 69 F.3d at 929; see also Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 395, 108 S.Ct. 636, 644, 98 L.Ed.2d 782 (1988) (refusing to accept as authority a non-binding attorney general opinion where narrowing construction advocated by attorney general was not in accordance with the plain meaning of the statute).
A. Plain Meaning Rule
¶ 30 The Attorney General maintains that although the Amendment declares English to be Arizona's "official" language, its proscriptions against the use of non-English languages should be interpreted to apply only to "official acts of government." Ariz. Att'y Gen. Op. I89-009, at 5-6. The Attorney General defines "official act" as "a decision or determination of a sovereign, a legislative council, or a court of justice." Id. at 7. Although he does not further explain what acts would be official, the Attorney General concludes that the Amendment should not be read to prohibit public employees from using non-English languages while performing their public functions that could not be characterized as official. The Attorney General opines that the provision "does not mean that languages other than English cannot be used when reasonable to facilitate the day-to-day operation of government." Id. at 10.
¶ 31 Somewhat curiously, intervenors now agree with the Attorney General that the Amendment should be held to govern only binding, official acts of the state, which they also seek to construe narrowly as "formal rule-making or rate making ... or any other policy matters." AOE and the state defendants also point to the definition of "official act" adopted by the court in Kerby v. State ex rel. Frohmiller, 62 Ariz. 294, 310-11, 157 P.2d 698, 705-06 (1945). The court there defined "official acts" as "acts by an officer in his official capacity under color and by virtue of his office." Id. However, assuming, without deciding, that the government could require official acts to be conducted in English only, nothing in the language of the Amendment remotely supports such a limiting construction.
¶ 32 To arrive at his interpretation, the Attorney General takes the word "act" from § 3(1)(a) of the Amendment, which provides that, with limited exceptions, the "State and *993 all political subdivisions of this State shall act in English and in no other language." (Emphasis added.) The Attorney General proposes that the word "act" from § 3(1)(a) should be ascribed to the word "official," found in the Amendment's proclamation that English is the official language of Arizona. Therefore, the Attorney General interprets the Amendment to apply only to the official acts of the state and limits the definition of the noun "act" to a "decision or determination of a sovereign, a legislative council, or a court of justice." Op. Atty. Gen. Az. No. I89-009, at 7 (quoting Webster's International Dictionary 20 (3d ed., unabridged, 1976) (third meaning of "act")). We agree with the Ninth Circuit in Yniguez v. AOE that the former Attorney General's opinion ignores the fact that "act," when used as a verb as in the Amendment, does not include among its meanings the limited definition he proposed. 69 F.3d at 929. Similarly, section 1(2) of the Amendment also describes English as the language of "all government functions and actions." The Amendment does not limit the terms "functions" and "actions" to official acts as urged by the Attorney General, and the ordinary meanings of those terms do not impose such a limitation. Id. at 929 n. 13. We agree with the district court that originally evaluated the challenges to the Amendment in Yniguez: "The Attorney General's restrictive interpretation of the Amendment is in effect a `remarkable job of plastic surgery upon the face of the [Amendment].'" Yniguez v. Mofford 730 F.Supp. at 316, citing Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 153, 89 S.Ct. 935, 940, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969).
¶ 33 We hold that by ignoring the express language of the Amendment, the Attorney General's proposed construction violates the plain meaning rule that requires the words of the Amendment to be given their natural, obvious, and ordinary meaning. County of Apache v. Southwest Lumber Mills, Inc., 92 Ariz. 323, 327, 376 P.2d 854, 856 (1962). By its express terms, the Amendment is not limited to official governmental acts or to the "formal, policy making, enacting and binding activities of government." Rather, it is plainly written in the broadest possible terms, declaring that the "English language is the language of ... all government functions and actions " and prohibiting all "government officials and employees" at every level of state and local government from using non-English languages" during the performance of government business." Amendment, §§ 1(2), 1(3)(a)(iv) (emphasis added).
B. Legislative Intent
¶ 34 We also believe the Attorney General's proposed construction is at odds with the intent of the drafters of the Amendment. The drafters perceived and obviously intended that the application of the Amendment would be widespread. They therefore inserted some limited exceptions to it. Those exceptions permit the use of non-English languages to protect the rights of criminal defendants and victims, to protect the public health and safety, to teach a foreign language, and to comply with federal laws. Amendment, § 3.2. Regardless of the precise limits of these general exceptions, their existence demonstrates that the drafters of the Amendment understood that it would apply to far more than just official acts.
¶ 35 For example, one exception allows public school teachers to instruct in a non-English language when teaching foreign languages or when teaching students with limited English proficiency. Such instruction by teachers is obviously not a "formal, policy making, enacting or binding activity by the government," the narrow construction urged by the Attorney General. The exceptions would have been largely, if not entirely, unnecessary under the Attorney General's proposed construction of the Amendment. When construing statutes, we must read the statute as a whole and give meaningful operation to each of its provisions. Kaku v. Arizona Board of Regents, 172 Ariz. 296, 297, 836 P.2d 1006, 1007 (App.1992).
¶ 36 In construing an initiative, we may consider ballot materials and publicity pamphlets circulated in support of the initiative. Bussanich v. Douglas, 152 Ariz. 447, 450, 733 P.2d 644, 647 (App.1986). The ballot materials and publicity pamphlets pertaining to the Amendment do not support *994 the Attorney General's limiting construction. In AOE's argument for the Amendment, Chairman Robert D. Park stated that the Amendment was intended to "require the government to function in English, except in certain circumstances," and then listed those exceptions set forth in section 4 of the Amendment (emphasis added). Chairman Park's argument then went on to state that "[o]fficially sanctioned multilingualism causes tension and division within a state. Proposition 106 [enacting the Amendment] will avoid that fate in Arizona." (Emphasis added.) The Legislative Council's argument in support of the Amendment stated that the existence of a multilingual society would lead to "the fears and tensions of language rivalries and ethnic distrust." Arizona Publicity Pamphlet in Support of the Amendment, at 26. Therefore, the Amendment's legislative history supports a broad, comprehensive construction of the Amendment, not the narrow construction urged by the Attorney General.
C. Ambiguity
¶ 37 The Attorney General's interpretation would unnecessarily inject elements of vagueness into the Amendment. We feel confident that an average reader of the Amendment would never divine that he or she was free to use a language other than English unless one was performing an official act defined as "a decision or determination of a sovereign, a legislative council, or a court of justice."[7]
¶ 38 Because we conclude that the narrow construction advocated by the Attorney General is untenable, we analyze the constitutionality of the Amendment based on the language of the Amendment itself.