Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple v. Sullivan

At issue in these consolidated appeals is the decision of Donald Clegg, then-Director of the Honolulu Department of Land Utilization (DLU) (the Director), to deny the appellant-appellant Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple of Hawaii’s (the Temple’s) application for a variance for its “Main Temple Hall” (the Hall), 2 which had previously been found to exceed the allowable height limit under the zoning code. The Temple filed a total of five appeals in the First Circuit Court from the actions of the Director and the Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) related to this issue, all of which were unsuccessful. On appeal to this court, the Temple argues that the circuit court erred because: (1) the Director abused his discretion by failing (a) either to make a declaratory ruling that the Hall was in compliance with the applicable zoning code (b) or to grant the Temple a variance; (2) the Temple was deprived of rights guaranteed by the Hawai'i Administrative Procedure Act (HAPA)—Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) ch. 91—and the due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 5 of the Hawai'i Constitution, in that it was not granted a full trial-like hearing before the Director made his initial decision; (3) a direct appeal lies to the circuit court from variance and other decisions of the Director; and (4) application of the relevant height restriction to the Temple illegally burdened its right to the free exercise of religion, in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C.2000bb et seq., the first amendment to the United States Constitution, and article I, section 4 of the Hawai'i Constitution.

All of the Temple’s arguments are without merit. Accordingly, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 25, 1986, the Honolulu Building Department issued a building per *222 mit to the Temple to expand the construction on its compound (then consisting of several buildings, a courtyard, and statuary) in an “R-5” residential district, located at Wai’ómoa'o Road and Halela'au Place, Pálolo Valley, City and County of Honolulu. The permit authorized the construction of the Hall, which the Temple expected to use for “offices, [a] library, [a] museum and [an] exhibition room intended to further the understanding of the Korean Buddhist religion.” The permit approved the Temple’s building plans accompanying its permit request, which indicated that the height of the Hall would be approximately sixty-six feet above grade. No revision of the building-plans was ever submitted to the Building Department. When the plans were approved, the Comprehensive Zoning Code (CZC) was in effect. CZC § 21-5.4 (1984-1985 Supp.) allowed a maximum height of twenty-five feet above the “high point of the buildable area boundary line” (HBABL). 3 However, after the Hall was actually built, a DLU inspector determined that an extra floor had been built and that the structure’s height was seventy-four to seventy-five feet—nine feet higher than authorized by the building permit and 6.88 feet higher than the maximum height allowed by CZC § 21-5.4 (i.e., 6.88 feet over the HBABL plus twenty-five feet). Accordingly, the inspector issued a notice of violation on February 23, 1988, ordering the Temple to stop work on the Hall. 4

The Temple filed its first application for a variance on June 15, 1988. The Director 5 denied the application on September 16, 1988, after a public hearing. The Director noted that, subsequent to the granting of the permit, the CZC was repealed and replaced by the Land Use Ordinance (LUO), which was enacted on October 22, 1986. LUO § 5.40 (1988) provides that the maximum height of buildings in a residential district is thirty feet above grade (and is therefore more restrictive than CZC § 21-5.4, which began its height calculation from the HBABL). 6 The Director ruled that the originally approved height of sixty-six feet, although greater than that allowed under the LUO, would be permitted as “nonconforming” because it had been allowed under the law in effect at the time the building permit was issued. However, he ruled that the *223 nine-foot overage, in excess of the authorized sixty-six-foot height, was illegal. The Director further ruled that the Temple had not met the standards for hardship that were required for a variance by the Revised Charter of the City and County of Honolulu (1973) (RCCCH or the City Charter).

The Temple appealed the Director’s decision to the ZBA, which affirmed the Director’s denial of the variance in an order entered on January 11, 1990. See Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 9 Haw.App. 298, 301, 837 P.2d 311, 312, cert. dismissed, 74 Haw. 651, 843 P.2d 144 (1992). The Temple filed an appeal of the ZBA’s decision in the circuit court on February 16, 1990. Id. at 301, 837 P.2d at 312. The ZBA moved to dismiss the circuit court appeal as untimely. Id. at 301, 837 P.2d at 312-13. The circuit court denied the ZBA’s motion. The ZBA appealed the circuit court’s order denying its dismissal motion to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), vacated the circuit court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the appeal as untimely. Id. at 301, 306, 837 P.2d at 312-13, 315.

The Temple filed a second variance application .for a height overage on February 1, 1993. 7 The Director considered the application “because the rules and regulations pertaining to variance applications permit an applicant to reapply for the same or substantially the same variance one year from the effective date of the denial.” 8 Public hearings were held on the 1993 variance application on September 2, 1993 and October 14, 1993. 9

*224 Despite the Temple’s insistence that it was entitled to a trial-like “contested case” hearing, the hearings officer (HO) treated the hearings as “public,” allowing all witnesses to testify briefly without being subject to direct or cross-examination. The HO denied the Temple’s repeated requests to cross-examine witnesses, but allowed the Temple to proffer rebuttal witnesses and arguments. In addition to the legal argument by counsel, fifty-three witnesses testified in support of the Temple’s application, and twelve spoke in opposition, including representatives of the neighborhood organizations, “Concerned Citizens of Palolo” and “Life of the Land.” Numerous letters, written statements, photographs, charts, and other exhibits, including evidence that other Buddhist temples in Korea and Hawai'i are not as large as the Hall and copies of a petition in support of the variance request allegedly signed by over 15,000 people.

Abbot Dae Won Ki, the spiritual leader of the Temple, introduced written testimony, in which he explained the importance of the design of the Hall and other Temple buildings to the ritual uses required by the Cho-gye Order of Korean Buddhism. After summarizing the history and some of the tenets of Buddhism, the abbot noted that the Temple is “dedicated ... to help spread the message of enlightenment, end suffering and promote world peace.” When he first encountered the land on which the Temple was eventually built, Abbot Ki

knew immediately that this place was the right place. It was uniquely suited to the Temple in every respect. It was rectangular, just the shape for the compound we had in mind. It was on a fairly steep hillside which meant that the parking structure could be placed under part of the compound rather than in plain view. The land also had something else which none of the other parcels I had seen possessed. This land gave the feeling that it was a holy place. In 1979 we were able to purchase the land, of which the Zen Master also approved, calling the mountain behind it “Botah San.”

Abbot Ki explained that the Temple’s architectural components have “a special purpose and meaning and the compound is organized in a very special way, each of the elements having a harmonious relationship with the other.” He elaborated that

[o]ur Buddhist order emphasizes meditation and all of the buildings and other parts of the Temple compound are very sensitively designed to be in balance and harmony with each other and the mountains which surround the Temple. The individual [b]uildings[,] and the individual parts of the buildings, serve more than a secular purpose!;] they add up to a whole, more like a religious work of art. Removing the peak of the roof of the Main Temple Hall would be comparable to removing the hand of God from Michelangelo’s painting on the ceiling of the Sistine chapel, or the head of Mary on the Pieta. This balance and harmony is an integral part of the religious teaching and experience which leads to Enlightenment. The Main Temple Hall is an integral part of this balance and harmony!;] it is not too tall and it is not too short!;] it is as it should be.

Finally, Abbot Ki stated that traditional Korean “temple builders” had been brought in from Korea to design and construct the project after the initial plans had been submitted to the Building Department. In order to “create the necessary balance and harmony” the builders had altered the plans and, thus, had extended the Hall to its present height. Describing the act of reducing the height of the Hall as a “desecration of the worst kind,” the abbot asserted that it would also cause extreme financial hardship to the Temple.

Many other witnesses testified similarly that it would be a spiritual violation to cut off the roof of the Hall, which they described as an object of great architectural beauty as well as a religious center. The Temple likewise adduced the testimony of a number of architects and academics, who echoed the points emphasized by Abbot Ki. These included Jon Shimizu, who testified that reducing the size of the Hall would cost approximately one million dollars and would require a year or more to accomplish. Jack J. McGarrity, another architect, testified that the arched shape and size of the Temple roof *225 was integral to the identification and spiritual significance of the building:

[W]here in a Christian church we have a spire or a steeple with a cross on it or in a Jewish synagogue we have a dome, a minaret in the eastern religion, in the Buddhist faith it is the church roof itself. It is the building and it is the proportions thereof that constitute[] its identification.

A third architect, Ben T. Torigoe, testified, inter alia, that new data had determined that the HBABL was higher than that indicated by the surveys performed prior to the initial 1988 variance application. According to the new data, the Hall was only 2.7 feet over the maximum height allowed by the CZC.

Those testifying in opposition to the variance voiced a number of complaints, ranging from damage, noise, pollution, and other interference with their property—all of which had resulted from the sustained construction on the Temple site—to parking congestion and the effects of the imposing size of the Hall, including loss of views, declining property values, and a sense of being overshadowed in their homes and yards.

In its “Memorandum in Support of Variance,” the Temple argued, inter alia, that it was entitled to a variance because: (1) it satisfied the three hardship conditions outlined in the City Charter; (2) application of the zoning laws would infringe upon the Temple’s right to the free exercise of religion; (3) the Hall roof was a spire or was sufficiently “spire-like” to fall within a height exception contained in the zoning laws.

The Director filed his written “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision and Order” on December 1, 1993, denying the Temple’s application for a variance. (Case No. 93/VAR-3). Citing LUO § 3.120, 10 the Director again ruled that the Hall was authorized to stand at a maximum of sixty-six feet tall as a “nonconforming” but permitted height because the Temple’s permit had originally been granted while the CZC was in force. He found that the actual height of the Hall was between seventy-four and seventy-five feet. 11 He then examined the facts in light of the three findings required for the issuance of a variance outlined in RCCCH § 6-910:(l) that without the variance the applicant would be denied reasonable use; (2) that the hardship is based on unique circumstances; and (3) that the variance does not alter the essential character of the neighborhood or act contrary to the intent and purpose of the zoning ordinance. 12

With respect to the first factor, the Director found that the Temple would have reasonable use of its land without a variance. He rejected Torigoe’s testimony and documentation purporting to “clarify” the actual height of the HBABL, noting that the survey data had not itself been introduced and that *226 it was “possible some fill material may have been placed on the site” during the five-year interval between the original and subsequent surveys. 13 He reasoned that the Temple “would have enjoyed a substantial height nonconformity if [it] had built according to approved plans[.]” He also rejected the Temple’s argument that because the code permits additional height for rooftop mechanical equipment, spires, flagpoles, and smokestacks, the same exception should be extended to the Temple’s roof. He ruled that the Temple’s wide roof could not be compared to the narrow protrusions of the enumerated permitted uses. The Director further rejected the Temple’s religious, architectural, and historical arguments that the roof must be higher than originally permitted, noting that the Temple itself had initially submitted plans calling for a height no greater that sixty-six feet. He also found that there was no apparent necessity for all the proposed functions of the building to be consolidated into one main building rather than two or more smaller ones.

Regarding the second factor, the Director ruled that no unique circumstances had been demonstrated. He found that the topographical conditions were not unusual for the neighborhood. He also rejected the Temple’s arguments that it would be especially costly to lower the roof, reasoning that the hardship was self-created.

Finally, with respect to the third factor, and relying on the opposition testimony of neighbors and the considerable height of the building, the Director ruled that the height overage altered the essential residential character of the neighborhood. He acknowledged that “the applicant has raised a number of constitutional concerns. However, these concerns are not related to the 3 conditions of hardship established by the Charter, and, hence, are beyond the scope of the Director’s review of a zoning variance.”

■ Accordingly, the Director denied the Temple’s variance application and ordered removal of that portion of the Hall exceeding sixty-six feet in height.

After the hearings on its second variance application, but before the Director’s decision was filed, the Temple filed a petition for a declaratory ruling from the Director that the height of the Hall and the setback of the compound’s ornamental gate 14 did not violate the applicable zoning code. The Temple argued that the Hall’s roof is a “spire” or is sufficiently “spire-like” that the height exemptions contained in the CZC and the LUO that are applicable to “spires” should apply. It also argued that, in order to interpret the zoning laws in conformity with the constitutionally guaranteed right of the free exercise of religion, the Director was obliged to find that the Temple’s height was lawful. The Director declined to enter the requested declaratory ruling, stating that “the Petition raises substantially the same legal and constitutional issues that have been raised in the Temple’s variance petition. Those issues, we believe, will soon be the subject of a ZBA appeal, and possible court review.” In connection with his ruling, the Director relied on DLU Rules Relating to Administrative Practice and Procedure (RRAPP) Rule 3-5(3) (1993), which authorizes him to refuse to enter a declaration where “[t]he issuance of a declaratory ruling may adversely affect the interests of the city in any litigation which is pending or may reasonably be expected to arise.”

The Temple appealed the Director’s decision and order regarding its request for a variance (Case No. 93/ZBA-8) and his refusal to issue a declaratory ruling as to the legality of the Hall’s size (Case No. 93/ZBA-ll) to the ZBA on December 23, 1993 and December 30,1993, respectively. 15 Two community *227 organizations, “Concerned Citizens of Palolo” and “Life of the Land” (collectively, Concerned Citizens) intervened in the Temple’s appeals. In addition, Concerned Citizens appealed that portion of the Director’s decision in which he ruled that the Hall would be permitted to remain sixty-six feet in height as a nonconforming use (Case No. 93/ZB A-9). The Temple intervened in this appeal. The Temple also appealed the Director’s decision and order on its variance application and his refusal to issue a declaratory ruling directly to the circuit court (Civil No. 93-5050-12) on December 30,1993, arguing that no appeal lay to the ZBA under the City Charter.

The ZBA held consolidated hearings on the Temple’s and Concerned Citizens’ appeals over six dates between February 17, 1994 and July 14, 1994. At a pre-hearing scheduling session, the Temple asked the ZBA whether it considered the hearing to be a “contested case hearing” and whether the Temple would be allowed to introduce new evidence. The Chair of the ZBA confirmed that the ZBA considered the hearing to be a contested case hearing, but ruled that the ZBA would not “accept any new evidence because we’re looking to see if the Director was arbitrary and capricious based on the facts known to him at the time he made his decision.”

In the course of the ZBA hearings, the parties were permitted to call and cross-examine witnesses. Nevertheless, the Temple declined to call any witnesses, opting instead to present its case through the documentary record and through cross-examination of the City’s witnesses (all of whom were employees of the DLU). On cross-examination, the Director testified that his staff had proffered evidence to him that had not been formally introduced at the public hearing-conducted by the HO and that this was common practice:

Q (By [the Temple’s counsel:]) The bottom line, thought,] is that evidence was considered that didn’t—that wasn’t introduced at the hearings officer’s hearing.

A There’s lots of evidence that was considered that wasn’t introduced at the hearings officer’s—

Q What other kind of evidence?

A Anything that’s submitted. We’re not in a court of law when we’re doing this. We accept documents from the neighborhood. We accept documents from anybody who wants to submit them to us. The public hearing is a requirement by law, and those who wish to participate in that may; but that’s not the only information we use. That would be terrible. We’re not in a court of law.

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Q ... Is there any provision that you have in the way you operate that allows an applicant to address things that you’re considering that the applicant doesn’t know you’re considering?

A The applicant can review the files at any time.

Q How does the applicant know what you’re considering?

A If the applicant’s concerned, they’ll go and review the files and find out what’s in there.

Among the items submitted to the Director by his staff in connection with the Temple’s variance application were “drawings in a book that related to Buddhist religion in Korea,” the title and author of which the Director could not remember. These drawings purportedly suggested that the teachings of Buddhism did not require the Hall to be of the height to which it was built. Additionally, the staff had undertaken to proffer testimony regarding the nature of Buddhism, to be given by a “qualified individual.” The Director testified that his staff had brought this testimony to his attention in response to the Temple’s evidence on the subject, but that he had not actually considered it in making his decision and, for that reason, had decided not to make it part of the record:

' These are things that they ... mentioned to me and showed me, but they are not part of the file ... because the reli *228 gious aspects of this building are not at issue in the variance.

You brought it up as it were, but in my opinion in looking at the charter and looking at the criteria for judgment, the religious significance of the structure, the height or the things that you mentioned is not a factor in my ... giving a variance or denying a variance.... The religious aspects of this, regardless of what they are, had no bearing on the variance.

The ZBA Chair sustained the City’s objection to the Temple’s continued examination as to the identity of the “qualified individual,” on the basis that the Director had not considered the matter in rendering his decision.

The ZBA rejected the positions advanced in both of the Temple’s appeals, as well as those taken in the appeal of Concerned Citizens, entering findings of fact and conclusions of law similar to those of the Director. The parties appealed the ZBA’s “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision and Order” in all three cases to the circuit court. In addition, the Temple filed yet another 16 appeal of the denial of its variance, as well as of the ZBA’s decision in Concerned Citizens’ appeal 17 in the circuit court, raising largely the same arguments as in its other appeals.

On March 5, 1996, the circuit court filed orders rejecting all five appeals. First, the circuit court dismissed the Temple’s appeal to it of the Director’s order declining to issue a declaratory ruling, on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction to hear it. The circuit court further ruled that HAPA did not require the Director to hold a contested case hearing on variance applications under HAPA; instead, the “contested ease hearing” prescribed by HRS ch. 91 transpired during the proceeding in the ZBA.

Second, the circuit court rejected Concerned Citizens’ contention on appeal, ruling that the Director’s finding that the Hall could be constructed to a height of sixty-six feet as a lawful nonconforming use was “neither arbitrary and capricious, nor an abuse of discretion or an erroneous finding of material fact” because (1) the Temple’s building permits were still “open,” and (2) the ZBA was bound, under the doctrine of collateral estop-pel, by its earlier decision affirming the Director’s finding in connection with the Temple’s first variance application (ZBA Case No. 88/ZBA-66).

Third, the circuit court rejected the Temple’s challenge of the ZBA’s order affirming the Director’s denial of its variance application, ruling that: (1) the Temple had failed to establish that it had met the three hardship conditions prerequisite to the issuance of a variance, pursuant to RCCCH § 6-910; (2) any hardship suffered by the Temple was self-created; (3) the Temple had failed to establish the facts necessary to support its claim of equitable estoppel; (4) with regard to its claim related to the free exercise of religion, (a) the Temple had failed to adduce sufficient facts to establish that the applicable provisions of the zoning code imposed a “substantial burden” on its members’ religious beliefs, for purposes of RFRA and the first amendment to the United States Constitution, (b) the unauthorized addition to the Hall served a clearly secular—and not a religious—purpose and constituted an intentional violation of the zoning laws, and (c) the City’s zoning laws had a clearly secular purpose and served a compelling governmental interest; and (5) the Hall’s roof was not a “spire,” within the meaning of the zoning code.

Fourth, the circuit court found (1) that “[t]he overwhelming weight of the evidence supported]” the denial of the Temple’s variance application and (2) that “the Temple’s representatives had engaged in deceitful and ‘bad faith’ conduct.”

And fifth, the circuit court expressly approved the ZBA’s order affirming the Di *229 rector’s refusal to issue a declaratory ruling, concluding that

[i]t was neither arbitrary and capricious nor an abuse of discretion or an erroneous finding of material fact for the ZBA to find that the Director properly refused to issue a declaratory ruling ... where, as is the case here, the issues raised in the declaratory ruling petition were identical or nearly identical in substance to the issues being litigated in the variance appeal.

The Temple timely appealed all five orders on March 18,1996 (including Concerned Citizens’ appeal from the ZBA’s order, although Concerned Citizens did not itself appeal the circuit court’s order, see supra note 17).

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Agency Decisions

Review of a decision made by the circuit court upon its review of an agency’s decision is a secondary appeal. The standard of review is one in which this court must determine whether the circuit court was right or wrong in its decision, applying the standards set forth in HRS § 91-14(g) [ (1993) ] to the agency’s decision. This court’s review is further qualified by the principle that the agency’s decision carries a presumption of validity and appellant has the heavy burden of making a convincing showing that the decision is invalid because it is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences.

Bragg v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins., 81 Hawai'i 302, 304, 916 P.2d 1203, 1205 (1996) (quoting University of Hawai'i Professional Assembly v. Tomasu, 79 Hawai'i 154, 157, 900 P.2d 161, 164 (1995)). HRS § 91-14(g) provides:

Upon review of the record the court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case with instructions for further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision and order if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the ad-^ ministrative findings, conclusions, decisions, or orders are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; or

(2) In excess of the statutory authority or. jurisdiction of the agency; or

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure; or

(4) Affected by other error of law; or

(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(6) Arbitrary, or capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

HRS § 91—14(g) (1993). “Under HRS § 91-14 (g), conclusions of law are reviewable under subsections (1), (2), and (4); questions regarding procedural defects are reviewable under subsection (3); findings of fact are reviewable under subsection (5); and an agency’s exercise of discretion is reviewable under subsection (6).” Bragg, 81 Hawai'i at 305, 916 P.2d at 1206.

Konno v. County of Hawai'i, 85 Hawai'i 61, 77, 937 P.2d 397, 413 (1997).

B. Interpretation Of A Statute, Ordinance, Or Charter

“[T]he interpretation of a statute[, ordinance, or charter] is a question of law reviewable de novo.” State v. Arceo, 84 Hawai'i 1, 10, 928 P.2d 843, 852 (1996) (quoting State v. Camara, 81 Hawai'i 324, 329, 916 P.2d 1225, 1230 (1996) (citations omitted)). See also State v. Toyomura, 80 Hawai'i 8, 18, 904 P.2d 893, 903 (1995); State v. Higa, 79 Hawai'i 1, 3, 897 P.2d 928, 930, reconsideration denied, 79 Hawai'i 341, 902 P.2d 976 (1995); State v. Nakata, 76 Hawai'i 360, 365, 878 P.2d 699, 704, reconsideration denied, 76 Hawai'i 453, 879 P.2d 558 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1147, 115 S.Ct. 1095, 130 L.Ed.2d 1063 (1995).

Gray v. Administrative Dir. of the Court, 84 Hawai'i 138, 144, 931 P.2d 580, 586 (1997) (some brackets added and some in original). See also State v. Soto, 84 Hawai'i 229, 236, 933 P.2d 66, 73 (1997).. Furthermore, our statutory construction is guided by established rules:

When construing a statute, our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which *230 is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. And we must read statutory language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose.

When there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an ambiguity exists....

In construing an ambiguous statute, “[t]he meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to ascertain their, true meaning.” HRS § 1-15(1) [ (1993) ]. Moreover, the courts may resort to extrinsic aids in determining legislative intent. One avenue is the use of legislative history as an interpretive tool.

Gray, 84 Hawai'i at 148, 931 P.2d at 590 (quoting State v. Toyomura, 80 Hawai'i 8, 18-19, 904 P.2d 893, 903-04 (1995)) (brackets and ellipsis points in original) (footnote omitted). This court may also consider “[t]he reason and spirit of the law, and the cause which induced the legislature to enact it ... to discover its true meaning.” HRS § 1-15(2) (1993). “Laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to each other. What is clear in one statute may be called upon in aid to explain what is doubtful in another.” HRS § 1-16 (1993).

State v. Cullen, 86 Hawai'i 1, 8-9, 946 P.2d 955, 963-64 (1997) (some brackets in original and some added.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Director Did Not Act In An Arbitrary Or Capricious Manner, Or In A Manner Characterized By Either Abuse Of Discretion Or Clearly Unwarranted Exercise Of Discretion By Failing To Issue A Declaratory Ruling Or By Failing To Grant The Temple’s Variance Application.

1. The Director rightly refused to issue a declaratory ruling.

The Temple argues that the Director was “arbitrary and capricious” in refusing to render a declaratory ruling on the issue whether the Hall actually complied with the zoning laws. It reasons that such a ruling might have made the variance proceedings unnecessary and that there was no showing that such a ruling would have resulted in “any potential adverse effect.”

RCCCH § 6-903 provides in relevant part that “[t]he director of land utilization shall: ... [b]e charged with the administration of the zoning and subdivision ordinances and rules and regulations adopted thereunder and any regulatory laws or ordinances which may be adopted to supplement or replace such ordinances.” RRAPP ch. 3 sets forth rule.s regarding the procedure for requesting a declaratory ruling from the Director. RRAPP Rule 3-1 provides that “[a]ny interested person may petition the director for a declaratory ruling as to the applicability of any statute or ordinance relating to the department, or of any rule or order of the department.” RRAPP Rule 3-5 authorizes the Director to refuse to issue a declaratory ruling if, inter alia, “[t]he issuance of the declaratory ruling may adversely affect the interests of the city in any litigation which is pending or may reasonably be expected to arise” or “[f|or other good cause.”

In this case, the Director refused to issue a declaratory ruling because the issues raised by the Temple were “substantially the same” as those being litigated in connection with its variance application and would “soon be the subject of a ZB A appeal, and possible court review.”

On review of the Temple’s petition, it cannot be said that the Director’s finding that the issues raisfed were “substantially the same” as those relating to the variance application was clearly erroneous. Although the arguments are framed slightly differently, as in the variance application, the Temple argued in its petition that (1) the Hall is a “spire” or sufficiently “spire-like” to fall into the height exceptions of CZC § 21-2.4 and/or LUO § 3.60(c) and (2) the United States and Hawai'i constitutional guarantees of free exercise of religion “require that the provisions of the CZC'and the LUO be applied to the Temple structures in a manner that is not *231 more restrictive than other structures permitted within the same zoning district.”

Neither can it be said that the Director’s prediction regarding future appeals to the ZBA and the circuit court were clearly erroneous. It would be reasonable to anticipate an appeal of any denial of a variance application. In this case, the Director’s apprehension was all the more justified, in light of the Temple’s strident rhetoric and flamboyant public campaign in support of its application. For example, in the Temple’s “Memorandum in Support of Variance,” submitted to the Director himself, the Temple accuses the Director of prejudging the case based on quotations from a newspaper article, complaining that “[t]he quandary with which the [Temple] is left is that the very city official who is empowered to grant variances has a publicly stated, but illegal, policy which will operate to deny the variance requested, regardless of whether the [Temple] is legally entitled to a variance.” Apart from having questionable value in persuading the Director to favor the Temple’s cause, such a statement would have reasonably induced the Director to believe that the Temple would appeal any negative decision regarding its variance application.

The Temple is theoretically correct that a declaratory ruling that the Hall was not in violation of the zoning laws might have saved time and expense by avoiding the need for an analysis of the factors justifying a variance. However, such conservation of resources would only have been achieved had the Temple requested the declaratory ruling before filing two applications for a variance, thereby itself precipitating the very analysis it claims to be seeking to avoid. The Temple advanced arguments regarding the legality of the Hall’s height in its 1993 variance application and engaged in numerous lengthy public hearings on the subject before filing its petition for a declaratory ruling. Thus, it had already placed these issues on the table in variance proceedings, and the Director was correct in concluding that it would be a waste of time and effort to duplicate his consideration of the same issues in the context of a request for a declaratory ruling. Nothing in the City Charter or the RRAPP forbids the Director from considering arguments that there has been no zoning violation in a consolidated proceeding with a request for a variance. Indeed, as a general matter, allowing the resolution of these matters in one proceeding makes practical sense because duplication of effort and waste of time are minimized.

The Director’s decision clearly comported with RRAPP Rule 3-5. The Temple has not challenged the validity of that rule. Thus, the Director did not'act arbitrarily or capriciously in refusing to issue a declaratory ruling in this case.

2. The Director’s ruling that the Hall was in violation of the applicable zoning laws and his denial of the variance were justified.

a. the Hall roof is neither a “spire” nor “spire-like”

The Temple argues that the Hall is not in violation of the applicable zoning laws because (1) its roof is a spire or sufficiently “spire-like” to fall within height exceptions contained in the CZC and/or the LUO and (2) the zoning laws must be read consistently with the mandates of the free exercise clauses of the United States and Hawai'i constitutions. However, inasmuch as the height restrictions as applied in this case do not infringe upon the free exercise of religion of its members, under either the United States or Hawai'i constitutions, see infra section III.D, the Temple’s second argument is not addressed here.

LUO § 3.60(c) (1990) created several specific exemptions from the maximum height of buildings in residential areas. That section provided in relevant part:

The following structures shall be exempt from zoning district height limits under the specified restrictions:

1. Vent pipes, fans, chimneys, and structures housing or screening elevator machinery and other similar rooftop machinery.

2. Safety railings not to exceed 42 inches above the governing height limit.

3. Utility poles, radio and television mast antennas, but not dish anten *232 nas, not to exceed 500 feet from existing grade. Other mast antennas shall not exceed 25 feet above the governing height limit.

4. Spires, flagpoles and smokestacks, not to exceed 350 feet from existing grade.

5. One (1) antenna for an amateur radio station operation per zoning lot, not to exceed 90 feet above existing grade.

6. Wind machines, where permitted, provided that each machine shall be set back from all property lines one foot for each foot of height, measured from the highest vertical extension of the system.

7. Any energy-savings device, including heat pumps and solar collectors, not to exceed five feet above the governing height limit.

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(Emphases added and emphases in original deleted.) 18 Similarly, CZC § 21-2.4 exempted from its height limits “structures housing or screening elevator machinery, vent pipes, and fans, safety railings, residential chimne