14 Cal.4th 1090 (1997)

THE PEOPLE ex rel. JOAN R. GALLO, as City Attorney, etc., Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CARLOS ACUNA et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Docket No. S046980.

Supreme Court of California.

January 30, 1997.

*1099 COUNSEL

Amitai Schwartz, Antonio Ponvert III, Sara T. Campos, Edward M. Chen, Alan L. Schlosser, Daniel M. Mayfield, Patricia Price, Amanda Wilson, Siner, Steinbock, Hofman & Pennypacker and Stuart D. Kirchick for Defendants and Appellants.

Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe, Sergio Garcia-Rodriguez and Joyce M. Cartun as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.

Joan R. Gallo, City Attorney, George Rios, Assistant City Attorney, Carol C. Weinstein and Glenn D. Schwarzbach, Deputy City Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

James K. Hahn, City Attorney (Los Angeles), Debbie Lew and Candice I. Horikawa, Deputy City Attorneys, George W. Kennedy, District Attorney (Santa Clara), Dale R. Sanderson, Deputy District Attorney, Gil Garcetti, District Attorney (Los Angeles), George M. Palmer, Brent Riggs and Deanne B. Ancker, Deputy District Attorneys, Berliner Cohen, Frank R. Ubhaus, Stacy L. Saetta, Robert Teir, Kent S. Scheidegger, Stephanie J. Finelli, Daniel J. Popeo, David A. Price, Sweeney, Mason & Wilson and Roger Mason as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

BROWN, J.

At the request of the City Attorney of the City of San Jose (hereafter the City), we granted review to resolve an array of challenges to *1100 two provisions of a preliminary injunction entered by the superior court against individual members of an alleged "criminal street gang." The underlying action was instituted under the provisions of sections 731 of the Code of Civil Procedure and 3480 of the Civil Code, the operative core of California's civil "public nuisance" statutes.

The 48 declarations submitted by the City in support of its plea for injunctive relief paint a graphic portrait of life in the community of Rocksprings. Rocksprings is an urban war zone. The four-square-block neighborhood, claimed as the turf of a gang variously known as Varrio Sureno Town, Varrio Sureno Treces (VST), or Varrio Sureno Locos (VSL), is an occupied territory. Gang members, all of whom live elsewhere, congregate on lawns, on sidewalks, and in front of apartment complexes at all hours of the day and night. They display a casual contempt for notions of law, order, and decency — openly drinking, smoking dope, sniffing toluene, and even snorting cocaine laid out in neat lines on the hoods of residents' cars. The people who live in Rocksprings are subjected to loud talk, loud music, vulgarity, profanity, brutality, fistfights and the sound of gunfire echoing in the streets. Gang members take over sidewalks, driveways, carports, apartment parking areas, and impede traffic on the public thoroughfares to conduct their drive-up drug bazaar. Murder, attempted murder, drive-by shootings, assault and battery, vandalism, arson, and theft are commonplace. The community has become a staging area for gang-related violence and a dumping ground for the weapons and instrumentalities of crime once the deed is done. Area residents have had their garages used as urinals; their homes commandeered as escape routes; their walls, fences, garage doors, sidewalks, and even their vehicles turned into a sullen canvas of gang graffiti.

The people of this community are prisoners in their own homes. Violence and the threat of violence are constant. Residents remain indoors, especially at night. They do not allow their children to play outside. Strangers wearing the wrong color clothing are at risk. Relatives and friends refuse to visit. The laundry rooms, the trash dumpsters, the residents' vehicles, and their parking spaces are used to deal and stash drugs. Verbal harassment, physical intimidation, threats of retaliation, and retaliation are the likely fate of anyone who complains of the gang's illegal activities or tells police where drugs may be hidden.

Among other allegations, the City's complaint asserted that the named defendants and others "[f]or more than 12 months precedent to the date of [the] complaint, continuing up to the present time... [have] occupied [and] used the area commonly known as `Rocksprings' ... in such a manner so as to constitute a public nuisance ... injurious to the health, indecent or *1101 offensive to the senses, [and] an obstruction to the free use of property so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property by those persons living in the ... neighborhood."

After alleging the usual requisites for equitable relief — the prospect of "great and irreparable injury" and the absence of "a plain, adequate and speedy remedy at law" — the complaint prayed for a broad and comprehensive injunction against defendants' alleged activities in Rocksprings. The superior court granted an ex parte temporary restraining order enjoining all 38 defendants named in the complaint and issued an order to show cause (OSC) why a preliminary injunction should not be entered.

Only five of the named defendants appeared in response to the OSC. Following a hearing, the superior court entered a preliminary injunction against the 33 defendants who had not appeared and continued the matter as to those 5 defendants who opposed entry of a preliminary injunction, leaving the temporary restraining order in force as to them. Eleven of the named defendants (the five who had originally appeared in opposition to the OSC, together with another six of the named defendants) moved to vacate the injunctions. After the matter was briefed and argued, the superior court entered a preliminary injunction. The multipart decree, consisting of some 24 paragraphs, was the subject of an interlocutory appeal by these 11 defendants.

The Court of Appeal disagreed with the superior court, upholding only provisions of the preliminary injunction enjoining acts or conduct defined as crimes under specific provisions of the Penal Code. Although its premise is never clearly articulated, that ruling effectively limits the scope of permissible injunctive relief under California's public nuisance statutes to independently criminal conduct. The Court of Appeal also concluded many of the provisions of the preliminary injunction were void and unenforceable under either the First and Fifth Amendments to the federal Constitution as unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Altogether, 15 of the 24 provisions of the trial court's preliminary injunction were partially or entirely invalidated. However, the City's petition only sought review of two provisions — paragraphs (a) and (k). We granted the City's petition and now reverse.

We consider first the scope of and conditions precedent to the exercise of the superior court's equitable jurisdiction to enjoin a public nuisance. We then assess defendants' challenges to paragraphs (a) and (k) of the superior court's preliminary injunction, challenges based on restraints inherent in the administration of equitable remedies, and those arising from constitutionally based limitations. Finally, we consider (and reject) defendants' arguments *1102 that the STEP Act^[1] is the exclusive means of obtaining nuisance-based injunctive relief against a criminal street gang. We will conclude the two challenged provisions fall within the superior court's equitable power to abate a public nuisance and neither runs afoul of rights secured to defendants by the federal Constitution.

I. Equitable Jurisdiction to Enjoin Public Nuisances

A. The Origin and Nature of Actions to Enjoin Public Nuisances

Often the public interest in tranquillity, security, and protection is invoked only to be blithely dismissed, subordinated to the paramount right of the individual. In this case, however, the true nature of the trade-off becomes painfully obvious. Liberty unrestrained is an invitation to anarchy. Freedom and responsibility are joined at the hip. "Wise accommodation between liberty and order always has been, and ever will be, indispensable for a democratic society." (Kovacs v. Cooper (1948) 336 U.S. 77, 89 [69 S.Ct. 448, 454, 93 L.Ed. 513, 10 A.L.R.2d 608] (conc. opn. of Frankfurter, J.).) There must be an irreducible minimum of reciprocity for civil society to function. "[T]he very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests." (Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) 406 U.S. 205, 215-216 [92 S.Ct. 1526, 1533, 32 L.Ed.2d 15].)

The state has not only a right to "maintain a decent society" (Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964) 378 U.S. 184, 199 [84 S.Ct. 1676, 1684, 12 L.Ed.2d 793]), but an obligation to do so. In the public nuisance context, the community's right to security and protection must be reconciled with the individual's right to expressive and associative freedom. Reconciliation begins with the acknowledgment that the interests of the community are not invariably less important than the freedom of individuals. Indeed, the security and protection of the community is the bedrock on which the superstructure of individual liberty rests. From Montesquieu to Locke to Madison, the description of the pivotal compact remains unchanged: By entering society, individuals give up the unrestrained right to act as they think fit; in return, each has a positive right to society's protection. Montesquieu describes this civil liberty as "that tranquillity of spirit which comes from the opinion each one has of his security, and in order for him to have this liberty the government must be such that one citizen cannot fear another citizen." (Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (U. Cambridge Press 1989) ch. 6, p. 157; and see Locke, Two Treatises on Government (U. Cambridge Press, student ed. 1988) §§ 122, *1103 140, 211, 227; Madison, The Federalist No. 51 (Rossiter ed. 1961) pp. 324, 325.) As we explain, a principal office of the centuries-old doctrine of the "public nuisance" has been the maintenance of public order — tranquillity, security and protection — when the criminal law proves inadequate.

There are few "forms of action" in the history of Anglo-American law with a pedigree older than suits seeking to restrain nuisances, whether public or private. Actions to abate private nuisances by injunction are the oldest of these apparent twins, which have almost nothing in common except the word "nuisance" itself. Unlike the private nuisance — tied to and designed to vindicate individual ownership interests in land — the "common" or public nuisance emerged from distinctly different historical origins. The public nuisance doctrine is aimed at the protection and redress of community interests and, at least in theory, embodies a kind of collective ideal of civil life which the courts have vindicated by equitable remedies since the beginning of the 16th century.

Originally, a public nuisance was an offense against the crown, prosecuted as a crime. The first known statute dealing with public nuisances — enacted in the 12th year of Richard II's reign — had as its subject the pollution of waters and ditches lying near settlements, and provided criminal liability for the offender.^[2] The earliest public nuisance statute thus bore a feature that marks the entire field even today: public nuisances are offenses against, or interferences with, the exercise of rights common to the public. (See generally, Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (3d ed. 1990) pp. 492-494.)

In this country, as in England, civil suits in equity to enjoin public nuisances at the instance of public law officers — typically a state's Attorney General — grew increasingly common during the course of the 19th century, a trend that was not without critics. (See, e.g., 2 Story, Equity Jurisprudence (14th ed. 1918) § 1250, p. 597 ["In cases of public nuisances properly so called an indictment lies to abate them and to punish the offenders. But an information also lies in equity to redress the grievance by way of injunction." (Fn. omitted.)]; Mugler v. Kansas (1887) 123 U.S. 623, 672-673 [8 S.Ct. 273, 302-303, 31 L.Ed. 205]; cf. State v. Ehrlick (1909) 65 W. Va. 700 [64 S.E. 935, 938] ["`If a charge be of a criminal nature, or an offense against the public, and does not touch the enjoyment of property, it ought not to be brought within the direct jurisdiction of this court, which was intended to deal only in matters of civil right resting in equity....' Attorney General v. Insurance Co., 2 Johns. Ch. 378...."].)

*1104 With the publication of the Restatement Second of Torts in 1965, the law of public nuisances had crystallized to such an extent that its features could be clearly delineated. Section 821B of Restatement Second of Torts identifies five general categories of "public rights," the unreasonable interference with which may constitute a public nuisance: "the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the public convenience." (Rest.2d Torts, § 821B, subd. (2)(a).) A "public right," according to the Restatement Second, "is one common to all members of the general public. It is collective in nature and not like the individual right that everyone has not to be assaulted or defamed or defrauded or negligently injured." (Id., com. g, p. 92.)

In California, the early common law categories of public nuisance, codified in 1872 and still applicable, define anything that is "injurious to health, ... or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway," as a nuisance. (Civ. Code, § 3479.) Civil Code sections 3480 and 3481 divide the class of nuisances into public and private. A public nuisance is one which "affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons." (Civ. Code, § 3480.) Rounding out the taxonomy of the Civil Code, section 3491 provides that "[t]he remedies against a public nuisance are: [¶] 1. Indictment or information; [¶] 2. A civil action; or, [¶] 3. Abatement."

Section 370 of the Penal Code mirrors these civil provisions, combining the characteristics of nuisances generally with a distinctly public quality: that a given activity "interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property by an entire community or neighborhood, or by any considerable number of persons." (Pen. Code, § 370, italics added.) In People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater (1976) 17 Cal.3d 42, 49 [130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 550 P.2d 600], we parsed these code provisions, remarking on "the substantial identity of definitions appearing in Penal Code sections 370 and 371, and Civil Code sections 3479 and 3480...." After quoting the text of section 370, we observed: "[T]he proscribed act may be anything which alternatively is injurious to health or is indecent, or offensive to the senses; the result[] of the act must interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property; and those affected by the act may be an entire neighborhood or a considerable number of persons, and as amplified by Penal Code section 371 the extent of the annoyance or damage on the affected individuals may be unequal." (People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 49, original italics deleted, new italics added.)

*1105 (1) It is this community aspect of the public nuisance, reflected in the civil and criminal counterparts of the California code, that distinguishes it from its private cousin, and makes possible its use, by means of the equitable injunction, to protect the quality of organized social life. Of course, not every interference with collective social interests constitutes a public nuisance. To qualify, and thus be enjoinable, the interference must be both substantial and unreasonable. We recently discussed these two requirements, albeit in the context of private nuisances, in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893 [55 Cal. Rptr.2d 724, 920 P.2d 669].^[3] Relying on the Restatement Second of Torts, we observed that "`Life in organized society and especially in populous communities involves an unavoidable clash of individual interests. Practically all human activities unless carried on in a wilderness interfere to some extent with others or involve some risk of interference, and these interferences range from mere trifling annoyances to serious harms. It is an obvious truth that each individual in a community must put up with a certain amount of annoyance, inconvenience and interference and must take a certain amount of risk in order that all may get on together.'" (13 Cal.4th at p. 937, quoting Rest.2d Torts, § 822, com. g, p. 112.)

The Restatement Second formulates the requirement of substantiality as proof of "significant harm," defined as a "real and appreciable invasion of the plaintiff's interests," one that is "definitely offensive, seriously annoying or intolerable." (Rest.2d Torts, § 821F, coms. c & d, pp. 105-106.) The measure is an objective one: "If normal persons in that locality would not be substantially annoyed or disturbed by the situation, then the invasion is not a significant one...." (Id., com. d, p. 106.) The unreasonableness of a given interference represents a judgment reached by comparing the social utility of an activity against the gravity of the harm it inflicts, taking into account a handful of relevant factors. (See Rest.2d Torts, §§ 826-831; San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 938.) Here again, the standard is an objective one: "[T]he question is not whether the particular plaintiff found the invasion unreasonable, but `whether reasonable persons generally, looking at the whole situation impartially and objectively, would consider it unreasonable.'" (San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 938, quoting Rest.2d Torts, § 826, com. c, p. 121.)

*1106 B. Expansion and Contraction of "Criminal Equity"

With the legitimacy of equitable relief to control public nuisances well established, American courts began to enlarge the jurisdiction of what has been called by some "criminal equity" and, by others, "government by injunction." (See Mack, The Revival of Criminal Equity (1903) 16 Harv. L.Rev. 389, 397; Fiss, Injunctions (1972) p. 580.) The high-water mark of this trend may have been reached in In re Debs (1895) 158 U.S. 564 [15 S.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed. 1092], where a strike by employees at the Pullman car works in Chicago paralyzed much of the nation's rail transportation and, with it, national commerce. The strike was broken by the entry of a public nuisance injunction — the controversial "Pullman injunction."

Whatever its merit as a question of commerce clause jurisprudence (see 8 Fiss, History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State, 1888-1910 (1993) pp. 58-72), and whatever its place in the history of American labor strife, Justice Brewer's opinion for the court in In re Debs, supra, 158 U.S. 564, reads like a primer on the first duty of government by consent — maintenance of the public order — and the utility of the public nuisance injunction in fulfilling that aspect of the social contract. Justice Brewer rested the power of the courts to issue such an injunction on the "obligations which [government] is under to promote the interest of all, and to prevent the wrongdoing of one resulting in injury to the general welfare," a duty which the court's opinion said was "often of itself sufficient to give [the government] standing in court." (Id. at p. 584 [15 S.Ct. at p. 906].)

An end to this expansive trend, at least as it was reflected in the jurisprudence of this court, came with Chief Justice Gibson's opinion in People v. Lim (1941) 18 Cal.2d 872 [118 P.2d 472]. Although we upheld the complaint as sufficient, our opinion in People v. Lim, supra, 18 Cal.2d 872, articulated an important limitation on the scope of the government's power to exploit the public nuisance injunction as an adjunct of general legal policy. "[T]he tendency to utilize the equity injunction as a means of enforcing public policy is a relatively recent development in the law," the Chief Justice wrote. (Id. at p. 877.) "This development has resulted in a continuous expansion of the field of public nuisances in which equitable relief is available at the request of the state." (Ibid.)

After identifying a division among the authorities "as to whether the expansion of the field of public nuisances in which equity will grant injunctions must be accomplished by an act of the legislature," the Lim court came down firmly on the side of legislative supremacy. (People v. Lim, *1107 supra, 18 Cal.2d at p. 878.) "The courts of this state," we wrote, "have refused to sanction the granting of injunctions on behalf of the state merely by a judicial extension of the definition of `public nuisance.' ... [They have] refused to grant injunctions on behalf of the state except where the objectionable activity can be brought within the terms of the statutory definition of public nuisance." (Id. at pp. 878-879, italics added.)

Reflected in the light of our holding in People v. Lim, supra, 18 Cal.2d 872, two features of California's public nuisance scheme stand out. (2) First, subject to overriding constitutional limitations, the ultimate legal authority to declare a given act or condition a public nuisance rests with the Legislature; the courts lack power to extend the definition of the wrong or to grant equitable relief against conduct not reasonably within the ambit of the statutory definition of a public nuisance. This lawmaking supremacy serves as a brake on any tendency in the courts to enjoin conduct and punish it with the contempt power under a standardless notion of what constitutes a "public nuisance." (See, e.g., People v. Seccombe (1930) 103 Cal. App. 306, 310 [284 P. 725] [Although defendant "follow[ed] the despicable calling of usurer" and had twice been convicted under the criminal statute, his conduct was not a public nuisance under the provisions of Civil Code section 3479 and was not enjoinable].)

Second, our opinion in People v. Lim, supra, 18 Cal.2d 872, affirms the equal dignity, at least as far as the protection of equity is concerned, of private, property-based interests and those values that are in essence collective, arising out of a shared ideal of community life and the minimum conditions for a civilized society. "Courts have held that public and social interests, as well as the rights of property," Chief Justice Gibson wrote, "are entitled to the protection of equity." (Id. at p. 877.) In a sense that cannot easily be dismissed, the availability of equitable relief to counter public nuisances is an expression of "`the interest of the public in the quality of life and the total community environment.'" (People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 52.)

C. The Relation Between Crimes and Public Nuisances

As Justice Brewer noted in the Debs case: "A chancellor has no criminal jurisdiction. Something more than the threatened commission of an offense against the laws of the land is necessary to call into exercise the injunctive powers of the court. There must be some interference, actual or threatened, with property or rights ... but when such interferences appear the jurisdiction of a court of equity arises, and is not destroyed by the fact that they are accompanied by or are themselves violations of the criminal law...." (In *1108 re Debs, supra, 158 U.S. at p. 593 [15 S.Ct. at pp. 909-910].) (3) We made the same point in People v. Lim, supra, 18 Cal.2d 872, 879, quoting a West Virginia case: "We think the proper rule, therefore, and the one to which this state is committed is expressed in the following language from State v. Ehrlick[, supra, 64 S.E. 935, 939]: `It is also competent for the Legislature ... to declare any act criminal and make the repetition or continuance thereof a public nuisance ... or to vest in courts of equity the power to abate them by injunction....'"

In the Ehrlick case itself, the West Virginia high court wrote that "the Attorney General may proceed in equity on behalf of the public to abate the nuisance, if it be one. Whether it be a criminal nuisance or not is wholly immaterial. If it is indictable as a crime, it does not bar the remedy in equity, because the citizen and the general public have an immediate right to the enjoyment of the thing interfered with. A criminal prosecution is inadequate in such case, because it does not prevent the doing of the unlawful act. It may ultimately correct the wrong, but, while the process of correction is going on, the public is deprived of an important and valuable right, wherefore the injury is irreparable. In such cases it is not the criminality of the act that gives jurisdiction in equity, but the deprivation of personal and property rights interfered with, injured, destroyed, or taken away by the unlawful act." (State v. Ehrlick, supra, 64 S.E. 935, 939; see also People v. Seccombe, supra, 103 Cal. App. 306, 314 [relying on State v. Ehrlick, supra, 64 S.E. 935, 939]; Weis v. Superior Court (1916) 30 Cal. App. 730, 732 [159 P. 464]; People v. Steele (1935) 4 Cal. App.2d 206, 208 [40 P.2d 959]; Commonwealth v. McGovern (1903) 116 Ky. 212 [75 S.W. 261, 264]; Nathan H. Schur, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (1956) 47 Cal.2d 11 [300 P.2d 831] (semble); Armory Park v. Episcopal Community Services (1985) 148 Ariz. 1 [712 P.2d 914, 923] ["We hold, therefore, that conduct which unreasonably ... interferes with the public health, safety, peace, comfort or convenience is a public nuisance ... even if that conduct is not specifically prohibited by the criminal law."]; cf. Rest.2d Torts, § 821B, com. d, p. 89 ["This [statement, i.e., that `in order to be treated as a public nuisance, conduct must have been already proscribed by the state as criminal'] is too restrictive.... [T]here is clear recognition that a defendant need not be subject to criminal responsibility."].)

The Court of Appeal was thus partly accurate in reasoning that "a public nuisance is always a criminal offense," for indeed it is. (See Pen. Code, § 372 [maintenance of a public nuisance is a misdemeanor].) It is the corollary to that proposition — that the superior court's injunction was valid only to the extent that it enjoined conduct that is independently proscribed by the Penal Code — that is flawed. (4) Acts or conduct which qualify as *1109 public nuisances are enjoinable as civil wrongs or prosecutable as criminal misdemeanors, a characteristic that derives not from their status as independent crimes, but from their inherent tendency to injure or interfere with the community's exercise and enjoyment of rights common to the public. It is precisely this recognition of — and willingness to vindicate — the value of community and the collective interests it furthers, rather than to punish criminal acts, that lies at the heart of the public nuisance as an equitable doctrine. We will return to this notion of the community and its collective values as the touchstone of the public nuisance doctrine later, when we assess the sufficiency of the superior court's interlocutory decree in light of the requirements laid down in People v. Lim, supra, 18 Cal.2d 872. Before doing so, however, we first consider defendants' challenges to the constitutionality of the preliminary injunction, challenges that the Court of Appeal found persuasive.

II. Defendants' Constitutional Challenges to Provisions (a) and (k) of the Preliminary Injunction

A. Standard of Review

At this initial stage in the proceeding, the scope of our inquiry is narrow. (5) We review an order granting a preliminary injunction under an abuse of discretion standard. (King v. Meese (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1217, 1227-1228 [240 Cal. Rptr. 829, 743 P.2d 889]; Cohen v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277, 286 [219 Cal. Rptr. 467, 707 P.2d 840].) Review is confined, in other words, to a consideration whether the trial court abused its discretion in "`evaluat[ing] two interrelated factors when deciding whether or not to issue a preliminary injunction. The first is the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial. The second is the interim harm that the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction were denied as compared to the harm the defendant is likely to suffer if the preliminary injunction were issued.'" (Cohen v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 286.) And although we will not ordinarily disturb the trial court's ruling absent a showing of abuse, an order granting or denying interlocutory relief reflects nothing more than the superior court's evaluation of the controversy on the record before it at the time of its ruling; it is not an adjudication of the ultimate merits of the dispute. (Ibid.; see also Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc. v. Williams (1994) 7 Cal.4th 860, 879, fn. 10 [30 Cal. Rptr.2d 629, 873 P.2d 1224]; Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 527 [67 Cal. Rptr. 761, 439 P.2d 889].)

*1110 B. First Amendment Challenges

1. Associational Interests

(6a) The Court of Appeal held that paragraph (a) of the preliminary injunction, enjoining defendants from "Standing, sitting, walking, driving, gathering or appearing anywhere in public view with any other defendant ... or with any other known `VST' (Varrio Sureno Town or Varrio Sureno Treces) or `VSL' (Varrio Sureno Locos) member" (italics added) was invalid on associational grounds; that is, the provision infringed defendants' right to associate with fellow gang members, a right protected by the First Amendment. We disagree.

In a series of opinions, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that, although the Constitution recognizes and shields from government intrusion a limited right of association, it does not recognize "a generalized right of `social association.'" (Dallas v. Stanglin (1989) 490 U.S. 19, 25 [109 S.Ct. 1591, 1594, 104 L.Ed.2d 18].) As we explain, neither does the First Amendment protect the collective public activities of the gang members within the four-block precinct of Rocksprings, activities directed in the main at trafficking in illegal drugs and securing control of the community through systematic acts of intimidation and violence.

(7) The high court has identified two kinds of associations entitled to First Amendment protection — those with an "intrinsic" or "intimate" value, and those that are "instrumental" to forms of religious and political expression and activity. Of the first, the court has said that it is "central to any concept of liberty" and is exemplified by personal affiliations that "attend the creation and sustenance of a family — marriage ...; the raising and education of children [citation]; and cohabitation with one's relatives." (Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984) 468 U.S. 609, 619 [104 S.Ct. 3244, 3250, 82 L.Ed.2d 462].) Such affiliations, the court has remarked, "involve deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life. Among other things... they are distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship." (Id. at p. 620 [104 S.Ct. at p. 3250].)

The second kind of association that merits First Amendment protection is composed of groups whose members join together for the purpose of pursuing "a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and *1111 cultural ends." (Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 622 [104 S.Ct. at p. 3252].) This instrumental right of protected association is directly related to the "individual's