Birnbaum v. United States

In each of these three cases consolidated for trial the plaintiff complains that first-class mail was intercepted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), opened without warrant and copied. Birnbaum and MacMillen each sent a letter abroad; Avery received one here. All the letters were resealed after copying and promptly returned to the mails. Plaintiffs, individually and as a class, seek to recover damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (the Act).

As explained in detail below:

(1) The court has jurisdiction to entertain these suits.

(2) A class action is not appropriate.

(3) The CIA acted tortiously under New York law in violating the plaintiffs’ rights, both common law and constitutional, to privacy in their personal papers and correspondence.

(4) The court had the power to empanel an advisory jury and to rely upon its expression of community consensus that individual rights of privacy are valuable in this nation; that people do suffer psychic damage when United States agents fail to obey the law and violate individual rights; and that plaintiffs should be awarded substantial money damages.

(5) A letter from the government to each plaintiff expressing regret for the violation of his or her rights and indicating that steps will be taken to prevent a recurrence will ameliorate the harm by helping to restore plaintiffs’ faith in their government.

(6) Recovery is granted to each individual plaintiff in the amount of $1,000 plus costs.

(7) In this country we do not pay lip service to the value of human rights and individual dignity—we mean to live by our ideals. A primary role of the courts is to translate these noble sentiments into palpable reality.

*971 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

From approximately 1953 until 1973, in violation of federal statutes and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Central Intelligence Agency conducted an extensive program of opening first-class mail passing in and out of the country through Hawaii, San Francisco, New Orleans, and New York.

Most of the correspondence opened, photographed and circulated within the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was intercepted by the New York project, known within the CIA by either of the two code names HTLINGUAL or SRPOINTER. Various criteria were employed in selecting letters for inspection. Sometimes the name of either the intended recipient or sender appeared on a “watch list” of “suspect” persons and institutions compiled by CIA and FBI agents. In other instances envelopes were opened because of the country of origin or destination; any letter to or from the Soviet Union, for example, was subject to inspection. In still other situations mail was examined at random. When HTLINGUAL was at its peak, New York agents investigated some 13,000 letters a year; over the life of the project, at least 215,000 pieces of mail were copied. See generally Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, The CIA’s Mail Intercepts, in Report to the President 101-15 (1975); Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Domestic CIA and FBI Mail Opening Programs, in III Final Report: Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Sen.Rep. No. 94-755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 559-677 (1976).

Ultimately, the CIA collected and placed in computers a list of some 1.5 million names gleaned from its various mail-opening projects. Among those whose mail was read and photographed were author John Steinbeck and Senator Frank Church. Schwarz, Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, 32 The Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 43, 48 (1977). These operations were only part of a general pattern of post-World War II lawlessness and abuse of power exemplifying “contempt for the law and the Constitution” by government. Schwarz at 46. Breaking this pernicious pattern and preventing its recurrence is the task of Congress and the President. The limited question before this court is whether and how reparations can be made to individuals who were personally affected by this partial breakdown in official respect for individual liberties.

Plaintiff Norman Birnbaum is a professor of sociology at Amherst College in Massachusetts. In 1970, he wrote letters to two academic colleagues—one in Canada, and the other in Rumania—about an upcoming meeting of specialists in the sociology of religion. He sent copies of those letters to a third colleague at Moscow State University. HTLINGUAL agents copied the contents of this third letter while it was in transit through the foreign mail depot at Kennedy International Airport, and later distributed four copies to various units of the CIA. According to testimony by a member of the staff of the Inspector General of the CIA, this was done solely because intelligence agencies had an “interest” in correspondence to and from Moscow University.

Plaintiff Mary Rule MacMillen wrote a personal letter in 1973 to a Soviet dissident she had met on a trip to Russia. Her letter was intercepted at Kennedy, opened and photographed, and a copy filed by the agency. But, apparently because project HTLINGUAL was terminated two weeks later, no other reproductions were disseminated.

In the final case, that of B. Leonard Avery, a letter was written to him by his son, who was then an exchange student studying .at Moscow State University. Ironically, Avery, concerned that his own letters to his son might be tampered with by Soviet authorities, attempted to avoid that possibility by sending them to the American Embassy in Vienna, where they were passed on to Moscow via diplomatic pouch. His son’s replies, however, arrived *972 by regular mail, and one of them, personal in nature, was opened here in 1968. Three copies of that letter were made, and one of these was sent to the FBI, which was described by a government witness as having “an interest in U.S. exchange students in Russia.”

None of the plaintiffs were aware that their mail had been interfered with until the government responded to general requests made under the Freedom of Information Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552. They were then notified that CIA files contained copies of the letters at issue.

These facts are not in dispute. The government concedes that the plaintiffs’ mail was opened, read and copied. It does not contend that the actions were lawful. No judicial warrants were obtained, and no evidence was submitted to suggest the existence of probable cause for a warrantless search. Both the First and Fourth Amendments of the Constitution as well as applicable statutes and regulations support the conclusion that the opening and reading of these letters under these circumstances was illegal. United States v. Ramsey, __U.S. __, __, 97 S.Ct. 1972, 1982, 52 L.Ed.2d 617, 631 (1977) (“Applicable postal regulations flatly prohibit, under all circumstances, the reading of correspondence absent a search warrant”); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1809, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974). Cf. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 251, 90 S.Ct. 1029, 1031, 25 L.Ed.2d 282 (1970).

In addition, HTLINGUAL and other mail-opening projects probably violated several criminal statutes. Included are 18 U.S.C. § 1702 (prohibiting the unauthorized opening or obstruction of mail within postal channels), 18 U.S.C. § 241 (prohibiting conspiracies to deprive citizens of their constitutional rights), and 18 U.S.C. § 371 (the general conspiracy statute). See generally Department of Justice, Report of the Department of Justice Concerning Its Investigation and Prosecutorial Decisions with Respect to Central Intelligence Agency Mail Opening Activities in the United States (1977).

The criminal liability—or lack of it—of government agents for the acts complained of is not an issue in this case. Plaintiffs seek a civil remedy: damages for injury suffered as a result of the operation of HTLINGUAL. They seek relief, not against the particular agents who opened their mail or who directed the program, but against the government, relying on the provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act.

Because the agents were acting within the scope of their employment in carrying out the mail project, Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 76 S.Ct. 745, 100 L.Ed. 1065 (1956); Avery v. United States, 434 F.Supp. 937 (D.Conn. 1977), only two substantial questions must be answered. First, has the government consented to such suits under the provisions of the Act? Second, under the relevant state law—that of New York—was the behavior of the government agents tortious and, therefore, compensable?

II. JURISDICTION

A. Not Defeated By Exception To The Federal Tort Claims Act.'

The United States has given its consent to be sued for torts in the District Courts whenever the government, if a private person, would be liable under the law of the place where the wrong was done. The Federal Tort Claims Act provides in part:

[T]he district courts, together with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the *973 claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). This general consent to suit for tortious acts of government officials and employees is qualified by a number of exceptions. 28 U.S.C. § 2680. The government argues that three exceptions— for discretionary acts, for postal matter, and for intentional torts—apply.

1. Discretionary Function Exception Does Not Apply.

Under section 2680(a) of title 28 of the United States Code the government is not liable in tort for the performance or failure to perform a discretionary act:

§ 2680. Exceptions

The provisions of this [Act] shall not apply to—

(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.

Any attempt to define “discretionary” in this context presents difficulties. The government relies primarily on Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 35-36, 73 S.Ct. 956, 968, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953), holding that discretionary acts include not only “the initiation of programs and activities”, 346 U.S. at 35, 73 S.Ct. at 968, but also

determinations made by executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations. Where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion.

Id. (Footnotes omitted.) While this language seems broad enough to encompass the acts complained of here, the underlying facts of the case suggest the contrary. Dalehite concerned explosions aboard ships loaded with ammonium nitrate fertilizer. Following World War II, the United States had sponsored the production of the highly explosive chemical product by American manufacturers in part to help alleviate acute food shortages in the occupied nations of Germany, Korea and Japan. While the wisdom of producing so dangerous a form of fertilizer was questionable, the thrust of the suit was against the judgment of government officials in approving the program. No negligence or illegality in carrying it out was averred.

Dalehite was followed in Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 92 S.Ct. 1899, 32 L.Ed.2d 499 (1972), a suit to recover for damage caused by sonic booms resulting from high-altitude military training flights. There, too, the government, as a matter of policy, had decided to engage in a hazardous, but legal, activity. The Court quoted, in its decision, that portion of the House Judiciary Committee report emphasizing that the purpose of the discretionary acts exemption in the Tort Claims Act was to exclude suits for

damages . . . growing out of a legally authorized activity, such as a flood-control or irrigation project, where no wrongful act or omission on the part of any Government agent is shown, and the only ground for suit is the contention that the same conduct by a private individual would be tortious.

406 U.S. at 801, 92 S.Ct. at 1902 (emphasis added).

The decision to conduct an intelligence operation by methods which violate the Constitution of the United States and which also probably violate several federal statutes is not discretionary in the same sense that the decision to fly a supersonic plane over land or to produce potentially explosive fertilizer might be. There is no evidence that Congress intended this exception to do more than free the operations of government from excessive concern over the untoward, and often unexpected, results of legitimate activity conducted in the public interest.

There is no discretion under our system to conceive, plan and execute an *974 illegal program. See Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 191, 76 S.Ct. 745, 100 L.Ed. 1065 (1956); Myers & Myers, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, 527 F.2d 1252, 1261 (2d Cir. 1975); Avery v. United States, 434 F.Supp. 937 (D.Conn. 1977). As the Second Circuit succinctly put the matter: “a federal official cannot have discretion to behave unconstitutionally.” Myers & Myers, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, 527 F.2d at 1261. In this circuit, following Myers and Avery, the discretionary defense must be rejected. Cases from other circuits to the contrary are not persuasive. See Murphy v. United States, 76-C-12 (N.D. Iowa May 28, 1976) (dictum); Hardy v. United States, 76-C-1427 (D.C.D.C. Feb. 14, 1977) (relies on Murphy); Siebel v. United States, 76-C-1737 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 17, 1976) (relies on Dalehite).

2. Postal Matter Exception Does Not Apply.

The United States also argues that these suits for damages against the government are barred by the postal matter exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act because the opening of the letters represents a mere “miscarriage” of the mail. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b). This portion of the statute maintains sovereign immunity with regard to:

(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.

None of the available sources for the interpretation of this subsection support such a restrictive reading. Rather, Congress was concerned with shielding the courts from the potential landslide of lawsuits that might be generated by the unavoidable mishaps incident to the ordinary, accepted operation of delivering millions of packages and letters each year. The kind of problem that was anticipated under the heading of “loss, miscarriage or negligent transmission” was suggested by a representative of the Department of Justice during hearings on the Act:

Every person who sends a piece of postal matter can protect himself by registering it, as provided by the postal laws and regulations. It would be intolerable, of course, if in any case of loss or delay, the Government could be sued for damages. Consequently, this provision was inserted.

Hearings before Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2690, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 38 (1940) (testimony of A. Holtzoff, Special Assistant to Attorney General of the United States.) Neither registration nor insurance of the letters in question.in these cases would have protected the correspondents from the risk that CIA agents would procure, open and copy their mail. See also, Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 Yale L.J. 534, 545-46 (1947); II L. Jayson, Handling Federal Tort Claims § 255 at 13-2— 13-3 (1975).

The postal exception has no application in cases such as those before us. Cruikshank v. United States, 76-C-362, 431 F.Supp. 1355 (D.Haw. May 9, 1977); Avery v. United States, 434 F.Supp. 937 (D.Conn. 1977).

3. The Intentional Tort Exception Does Not Apply.

The final statutory defense of the United States is based on subdivision (h) of 28 U.S.C. § 2680. This provision, exempting the federal government from suits for specified intentional torts, reads as follows:

The provisions of [the Act] shall not apply to—

(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of the enactment of this proviso, out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For the purpose of this subsection, “investigative or law enforcement officer” means any officer of the *975 United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.

Prior to 1976, when the subsection was revised, it merely provided that no suit could be brought for:

(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2680 (1965). Congress amended the exception to broaden its consent to suit following some particularly egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment by federal narcotics agents who engaged in a series of illegal “no-knock” raids on private homes. One such raid generated a civil suit in which the Supreme Court— barred by section 2680(h), as it was then written, from holding the government itself liable—granted plaintiff the right to recover damages from the individual agents. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). Congress altered section 2680(h) so that, from the date of amendment forward, such Fourth Amendment violations would be actionable against the government, providing aggrieved persons actual relief, rather than worthless awards against “judgment-proof” individual agents. S.Rep. No. 83-588, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3, reprinted in [1974] U.S.Code & Cong.Ad. News 2789, 2790-91.

The government argues that, based on this history of subsection (h), a court cannot assume that any case arising from a Fourth Amendment violation was intended, prior to 1974, to be included in the Act. The government’s position apparently is that the list of exempted torts in subsection (h) was and is not exclusive, and that additional exclusions must be implied, where necessary, to protect the government against liability for types of torts Congress may not have contemplated when it drafted the law. Invasion of the constitutional right to privacy is one such uncontemplated intentional tort, runs the argument, and should be excluded—at least if it occurred before 1974.

Implied exceptions, derived in this wholesale fashion, subvert the structure of the statute itself. .Congress, in writing the Act, chose to enumerate very specific exemptions. No vague terms or general words are used. This problem was treated in Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 276 F.Supp. 518 (E.D.N.Y.1967), aff’d, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968). The court concluded that:

The detailed listing and the absence of general terms suggests that only the torts mentioned are to be excluded.

276 F.Supp. at 526. Invasion of privacy, common law or constitutional, is not mentioned in the list either before or after 1974, and for that reason is not excluded. See Avery v. United States, 434 F.Supp. 937 (D.Conn., 1977) (same conclusion with respect to the HTLINGUAL program); contra, Murphy v. Central Intelligence Agency, 76-C-12 (N.D.Iowa, May 28,1976) (dictum). As the court in Gruikshank v. United States, 76-C-362, 431 F.Supp: 1355 (D.Haw., May 9, 1977), put it when faced with a case similar to those of Birnbaum, Avery and MacMillen:

[W]e are dealing with the commission of a series of illegal acts by agents of the Government. Justice would certainly not countenance a court straining the language of a statute in order to deny the victim of such illegality at least some measure of compensation.

431 F.Supp. at 1361.

In at least one unrelated case, Black v. United States, 389 F.Supp. 529 (D.C.D.C. 1975), a plaintiff did recover for an invasion of common law and constitutional rights of privacy, through illegal electronic surveillance, which occurred in 1963, eleven years before the subsection was revised to take Bivens and similar cases into account. The court never suggested that an implied exclusion of such claims might exist. It noted that its judgment rested “on theories of trespass, invasion of privacy by intrusion, invasion of privacy by publication, and vio *976 lation of Constitutional rights”, characterized by the court as “intentional torts.” 389 F.Supp. at 5,31.

The straightforward reading of the statute in Black is consistent with the general treatment of intentional torts by federal courts in suits against the government. The principle is well-established that parties may sue under the Act for intentional wrongs. The Supreme Court in Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 92 S.Ct. 1899, 32 L.Ed.2d 499 (1972), for example, stated that:

The legislative history [of the Federal Tort Claims Act] indicates that Congress intended to permit liability essentially based on the intentionally wrongful . . . conduct of Government employees

406 U.S. at 801, 92 S.Ct. at 1901 (emphasis added). See also, e. g., Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 76 S.Ct. 745,100 L.Ed. 1065 (1956) (trespass and conversion); Myers & Myers, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, 527 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1975) (denial of due process and interference with business opportunity through blacklisting); Aleutco Corp. v. United States, 244 F.2d 674 (3d Cir. 1957) (conversion); Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 276 F.Supp. 518 (E.D.N.Y.1967), aff’d, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968) (trespass); Palomo v. United States, 188 F.Supp. 633, 637 (D.Guam 1960) (waste); United States v. Ein Chemical Corp., 161 F.Supp. 238, 246-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (conversion by duress). The government’s suggestion that suits for invasions of constitutional rights of privacy are exempt by implication must be rejected.

B. LIABILITY UNDER NEW YORK TORT LAW

Section 1346(b) of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) provides that the United States may be sued for money damages caused by the wrongful act of any employee of the Government “under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act . . . occurred.” The “congressional policy underlying the Act . is to hold the United States liable under state law principles to the same extent as a similarly situated private individual.” Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, __U.S.__, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 2057, 52 L.Ed.2d 665, 669 (1977).

Since the opening of mail complained of in these cases occurred at the international mail facility at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York, the “law of the place where the act or omission occurred” is that of New York. Under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of this language, a trial court hearing a federal tort action must look to the whole law of the state where the tort occurred, including that state’s law of conflicts. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 82 S.Ct. 585, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962). Ordinarily, therefore, the court would first need to decide whether a New York court would apply its own law since the letters were neither mailed from or to a New York address. This issue need not be decided because the parties have stipulated that the substantive tort law of New York is applicable.

1. Common Law Right To Privacy.

Most states recognize invasions of privacy as actionable torts. W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 117 at 804 (4th ed. 1971); 1 F. V. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 9.6 at 682 (1956).

In this context, the general rubric “right of privacy” encompasses four concepts. As described by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, they are:

(a) Intrusion upon the seclusion of another . . ., or

(b) Appropriation of the other’s name or likeness, ... or

(c) Publicity given to the other’s private life [of a sort which is offensive and not of legitimate public concern],

. or

(d) Publicity which places the other in a false light before the public. .

*977 3 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 625A (1977).

Intrusion upon the seclusion of these plaintiffs is the branch of privacy involved in these cases. Comments to the Restatement make it plain that the tort is committed whenever an intrusive act is committed, even if the tortfeasor never reveals either the fact of the invasion or any information about the plaintiff to third persons.

The form of invasion of privacy covered by this Section does not depend upon any publicity given to the person whose interest is invaded, or to his affairs. It consists solely of an intentional interference with his interest in solitude or seclusion, either as to his person or as to his private affairs or concerns, of a kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable man.

3 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652B, Comment a at 378 (1977) (emphasis added). This common law right extends beyond the plaintiffs immediate physical environment and is infringed by examinations of bank accounts or of personal records under false pretenses, or by opening of mail.

The invasion may be by physical intrusion into a place in which the plaintiff has secluded himself, as where the defendant forces his way into the plaintiff’s room in a hotel, or insists over the plaintiff’s objection in entering his home. It may also be by the use of the defendant’s senses, with or without mechanical aids, to oversee or overhear the plaintiff’s private affairs, as by looking into his upstairs windows with binoculars, or tapping his telephone wires. It may be by some other form of investigation or examination into his private concerns, as by opening his private and personal mail, searching his safe or his wallet, examining his private bank account, or compelling him by a forged court order to permit an inspection of his personal documents.

3 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652B, Comment b at 378-79 (1977) (emphasis added). The comment emphasizes that “The intrusion itself makes the defendant subject to liability, even though there is no publication or other use of any kind of the . information. . . .” Id. at 379. It is apparent, therefore, that, in the majority of states, case law would provide a right to recovery on the facts of these cases.

The law of New York is less clear. This state was the first to consider a case sounding in common law privacy following the publication of a leading article on the subject by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandéis, Warren & Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 Harv.L.Rev. 193 (1890), and its lower courts quickly recognized the doctrine. W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 117 n. 10 at 803 (4th ed. 1971). The New York Court of Appeals at the turn of the century was, however, not yet prepared to accept the doctrine. In Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box Company, 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902)—a case of commercial appropriation where defendant used the photograph of a woman in its advertisements without her permission—the Court by a four to three decision rejected the right to privacy as a distinct and independent tort. It stated that “The so-called right of privacy has not as yet found an abiding place in our jurisprudence”. 171 N.Y. at 556, 64 N.E. at 447. The court was careful to note, however, that it was speaking of the developments up to that point—“the doctrine cannot now be incorporated” (id.) (emphasis supplied)—and not predicting future development. Roberson’s refusal to recognize commercial appropriations of names, faces and the like as torts was legislatively overruled by sections 50 and 51 of New York’s Civil Rights Law, but the general right to privacy has not yet been recognized explicitly by the New York Court of Appeals. Were the question to be placed once more squarely before the Court of Appeals, strong evidence suggests that the court would follow the American “tide . in favor of recognition.” W. L. Prosser, T.he Law of Torts § 117 at 804 (4th ed. 1971).

Lower courts in the state have generally continued to acknowledge Roberson while *978 finding ways to avoid it and grant recovery. See, e. g., Association for Preservation of Freedom of Choice, Inc. v. Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, 37 Misc.2d 599, 236 N.Y.S.2d 216 (Sup.Ct.1962) (avoiding Roberson by applying law of privacy of sister states where some events occurred); Blair v. Union Free School District No. 6, Hauppauge, Suffolk County, 67 Misc.2d 248, 324 N.Y.S.2d 222 (Dist.Ct.1971) (avoiding Roberson by finding “outrageous” breach of confidence); Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 n. 12 (2d Cir. 1973) (collecting cases). Addressing the question of the right to privacy in New York, the Second Circuit in Galella noted:

[I]f we were required to reach the question, we would be inclined to agree . that when again faced with the issue the Court of Appeals may well modify or distinguish its 1902 holding [in Roberson ] . . There is substantive support today for the proposition that privacy is a “basic right” entitled to legal protection . . Privacy essential to individual dignity and personal liberty underlies the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.

Id. (extensive cititions omitted).

Numerous statutory enactments in New York support the Second Circuit’s view. The provisions which overruled the specific holding of