902 A.2d 620 (2006) 279 Conn. 239

Michael G. BLAKESLEE, Jr.
v.
PLATT BROTHERS AND COMPANY et al.

No. 17421.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 18, 2005. Decided August 1, 2006.

*622 James P. Brennan, Waterbury, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Jennifer A. Hock, for the appellees (defendants).

SULLIVAN, C.J., and BORDEN, NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.^[*]

BORDEN, J.

The plaintiff, Michael G. Blakeslee, Jr., appeals from the decision of the workers' compensation review board (board) affirming the decision of the workers' compensation commissioner for the fifth district (commissioner). The commissioner had dismissed the plaintiff's application for benefits for injuries the plaintiff sustained when his coworkers physically had restrained him after he suffered a noncompensable seizure. The plaintiff claims that the board improperly concluded that his injuries resulting from the restraint were not compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq., because they did not arise out of his employment. We agree with the plaintiff and reverse the board's decision.

The plaintiff filed a workers' compensation claim, which the commissioner dismissed. The plaintiff appealed to the board, which affirmed the commissioner's decision. This appeal followed.^[1]

The commissioner found the following facts, which are undisputed. On February 13, 2002, the plaintiff suffered a grand mal seizure while he was at work for the named defendant, Platt Brothers and Company.^[2] The seizure itself was not a compensable injury. As a result of the seizure, the plaintiff fell to the ground, unconscious, near a large steel scale in his workplace. As the plaintiff regained consciousness, he began flailing around, swinging his arms and kicking his legs. Mike Noel, a coworker, witnessed this incident and summoned two other coworkers, Bob Grenick, whom Noel referred to in his testimony as a paramedic, and Emo Bimmler, a factory foreman. The three men, in an attempt to prevent the plaintiff from injuring himself, as well as others, restrained the plaintiff. They held the plaintiff's arms down to the floor while the plaintiff attempted to break free from the restraint. As a result, the plaintiff suffered dislocations of both of his shoulders. The plaintiff initially sought treatment and ultimately surgery from Michael Sermer, an orthopedic surgeon. Sermer thereafter reported that he had concluded, on the *623 basis of a reasonable medical certainty, that the plaintiff's shoulder dislocations were a result of the restraint, not the seizure.

The commissioner identified as the sole issue regarding the plaintiff's entitlement to workers' compensation benefits whether the plaintiff's injuries arose out of his employment. The commissioner made the following determinations based on his factual findings: (1) "The chain of causation which resulted in the [plaintiff's] shoulder injuries was set in motion by the [plaintiff's] grand mal seizure"; (2) "The seizure did not arise out of the [plaintiff's] employment"; and (3) "The [plaintiff's] injuries were caused by the intervention of other employees in his workplace who were trying to assist the [plaintiff]." In light of these determinations, the commissioner concluded that the injuries did not arise out of the plaintiff's employment and dismissed his claim for benefits.

The plaintiff then appealed from that decision to the board, which affirmed the commissioner's decision. The board noted the well established two-prong requirement of compensability—an injury arising out of and in the course of employment—and further noted that the latter was undisputed, given that the plaintiff had suffered the seizure during work hours, while fulfilling his work duties. Turning to the disputed issue, the board noted that, for an injury to arise out of employment, the proximate cause of the injury must be set in motion by the employment, not some other agency. The board concluded that, because the plaintiff's original injury—the seizure—was not compensable, the resulting injury from his coworkers' application of first aid similarly was not compensable. The board analogized the present case to Porter v. New Haven, 105 Conn. 394, 397, 135 A. 293 (1926), wherein this court had concluded that a claimant's injury was not compensable when a visitor to the workplace had pushed the claimant, causing him to strike his head on a concrete floor. The board further concluded that the first aid was applied for the plaintiff's exclusive benefit and, accordingly, could not be deemed to arise out of his employment.

The plaintiff claims that the board improperly concluded that his injuries did not arise out of his employment. We agree with the plaintiff that his injuries arose out of his employment and, therefore, are compensable.

We begin by underscoring that the facts found by the commissioner were not contested by either party. Therefore, the issue before us is whether, given those undisputed facts, the board properly concluded that the plaintiff's injury did not arise out of his employment. As a general matter, "we have treated this issue [namely, whether the injury arose out of the employment] as factual in nature and, therefore, have accorded the commissioner's conclusion the same deference as that given to similar conclusions of a trial judge or jury on the issue of proximate cause. A finding of a fact of this character ... is the finding of a primary fact.... This ordinarily... presents a question for the determination of the commissioner...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fair v. People's Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535, 541, 542 A.2d 1118 (1988); accord Daubert v. Borough of Naugatuck, 267 Conn. 583, 590, 840 A.2d 1152 (2004). Despite this highly deferential standard, however, "[t]he conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from the facts found [will not] stand [if] they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Labadie v. Norwalk Rehabilitation Services, Inc., 274 *624 Conn. 219, 227, 875 A.2d 485 (2005). Because in the present case the underlying facts are undisputed, and because both the commissioner and the board predicated their ultimate conclusions solely on the fact that the plaintiff's original fall was from a cause unrelated to the plaintiff's employment, the latter standard applies to this case. Thus, we review the board's decision on a de novo basis.^[3]

In determining whether the commissioner properly applied the law to the subordinate facts, we begin with the following general principles. "It is an axiom of [workers'] compensation law that awards are determined by a two-part test. The [claimant] has the burden of proving that the injury claimed [1] arose out of the employment and [2] occurred in the course of the employment.... The two part test is based on General Statutes § 31-275^[4]. . . .

"An injury is said to arise out of the employment when (a) it occurs in the course of the employment and (b) is the result of a risk involved in the employment or incident to it or to the conditions under which it is required to be performed.... There must be a conjunction of [these] two requirements [of the test] ... to permit compensation.... The former requirement [of arising out of the employment] relates to the origin and cause of the accident, while the latter requirement [of occurring in the course of employment] relates to the time, place and [circumstance] of the accident." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 227-28, 875 A.2d 485.

"An injury which occurs in the course of the employment will ordinarily [also] arise out of the employment; but not necessarily so, for the injury might occur out of an act or omission for the exclusive benefit of the employee, or of another than the master, while the employee is engaged in the course of his employment.... Speaking generally, an injury arises out of an employment when it occurs in the course of the employment and as a proximate *625 cause of it. [Therefore] [a]n injury which is a natural and necessary incident or consequence of the employment, though not foreseen or expected, arises out of it. . . . An injury of this description is one of the risks of the employment, for it is due to it and arises from it, either directly, or as incident to it, or to the conditions and exposure surrounding it. And the proximate cause of the injury is not necessarily that which immediately arises out of the employment, but may be that which is reasonably incidental to it." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 237-38, 875 A.2d 485.

In applying these general principles, we are mindful that the act "indisputably is a remedial statute that should be construed generously to accomplish its purpose." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mello v. Big Y Foods, Inc., 265 Conn. 21, 25, 826 A.2d 1117 (2003). "The humanitarian and remedial purposes of the act counsel against an overly narrow construction that unduly limits eligibility for workers' compensation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gartrell v. Dept. of Correction, 259 Conn. 29, 41-42, 787 A.2d 541 (2002).

Turning to the present case, it is evident that the commissioner and the board began with a single proposition from which all other conclusions inexorably followed, namely, that, if the plaintiff's seizure was a noncompensable injury, any injuries causally connected thereto similarly must be noncompensable. This essential proposition, however, cannot be sustained.

"It long has been a fundamental tenet of workers' compensation law ... that an employer takes the employee in the state of health in which it finds the employee." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 40, 787 A.2d 541. Thus, "an injury received in the course of the employment does not cease to be one arising out of the employment merely because some infirmity due to disease has originally set in action the final and proximate cause of the injury. The employer of labor takes his workman as he finds him and compensation does not depend upon his freedom from liability to injury through a constitutional weakness or latent tendency. Whatever predisposing physical condition may exist, if the employment is the immediate occasion of the injury, it arises out of the employment because it develops within it." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Savage v. St. Aeden's Church, 122 Conn. 343, 346-47, 189 A. 599 (1937); accord McDonough v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 204 Conn. 104, 112-13, 527 A.2d 664 (1987); Gonier v. Chase Cos., Inc., 97 Conn. 46, 50-51, 115 A. 677 (1921).

Compensability also may not be denied simply because the plaintiff could have been exposed to a similar risk of injury from the administration of aid had he suffered the seizure outside of work. "[A]n injury may arise out of an employment although the risk of injury from that employment is no different in degree or kind [from that] to which [the employee] may be exposed outside of his employment. The injury is compensable, not because of the extent or particular character of the hazard, but because it exists as one of the conditions of the employment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Triano v. United States Rubber Co., 144 Conn. 393, 397, 132 A.2d 570 (1957).

It is axiomatic, however, that "[t]he conditions of employment are not confined to those which the employer creates. . . . In determining whether the injury does result from the conditions of the employment, the normal reactions of men to those conditions are to be considered.... [Thus] the right of an employee *626 to recover compensation is not nullified by the fact that his injury is augmented by natural human reactions to the danger or injury threatened or done.... The question is whether taking all the facts into consideration the conditions of the employment are the legal cause of the injury." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stulginski v. Waterbury Rolling Mills Co., 124 Conn. 355, 360-61, 199 A. 653 (1938). In assessing such natural human reactions, we have stated that, "[w]henever an employer puts his employees at work with fellow servants, the conditions actually existing— apart from the possibility of wilful assaults by a fellow servant independent of the employment—which result in injury to a fellow employee, are a basis for compensation under the implied contract of th[e][a]ct." Anderson v. Security Building Co., 100 Conn. 373, 377, 123 A. 843 (1924).

It seriously cannot be questioned that a risk exists in the workplace that an employee might fall stricken to the ground, thereby prompting the natural, foreseeable reaction of coworkers to render aid. With respect to the employer's liability for injuries arising from such actions, in his treatise, Professor Arthur Larson sets forth the general proposition that, "the scope of an employee's employment is impliedly extended in an emergency to include the performance of any act designed to save life or property in which the employer has an interest." 2 A. Larson & L. Larson, Workers' Compensation Law (2006) § 28.01[1], p. 28-2. "The most common type of rescue case is the rescue of coemployees, and compensation is clearly payable for injuries so sustained, on the theory that the employer has a duty to aid its own employees in peril and that any employee is impliedly authorized to discharge this duty in an emergency." Id., at p. 28-4. Courts have recognized under similar statutory schemes that, "[a] reasonable rescue attempt ... may be one of the risks of employment, an incident of the service, foreseeable, if not foreseen, and so covered by the statute." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 507, 71 S.Ct. 470, 95 L.Ed. 483 (1951).^[5]

Under these principles, it is clear that, had the plaintiff's coworkers themselves sustained injuries while tending to the plaintiff, their injuries would have been compensable. It would be anomalous, therefore, to conclude that injuries that these same coworkers, while acting in the course of their employment, inflicted on the plaintiff in attempting to prevent him from injuring himself and other workers would not be compensable. In other words, whether the rescue attempt at issue is characterized as a risk of, or a condition incident to, employment for those engaged in the conduct, the essential character of the act does not change when viewed from the perspective of the coworker injured by that same conduct. Cf. Mascika v. Connecticut *627 Tool & Engineering Co., 109 Conn. 473, 481, 147 A. 11 (1929) (Explaining, in a case in which the plaintiff, while on his way into work, was struck by a stick thrown by his coworkers who were engaging in horseplay: "So far as the plaintiff was concerned the legal situation was the same as if he had been struck while actually engaged in the operation of his press. The risk of being injured by reason of the skylarking of his fellow employees while he himself was a passive actor was one of the risks of his employment, being incident to the conditions under which his work was performed."). Indeed, this uniform treatment of the conduct and injuries arising therefrom is compelled in the present case, given that the commissioner found that the plaintiff's coworkers had acted to prevent injury both to the plaintiff, "as well as others. . . ."^[6] (Emphasis added.)

We have recognized that, "[i]f the act is one for the benefit of the employer or for the mutual benefit of both an injury arising out of it will usually be compensable; on the other hand, if the act being performed is for the exclusive benefit of the employee so that it is a personal privilege or is one which the employer permits the employee to undertake for the benefit of some other person or for some cause apart from his own interests, an injury arising out of it will not be compensable." Smith v. Seamless Rubber Co., 111 Conn. 365, 368-69, 150 A. 110 (1930).^[7] Thus, when the action giving rise to injury provides some benefit to the employer, the *628 claimant need not prove the employer acquiesced to the action in order to establish compensability.^[8] See McNamara v. Hamden, 176 Conn. 547, 553-54, 398 A.2d 1161 (1979) (concluding that meaning of activity deemed "incidental to" employment and hence compensable is not limited to "compulsion by or benefit to the employer" but also includes "customary activity sanctioned by the employer through approval or acquiescence" [internal quotation marks omitted]). Such acquiescence, or constructive knowledge, is implicit by virtue of the benefit. See Kish v. Nursing & Home Care, Inc., 248 Conn. 379, 389-90 n. 14, 727 A.2d 1253 (1999) (noting that, under our case law, constructive knowledge may be imputed as matter of law).

In light of the commissioner's finding that the plaintiff's coworkers had rendered aid to prevent injury not only to the plaintiff, but also to other workers, the only reasonable inference from this fact is that, contrary to the board's conclusion, the coworkers' actions were undertaken to benefit both the plaintiff and the defendant. Given this mutual benefit, the injuries sustained as a result thereof must fall within the scope of the general rule that an injury sustained in the course of employment also arises out of the employment.^[9] See Labadie v. Norwalk Rehabilitation Services, Inc., supra, 274 Conn. at 237, 875 A.2d 485 ("[a]n injury which occurs in the course of the employment will ordinarily [also] arise out of the employment; but not necessarily so, for the injury might occur out of an act or omission for the exclusive benefit of the employee, or of another than the master, while the employee is engaged in the course of his employment" [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Ryerson v. A.E. Bounty Co., 107 Conn. 370, 379, 140 A. 728 (1928) (plaintiff's action for his own safety, although ultimately causing injury, "was as important an act for the employer as for the employee, so that the master's work could be done" and thus gave rise to compensable injury).

Indeed, although it is not a prerequisite to compensability that the risk of injury be greater to the employee than to a member of the public; Triano v. United States Rubber Co., supra, 144 Conn. at 397, 132 A.2d 570; it cannot be questioned that the plaintiff was more likely to be physically restrained by his coworkers than by strangers had he suffered the seizure in some neutral, public forum. The incentive to act in the employer's interest, the community of purpose among coworkers and the relationships engendered by that purpose would make intervention, and hence injury therefrom, more likely.

This discussion demonstrates that the board's reliance on our decision in Porter v. New Haven, supra, 105 Conn. at 394, 135 A. 293, was misplaced. In Porter, a visitor to the claimant's workplace pushed *629 the claimant, causing him to fall to the floor and sustain serious injury. Id., at 395, 135 A. 293. The court emphasized that the actor in that case was not a coworker; id., at 397, 135 A. 293; and it is self-evident that such an action could not be characterized as one benefiting the employer, or the employee for that matter.

The defendant contends, however, that public policy counsels against the compensability of the injury in the present case because such a result would have a chilling effect on coworkers and employers rendering aid to a stricken employee. We disagree that such a consequence is likely. Employers have a vested interest in the welfare of their employees and an even greater interest in preventing and minimizing compensable injuries. Employees witnessing a coworker in distress generally will not know whether the distress results from, or will lead to, a compensable or noncompensable injury. Moreover, it seems doubtful that an employer would risk possible liability for an employee's injuries that were sustained as a result of the employer's categorical bar on direct aid to an injured employee. Therefore, we conclude that the defendant's public policy argument is unpersuasive.

The decision of the board is reversed and the case is remanded to the board with direction to sustain the plaintiff's appeal.

In this opinion NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., concurred.

SULLIVAN, C.J., with whom ZARELLA, J., joins, dissenting.

The majority concludes that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, Michael G. Blakeslee, Jr., when his coworkers attempted to assist him after he suffered an idiopathic seizure, arose in the course of his employment.^[1] Accordingly, the majority concludes that the workers' compensation commissioner for the fifth district (commissioner) improperly dismissed the plaintiff's application for workers' compensation benefits. I disagree.

In Fair v. People's Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535, 539-40, 542 A.2d 1118 (1988), this court stated that "[i]n determining whether a particular injury arose out of. . . employment, the [commissioner] must necessarily draw an inference from what he has found to be the basic facts. The propriety of that inference, of course, is vital to the validity of the order subsequently entered. But the scope of judicial review of that inference is sharply limited. . . . If supported by evidence and not inconsistent with the law, the [commissioner's] inference that an injury did or did not arise out of and in the course of employment is conclusive. No reviewing court can then set aside that inference because the opposite one is thought to be more reasonable; nor can the opposite inference be substituted by the court because of a belief that the one chosen by the [commissioner] is factually questionable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) "It matters not that the basic facts from which the [commissioner] draws this inference are undisputed rather than controverted.... It is likewise immaterial that the facts permit the drawing of diverse inferences. The [commissioner] alone is charged with the duty of initially selecting the inference which seems most reasonable and his choice, if otherwise sustainable, may not be disturbed by a reviewing court." (Citation *630 omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 540, 542 A.2d 1118.

Thus, the commissioner's findings of basic facts and his finding as to whether those facts support an inference that the plaintiff's injury arose from his employment are subject to a highly deferential standard of review. If any view of the evidence would support the commissioner's finding, then this court may not set aside that finding simply because it believes that another view is more reasonable.

The majority concludes that the question before us is not a factual question, subject to this highly deferential standard of review, but a legal question subject to plenary review. In support of this conclusion, it states that the commissioner and the board "predicated their ultimate conclusions solely on the fact that the plaintiff's original fall was from a cause unrelated to the plaintiff's employment," namely, his idiopathic medical condition. I agree that a ruling based solely on the application of that incorrect legal principle to the undisputed facts of this case would be subject to plenary review. I do not believe, however, that the majority accurately characterizes either the commissioner's holding or the board's holding. The commissioner's decision was based on its findings both that the causal chain resulting in the injury was "set in motion by the [plaintiff's] grand mal seizure" and that the injuries "were caused by intervention of other employees in his work place who were trying to assist the [plaintiff]." Similarly, the board recognized that an injury arising from an idiopathic medical condition may be compensable in some cases, but only if the injury was the result of a condition of employment. The legal question before the court, therefore, is whether an injury is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act (act) when the initial cause of the injury was an idiopathic medical condition and the injury resulted from the efforts of the plaintiff's fellow employees to assist him. For reasons I discuss later in this dissenting opinion, I would conclude that, as a general rule, the answer to that question is no. I would also conclude that the evidence amply supports that conclusion in the present case.

After setting forth the standard of review, the majority makes the following observations: first, that an employer takes an employee in the state of health in which it finds him; second, that an injury may arise out of employment although the risk of injury from that employment is no different in degree from that to which the employee may be exposed outside of his employment; third, that an employee's right to recover compensation is not nullified because his injury was augmented by natural human reactions to a dangerous or injurious employment condition; and, fourth, that if an employee is injured while rescuing a fellow employee in peril, his injuries are compensable. Relying on these principles, the majority states that "[i]t would be anomalous ... to conclude that injuries . . . inflicted on the plaintiff in attempting to prevent him from injuring himself and other workers would not be compensable." (Emphasis in original.) The majority reasons that, "whether the rescue attempt at issue is characterized as a risk of, or a condition incident to, employment for those engaged in the conduct, the essential character of the act does not change when viewed from the perspective of the coworker injured by that same conduct."

Upon closer examination, however, none of the general principles relied on by the majority supports its conclusion. The majority relies on Savage v. St. Aeden's Church, 122 Conn. 343, 346-47, 189 A. 599 (1937), for the proposition that an employer takes the employee in the state of *631 health in which it finds him. This court stated in Savage that, "[w]hatever predisposing physical condition may exist, if the employment is the immediate occasion of the injury, it arises out of the employment because it develops within it." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 347, 189 A. 599. We also stated, however, that "[a]n injury arises out of an employment when it occurs in the course of the employment and is the result of a risk involved in the employment or incidental to it. . . ."^[2] (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 345, 189 A. 599. The majority also points out that an "injury is compensable, not because of the extent or particular character of the hazard, but because it exists as one of the conditions of the employment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Triano v. United States Rubber Co., 144 Conn. 393, 397, 132 A.2d 570 (1957). This language merely indicates, however, that, although there is no requirement that an employment-related risk be extraordinary or exclusive to the workplace, there must be an employment-related risk. Finally, the majority points out that "the right of an employee to recover compensation is not nullified by the fact that his injury is augmented by natural human reactions to the danger or injury threatened or done." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stulginski v. Waterbury Rolling Mills Co., 124 Conn. 355, 361, 199 A. 653 (1938). We also stated in Stulginski, however, that the claimant must prove that "the conditions of the employment are the legal cause of the injury." (Emphasis added.) Id.

Thus, all of these cases cited by the majority merely hold that, if an injury is the result of a risk of employment, it is compensable. They also hold that certain circumstances and conditions are not disqualifying if the injury is the result of a risk of employment. None of the cases, however, attempts to define what constitutes a risk of employment with respect to an idiopathic medical condition. The majority simply begs that question when it concludes that an employer's provision of assistance to an employee suffering from an idiopathic medical condition is a risk of employment because public policy and employment relationships make the provision of such aid desirable and likely. For reasons that I discuss later in this dissenting opinion, I would conclude that, when the initial cause of an injury is an idiopathic medical condition, a "risk of employment" is an employment condition that increases the likelihood of injury from the medical condition.

Moreover, I do not agree that characterizing workplace conduct as a condition of employment depending on the perspective of the person making the claim creates anomalies. For example, the fact that a worker injured by a stick thrown by another worker may receive compensation because horseplay is a condition of employment; see Mascika v. Connecticut Tool & Engineering Co., 109 Conn. 473, 481, 147 A. 11 (1929); does not logically imply that a worker who injures his back throwing a stick at another worker would be compensated. Similarly, the fact that an employee who is injured by an fellow employee who is insane may receive compensation because the risk that a fellow employee will become insane is a condition of employment; see Anderson v. Security Building Co., 100 Conn. 373, 377, 123 A. 843 (1924); does not necessarily mean that an employee who injures himself after becoming insane would be compensated. Indeed, under the majority's reasoning, if an employee who held a grudge against a *632 coworker wildly fired a gun at the coworker in the workplace, and was injured when fellow employees restrained him in an effort to protect the coworker and themselves, the fact that they were attempting to save lives in which the employer had an interest would mean that the injuries were compensable. In my view, that result would be anomalous. Accordingly, I do not believe that denying compensation to the plaintiff in the present case while granting compensation to coworkers injured while coming to his rescue would be inherently inconsistent or inconsistent with the general principles cited by the majority.

Finally, the majority concludes that "[i]n light of the commissioner's finding that the plaintiff's coworkers had rendered aid to prevent injury not only to the plaintiff, but also to other workers, the only reasonable inference from this fact is that, contrary to the [compensation review] board's conclusion, the coworkers' actions were undertaken to benefit both the plaintiff and the defendant." (Emphasis in original.) The board's finding that the plaintiff's injuries did not arise in the course of employment was not, however, based solely on a finding that the aid that the plaintiff received was for his benefit alone. Rather, the board concluded that the injuries were not compensable in part because they arose from an idiopathic medical condition. That conclusion was consistent with the commissioner's rejection of the plaintiff's claim on the sole ground that "[t]he chain of causation which resulted in the [plaintiff's] shoulder injuries was set in motion by the [plaintiff's] grand mal seizure." Thus, the board's finding that the provision of the aid was for the sole benefit of the plaintiff was essentially an alternate ground for affirming the commissioner's ruling. Accordingly, even if that finding was not supported by the evidence, it would not be fatal to the defendant's claim. As I have indicated, the fact that an employer indirectly benefits from restraining an employee does not necessarily mean that injuries suffered by the employee as a result of the restraint are compensable.

In summary, I believe that the relevant case law does not support that majority's conclusion that an employer's provision of aid to an employee suffering from an idiopathic medical condition is an inherent risk of employment; its conclusion that the essential character of an employee's act as a condition of employment "does not change when viewed from the perspective of the coworker injured by that same conduct" finds no basis in law or in logic; and its determination that the aid provided to the plaintiff in the present case did not solely benefit the plaintiff is irrelevant to the question before us. Accordingly, I am entirely unpersuaded by its analysis. Instead, I would conclude that Larson's distinction between personal risks and neutral risks; see 1 A. Larson & L. Larson, Workers' Compensation Law (2006) § 4.03, pp. 4-2 through 4-3; provides the proper analytical framework for resolving the question of whether the plaintiff's injuries arose from his employment. Larson defines neutral risks as workplace conditions that arise neither from a specific employment activity nor from a characteristic personal to the employee. Id. Such risks include employee horseplay in which the injured employee has not participated or an attack by a fellow employee who has lapsed into insanity. See id. When an injury arises from a neutral risk, "all that is needed to tip the scales in the direction of employment connection ... is the fact that the employment brought the employee to the place at the time he or she was injured—an extremely lightweight causal factor, but enough to tip scales that are otherwise perfectly evenly balanced." Id., *633 § 9.01[4][b], at p. 9-8. In other words, the employer assumes the risk of injury from dangerous conditions that may arise at the place of work and that are not personal to, caused by or within the control of the employee, even when, as in the horseplay cases, the workplace condition is not specifically employment-related.

Larson describes risks that attach to a particular employee and that have no connection to the employment, such as an employee's own idiopathic medical condition or animus between employees, as personal risks. Id., § 4.02, at p. 4-2. When an injury's initial causative factor is a personal risk, a stronger causal connection between the ultimate injury and the employment than mere presence at the place of work and exposure to general workplace conditions is required to establish compensability. See id., § 9.01[4][b], at p. 9-8 ("[t]o shift the loss in the idiopathic-fall cases to the employment ... it is reasonable to require a showing of at least some substantial employment contribution to the harm"). In cases in which a fall on a level floor was triggered by the injured employee's idiopathic medical condition, for example, the presence of the employee at the site of employment plus the unusual hardness of the floor may be required to constitute a sufficient causal connection.^[3]*634 See id., § 9.01[4][e], at p. 9-14. If the conditions of employment reduce or do not increase the likelihood of injury from an idiopathic medical condition, any resulting injury should not be compensable. For example, if an employee were injured even though he fell on a thick carpet or an "8-inch-thick, deluxe, innerspring mattress"; id., § 9.01[4][c], at p. 9-11; Larson would find no causal co