DeJohn v. Temple University

OPINION

Christian DeJohn sued Temple University, its former president, David Adamany, and two of his former graduate school professors, Richard H. Immerman and Gregory J.W. Urwin (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Temple” or “the University”) in an eight-count complaint for violations of, inter alia, First Amendment freedom of speech and expression stemming from the University’s Policy on Sexual Harassment. 1 In an Order dated March 21, 2007, the District Court granted DeJohn’s motion for partial summary judgment in the form of injunctive relief (“March 21 Order”). At that time, the Court reserved the issue of damages for trial, explaining that “[bjecause the question of what, if any, harm DeJohn suffered as a result of the unconstitutional policy is a question of fact about which there are serious disputes, it must be held over for trial.” On April 20, 2007, Temple timely appealed to this Court from the March 21 Order. The case went to trial, and on April 26, 2007, the District Court entered Final Judgment in favor of DeJohn on counts seven and eight of his Complaint, permanently enjoining Temple from reimplementing or enforcing its previous sexual harassment policy, 2 and awarding $1.00 in nominal damages in favor of DeJohn and against Temple University. Temple did not appeal from the Final Judgment. Because we conclude that the District Court’s March 21 Order was a non-final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we exercise appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) over only that portion of the order granting injunctive relief. However, we lack jurisdiction over the Final Judgment and award of damages in DeJohn’s favor. In addition, because we conclude that the issue of whether Temple University’s Policy on Sexual Harassment is constitutional is not moot, and because we conclude on the merits that the policy is facially unconstitutional, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of injunctive relief.

I.

Christian DeJohn served in the Pennsylvania Army National Guard. In January 2002, he enrolled in Temple University to pursue a master’s degree in Military and American History. To obtain a master’s degree in history at Temple, a student must first successfully complete his course work. The student then has the option of either taking a comprehensive exam or completing a master’s thesis. The parties agree that all course work and other re *305 quirements must be completed within three years from the date of admission unless a leave of absence has been granted. A graduate student in the history department must form a thesis committee, which includes an advisor selected by the student to serve as the primary reader of the master’s thesis and a secondary reader also chosen by the student. The thesis must be acceptable to both readers before the graduate student is allowed to defend it.

DeJohn took four classes in his first semester as a graduate student. Following that semester, DeJohn was called to active military duty and was deployed to Bosnia. He earned graduate level credit while deployed through a correspondence course related to the Vietnam War. By the end of the following fall 2003 semester, DeJohn had completed all of the required course work for his advanced degree. In January 2004, he chose to draft a master’s thesis in lieu of taking a comprehensive examination, and Dr. Jay Lockenour, a tenured associate professor of history, agreed to serve as his thesis advisor. Dr. Lockenour received DeJohn’s completed draft of his thesis on March 16, 2005. By March 27, 2005, Dr. Lockenour had read the entire thesis and e-mailed DeJohn with further, specific critiques. DeJohn met with Dr. Lockenour on April 18, 2005, to discuss necessary revisions, and the revisions continued. On July 21, 2005, Dr. Lockenour approached Dr. Gregory J.W. Urwin, a professor of history, at DeJohn’s request and asked him to serve as De-John’s secondary reader; Dr. Urwin agreed. On August 20, 2005, DeJohn delivered a revised draft of his thesis to Dr. Urwin, who reviewed it. In March 2006, DeJohn produced his most recent thesis draft to Dr. Andrew Isenberg, the Chair of the History Department. Dr. Isenberg forwarded the draft to Dr. Lockenour for his review as DeJohn’s primary reader. The record indicates that DeJohn is not currently registered as a student at Temple and has not been registered since the 2006 spring semester.

DeJohn filed the instant action on February 22, 2006. Only two of the original counts are at issue in this appeal. These remaining counts embody DeJohn’s challenge of Temple University’s Student Code of Conduct and related polices, in particular as they address sexual harassment. The Temple policy challenged here reads, in relevant part:

all forms of sexual harassment are prohibited, including ... expressive, visual, or physical conduct of a sexual or gender-motivated nature, when ... (c) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work, educational performance, or status; or (d) such conduct has the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment.

DeJohn claims that this policy is facially overbroad. Specifically, because of the sexual harassment policy, he felt inhibited in expressing his opinions in class concerning women in combat and women in the military. As a history graduate student, DeJohn found himself engaged in conversations and class discussions regarding issues he believed were implicated by the policy. That, in turn, caused him to be concerned that discussing his social, cultural, political, and/or religious views regarding these issues might be sanctionable by the University. Thus, DeJohn contends that the policy had a chilling effect on his ability to exercise his constitutionally protected rights.

On May 22, 2006, Temple filed a motion to dismiss DeJohn’s Complaint. On September 11, 2006, the District Court granted in part Temple’s motion to dismiss with respect to counts three through six. The *306 Court ordered Temple to file an Answer to the remaining counts. On October 9, 2006, DeJohn moved for a judgment on the pleadings on his seventh and eighth causes of action. The Court denied the motion, giving Temple an opportunity to support its sexual harassment policy by showing it had a particularized reason to anticipate “substantial disruption from the broad swath of student speech prohibited under the Policy.”

On January 15, 2007, less than three weeks before the deadline for filing dispos-itive motions in the case, Temple modified its sexual harassment policy. Temple then filed a motion for a protective order and a motion to quash duces tecum — arguing that because there were no longer issues in the case due to the policy modification, DeJohn was not entitled to a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition on the sexual harassment policy or duces tecum discovery of records of past harassment complaints. The District Court denied this motion, concluding in part that there was nothing to prevent Temple from restoring the policy as soon as counts seven and eight of the Complaint were resolved.

After discovery, DeJohn moved for summary judgment on counts seven and eight and Temple moved for summary judgment on all remaining claims. On March 21, 2007, the District Court granted DeJohn’s motion, declared the Temple University Policy on Sexual Harassment (as enacted before January 15, 2007) facially unconstitutional and enjoined Temple from reimplementing or enforcing the sexual harassment policy that existed before the changes implemented on January 15, 2007. The District Court granted in part and denied in part Temple’s motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims in the case. Temple appealed the partial grant of summary judgment.

After trial, the District Court entered Final Judgment in favor of DeJohn on counts seven and eight, permanently enjoined Temple from reimplementing or enforcing its previous policy, and awarded $1.00 in nominal damages in favor of De-John and against Temple University. The Court entered judgment in Temple’s favor as to counts one and two.

II.

Before we address the merits of Temple’s appeal, we must determine the scope of our jurisdiction. Temple argues that we have jurisdiction over the District Court’s grant of an injunction, as well as the District Court’s award of damages. Temple argues that while the District Court did not award damages to DeJohn until April 26, 2007, its act of awarding damages was “purely ministerial or mechanical,” and as such, the March 21 Order was a final order disposing of all of the claims. We cannot agree.

Temple argues that the March 21 Order ended the litigation related to counts seven and eight on the merits and left nothing else for the District Court to do but execute the judgment. That is, Temple argues that this Court has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) directs otherwise. It provides that:

When an action presents more than one claim for relief — whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim — or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and *307 liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’rights and liabilities.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) (emphasis added). The March 21 Order left a First Amendment retaliation claim and a § 1983 claim for money damages unresolved, and as such, the order was not final within the meaning of Rule 54(b). Rule 54(b) “expressly provides that an order adjudicating less than all claims in an action with multiple claims is not final unless the district court makes an express determination that there is no just reason for delay ... on express direction for the entry of judgment.” Ortiz v. Eichler, 794 F.2d 889, 891 (3d Cir.1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). A district court may direct the entry of a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) only when a distinct claim is fully adjudicated. Neither party suggests that Temple University moved for certification pursuant to Rule 54(b) on counts seven and eight of the Complaint. Even had it done so, those counts had not been fully adjudicated as of March 21 because DeJohn’s request for damages had yet to be determined. The quantification of damages, contrary to the University’s argument, was more than a ministerial act to be performed by the clerk of the court and routinely executed by the judge. Indeed, it was a contested issue held for trial that required adjudication by a finder of fact and was not resolved by the March 21 Order. We have previously recognized that, “[i]t is a well-established rule of appellate jurisdiction ... that where liability has been decided but the extent of damage remains undetermined, there is no final order.” Apex Fountain Sales, Inc. v. Kleinfeld, 27 F.3d 931, 934-35 (3d Cir.1994) (quoting Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Benefits Review Bd., 535 F.2d 758, 760 (3d Cir.1976)) (per curiam) (collecting cases). See also, e.g., Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 68, 68 S.Ct. 972, 92 L.Ed. 1212 (1948) (“[T]he requirement of finality has not been met merely because the major issues in a case have been decided and only a few loose ends remain to be tied up — for example, where liability has been determined and all that needs to be adjudicated is the amount of damages.”); Cohen v. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 867 F.2d 1455, 1465 n. 8 (3d Cir.1989) (en banc) (explaining that the plaintiffs claim had not been fully adjudicated because her request for damages had not been determined); EEOC v. Del. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 865 F.2d 1408, 1413 (3d Cir.1989) (“An order which establishes liability without fixing the amount of recovery is generally not final.”); Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 802 (3d Cir.1984) (“because ... additional proceedings, including the determination of certain defenses and of damages, are yet to take place, most of these ‘judgments’ ... are not final within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291”), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060, 105 S.Ct. 1777, 84 L.Ed.2d 836 (1985); In re Jack Raley, 17 F.3d 291 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that the premature notice of appeal was not valid because the matter of prejudgment interest was not decided until long after the notice of appeal had been filed). Thus, the March 21 Order, though appealable under § 1292(a)(1), is not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 3

*308 Appeal is available as a matter of right from interlocutory orders with respect to injunctions. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Rule 54(b) does not limit appeals under § 1292(a)(1), even as to orders granting permanent injunctions. 16 Chaeles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3921.1 (2d ed.1996). 4 Thus, Temple’s Notice of Appeal is timely only to the extent that it appeals from the District Court’s March 21 Order granting DeJohn’s requests for in-junctive relief on counts seven and eight of his Complaint.

III.

Temple University argues that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to declare its former sexual harassment policy unconstitutional and to issue an injunction relating to that policy because 1) the constitutionality of the former policy was rendered moot after Temple voluntarily revised the policy on January 15, 2007, and/or 2) De-John left the University. We have explained that:

The Constitution limits this court’s jurisdiction to the adjudication of actual cases and controversies. “[A] case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” The court’s ability to grant effective relief lies at the heart of the mootness doctrine. That is, “[i]f developments occur during the course of adjudication that eliminate a plaintiffs personal stake in the outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be dismissed as moot.”

*309 Donovan ex rel. Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211, 216 (3d Cir.2003) (citations omitted).

We will first examine Temple’s argument that DeJohn’s claims for equitable relief in counts seven and eight became moot with the school’s voluntary amendment of the contested policy. In doing so, we heed the Supreme Court’s instruction that

as a general rule, “voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case, i.e., does not make the case moot.” But jurisdiction, properly acquired, may abate if the case becomes moot because (1) it can be said with assurance that “there is no reasonable expectation ...” that the alleged violation will recur, and (2) interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation. When both conditions are satisfied it may be said that the case is moot because neither party has a legally cognizable interest in the final determination of the underlying questions of fact and law.

Los Angeles County v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979) (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court noted that, “[t]he burden of demonstrating mootness ‘is a heavy one.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). Our Court has articulated the burden for the party alleging mootness as “ ‘heavy,’ even ‘formidable.’ ” United States v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 363 F.3d 276, 285 (3d Cir.2004). We conclude that Temple has not met this burden.

Given the posture of this case, and the briefing on appeal, we are left with no assurance that Temple will not reimplement its pre-January 15 sexual harassment policy, absent an injunction, after this litigation has concluded. See Davis, 440 U.S. at 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379 (holding that only if there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur can the voluntary cessation of a challenged practice render a case moot). Temple did not change its sexual harassment policy for more than a year after the commencement of litigation and then only near the end of discovery, less than three weeks before the dis-positive motions deadline in the case. More importantly, Temple defended and continues to defend not only the constitutionality of its prior sexual harassment policy, but also the need for the former policy. We consider these two factors significant in evaluating whether there is a “reasonable expectation” that Temple will reimplement its previous sexual harassment policy. See id.

The Supreme Court considered mootness and the voluntary cessation of a policy in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2738, 2751, 168 L.Ed.2d 508 (2007). There, the Supreme Court considered whether a student assignment plan that relied on racial classification to allocate slots in oversubscribed high schools was constitutional. Parents Involved in Cmty Schs., 127 S.Ct. at 2749. The plaintiffs son, Joshua, was assigned to Young Elementary, a school approximately ten miles away from their house. The mother attempted to have him transferred to a school one-mile away that had openings. Her request was denied because, “[t]he transfer would have an adverse effect on desegregation compliance” of Young. The mother then brought suit, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause. In challenging the petitioner’s standing, the School District noted that it had ceased using the racial tiebreaker pending the outcome of the litigation. Id. at 2751. The Court noted that, despite this suspension, the School District vigor *310 ously defended the constitutionality of its race-based program, and did not deny that if the litigation was resolved in its favor it would resume using race to assign students. Id. The Court reiterated that, “[v]oluntary cessation does not moot a ease or controversy unless ‘subsequent events ma[ke] it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur,’ ” and the Court concluded that it was “a heavy burden that [the school district] has clearly not met.” Id. We recognize that Temple never stated that it only changed its policy pending the outcome of this litigation, as occurred in Parents Involved in Community Schools. Nevertheless, Temple defended and continues to defend not only the constitutionality of its prior sexual harassment policy, but also the need for the former policy. Thus, like Parents Involved in Community Schools, there have been no subsequent events that make it absolutely clear that Temple will not reinstate the allegedly wrongful policy in the absence of the injunction. See Davis, 440 U.S. at 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379; see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (holding that the standard for “determining whether a case has been mooted by the defendant’s voluntary conduct is stringent: A case might become moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”).

We came to a similar conclusion in United States v. Government of Virgin Islands, 363 F.3d 276 (3d Cir.2004). There, the United States brought a Clean Water Act enforcement action against the U.S. Virgin Islands. 363 F.3d at 279. The Virgin Islands then entered into a negotiated contract with Global Resources Management (“GRM”), a company that was to provide the services necessary to achieve compliance. Id. The United States filed a motion to show cause as to why performance of the GRM contract should not be enjoined because it was likely tainted by political corruption, and that GRM itself was a start-up company with no equipment, assets, or experience in construction. Id. The District Court entered an order in March 2003 enjoining the Virgin Islands from proceeding with or reviving the GRM contract. Id. The Virgin Islands argued on appeal that the District Court lacked jurisdiction — on mootness grounds — to enjoin the contract between the Virgin Islands and GRM because the Virgin Islands had voluntarily terminated the contract two days before the hearing on the motion. Id. This Court determined that the Virgin Islands “failed to meet its heavy burden of demonstrating that there is no reasonable expectation that it would again enter into a contract similar to the one at issue.” Id. at 285. We reasoned, in part, that:

The timing of the contract termination' — ■ just five days after the United States moved to invalidate it, and just two days before the District Court’s hearing on the motion — strongly suggests that the impending litigation was the cause of the termination. Additionally, the Governor’s sole justification for the termination of the contract was that “such termination is in the best interest of the Government.” But this statement is extremely general, and surely does not provide any assurance that a similar contract would not be entered into again.... In short, the mere fact that the Governor has terminated a contract in this one instance with litigation lurking a couple of days away gives no assurance that a similar contract will not be entered into in the future.

Additionally, the [Virgin Islands’] continued defense of the validity and soundness of the contract prevents the mootness argument from carrying much *311 weight.... This stance does not bespeak of a genuine belief that the contract was of a type that would not be contemplated again.

Id. at 285-86. Like the timing of the contract termination and the Virgin Islands’ continued defense of its contract, here Temple’s timing of the policy change, as well as its continued defense of its former policy, do not meet the “formidable” burden of demonstrating that there is no reasonable expectation that it would reimplement its former policy. See id. at 285.

Temple urges us to consider the Eleventh Circuit opinion in Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, 162 F.3d 627 (11th Cir.1998), as support for its position that this issue is moot. In Jews for Jesus, the plaintiff brought a lawsuit in August 1995 against Tampa International Airport seeking in-junctive and declaratory relief that would permit the organization to distribute literature at the airport. 5 162 F.3d at 629. Approximately one month after the commencement of the lawsuit, in September 1995, the airport lifted the prohibition on the distribution of literature. Id. After that time, individuals and organizations— including Jews for Jesus — were freely permitted to distribute literature at the Tampa International Airport. Id. Jews for Jesus argued, however, that there was still a justiciable “case or controversy” before the district court because of the possibility of a return to the prior prohibition (or to the restrictive policy in place before the prohibition). Id. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed. It found that there was no reasonable expectation that Tampa International Airport would return to its prior policy. Id. This determination was based on the Court’s assessment that the new “open door” policy appeared to have been the result of substantial deliberation on the part of airport officials. Id. In addition, the Court noted that evidence suggested that the Airport consistently applied the new policy for three years (the policy was changed in September 1995 and the Court issued its opinion in December 1998). Id. Of course we are not bound by Eleventh Circuit precedent; regardless, we do not believe that our conclusion is at odds with that of the Eleventh Circuit. In contrast to Jews for Jesus, where the airport lifted its prohibition one month after the lawsuit began, Temple did not change its policy until the discovery process was almost over, more than a year after the commencement of litigation, and less than three weeks remained before the disposi-tive motion deadline in the case. Further, the record before us does not support an assessment that Temple’s policy change was the result of substantial deliberation, such that Temple would not be inclined to revert back to its old policy. To the contrary, Temple continues to defend that former policy.

Thus, DeJohn’s claims for equitable relief did not become moot with Temple’s voluntary revision of its policy.

We now consider Temple’s argument that DeJohn is no longer a student at the University, and that his claim for in-junctive relief is moot for that reason. Temple would have us resolve this issue based on whether DeJohn is currently a student. The circumstances of this case reveal, however, that whether DeJohn qualifies as a “student” — one who attends a school or one who studies 6 — is not neees- *312 sarily easy to discern. On the record before us, we are satisfied that DeJohn has a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of this case.

There is no dispute between the parties that in the master’s degree program at Temple University all course work and other requirements must be completed within three years from the date of admission unless a student successfully secures a leave of absence. 7 DeJohn enrolled in January 2002 and completed all of the required course work for his master’s thesis by the end of the fall 2003 semester. DeJohn submitted the first completed draft of his thesis to Dr. Lockenour, his thesis advisor, in March 2005. In March 2006, DeJohn provided his most recent thesis draft to Dr. Andrew Isenberg, the Chair of the History Department. De-John’s thesis has not since been approved; the record reflects that the last action taken with respect to it was when Dr. Isenberg forwarded the draft to Dr. Lock-enour for his review as DeJohn’s primary thesis reader.

Temple argues that the reason DeJohn is not registered as a student, and why he cannot be a student at Temple, is because the time period for his matriculation, three years enrolled and one year on military leave, expired in December 2006 8 before DeJohn fulfilled the requirements of the master’s program. 9 Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 3, DeJohn v. Temple University, No. 06-0778 (3d Cir. September 13, 2007). DeJohn states that the reason he is not currently registered for classes is because he already completed all of the required course work for his master’s degree, and is awaiting approval of his thesis. DeJohn points out that absent from the record is any fact indicating that he graduated or that he has been dismissed from the school. We agree that, on this record, DeJohn continues to have a relationship with Temple University, and as such, continues to be subject to the sexual harassment policy. DeJohn completed all of the required course work for his master’s program and submitted a complete draft of his master’s thesis by March of 2005, that is, within the allowable time period for matriculation. From our perspective, DeJohn will continue to be a “student,” interacting with students, professors, and administration, until his graduate degree is either granted or denied. Temple itself averred that there is no required standard time frame in which university officials must review and render a final decision on his graduate thesis — that “[t]he time frame to review and grant final approval of a graduate degree thesis is *313 solely dependent upon the quality of work that the graduate submits for review.” Answer at 19, DeJohn v. Temple University, No. 06-00778, 2006 WL 738108 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 22, 2006). Until DeJohn’s thesis has received final approval or disapproval, it seems clear that he remains a member of the Temple University community, 10 subject to its Policy on Sexual Harassment. As such, DeJohn’s claims for equitable relief are not moot.

IV.

Our appellate review properly extends to matters inextricably bound up with the injunction decision. Wmght & MilleR, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3921.1. While the scope of appellate review under § 1292(a)(1) is confined to the issues necessary to determine the propriety of the interlocutory order itself, interlocutory orders with respect to permanent injunctions provide frequent occasion for review of the merits. Id. Here, in order for us to determine the propriety of the injunction, we must review the District Court’s determination that Temple University’s Policy on Sexual Harassment is facially unconstitutional.

A.

We begin our analysis by noting that the overbreadth doctrine may be ap-propriately utilized in the school setting. 11 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200, 111 S.Ct. 1759, 114 L.Ed.2d 233 (1991) (referencing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, State Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603, 605-06, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967)) (“[W]e have recognized that the university is a traditional sphere of free expression so fundamental to the functioning of our society that the Government’s ability to control speech within that sphere by means of conditions attached to the expenditure of Government funds is restricted by the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the First Amendment.”). We think this is an important initial observation as the Supreme Court’s resolution of student free speech cases has been, to this point in time, without reference to the overbreadth doctrine. See Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Cmty Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969) (implicating a school policy); Papish v. Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667, 93 S.Ct. 1197, 35 L.Ed.2d 618 (1973) (same); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986) (same). Even so, since the inception of overbreadth jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has recognized its prominent role in preventing a “chilling effect” on protected expression. Broadrick v. Okla *314 homo, 413 U.S. 601, 630, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (“Although the Court declines to hold the Oklahoma Act unconstitutional on its face, it does expressly recognize that overbreadth review is a necessary means of preventing a ‘chilling effect’ on protected expression.”). This laudable goal is no less implicated on public university campuses throughout this country, where free speech is of critical importance because it is the lifeblood of academic freedom. As the Supreme Court in Healy v. James explained, “the precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses than in the community at large. Quite to the contrary, ‘the vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools.’ ” 408 U.S. 169, 180, 92 S.Ct. 2338, 33 L.Ed.2d 266 (1972) (citation omitted). See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268-69, 102 S.Ct. 269,