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Full Opinion
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
HOLMES v. SOUTH CAROLINA
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
No. 04–1327. Argued February 22, 2006—Decided May 1, 2006
At petitioner’s South Carolina trial for murder and related crimes, the
prosecution relied heavily on forensic evidence that strongly sup
ported petitioner’s guilt. Petitioner sought to undermine the State’s
forensic evidence by introducing expert testimony suggesting that the
evidence had been contaminated and that the police had engaged in a
plot to frame him. Petitioner also sought to introduce evidence that
another man, Jimmy McCaw White, had been in the victim’s
neighborhood on the morning of the assault and that White had ei
ther acknowledged petitioner’s innocence or admitted to committing
the crimes himself. In White’s pretrial testimony, he denied making
the incriminating statements and provided an alibi for the time of the
assault.
The trial court excluded petitioner’s third-party guilt evidence cit
ing the State Supreme Court’s Gregory decision, which held such evi
dence admissible if it raises a reasonable inference as to the defen
dant’s own innocence, but inadmissible if it merely casts a bare
suspicion or raises a conjectural inference as to another’s guilt. Af
firming the trial court, the State Supreme Court cited both Gregory
and its later decision in Gay, and held that where there is strong fo
rensic evidence of an appellant’s guilt, proffered evidence about a
third party’s alleged guilt does not raise a reasonable inference as to
the appellant’s own innocence. Applying this standard, the court
held that petitioner could not overcome the forensic evidence against
him.
Held: A criminal defendant’s federal constitutional rights are violated
by an evidence rule under which the defendant may not introduce
evidence of third-party guilt if the prosecution has introduced foren
sic evidence that, if believed, strongly supports a guilty verdict.
“[S]tate and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Con
2 HOLMES v. SOUTH CAROLINA
Syllabus
stitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials.”
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U. S. 303, 308. This latitude, however,
has limits. “Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confronta
tion clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees
criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete
defense.’ ” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 683, 690. This right is
abridged by evidence rules that “infring[e] upon a weighty interest of
the accused” and are “ ‘arbitrary’ or ‘disproportionate to the purposes
they are designed to serve.’ ” Scheffer, supra, at 308.
While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evi
dence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are dis
proportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-
established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if
its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as un
fair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the
jury. An application of this principle is found in rules regulating the
admission of evidence proffered by criminal defendants to show that
someone else committed the crime with which they are charged.
Such rules are widely accepted and are not challenged here.
In Gregory, the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted and ap
plied a rule intended to be of this type. In Gay and this case, how
ever, that court radically changed and extended the Gregory rule by
holding that, where there is strong evidence of a defendant’s guilt,
especially strong forensic evidence, proffered evidence about a third
party’s alleged guilt may (or perhaps must) be excluded. Under this
rule, the trial judge does not focus on the probative value or the po
tential adverse effects of admitting the defense evidence of third-
party guilt. Instead, the critical inquiry concerns the strength of the
prosecution’s case: If the prosecution’s case is strong enough, the evi
dence of third-party guilt is excluded even if that evidence, if viewed
independently, would have great probative value and even if it would
not pose an undue risk of harassment, prejudice, or confusion of the
issues. Furthermore, as applied below, the rule seems to call for lit
tle, if any, examination of the credibility of the prosecution’s wit
nesses or the reliability of its evidence.
By evaluating the strength of only one party’s evidence, no logical
conclusion can be reached regarding the strength of contrary evi
dence offered by the other side to rebut or cast doubt. Because the
rule applied below did not heed this point, the rule is “arbitrary” in
the sense that it does not rationally serve the end that the Gregory
rule and other similar third-party guilt rules were designed to fur
ther. Nor has the State identified any other legitimate end served by
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 3
Syllabus
the rule. Thus, the rule violates a criminal defendant’s right to have
“ ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’ ” Crane,
supra, at 690. Pp. 4–11.
361 S. C. 333, 605 S. E. 2d 19, vacated and remanded.
ALITO, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 04–1327
_________________
BOBBY LEE HOLMES, PETITIONER v. SOUTH
CAROLINA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH
CAROLINA
[May 1, 2006]
JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a criminal
defendant’s federal constitutional rights are violated by an
evidence rule under which the defendant may not intro
duce proof of third-party guilt if the prosecution has intro
duced forensic evidence that, if believed, strongly supports
a guilty verdict.
I
On the morning of December 31, 1989, 86-year-old Mary
Stewart was beaten, raped, and robbed in her home. She
later died of complications stemming from her injuries.
Petitioner was convicted by a South Carolina jury of mur
der, first-degree criminal sexual conduct, first-degree
burglary, and robbery, and he was sentenced to death.
State v. Holmes, 320 S. C. 259, 262, 464 S. E. 2d 334, 336
(1995). The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed his
convictions and sentence, and this Court denied certiorari.
Ibid., cert. denied, 517 U. S. 1248 (1996). Upon state post-
conviction review, however, petitioner was granted a new
trial. 361 S. C. 333, 335, n. 1, 605 S. E. 2d 19, 20, n. 1
(2004).
2 HOLMES v. SOUTH CAROLINA
Opinion of the Court
At the second trial, the prosecution relied heavily on the
following forensic evidence:
“(1) [Petitioner’s] palm print was found just above the
door knob on the interior side of the front door of the
victim’s house; (2) fibers consistent with a black
sweatshirt owned by [petitioner] were found on the
victim’s bed sheets; (3) matching blue fibers were
found on the victim’s pink nightgown and on [peti
tioner’s] blue jeans; (4) microscopically consistent fi
bers were found on the pink nightgown and on [peti
tioner’s] underwear; (5) [petitioner’s] underwear
contained a mixture of DNA from two individuals, and
99.99% of the population other than [petitioner] and
the victim were excluded as contributors to that mix
ture; and (6) [petitioner’s] tank top was found to con
tain a mixture of [petitioner’s] blood and the victim’s
blood.” Id., at 343, 605 S. E. 2d, at 24.
In addition, the prosecution introduced evidence that
petitioner had been seen near Stewart’s home within an
hour of the time when, according to the prosecution’s
evidence, the attack took place. Id., at 337–338, 343, 605
S. E. 2d, at 21, 24.
As a major part of his defense, petitioner attempted to
undermine the State’s forensic evidence by suggesting that
it had been contaminated and that certain law enforce
ment officers had engaged in a plot to frame him. Id., at
339, 605 S. E. 2d, at 22. Petitioner’s expert witnesses
criticized the procedures used by the police in handling the
fiber and DNA evidence and in collecting the fingerprint
evidence. App. 299–311, 313–323. Another defense expert
provided testimony that petitioner cited as supporting his
claim that the palm print had been planted by the police.
Id., at 326–327.
Petitioner also sought to introduce proof that another
man, Jimmy McCaw White, had attacked Stewart. 361
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 3
Opinion of the Court
S. C., at 340, 605 S. E. 2d, at 22. At a pretrial hearing,
petitioner proffered several witnesses who placed White in
the victim’s neighborhood on the morning of the assault,
as well as four other witnesses who testified that White
had either acknowledged that petitioner was “ ‘innocent’ ”
or had actually admitted to committing the crimes. Id., at
340–342, 605 S. E. 2d, at 22–23. One witness recounted
that when he asked White about the “word . . . on the
street” that White was responsible for Stewart’s murder,
White “put his head down and he raised his head back up
and he said, well, you know I like older women.” App. 119.
According to this witness, White added that “he did what
they say he did” and that he had “no regrets about it at
all.” Id., at 120. Another witness, who had been incarcer
ated with White, testified that White had admitted to
assaulting Stewart, that a police officer had asked the
witness to testify falsely against petitioner, and that
employees of the prosecutor’s office, while soliciting the
witness’ cooperation, had spoken of manufacturing evi
dence against petitioner. Id., at 38–50. White testified at
the pretrial hearing and denied making the incriminating
statements. 361 S. C., at 341–342, 605 S. E. 2d, at 23. He
also provided an alibi for the time of the crime, but an
other witness refuted his alibi. Id., at 342, 605 S. E. 2d, at
23.
The trial court excluded petitioner’s third-party guilt
evidence citing State v. Gregory, 198 S. C. 98, 16 S. E. 2d
532 (1941), which held that such evidence is admissible if it
“ ‘raise[s] a reasonable inference or presumption as to [the
defendant’s] own innocence’ ” but is not admissible if it
merely “ ‘cast[s] a bare suspicion upon another’ ” or “ ‘raise[s]
a conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime by
another.’ ” App. 133–134 (quoting Gregory, supra, at 104,
16 S. E. 2d, at 534). On appeal, the South Carolina Su
preme Court found no error in the exclusion of petitioner’s
third-party guilt evidence. Citing both Gregory and its
4 HOLMES v. SOUTH CAROLINA
Opinion of the Court
later decision in State v. Gay, 343 S. C. 543, 541 S. E. 2d
541 (2001), the State Supreme Court held that “where there
is strong evidence of an appellant’s guilt, especially where
there is strong forensic evidence, the proffered evidence
about a third party’s alleged guilt does not raise a reason
able inference as to the appellant’s own innocence.” 361
S. C., at 342–343, 605 S. E. 2d, at 24. Applying this stan
dard, the court held that petitioner could not “overcome the
forensic evidence against him to raise a reasonable infer
ence of his own innocence.” Id., at 343, 605 S. E. 2d, at 24.
We granted certiorari. 545 U. S. ___ (2005).
II
“[S]tate and federal rulemakers have broad latitude
under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evi
dence from criminal trials.” United States v. Scheffer, 523
U. S. 303, 308 (1998); see also Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U. S.
683, 689–690 (1986); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422,
438, n. 6 (1983); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284,
302–303 (1973); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554, 564 (1967).
This latitude, however, has limits. “Whether rooted di
rectly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation
clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guaran
tees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense.’ ” Crane, supra, at 690 (quot
ing California v. Trombetta, 467 U. S. 479, 485 (1984);
citations omitted). This right is abridged by evidence rules
that “infring[e] upon a weighty interest of the accused”
and are “ ‘arbitrary’ or ‘disproportionate to the purposes
they are designed to serve.’ ” Scheffer, supra, at 308 (quot
ing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U. S. 44, 58, 56 (1987)).
This Court’s cases contain several illustrations of “arbi
trary” rules, i.e., rules that excluded important defense
evidence but that did not serve any legitimate interests.
In Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14 (1967), state statutes
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 5
Opinion of the Court
barred a person who had been charged as a participant in
a crime from testifying in defense of another alleged par
ticipant unless the witness had been acquitted. As a
result, when the defendant in Washington was tried for
murder, he was precluded from calling as a witness a
person who had been charged and previously convicted of
committing the same murder. Holding that the defen
dant’s right to put on a defense had been violated, we
noted that the rule embodied in the statutes could not
“even be defended on the ground that it rationally sets
apart a group of persons who are particularly likely to
commit perjury” since the rule allowed an alleged partici
pant to testify if he or she had been acquitted or was
called by the prosecution. Id., at 22–23.
A similar constitutional violation occurred in Chambers
v. Mississippi, supra. A murder defendant called as a
witness a man named McDonald, who had previously
confessed to the murder. When McDonald repudiated the
confession on the stand, the defendant was denied permis
sion to examine McDonald as an adverse witness based on
the State’s “ ‘voucher’ rule,” which barred parties from
impeaching their own witnesses. Id., at 294. In addition,
because the state hearsay rule did not include an excep
tion for statements against penal interest, the defendant
was not permitted to introduce evidence that McDonald
had made self-incriminating statements to three other
persons. Noting that the State had not even attempted to
“defend” or “explain [the] underlying rationale” of the
“voucher rule,” id., at 297, this Court held that “the exclu
sion of [the evidence of McDonald’s out-of-court state
ments], coupled with the State’s refusal to permit [the
defendant] to cross-examine McDonald, denied him a trial
in accord with traditional and fundamental standards of
due process,” id., at 302.
Another arbitrary rule was held unconstitutional in
Crane v. Kentucky, supra. There, the defendant was pre
6 HOLMES v. SOUTH CAROLINA
Opinion of the Court
vented from attempting to show at trial that his confession
was unreliable because of the circumstances under which
it was obtained, and neither the State Supreme Court nor
the prosecution “advanced any rational justification for
the wholesale exclusion of this body of potentially exculpa
tory evidence.” Id., at 691.
In Rock v. Arkansas, supra, this Court held that a rule
prohibiting hypnotically refreshed testimony was uncon
stitutional because “[w]holesale inadmissibility of a defen
dant’s testimony is an arbitrary restriction on the right to
testify in the absence of clear evidence by the State repu
diating the validity of all post-hypnotic recollections.” Id.,
at 61. By contrast, in United States v. Scheffer, supra, we
held that a rule excluding all polygraph evidence did not
abridge the right to present a defense because the rule
“serve[d] several legitimate interests in the criminal trial
process,” was “neither arbitrary nor disproportionate in
promoting these ends,” and did not “implicate a suffi
ciently weighty interest of the defendant.” Id., at 309.
While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of
defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate
purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they
are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence
permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative
value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead
the jury. See, e.g., Fed. Rule Evid. 403; Uniform Rule of
Evid. 45 (1953); ALI, Model Code of Evidence Rule 303
(1942); 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§1863, 1904 (1904).
Plainly referring to rules of this type, we have stated that
the Constitution permits judges “to exclude evidence that
is ‘repetitive . . . , only marginally relevant’ or poses an
undue risk of ‘harassment, prejudice, [or] confusion of the
issues.’ ” Crane, supra, at 689–690 (quoting Delaware v.
Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673, 679 (1986); ellipsis and brack
ets in original). See also Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U. S. 37,
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 7
Opinion of the Court
42 (1996) (plurality opinion) (terming such rules “familiar
and unquestionably constitutional”).
A specific application of this principle is found in rules
regulating the admission of evidence proffered by criminal
defendants to show that someone else committed the
crime with which they are charged. See, e.g., 41 C. J. S.,
Homicide §216, pp. 56–58 (1991) (“Evidence tending to
show the commission by another person of the crime
charged may be introduced by accused when it is inconsis
tent with, and raises a reasonable doubt of, his own guilt;
but frequently matters offered in evidence for this purpose
are so remote and lack such connection with the crime
that they are excluded”); 40A Am. Jur. 2d, Homicide §286,
pp. 136–138 (1999) (“[T]he accused may introduce any
legal evidence tending to prove that another person may
have committed the crime with which the defendant is
charged . . . . [Such evidence] may be excluded where it
does not sufficiently connect the other person to the crime,
as, for example, where the evidence is speculative or re
mote, or does not tend to prove or disprove a material fact
in issue at the defendant’s trial” (footnotes omitted)).
Such rules are widely accepted,* and neither petitioner
——————
* See, e.g., Smithart v. State, 988 P. 2d 583, 586–587 (Alaska 1999);
Shields v. State, 357 Ark. 283, 287–288, 166 S. W. 3d 28, 32 (2004);
People v. Hall, 41 Cal. 3d 826, 833, 718 P. 2d 99, 103–104 (1986) (en
banc); People v. Mulligan, 193 Colo. 509, 517–518, 568 P. 2d 449, 456–
457 (1977) (en banc); State v. West, 274 Conn. 605, 624–627, 877 A. 2d
787, 802–803 (2005); Winfield v. United States, 676 A. 2d 1 (DC App.
1996) (en banc); Klinect v. State, 269 Ga. 570, 573, 501 S. E. 2d 810,
813–814 (1998); State v. Rabellizsa, 79 Haw. 347, 350–351, 903 P. 2d
43, 46–47 (1995); People v. Fort, 248 Ill. App. 3d 301, 314, 618 N. E. 2d
445, 455 (1993); State v. Adams, 280 Kan. 494, 504–507, 124 P. 3d 19,
27–29 (2005); Beaty v. Commonwealth, 125 S. W. 3d 196, 207–208 (Ky.
2003); State v. Dechaine, 572 A. 2d 130, 134 (Me. 1990); Commonwealth
v. Scott, 408 Mass. 811, 815–816, 564 N. E. 2d 370, 374–375 (1990);
State v. Jones, 678 N. W. 2d 1, 16–17 (Minn. 2004); Moore v. State, 179
Miss. 268, 274–275, 175 So. 183, 184 (1937); State v. Chaney, 967 S. W.
2d 47, 55 (Mo. 1998) (en banc); State v. Cotto, 182 N. J. 316, 332–333,
8 HOLMES v. SOUTH CAROLINA
Opinion of the Court
nor his amici challenge them here.
In Gregory, the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted
and applied a rule apparently intended to be of this type,
given the court’s references to the “applicable rule” from
Corpus Juris and American Jurisprudence:
“ ‘[E]vidence offered by accused as to the commission
of the crime by another person must be limited to such
facts as are inconsistent with his own guilt, and to
such facts as raise a reasonable inference or presump
tion as to his own innocence; evidence which can have
(no) other effect than to cast a bare suspicion upon
another, or to raise a conjectural inference as to the
commission of the crime by another, is not admissi
ble. . . . [B]efore such testimony can be received, there
must be such proof of connection with it, such a train
of facts or circumstances, as tends clearly to point out
such other person as the guilty party.’ ” 198 S. C., at
104–105, 16 S. E. 2d, at 534–535 (quoting 16 C. J.,
Criminal Law §1085, p. 560 (1918) and 20 Am. Jur.,
Evidence §265, p. 254 (1939); footnotes omitted).
In Gay and this case, however, the South Carolina
Supreme Court radically changed and extended the rule.
In Gay, after recognizing the standard applied in Gregory,
the court stated that “[i]n view of the strong evidence of
appellant’s guilt—especially the forensic evidence—. . . the
proffered evidence . . . did not raise ‘a reasonable infer
ence’ as to appellant’s own innocence.” Gay, 343 S. C., at
——————
865 A. 2d 660, 669–670 (2005); Gore v. State, 2005 OK CR 14, ¶¶13–24,
119 P. 3d 1268, 1272–1276; State v. Gregory, 198 S. C. 98, 104–105, 16
S. E. 2d 532, 534–535 (1941); Wiley v. State, 74 S. W. 3d 399, 405–408
(Tex. Crim. App. 2002); State v. Grega, 168 Vt. 363, 375, 721 A. 2d 445,
454 (1998); State v. Thomas, 150 Wash. 2d 821, 856–858, 83 P. 3d 970,
988 (2004) (en banc); State v. Parr, 207 W. Va. 469, 475, 534 S. E. 2d
23, 29 (2000) (per curiam); State v. Denny, 120 Wis. 2d 614, 622–625,
357 N. W. 2d 12, 16–17 (Wis. App. 1984).
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 9
Opinion of the Court
550, 541 S. E. 2d, at 545 (quoting Gregory, supra, at 104,
16 S. E. 2d, at 534, in turn quoting 16 C. J., §1085, at 560).
Similarly, in the present case, as noted, the State Supreme
Court applied the rule that “where there is strong evi
dence of [a defendant’s] guilt, especially where there is
strong forensic evidence, the proffered evidence about a
third party’s alleged guilt” may (or perhaps must) be
excluded. 361 S. C., at 342, 605 S. E. 2d, at 24.
Under this rule, the trial judge does not focus on the
probative value or the potential adverse effects of admit
ting the defense evidence of third-party guilt. Instead, the
critical inquiry concerns the strength of the prosecution’s
case: If the prosecution’s case is strong enough, the evi
dence of third-party guilt is excluded even if that evidence,
if viewed independently, would have great probative value
and even if it would not pose an undue risk of harassment,
prejudice, or confusion of the issues.
Furthermore, as applied in this case, the South Carolina
Supreme Court’s rule seems to call for little, if any, exami
nation of the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses or
the reliability of its evidence. Here, for example, the de
fense strenuously claimed that the prosecution’s forensic
evidence was so unreliable (due to mishandling and a
deliberate plot to frame petitioner) that the evidence
should not have even been admitted. The South Carolina
Supreme Court responded that these challenges did not
entirely “eviscerate” the forensic evidence and that the
defense challenges went to the weight and not to the ad
missibility of that evidence. Id., at 343, n. 8, 605 S. E. 2d,
at 24, n. 8. Yet, in evaluating the prosecution’s forensic
evidence and deeming it to be “strong”—and thereby justi
fying exclusion of petitioner’s third-party guilt evidence—
the South Carolina Supreme Court made no mention of the
defense challenges to the prosecution’s evidence.
Interpreted in this way, the rule applied by the State
Supreme Court does not rationally serve the end that the
10 HOLMES v. SOUTH CAROLINA
Opinion of the Court
Gregory rule and its analogues in other jurisdictions were
designed to promote, i.e., to focus the trial on the central
issues by excluding evidence that has only a very weak
logical connection to the central issues. The rule applied
in this case appears to be based on the following logic:
Where (1) it is clear that only one person was involved in
the commission of a particular crime and (2) there is
strong evidence that the defendant was the perpetrator, it
follows that evidence of third-party guilt must be weak.
But this logic depends on an accurate evaluation of the
prosecution’s proof, and the true strength of the prosecu
tion’s proof cannot be assessed without considering chal
lenges to the reliability of the prosecution’s evidence. Just
because the prosecution’s evidence, if credited, would
provide strong support for a guilty verdict, it does not
follow that evidence of third-party guilt has only a weak
logical connection to the central issues in the case. And
where the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses or the
reliability of its evidence is not conceded, the strength of
the prosecution’s case cannot be assessed without making
the sort of factual findings that have traditionally been
reserved for the trier of fact and that the South Carolina
courts did not purport to make in this case.
The rule applied in this case is no more logical than its
converse would be, i.e., a rule barring the prosecution from
introducing evidence of a defendant’s guilt if the defendant
is able to proffer, at a pretrial hearing, evidence that, if
believed, strongly supports a verdict of not guilty. In the
present case, for example, the petitioner proffered evi
dence that, if believed, squarely proved that White, not
petitioner, was the perpetrator. It would make no sense,
however, to hold that this proffer precluded the prosecu
tion from introducing its evidence, including the forensic
evidence that, if credited, provided strong proof of the
petitioner’s guilt.
The point is that, by evaluating the strength of only one
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 11
Opinion of the Court
party’s evidence, no logical conclusion can be reached
regarding the strength of contrary evidence offered by the
other side to rebut or cast doubt. Because the rule applied
by the State Supreme Court in this case did not heed this
point, the rule is “arbitrary” in the sense that it does not
rationally serve the end that the Gregory rule and other
similar third-party guilt rules were designed to further.
Nor has the State identified any other legitimate end that
the rule serves. It follows that the rule applied in this case
by the State Supreme Court violates a criminal defendant’s
right to have “ ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a com
plete defense.’ ” Crane, 476 U. S., at 690 (quoting Trom
betta, 467 U. S., at 485).
III
For these reasons, we vacate the judgment of the South
Carolina Supreme Court and remand the case for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.