United States v. Ressam

(Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2007                                       1

                                       Syllabus

         NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
       being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
       The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
       prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
       See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                       Syllabus

                    UNITED STATES v. RESSAM

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
                  THE NINTH CIRCUIT

      No. 07–455.      Argued March 25, 2008—Decided May 19, 2008
After respondent gave false information on his customs form while at-
  tempting to enter the United States, a search of his car revealed ex-
  plosives that he intended to detonate in this country. He was con-
  victed of, inter alia, (1) feloniously making a false statement to a
  customs official in violation of 18 U. S. C. §1001, and (2) “carr[ying]
  an explosive during the commission of” that felony in violation of
  §844(h)(2). The Ninth Circuit set aside the latter conviction because
  it read “during” in §844(h)(2) to include a requirement that the explo-
  sive be carried “in relation to” the underlying felony.
Held: Since respondent was carrying explosives when he violated
  §1001, he was carrying them “during” the commission of that felony.
  The most natural reading of §844(h)(2) provides a sufficient basis for
  reversal. It is undisputed that the items in respondent’s car were
  “explosives,” and that he was “carr[ying]” those explosives when he
  knowingly made false statements to a customs official in violation of
  §1001. Dictionary definitions need not be consulted to arrive at the
  conclusion that he engaged in §844(h)(2)’s precise conduct. “[D]uring”
  denotes a temporal link. Because his carrying of explosives was con-
  temporaneous with his §1001 violation, he carried them “during” that
  violation. The statute’s history further supports the conclusion that
  Congress did not intend a relational requirement in §844(h) as pres-
  ently written. Pp. 2–6
474 F. 3d 597, reversed.

  STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and ALITO, JJ., joined, and in
which SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined as to Part I. THOMAS, J., filed an
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which
SCALIA, J., joined. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
                        Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008)                              1

                             Opinion of the Court

     NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
     preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
     notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
     ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
     that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                                   _________________

                                   No. 07–455
                                   _________________


 UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. AHMED RESSAM
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

            APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

                                 [May 19, 2008] 


  JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
  Respondent attempted to enter the United States by car
ferry at Port Angeles, Washington. Hidden in the trunk of
his rental car were explosives that he intended to detonate
at the Los Angeles International Airport. After the ferry
docked, respondent was questioned by a customs official,
who instructed him to complete a customs declaration
form; respondent did so, identifying himself on the form as
a Canadian citizen (he is Algerian) named Benni Noris
(his name is Ahmed Ressam). Respondent was then di-
rected to a secondary inspection station, where another
official performed a search of his car. The official discov-
ered explosives and related items in the car’s spare tire
well.
  Respondent was subsequently convicted of a number of
crimes, including the felony of making a false statement to
a United States customs official in violation of 18 U. S. C.
§1001 (1994 ed., Supp. V) (Count 5) and carrying an explo-
sive “during the commission of” that felony in violation of
§844(h)(2) (1994 ed.) (Count 9). The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit set aside his conviction on Count 9
because it read the word “during,” as used in §844(h)(2), to
2                    UNITED STATES v. RESSAM

                          Opinion of the Court

include a requirement that the explosive be carried “in
relation to” the underlying felony. 474 F. 3d 597 (2007).
Because that construction of the statute conflicted with
decisions of other Courts of Appeals, we granted certio-
rari.1 552 U. S. ___ (2007).
                               I
  The most natural reading of the relevant statutory text
provides a sufficient basis for reversal. That text reads:
       “Whoever—
       “(1) uses fire or an explosive to commit any felony
       which may be prosecuted in a court of the United
       States, or
       “(2) carries an explosive during the commission of any
       felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the
       United States,
“including a felony which provides for an enhanced pun-
ishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous
weapon or device shall, in addition to the punishment
provided for such felony, be sentenced to imprisonment for
10 years.” 18 U. S. C. §844(h).
  It is undisputed that the items hidden in respondent’s
car were “explosives.”2 It is also undisputed that respon-
——————
    1 Boththe Third and Fifth Circuits have declined to interpret
§844(h)(2) as requiring that the explosive be carried in relation to the
underlying felony. See United States v. Rosenberg, 806 F. 2d 1169,
1178–1179 (CA3 1986) (“The plain everyday meaning of ‘during’ is ‘at
the same time’ or ‘at a point in the course of. . . . It does not normally
mean ‘at the same time and in connection with. . . .’ It is not fitting for
this court to declare that the crime defined by §844(h)(2) has more
elements than those enumerated on the face of the statute”); United
States v. Ivy, 929 F. 2d 147, 151 (CA5 1991) (“Section 844(h)(2) . . . does
not include the relation element Ivy urges. . . . We . . . refuse to judi-
cially append the relation element to §844(h)(2)”).
  2 Because respondent concedes that the items in his car were “explo-

sives,” we have no occasion to determine the boundaries of that term as
used in the statute. Specifically, we do not comment on when, if ever,
                      Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008)                     3

                          Opinion of the Court

dent was “carr[ying]” those explosives when he knowingly
made false statements to a customs official, and that those
statements violated §1001 (1994 ed., Supp. V).
   There is no need to consult dictionary definitions of the
word “during” in order to arrive at the conclusion that
respondent engaged in the precise conduct described in
§844(h)(2) (1994 ed.). The term “during” denotes a tempo-
ral link; that is surely the most natural reading of the
word as used in the statute. Because respondent’s carry-
ing of the explosives was contemporaneous with his viola-
tion of §1001, he carried them “during” that violation.
                             II
  The history of the statute we construe today further
supports our conclusion that Congress did not intend to
require the Government to establish a relationship be-
tween the explosive carried and the underlying felony.
Congress originally enacted §844(h)(2) as part of its “Regu-
lation of Explosives” in Title XI of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 957. The provision was
modeled after a portion of the Gun Control Act of 1968,
§102, 82 Stat. 1224, codified, as amended, at 18 U. S. C.
§924(c) (2000 ed. and Supp. V). The earlier statute man-
dated at least 1 and no more than 10 years’ imprisonment
for any person who “carries a firearm unlawfully during
the commission of any felony which may be prosecuted in
a court of the United States.” 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(2) (1964
ed., Supp. IV).     Except for the word “explosive” in
§844(h)(2), instead of the word “firearm” in §924(c)(2), the
two provisions as originally enacted were identical.
  In 1984, Congress redrafted the firearm statute; it
increased the penalties attached to the provision and,
most significantly for our purposes, deleted the word
——————
“such commonplace materials as kerosene, gasoline, or certain fertiliz-
ers,” post, at 2 (BREYER, J., dissenting), might fall within the definition
of “explosive.”
4                 UNITED STATES v. RESSAM

                       Opinion of the Court

“unlawfully” and inserted the words “and in relation to”
immediately after the word “during.” §1005(a), 98 Stat.
2138. Reviewing a conviction for an offense that was
committed before the amendment but not decided on
appeal until after its enactment, the Ninth Circuit held
that the original version of the firearm statute had implic-
itly included the “in relation to” requirement that was
expressly added while the case was pending on appeal. As
then-Judge Kennedy explained:
      “The statute as written when Stewart committed the
      offense provided in pertinent part that it was a crime
      to ‘carr[y] a firearm unlawfully during the commission
      of any felony. . . .’ 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(2) (1982). In
      1984, Congress revised section 924(c) . . . . The 1984
      amendment substituted for the word ‘during’ the
      phrase ‘during and in relation to.’ 18 U. S. C. A.
      §924(c) (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). Our
      study of the legislative history of the amendment . . .
      indicates the ‘in relation to’ language was not in-
      tended to create an element of the crime that did not
      previously exist, but rather was intended to make
      clear a condition already implicit in the statute. The
      legislative history reveals that because the amend-
      ment eliminated the requirement that the firearm be
      carried unlawfully, 18 U. S. C. A. §924(c) (West Supp.
      1985), the ‘in relation to’ language was added to allay
      explicitly the concern that a person could be prose-
      cuted under section 924(c) for committing an entirely
      unrelated crime while in possession of a firearm.
      Though the legislative history does not say so ex-
      pressly, it strongly implies that the ‘in relation to’
      language did not alter the scope of the statute . . . .”
      United States v. Stewart, 779 F. 2d 538, 539–540
      (1985) (citations omitted).
    Relying on that Circuit precedent, the Court of Appeals
                 Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008)           5

                     Opinion of the Court

in this case concluded that the explosives statute, like the
firearm statute, implicitly included a requirement of a
relationship between possession of the item in question
and the underlying felony. Whatever the merits of the
argument that §924(c) as originally enacted contained a
relational requirement, the subsequent changes to both
statutes convince us that the Government’s reading of
§844(h) as presently written is correct.
                             III
   In 1988, Congress enacted the “Explosives Offenses
Amendments,” §6474(b), 102 Stat. 4379, which modified
the text of §844(h). Those amendments increased the
penalties for violating the provision, §6474(b)(2), id., at
4380; they also deleted the word “unlawfully,”
§6474(b)(1), ibid. Unlike its earlier amendment to the
firearm statute, however, Congress did not also insert the
words “and in relation to” after the word “during.” While
it is possible that this omission was inadvertent, that
possibility seems remote given the stark difference that
was thereby introduced into the otherwise similar texts of
18 U. S. C. §§844(h) and 924(c).
   Even if the similarity of the original texts of the two
statutes might have supported an inference that both
included an implicit relationship requirement, their cur-
rent difference virtually commands the opposite inference.
While the two provisions were initially identical, Congress’
replacement of the word “unlawfully” in the firearm stat-
ute with the phrase “and in relation to,” coupled with the
deletion of the word “unlawfully” without any similar
replacement in the explosives statute, convinces us that
Congress did not intend to introduce a relational require-
ment into the explosives provision, but rather intended us
to accept the more straightforward reading of §844(h).
Since respondent was carrying explosives when he vio-
lated §1001, he was carrying them “during” the commis-
6               UNITED STATES v. RESSAM

                     Opinion of the Court

sion of that felony. The statute as presently written re-
quires nothing further.
  Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed.
                                          It is so ordered.
                Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008)         1

                   Opinion of THOMAS, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                        _________________

                         No. 07–455
                        _________________


 UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. AHMED RESSAM
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

            APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

                       [May 19, 2008] 


  JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
  Because the plain language of the statute squarely
answers the question presented in this case, I join only
Part I of the Court’s opinion.
                 Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008)            1

                     BREYER, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                         _________________

                          No. 07–455
                         _________________


 UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. AHMED RESSAM
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

            APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

                        [May 19, 2008] 


   JUSTICE BREYER, dissenting.
   The statute before us imposes a mandatory 10-year
sentence on any person who “carries an explosive during
the commission of any [federal] felony.” 18 U. S. C.
§844(h)(2). The Ninth Circuit interpreted the statute as
requiring a “relation” between the explosives-carrying and
the felony (here, making a false statement to a customs
officer), such that the explosives-carrying “ ‘facilitated’ ”
or “aided” the commission of the felony. 474 F. 3d 597,
604 (2007). The Court interprets the statute to the con-
trary. It holds that the statute requires no more than a
“temporal link” between the explosives-carrying and the
felony, that is to say, the two need only have occurred at
the same time. See ante, at 3. I cannot agree with either
interpretation.
                               I
   My problem with the Court’s interpretation is that it
would permit conviction of any individual who legally
carries explosives at the time that he engages in a totally
unrelated felony. “Explosives,” the statute tells us, in-
cludes not only obviously explosive material such as “gun-
powders” and “dynamite” but also any “chemical com-
pounds” or “mixture[s]” or “device[s]” whose “ignition by
fire, by friction, by concussion” or other means “may cause
an explosion.” 18 U. S. C. §844(j). And that definition
2                UNITED STATES v. RESSAM

                     BREYER, J., dissenting

encompasses such commonplace materials as kerosene,
gasoline, or certain fertilizers. Moreover, the “carr[ying]”
to which the statute refers includes carrying that is oth-
erwise legal. Further, the statute applies to the carrying
of explosives during “any” federal felony, a category that
ranges from murder to mail fraud. See §1111 (2000 ed.
and Supp. V); §1341 (2000 ed., Supp. V).
   Consequently the Court’s opinion brings within the
statute’s scope (and would impose an additional manda-
tory 10-year prison term upon), for example, a farmer
lawfully transporting a load of fertilizer who intentionally
mails an unauthorized lottery ticket to a friend, a hunter
lawfully carrying gunpowder for shotgun shells who buys
snacks with a counterfeit $20 bill, a truckdriver lawfully
transporting diesel fuel who lies to a customs official about
the value of presents he bought in Canada for his family,
or an accountant who engaged in a 6-year-long conspiracy
to commit tax evasion and who, one day during that con-
spiracy, bought gas for his lawnmower. In such instances
the lawful carrying of an “explosive” has nothing whatso-
ever to do with the unlawful felonies. I cannot imagine
why Congress would have wanted the presence of totally
irrelevant, lawful behavior to trigger an additional 10-year
mandatory prison term.
   The statute’s language does not demand such an inter-
pretation. I agree with the majority that the word “dur-
ing” requires a “temporal link.” See ante, at 3. But a
statement that uses the word “during” may or may not
imply other limitations as well, depending upon the con-
text in which the statement is made. Thus, when I tell a
friend from Puerto Rico, “I wear gloves during Washing-
ton’s winter,” he does not think I mean baseball mitts.
Rather, I imply (and he understands) a relation or link
between the gloves and the winter. When I say to a group
of lawyers, “I take notes during oral argument,” I imply
(and they understand) that the notes bear a relation to the
                 Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008)            3

                     BREYER, J., dissenting

law being argued. But when I say, “I called my brother
during the day,” I do not imply any particular relation
(other than a temporal relation) between the day and the
phone call. Context makes the difference.
   Here, the statute’s context makes clear that the statu-
tory statement does not cover a “carr[ying]” of explosives
that is totally unrelated to the “felony.” The lengthy
mandatory minimum sentence is evidence of what the
statute’s legislative history separately indicates, namely
that Congress sought to criminalize and impose harsh
penalties in respect to the “intentional misuse of explo-
sives,” see H. R. Rep. No. 91–1549, p. 38 (1970) (emphasis
added) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.). A person who lawfully
carries explosives while committing some other felony
does not even arguably “misuse” those explosives unless
the carrying has something to do with the other felony.
Nor in the absence of some such relationship is there any
obvious reason to impose an additional mandatory 10-year
sentence on a person who unlawfully carries explosives
while committing some other felony.
   Similar reasoning led the Ninth Circuit in 1985 to in-
terpret a related statute, which punished the carrying of a
firearm “during” the commission of a federal felony, as
requiring a significant relationship between the firearms-
carrying and the other felony. See United States v. Stew-
art, 779 F. 2d 538. JUSTICE (then-Judge) KENNEDY recog-
nized that “ ‘Congress did not intend to penalize one who
happens to have a gun in his possession when he commits
an entirely unrelated offense.’ ” Id., at 540 (quoting United
States v. Moore, 580 F. 2d 360, 362 (CA9 1978)). In my
view, that same reasoning should apply when we interpret
the explosives statute, which was originally modeled on
the firearms statute. See H. R. Rep., at 69 (the explosives
statute “carries over to the explosives area the stringent
provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968 relating to the
use of firearms and the unlawful carrying of firearms to
4                UNITED STATES v. RESSAM

                    BREYER, J., dissenting

commit, or during the commission of a Federal felony”).
   I recognize that the language of the firearms statute
now differs from the language of the explosives statute in
an important way. The firearms statute originally pun-
ished (with a 1-to-10-year sentence) a person who “carries
a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any [fed-
eral] felony.” 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(2) (1964 ed., Supp. IV).
In 1984, Congress amended the firearms statute by pro-
viding a mandatory minimum punishment of five years
and by striking the word “unlawfully.” §1005(a), 98 Stat.
2138. When it did so, Congress also added to the statute
specific words of limitation, namely the words “and in
relation to” (so that the statute covered any person who
carried a firearm “during and in relation to” the commis-
sion of a “felony”). Ibid.
   The words “in relation to” do not appear in the explo-
sives statute. But neither did those words appear in the
pre-1984 version of the firearms statute that was the
subject of the Ninth Circuit opinion in Stewart (yet the
Ninth Circuit nonetheless found an implicit relational
requirement). And the fact that these words now appear
in the firearms statute but not the explosives statute
cannot make the determinative difference.
   The history of the firearms statute makes clear that the
reason Congress added to that statute the words “in rela-
tion to” has to do with Congress’ decision to remove from
the firearms statute the word “unlawfully”. By removing
that word, Congress indicated that the firearms statute
should apply to “persons who are licensed to carry fire-
arms” but who “abuse that privilege by committing a
crime with the weapon.” S. Rep. No. 98–225, p. 314, n. 10
(1983). At the same time, however, Congress believed that
the statute should not apply where the firearm’s presence
“played no part in the crime, such as a gun carried in a
pocket and never displayed or referred to in the course of a
pugilistic barroom fight.” Ibid. The addition of the words
                  Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008)            5

                     BREYER, J., dissenting

“in relation to” made this dual objective textually clear.
   The absence of the words “in relation to” here must lead
us to ask (but it does not answer) the question: Did Con-
gress intend something different in respect to the explo-
sives statute? There are strong reasons for thinking it did
not. Congress, after all, amended the explosives statute in
response to the Department of Justice’s express request to
“bring” the explosives statute “in line with” the firearms
statute. See 131 Cong. Rec. 14166 (1985); see also 134
Cong. Rec. 32700 (1988) (statement of Sen. Biden) (noting
that the purpose of amending the explosives statute was to
“bring it in line with similar amendments [previously]
adopted . . . with respect to the parallel offense of using or
carrying a firearm during the commission of federal of-
fenses”). Congress accordingly increased the mandatory
minimum punishment to five years and struck the word
“unlawfully.” See §6474(b), 102 Stat. 4379–4380. If Con-
gress, in neglecting to add the words “in relation to,”
sought to create a meaningful distinction between the
explosives and firearms statutes, one would think that
someone somewhere would have mentioned this objective.
   Further, to read the two statutes differently would
break the very parallel treatment of firearms and explo-
sives that led Congress, at the Department of Justice’s
urging, to amend the explosives statute in the first place.
It would produce the peculiar and unfair results I previ-
ously mentioned. See supra, at 2. It would conflict with
Congress’ original rationale for enacting the explosives
statute (to punish the misuse of explosives). And it would
risk incoherent results: Why would Congress wish not to
punish a policeman for carrying an unrelated revolver
during the commission of a felony, but then wish to punish
that same policeman for carrying unrelated gunpowder for
unrelated bullets?
   At the same time one can explain the absence of the
words “in relation to” in less damaging ways. The legisla-
6                UNITED STATES v. RESSAM

                    BREYER, J., dissenting

tive drafters of the explosives amendment may have as-
sumed that prior judicial interpretation, (namely, United
States v. Stewart, 779 F. 2d 538) made the words “in rela-
tion to” unnecessary. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575,
580 (1978) (“Congress is presumed to be aware of an ad-
ministrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to
adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute
without change”). Or, as the majority recognizes, the
omission of the language may reflect simple drafting
inadvertence. See ante, at 5.
   I concede that the presence of a phrase in one statute
and the absence of the same phrase in another related
statute can signal an intended difference in relative statu-
tory scope. But that is not inevitably so. Cf. Russello v.
United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (noting only a pre-
sumption that Congress has acted intentionally and pur-
posely if it “includes particular language in one section of
a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). And here the cir-
cumstances that I have mentioned make this a case in
which that linguistic fact is not determinative.
   No more here than elsewhere in life can words alone
explain every nuance of their intended application. Con-
text matters. And if judges are to give meaningful effect
to the intent of the enacting legislature, they must inter-
pret statutory text with reference to the statute’s purpose
and its history.
   The Court, with its decision today, makes possible the
strange results I describe above precisely because it re-
solves the statutory interpretation question by examining
the meaning of just one word in isolation. In context,
however, the language excludes from the statute’s scope
instances in which there is no significant relation between
the explosives-carrying and the felony. A contextual
interpretation furthers Congress’ original purpose, is less
likely to encourage random punishment, and is consistent
                 Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008)            7

                     BREYER, J., dissenting

with the statute’s overall history. As a result, like the
Ninth Circuit, I would read the statute as insisting upon
some (other than merely temporal) relationship between
explosives carrying and “felony.”
                              II
   At the same time, I cannot agree with the Ninth Circuit
that the statute restricts the requisite relationship to one
in which the carrying of the explosives “ ‘facilitated’ ” (or
“aided”) the felony. 474 F. 3d, at 604. In my view, the
statute must also cover a felony committed to facilitate the
carrying of explosives. Why should it matter in which
direction the facilitating flows? Either way, there is a
relation between the carrying of explosives and the other
felony. Either way, one might reasonably conclude that
the presence of the explosives will elevate the risks of
harm that otherwise would ordinarily arise out of the
felony’s commission. Either way, one might consider the
explosives “misused.” Thus, I believe the statute applies
if the felony, here, the making of a false statement to
a customs officer, facilitated or aided the carrying of
explosives. And I would remand the case for the Circuit
to determine the presence or absence of that relevant
relation.
   For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.