866 A.2d 270 (2005)

BILT-RITE CONTRACTORS, INC., Appellant
v.
THE ARCHITECTURAL STUDIO, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued December 4, 2002. Decided January 19, 2005.

*272 Mason Avrigian, Jr., Blue Bell, for Bilt-Rite Contractors, Inc., appellant.

Maura Zajac McGuire, Nicholas Noel, Easton, for The Architectural Studio, appellee.

Before: CAPPY, C.J., CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR and EAKIN, JJ.

OPINION

Justice CASTILLE.

This appeal raises the first impression question of whether a building contractor may maintain a negligent misrepresentation claim against an architect for alleged misrepresentations in the architect's plans for a public construction contract, where there was no privity of contract between the architect and the contractor, but the contractor reasonably relied upon the misrepresentations in submitting its winning bid and consequently suffered purely economic damages as a result of that reliance. The Superior Court found as a matter of law that, absent privity of contract, the contractor could not maintain such a tort action against the architect. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the order of the Superior Court and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

Because this Court sits in review of the trial court's grant of appellee's preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, the salient facts are derived solely from the allegations in appellant's complaint. In such an instance, all material facts as set forth in the complaint, as well as all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom, must be accepted as true. Estate of Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, 557 Pa. 340, 733 A.2d 623, 624 n. 1 (1999). The facts are as follows: East Penn School District entered into a contract with appellee, The Architectural Studio ("TAS"), pursuant to which TAS provided architectural services for the design and construction of a new school in Lower Macungie Township, Lehigh County. The services included the preparation of plans, drawings and specifications to be submitted to contractors for the purpose of preparing bids for the construction of the new school. In February of 1997, the school district solicited bids from contractors for all aspects of the project and included TAS's plans, drawings and specifications in the bid documents supplied to the contractors. Appellant, Bilt-Rite Contractors, Inc. ("Bilt-Rite"), submitted its bid for general construction work on the project and on May 6, 1997, the school district awarded the general construction contract to Bilt-Rite, who was the lowest responsible bidder. On June 6, 1997, the school district and Bilt-Rite entered into a contract for the project in the base amount of $16,238,900. The contract specifically referred to, and incorporated by reference, TAS's plans, drawings and specifications.

TAS's plans provided for the installation of an aluminum curtain wall system, sloped glazing system and metal support systems, all of which TAS expressly represented could be installed and constructed through the use of normal and reasonable construction means and methods, using standard construction design tables. Once construction commenced, however, Bilt-Rite discovered that the work including the aluminum curtain wall, sloped glazing and metal support systems could not be constructed using normal and reasonable construction methods, and instead required Bilt-Rite to employ special construction means, methods and design tables, resulting in substantially increased construction costs.

On November 19, 1999, Bilt-Rite sued TAS on a theory of negligent misrepresentation under Section 552 of the Restatement *273 (Second) of Torts, claiming that TAS's specifications were false and/or misleading, and seeking damages for its increased construction costs.^[1] On December 9, 1999, TAS filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, arguing that: (1) Bilt-Rite's action was barred by the "economic loss doctrine," which holds that a tort plaintiff cannot recover for purely economic losses; and (2) TAS owed no duty to Bilt-Rite, with whom it had no contractual relationship. On June 22, 2000, the trial court sustained TAS's preliminary objections and dismissed Bilt-Rite's complaint.

The trial court deemed itself bound by the Superior Court's decision in Linde Enterprises, Inc. v. Hazelton City Authority, 412 Pa.Super. 67, 602 A.2d 897 (1992), appeal denied, 533 Pa. 601, 617 A.2d 1275 (1992), which, the court noted, held that a contractor cannot prevail against an architect for economic damages suffered as a result of negligence in drafting specifications, absent privity of contract between the contractor and the architect. Slip op. at 2 n. 1. The trial court found further support for its decision in Palco Linings, Inc. v. Pavex, Inc., 755 F.Supp. 1269 (M.D.Pa.1990). In Palco, the district court, which was applying Pennsylvania law in a diversity action, addressed the operation of the economic loss rule in actions involving negligent misrepresentation. Palco noted that the economic loss rule reflects the concern that tort law (unlike contract law) is not generally intended to compensate parties for losses suffered as a result of a breach of duties which are assumed only by agreement; to recover in tort, there must be a breach of a duty of care imposed by law and a resulting injury. 755 F.Supp. at 1271. Looking to Illinois cases for persuasive authority, the Palco court suggested two viable exceptions to the economic loss rule in negligent misrepresentation cases: (1) where the defendant intentionally makes a false misrepresentation; and (2) where the defendant is in the business of supplying information for the guidance of others and makes negligent misrepresentations. The Palco *274 court found that neither exception should apply to architects sued in their capacity as design professionals. Id. at 1274.

Following its discussion of Linde and Palco, the trial court noted that, although Pennsylvania courts have cited Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) with approval, no court had held that it permitted such a cause of action against a design professional. The trial court found that Bilt-Rite's action did not fall into either of the exceptions outlined in Palco, and therefore, Bilt-Rite had failed to set forth a viable Section 552 cause of action against TAS.

On Bilt-Rite's appeal, the Superior Court affirmed in an unpublished decision. The panel noted that the absence of privity is not an absolute bar to recovery for economic damages in tort; however, the question of which business relationships should be deemed exempt from the privity requirement (and thus exempt from the economic loss rule) must be decided on a case-by case basis. The panel further noted that the architect-contractor relationship had never been expressly included or excluded from the reach of Section 552. Therefore, the panel reasoned, its "review is guided by the principle that the tort of negligent misrepresentation, like the [sic] any action in negligence, requires the existence of a duty owed by one party to another." Slip op. at 9, citing, inter alia, Bortz v. Noon, 556 Pa. 489, 729 A.2d 555, 561 (1999) and Gibbs v. Ernst, 538 Pa. 193, 647 A.2d 882, 889 (1994). The question then became whether, as a matter of law, an architect such as TAS who prepares and develops design drawings and specifications, owes a duty to the contractors who apply those specifications in the situation where no contractual relationship exists. The panel recognized that question was controlled by Linde; since Bilt-Rite enjoyed no privity of contract with TAS, TAS owed it no duty, and Bilt-Rite could not proceed upon its negligent misrepresentation claim.

This Court granted further review because the question of the viability of a negligent representation tort action in the architect/contractor/no privity scenario is one of first impression for this Court; the question has split other state courts and the federal courts, see Linde, 602 A.2d at 901(discussing competing authority); and the question has split the lower federal courts in Pennsylvania, attempting to predict how this Court would rule on the question in light of our previous applications of Section 552. Compare Palco, supra with Borough of Lansdowne v. Sevenson Env. Services, 2000 WL 1886578 (E.D.Pa.2000), at *4-*5 (unpublished memorandum by Weiner, J.). The question of the reach and scope of the action is a pure question of law; as such, this Court's review is plenary. E.g. MCI WorldCom, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n, 577 Pa. 294, 844 A.2d 1239 (2004). Further, "the standard of review for preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer is limited; the question presented by the demurrer is whether, on the facts averred, the law says with certainty that no recovery is possible. Where a doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, this doubt should be resolved in favor of overruling it." MacElree v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 544 Pa. 117, 674 A.2d 1050, 1056 (1996) (quoting AM/PM Franchise v. Atlantic Richfield, 526 Pa. 110, 584 A.2d 915, 921 (1990)). Thus, this Court is charged with deciding whether, under the facts alleged in Bilt-Rite's complaint, tort recovery is possible under Pennsylvania law.

Citing Rempel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 471 Pa. 404, 370 A.2d 366 (1977) (plurality opinion) and Gibbs v. Ernst, supra, Bilt-Rite argues that this Court has recognized *275 the tort of negligent misrepresentation and, in so doing, has approved the Restatement (Second) Section 552 formulation of the action.^[2] Bilt-Rite further argues that, when this Court has set forth the elements of the negligent misrepresentation action (relying upon the Restatement for those elements), it has not included contractual privity. Instead, Bilt-Rite argues, this Court has focused on whether there was reliance upon the misrepresentations and the foreseeability of that reliance. Bilt-Rite argues that the focus on foreseeability, rather than privity, is sensible because it is "the foreseeability of one party using and relying upon the misrepresentations of another which creates the duty." Brief for Appellant, 13.

Bilt-Rite posits that the school district hired TAS to prepare plans, drawings and specifications with the intention of conveying those documents to contractors for purposes of bidding; in fact, the sole purpose of the design documents was for their use by contractors in the bidding process.^[3] Bilt-Rite argues that TAS knew that contractors would rely upon its designs and specifications in submitting bids and yet failed to exercise reasonable care in preparing those documents. Since Bilt-Rites reliance on the designs was both justifiable and foreseeable, Bilt-Rite argues, its complaint falls squarely within Section 552.

In further support of its construction of Section 552, Bilt-Rite notes that Comment h and Illustration 9 to comment h of Section 552 exactly describe this case. Comment h provides in pertinent part:

h. Persons for whose guidance the information is supplied. The rule stated in this Section subjects the negligent supplier of misinformation to liability only to those persons for whose benefit and guidance it is supplied. In this particular his liability is somewhat more narrowly restricted than that of the maker of a fraudulent representation (see § 531), which extends to any person whom the maker of the representation has reason to expect to act in reliance upon it.

Under this Section, as in the case of the fraudulent misrepresentation (see § 531), it is not necessary that the maker should have any particular person in mind as the intended, or even the probable, recipient of the information. In other words, it is not required that the person who is to become the plaintiff be identified or known to the defendant as an individual when the information is supplied. It is enough that the maker of the representation intends it to reach and influence either a particular person or persons, known to him, or a group or class of persons, distinct from the much larger class who might reasonably be expected sooner or later to have access to the information and foreseeably to take some action in reliance upon it. It is enough, likewise, that the maker of the representation knows that his recipient intends to transmit the information to a similar person, persons or group. It is sufficient, in other words, insofar as the plaintiff's identity is concerned, that the maker supplies the information for repetition to a certain group or class of persons and that the plaintiff proves to *276 be one of them, even though the maker never had heard of him by name when the information was given. It is not enough that the maker merely knows of the ever-present possibility of repetition to anyone, and the possibility of action in reliance upon it, on the part of anyone to whom it may be repeated.

Illustration 9 then sets forth a specific example regarding bids for a government construction contract:

9. The City of A is about to ask for bids for work on a sewer tunnel. It hires B Company, a firm of engineers, to make boring tests and provide a report showing the rock and soil conditions to be encountered. It notifies B Company that the report will be made available to bidders as a basis for their bids and that it is expected to be used by the successful bidder in doing the work. Without knowing the identity of any of the contractors bidding on the work, B Company negligently prepares and delivers to the City an inaccurate report, containing false and misleading information. On the basis of the report C makes a successful bid, and also on the basis of the report D, a subcontractor, contracts with C to do a part of the work. By reason of the inaccuracy of the report, C and D suffer pecuniary loss in performing their contracts. B Company is subject to liability to C and to D.

Bilt-Rite avers that Comment h proves that the tort does not include a privity requirement, but rather, contemplates that the plaintiff may be a member of a group or class of persons for whose use the defendant supplies the information. Bilt-Rite also argues that Illustration 9 demonstrates that design professionals such as TAS should be deemed subject to liability to contractors like Bilt-Rite for negligent misrepresentations in their design documents.

Bilt-Rite also submits that the Superior Courts own precedent does not require privity of contract in a negligent misrepresentation action and that federal district courts applying Pennsylvania law, as well as courts in other jurisdictions, have permitted contractors to maintain negligent misrepresentation claims against design professionals without requiring privity. Indeed, Bilt-Rite notes, a majority of the jurisdictions to consider the question have not required contractual privity. Finally, Bilt-Rite claims that the Superior Court's reliance upon its precedent in Linde was misplaced because Linde involved a general negligence claim, not a negligent misrepresentation claim, which is distinctly different. In Bilt-Rite's view, the economic loss rule does not bar the claim sub judice because negligent misrepresentation is a recognized exception to the economic loss doctrine.

TAS's response mirrors the reasoning of the courts below. Advancing a more traditional view of tort law, TAS responds that the economic loss doctrine precludes causes of action based upon negligence or negligent misrepresentation where the plaintiff claims only economic loss and the parties are not in privity of contract. TAS argues that the doctrine applies to services rendered by design professionals, and Pennsylvania courts and federal courts in Pennsylvania have held that design professionals cannot be held liable for purely economic losses to a party with whom they share no contractual relationship. TAS further argues that Section 522 should be construed as inapplicable to cases involving design professionals, and cites as support the Pennsylvania state and federal cases relied upon below, which have declined to apply Section 552 to design professionals absent privity. TAS argues that all of the cases relied upon by Bilt-Rite to *277 reach a contrary conclusion involve professions other than design professions.

The trio of cases that comprise this Court's recent jurisprudence on the negligent misrepresentation tort provide little guidance in resolving the specific issue in this appeal. Bortz v. Noon, supra, relied upon by the Superior Court, involved a real estate agent who allegedly failed to disclose to buyers that the septic system on the property the buyers were purchasing had not passed a dye test intended to show whether the system was functioning properly. After the septic system failed an initial dye test, the sellers' real estate agent informed the buyers that the sellers would repair the system and had retained a contractor to perform repairs. Settlement on the property was delayed until the repairs were completed and the system passed a dye test. Approximately one month after the initial failed dye test, a representative of the title company involved in settlement informed the real estate agent that the system had passed a new dye test, and the agent relayed that information to the buyers. Neither the agent nor the buyers reviewed any written report. On the day of settlement, the proceedings were delayed because, according to the real estate agent, the county was inspecting the work on the septic system. During the actual settlement, the title company's representative told everyone present, including the real estate agent and the buyers, that the system had passed the dye test.

After settlement, the buyers discovered that the septic system had not passed a dye test. The system was retested and failed, forcing the buyers to connect to the public sewer system at a cost of $15,000. The buyers filed an equity action against the real estate agency, the title company, and the contractor who repaired the septic system, seeking monetary damages and rescission of the sale. The chancellor denied rescission, granted judgment against the real estate agency in the amount of $15,300, and held that neither the title company nor the contractor were liable as they owed no duty to the buyers.

On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the judgment against the real estate agency, but reversed the finding in favor of the title company and the contractor, holding that both could be liable to the buyers for negligent misrepresentation. This Court granted allocatur limited to the question of whether the real estate agent had a duty to ascertain that the septic system had actually passed a dye test and whether her failure in this regard constituted a misrepresentation to the buyers. In distinguishing the tort of negligent misrepresentation from intentional misrepresentation, we stated:

Negligent misrepresentation requires proof of: (1) a misrepresentation of a material fact; (2) made under circumstances in which the misrepresenter ought to have known its falsity; (3) with an intent to induce another to act on it; and (4) which results in injury to a party acting in justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation. See, e.g., Gibbs, 538 Pa. at 210, 647 A.2d at 890, citing, Restatement (Second) Torts 552. The elements of negligent misrepresentation differ from intentional misrepresentation in that the misrepresentation must concern a material fact and the speaker need not know his or her words are untrue, but must have failed to make a reasonable investigation of the truth of these words. Id. Moreover, like any action in negligence, there must be an existence of a duty owed by one party to another. Id.

Bortz, 729 A.2d at 561. Although this Court acknowledged Restatement Section 552 through the citation to Gibbs, we did not purport to adopt Section 552 as a *278 matter of Pennsylvania law. Indeed, the elements of negligent misrepresentation that this Court set forth in the Bortz decision are not identical to Section 552's elements.

The Bortz Court concluded that there was no special relationship among the buyers, the agent, the contractor or the title company that would require the real estate agent to engage in an investigation regarding the dye test. Further, we determined that the agent was not in a superior position to the buyers in terms of verifying that the system had passed the dye test. In addition to finding that the agent owed no duty to the buyers, we held that she had no duty to make an independent investigation of the contractor's report because she had no contractual or agency relationship with the contractor.

Gibbs v. Ernst, supra, considered the issue of negligent misrepresentation in the distinct context of adoption. The Gibbs had adopted a child whom the adoption agency represented to be a five-year-old boy who had been verbally abused and neglected by his mother. (It turned out the child was actually seven-years-old at the time.) The Gibbs had specifically informed the agency that they wanted to adopt a child who had no history of physical or sexual abuse or any mental or emotional problems. During the nine months between the placement of the child with the Gibbs and the finalization of the adoption, the Gibbs repeatedly asked the adoption agency if there was any information about the boy that had not been disclosed to them. They were assured that they had been provided everything that the county's Children and Youth department had given to the agency. Immediately after the adoption was final, the child began to reveal severe emotional problems, becoming violent and aggressive toward younger children.^[4] After inpatient evaluations at two different institutions, the child was transferred by court order to Eastern State School and Hospital, declared dependent by the court, and placed in the custody of Philadelphia's Department of Human Services (DHS).

Shortly after DHS acquired custody, and nearly four years after the adoption was finalized, the Gibbs learned for the first time that the boy had been severely sexually and physically abused and neglected by his biological parents, that he had been in ten different foster homes during his first six years, that he had an extensive history of aggression and hostility towards other children, and that his biological mother had once attempted to sever a body part. Both Children and Youth and the adoption agency had all of this information in their possession prior to the finalization of the adoption, yet they failed to disclose it even though the Gibbs had specifically requested any negative information.

The Gibbs sued the adoption agency and Children and Youth in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, alleging wrongful adoption and negligent placement of an adoptive child. The defendants filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, which the trial court granted. The Commonwealth Court reversed, Gibbs v. Ernst, 150 Pa.Cmwlth. 154, 615 A.2d 851 (1991), and this Court granted further review of the viability of the Gibbs' tort action.

This Court first determined that the Gibbs' complaint did not set forth novel *279 theories of recovery, but rather advanced claims cognizable under long-standing common law pertaining to intentional and negligent misrepresentations. We noted that "Pennsylvania has long recognized the common law tort of negligent misrepresentation," citing to cases from federal district and bankruptcy courts in Pennsylvania and our Superior Court. Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 891. In analyzing the negligent misrepresentation claim presented, we set forth the elements quoted later in the Bortz opinion and also cited to Section 552 with approval, albeit this Court did not explicitly state that it was adopting the Section 552 formulation as a matter of Pennsylvania tort law. The Gibbs Court emphasized, as the Bortz Court did, that "[a]ny negligence action is premised on the existence of a duty owed by one party to another." Id. at 890. Recognizing that foreseeability is an important element of duty, we held that an adoption agency could only be liable to adoptive parents for those conditions reasonably foreseeable at the time of placement. Because the Gibbs had alleged that the adoption agency should have known that the affirmative representations it had made to the Gibbs regarding the boys past were false, this Court found that the Gibbs had stated a viable cause of action for negligent misrepresentation that should be permitted to proceed to trial.

This Court's plurality opinion in Rempel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., supra, involved alleged negligent misrepresentations made by an insurance agent. There, the plaintiff and her husband had purchased a thirty-year mortgage protection policy on the husbands life through a Nationwide agent. In the event of the husband's death, the policy was to pay any outstanding mortgage balance on the Rempels' home. Shortly after purchasing the policy, the plaintiff contacted the Nationwide agent to inquire whether Nationwide could match a policy offered by a competing insurer that would provide the same mortgage protection plus $5,000 in life insurance protection for a few dollars more per month. The agent consulted with Nationwide and then informed the plaintiff that Nationwide would provide a $5,000 whole life policy with a twenty-year family income rider, which would offer the same protection as the competing insurers policy for a few dollars per month over the cost of the original policy. Plaintiff and her husband opted to stay with Nationwide and take the new coverage and, thereafter, paid the premiums until nine years later when the plaintiff's husband died.

After her husband's death, the plaintiff telephoned the Nationwide agent who informed her that the policy would pay her approximately $16,000, representing the $11,100 outstanding mortgage balance plus the $5,000 life insurance benefit. A few days later, however, the agent advised the plaintiff that the policy would pay her only a lump sum of $10,430. The plaintiff sued Nationwide and its agent, contending that the agent had either negligently or fraudulently misrepresented that the policy he sold them would pay the outstanding mortgage balance plus $5,000 of life insurance. The trial court directed a verdict in the plaintiff's favor for $10,430. The court also denied Nationwide's motion for a directed verdict on the plaintiff's remaining claims and withdrew the fraudulent misrepresentation claim from the jury, but permitted the jury to consider plaintiff's negligent misrepresentation claim. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $5,670, and the Superior Court affirmed. Rempel v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 227 Pa.Super. 87, 323 A.2d 193 (1974). This Court granted allocatur.

The plurality cited with approval to Section 552, but did not expressly adopt it. Nationwide's challenge on appeal focused *280 on whether the plaintiff and her husband were justified in relying on the representations made by the Nationwide agent when they could have simply read the policy to discover the actual coverage the policy afforded. This Court determined that, under the facts of the case, the evidence was sufficient to present a jury question of whether the plaintiff and her husband had justifiably relied on the agent's representations.

In summary, although this Court has cited with approval to Section 552 on multiple occasions, this Court has never explicitly adopted Section 552 as the law in Pennsylvania, much less the specific comment and illustration which are relied upon by Bilt-Rite here. In Bortz, the most recent case, we listed the elements of the common law tort of negligent misrepresentation, elements which appear to be more general in nature than those in Section 552, which perhaps would make the tort available against a narrower class of tortfeasors. Thus, on their face, the Bortz elements would appear to apply to any allegation of negligent misrepresentation against any individual no matter what his occupation or relationship to the injured party. In contrast, Section 552 is more specific, appearing to apply on its face only to actions against those individuals who, in the course of their business, profession or employment, or in any other transaction in which they have a pecuniary interest, supply false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions. It is arguable that Section 552, due to its specific nature, was not necessarily intended to apply in a case such as Gibbs, because an adoption might not be considered a business transaction and because Children and Youth likely did not have a pecuniary interest in the adoption at issue, while the more general Bortz common law elements would apply in such a case. Thus, it would appear that, if this Court were to adopt Section 552, it would not supplant the common law version of the Pennsylvania tort, but rather, would serve to clarify the elements of the tort as they apply to those in the business of supplying information to others for pecuniary gain.

General principles of tort law of necessity come into play in our examination of the common law tort of negligent misrepresentation and the tort embodied in Section 552, and those principles are particularly pertinent in this case. It is well established that, "[a] cause of action in negligence requires allegations that establish the breach of a legally recognized duty or obligation that is causally connected to the damages suffered by the complainant." Sharpe v. St. Luke's Hospital, 573 Pa. 90, 821 A.2d 1215, 1218 (2003) (citation omitted). "The primary element in any negligence cause of action is that the defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff." Althaus ex rel. Althaus v. Cohen, 562 Pa. 547, 756 A.2d 1166, 1168 (2000). The Althaus Court further summarized the traditional considerations of public policy involved in any assessment of the existence of a duty of care as follows:

"In determining the existence of a duty of care, it must be remembered that the concept of duty amounts to no more than `the sum total of those considerations of policy which led the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection' from the harm suffered.... To give it any greater mystique would unduly hamper our system of jurisprudence in adjusting to the changing times. The late Dean Prosser expressed this view as follows:

These are shifting sands, and no fit foundation. There is a duty if the court says there is a duty; the law, like the Constitution, is what we make it. Duty is only a word with which we *281 state our conclusion that there is or is not to be liability; it necessarily begs the essential question. When we find a duty, breach and damage, everything has been said. The word serves a useful purpose in directing attention to the obligation to be imposed upon the defendant, rather than the causal sequence of events; beyond that it serves none. In the decision whether or not there is a duty, many factors interplay: The hand of history, our ideas of morals and justice, the convenience of administration of the rule, and our social ideas as to where the loss should fall. In the end the court will decide whether there is a duty on the basis of the mores of the community, `always keeping in mind the fact that we endeavor to make a rule in each case that will be practical and in keeping with the general understanding of mankind.'

[Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 14-15 (1953).]"

756 A.2d at 1168-69, quoting Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672, 681 (1979) (citation and footnote from Sinn omitted). Accord Sharpe, 821 A.2d at 1219. The factors utilized in determining the existence of a duty are well-settled:

The determination of whether a duty exists in a particular case involves the weighing of several discrete factors which include: (1) the relationship between the parties; (2) the social utility of the actor's conduct; (3) the nature of the risk imposed and foreseeability of the harm incurred; (4) the consequences of imposing a duty upon the actor; and (5) the overall public interest in the proposed solution.

Althaus, 756 A.2d at 1169 (listing cases).

The concept of duty in the tort setting can be intertwined with contractual notions of privity, as is the case here, where the task is to determine whether the relationship between the parties gives rise to a duty. In Sharpe, this Court considered whether the lack of a contractual relationship between the parties precluded a finding that a duty existed between the parties. There, Federal Express contracted with the defendant hospital to collect urine samples from Federal Express employees for routine, random drug testing and then forward the samples to an outside laboratory for testing. The plaintiff, a Federal Express employee/courier, reported to the hospital to provide the required urine sample, which the hospital later reported as testing positive for cocaine. The plaintiff alleged that there were problems with the chain of custody of her sample, as a result of which it was misidentified and/or mishandled. Once the hospital investigated and verified the chain of custody to Federal Express, the plaintiff's employment was terminated.

The plaintiff sued the hospital, claiming that it owed her a duty of care in regards to the collection and handling of her specimen, that it breached the duty of care, and that as a result, her test resulted in a false positive causing her to lose her job. The hospital filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it owed no duty to the plaintiff because the hospital's contractual relationship was with Federal Express, not the plaintiff. The lack of a professional or contractual relationship, according to the hospital, obviated the existence of any duty to the plaintiff. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding that, where a third party engages an entity to perform employee drug testing, the employee cannot maintain a negligence action against the entity. The Superior Court affirmed, declining to recognize a duty on the part of the hospital where its role was limited to collecting the specimen. President Judge McEwen dissented, opining *282 that because the plaintiff was already employed by Federal Express and was not merely seeking employment, there is a recognized duty on the part of the hospital, requiring it to abide by a standard of reasonable and prudent conduct to prevent any undue risk of harm caused by a false positive result.

On further appeal, this Court, after citing the Althaus factors for determining the existence of a duty, found that the hospital indeed owed a duty to the plaintiff:

As to the first of the Althaus factors, a sufficient relationship exists between the Hospital and Sharpe to justify the imposition of a duty upon the Hospital to exercise reasonable care in the collection and handling of the urine specimen, despite the absence of a contract between the two parties. Specifically, Sharpe personally presented herself to the Hospital, which was aware of the purpose of the urine screening; the Hospital, in turn, should have realized that any negligence with respect to the handling of the specimen could harm Sharpe's employment.

Sharpe, 821 A.2d at 1219. Thus, this Court recognized that a tort duty can arise absent privity of contract in that circumstance.

With these established negligence principles in mind, we next turn to an examination of the persuasiveness of the cases relied upon by the courts below in support of the holding that Bilt-Rites negligent misrepresentation claim fails as a matter of law — i.e., the Superior Courts decision in Linde and the federal district courts Palco decision. In Linde, the plaintiff, Linde Enterprises, was the low bidder who was awarded a contract for the reconstruction of a dam in Hazel Township owned by the Hazelton City Authority (HCA). HCA hired an engineering firm, WECO, to provide the specifications for the dam and to supervise its construction. Linde incurred significant cost overruns, which it attributed to faulty specifications provided by the HCA and negligent supervision by WECO, and filed suit against both HCA and WECO. Following a jury trial, the jury found in favor of the plaintiff and against both defendants.

On appeal, the Superior Court reversed the jury verdict against WECO, finding that Linde could not recover in negligence against WECO because there was no privity of contract between them. The panel reasoned that a negligence claim cannot be based upon circumstances for which the law imposes no recognized duty of care on the defendant and that privity of contract is required between the parties in order to maintain a claim for professional liability. Since Linde had no contractual relationship with WECO and WECO owed no traditional duty of care to Linde, the panel held that WECO was not liable to Linde for its cost overruns, damages which were purely economic in nature. The panel further opined:

Linde also claims that WECO as an architect drawing up design specifications owes a duty under Pennsylvania law to the contractors who apply specifications. Several states have allowed a contractor to sue an architect for economic damages suffered by negligent drafting of design specifications despite the absence of privity. See, e.g., Donnelly Constr. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 139 Ariz. 184, 677 P.2d 1292 (1984); Owen v. Dodd, 431 F.Supp. 1239 (D.C.Miss.1977) (applying Mississippi law); Shoffner Indus. v. W.B. Lloyd Const. Co., 42 N.C.App. 259, 257 S.E.2d 50 (1979). However, Pennsylvania is not one of them. Moreover, there does not appear to be a clear-cut majority position on the issue in other jurisdictions. *283 See Annot. Tort Liability of Project Architect for Economic Damages Suffered by Contractor, <