National Oil Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil Co.

OPINION

In this case the Court has been called upon to examine and evaluate, among other things, the legal significance of the current state of relations between Libya and the United States. The facts and arguments presented by the parties have put this Court in the unenviable and precarious position of having to place legal labels on the foreign policy maneuvers of the Bush administration. Unfortunately, the Court has no choice but to proceed.

Petitioner, National Oil Corporation (“NOC”), seeks to have this Court enter an order confirming a foreign arbitral award rendered in NOC’s favor against respondent, Libyan Sun Oil Company (“Sun Oil”). (Docket Item [“D.I.”] 2 at 6-7; see Case No. 4462/AS/JRI, National Oil Corporation (Libya) v. Libyan Sun Oil Company, Inc. (U.S.A.), Exhibits B [First Award] & C [Final Award], D.I. 3.) NOC brings this action pursuant to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“the Convention”), a treaty ratified by the United States and implemented through Congressional legislation. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1970). Sun Oil has moved to dismiss the petition or, in the alternative, to deny recognition of the award. (D.I. 11; D.I. 12.) This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as this case arises under federal law. See 9 U.S.C. § 203 (West Supp.1989). 1

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

NOC is a corporation organized under the laws of the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (“Libya”), and wholly owned by the Libyan Government. (D.I. 3 at 2.) Sun Oil is a Delaware corporation and a subsidiary of Sun Company, Inc. {See D.I. 12 at 1.) The dispute currently before the Court stems from an Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement (“EPSA”) entered into by the parties on November 20, 1980. {See EPSA, Annex 1, Exhibit A, D.I. 3.) The EPSA provided, inter alia, that Sun Oil was to carry out and fund an oil exploration program in Libya.

Sun Oil began exploration activities in the first half of 1981. On December 18, 1981, Sun Oil invoked the force majeure provision 2 contained in the EPSA and suspended performance. (D.I. 3 at 4; D.I. 12 at 6.) Sun Oil claimed that a State Department order prohibiting the use of United States passports for travel to Libya 3 prevented its personnel, all of whom were U.S. citizens, from going to Libya. (D.I. 12 at 5-6.) Thus, Sun Oil believed it could not carry out the EPSA “in accordance with the intentions of the parties to the contract.” {Id. at 6 [footnote omitted].) NOC disputed Sun Oil’s claim of force majeure and called for continued performance. (D.I. 3 at 4.)

In March of 1982, the U.S. Government banned the importation into the United States of any oil from Libya and severely restricted exports from the United States to Libya. 47 Fed.Reg. 10,507 (1982); 47 Fed.Reg. 11,247 (1982). Export regulations issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce required a license for the export of most goods, including all technical information. Because it “had planned to export *805 substantial quantities of technical data and oil technology to Libya in connection with the exploration program,” Sun Oil claims that it filed for such an export license “so as to be prepared to resume operations in Libya promptly in the event the U.S. Government lifted the passport prohibition.” (D.I. 12 at 7.) The application for a license was denied. (Id.) Thereafter, in late June of 1982, Sun Oil notified NOC that it was claiming the export regulations as an additional event of force majeure. (See D.I. 3 at 4; D.I. 12 at 7-8.)

On July 19,1982, NOC filed a request for arbitration with the Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (“the ICC”) in Paris, France, pursuant to the arbitration provision contained in the EPSA. 4 (D.I. 3 at 4.) The members of the arbitration panel (“the Arbitral Tribunal”) were chosen in accordance with the arbitration clause. Each party picked one arbitrator; the third was chosen by the International Chamber of Commerce. Sun Oil selected Edmund Muskie, a former United States Senator and Secretary of State. NOC selected Professor Hein Kotz, Director of the Max Planck Instituí in West Germany. Robert Schmelck, a former chief justice of France’s supreme court (la Cour de Cassation), was selected as the third arbitrator by the ICC Court of Arbitration.

The arbitration proceedings were held in Paris, France. In May and June of 1984, the Arbitral Tribunal held hearings on the issue of force majeure. It issued an initial award on May 31, 1985, that stated there had been no force majeure within the meaning of the EPSA. (D.I. 3, Exhibit B, First Award at 67.) The Arbitral Tribunal later held further hearings, and on February 23, 1987, it rendered a second and final award in favor of NOC and against Sun Oil in the amount of twenty million U.S. dollars. (See D.I. 3, Exhibit C, Final Award.) NOC has since been unable to collect payment from Sun Oil. (See D.I. 3 at 6.)

NOC filed this petition for confirmation of the Tribunal’s award on July 24, 1989. (D.I. 3.) On September 15, 1989, Sun Oil moved to dismiss the petition. (D.I. 11.) The Court heard oral argument on November 29, 1989 and January 26, 1990.

THE MOTION TO DISMISS

Sun Oil makes numerous arguments regarding why NOC’s petition for recognition of this arbitral award should be dismissed. For the reasons stated below, the Court will deny Sun Oil’s motion.

I. Recognition As Prerequisite For Access To U.S. Courts

In support of its motion to dismiss NOC’s petition, Sun Oil first advances the argument that NOC, as an arm of the Libyan Government, is not entitled to access to U.S. courts because of the status of U.S.-Libyan relations. NOC counters that it is an entity owned by a foreign government which is recognized by the U.S., and is thus entitled to access to our courts regardless of the present state of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Libya. The Court agrees with NOC that it should not be barred from U.S. courts merely because of poor U.S.-Libyan relations.

In Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137, 58 S.Ct. 785, 791, 82 L.Ed. 1224 (1938), the Supreme Court affirmed the “generally accepted principle” that suit on behalf of a sovereign state “may be maintained in our courts only by that government which has been recognized by the political department of our own government as the authorized government of the foreign state.” Later, in its landmark Sabbatino decision, the Court interpreted this rule to mean that an instru *806 mentality of the unfriendly but recognized Castro government in Cuba was entitled to access to U.S. courts. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 412, 84 S.Ct. 923, 931, 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964). Although it noted that diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Cuba had been severed, and the U.S. had imposed a commercial embargo against Cuba and frozen Cuban assets, the Court nevertheless concluded that it was “constrained to consider any relationship, short of war, with a recognized sovereign power as embracing the privilege of resorting to United States courts.” Id. at 410, 84 S.Ct. at 931 (emphasis added).

The Sabbatino Court underscored the important point that recognition and the existence of diplomatic relations are not synonymous. See id. at 409 n. 10, 410, 84 S.Ct. at 930 n. 10, 931. While diplomatic relations may be severed “for any number of political reasons,” such an act “does not approach that [expression of animosity] implicit in a declaration of war.” Id. at 410, 84 S.Ct. at 931; see also 1 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 203, comment d (1987) (“Recognition of a government is often effected by sending and receiving diplomatic representatives, but one government may recognize another yet refrain from assuming diplomatic relations with it. Similarly, breaking off relations does not constitute derecognition of the government.”).

The Supreme Court more recently reaffirmed, in dictum, its adherence to this recognition-access principle. “It has long been established,” stated the Court, “that only governments recognized by the United States and at peace with us are entitled to access to our courts_” Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 319—20, 98 S.Ct. 584, 591, 54 L.Ed.2d 563 (1978) (emphasis added). In sum, under existing ease law it is clear that NOC should not be barred from this Court unless the United States either does not recognize the Qadha-fi Government, or is at war with Libya.

Significantly, Sun Oil does not argue that the Libyan Government is not recognized by the United States. Instead, Sun Oil argues that “[t]he ‘outlaw regime’ of Libya’s Mu’ammar Qadhafi is precisely the type of regime at which these [access-limiting] rules are aimed.” (D.I. 12 at 17 [emphasis added].) Sun Oil further argues that the appropriate inquiry, for determining whether a foreign government should be denied access to U.S. courts based on foreign policy concerns, is no longer whether a government is “recognized.” Id. at n. 17. Apparently, the United States traditionally “regarded recognition as a political weapon, not as something to be granted as a matter of international obligation. Its granting or refusal was discretionary and could be withheld to further national policy.” R. Wallace, International Law 71 (1986). But, according to Sun Oil, “[i]n recent years, the U.S. practice has been to deemphasize and avoid the use of recognition in case of changes and instead to focus on the presence or absence of diplomatic relations.” (D.I. 12 at 17 n. 17 [citation omitted].) See also R. Wallace, supra; 1 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 203, reporters’ notes at 87. Therefore, after detailing the decline of U.S.-Libyan relations, 5 Sun Oil concludes that the resulting breakdown in diplomatic relations bars the Libyan Government’s access to U.S. courts. (D.I. 12 at 16.)

Nevertheless, Libya is still “recognized” by the U.S., albeit perhaps only “technically” given the unfriendly state of relations. At the very least, this is what NOC asserts (see D.I. 15 at 5, 10), and Sun Oil does not *807 dispute. (Cf D.I. 16 at 2.) Neither party has pointed to any Executive Branch statement purporting to derecognize the Libyan Government; and it seems clear that however poor relations with Qadhafi may be today, relations with Castro when Sabbati-no was decided were at least equally strained. Thus, under the Supreme Court’s Sabbatino analysis, the currently unfriendly state of diplomatic relations with Libya would not appear to be sufficient to bar the Libyan Government from U.S. courts. 6

A second reason why the Libyan Government should not be barred from our courts because of the state of its diplomatic relations with the U.S. is that the Executive Branch has indicated its preference that the Libyan Government should be given access by granting NOC a license to initiate these proceedings. 7 (See D.I. 15A, Exhibit 2E.) In the words of one commentator,

[I]t is safe to generalize that [in this area] the courts have attempted to support the policy of the executive branch whenever such policy is discernible ... and [thus] one may well conclude that the true significance of recognition or nonrecognition to the federal courts is that the act serves as a guidepost to the political wishes of the executive branch.

Annotation, Access to Federal Courts by Foreign State, or National Thereof, Which United States Does Not Recognize or With Which United States Has No Diplomatic Relations, 65 A.L.R. Fed. 881, 884 (1983 & Supp.1989); see also Comment, Unrecognized Foreign Sovereign Court Access After National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. The M/T Stolt Sheaf, 12 Fordham Int’l L.J. 790, 817-18 (1989).

Indeed, the instant case is not unlike an earlier dispute litigated in this Court a few years ago. The latter case, Transportes Aereos de Angola v. Ronair, Inc., 544 F.Supp. 858 (D.Del.1982), presented the question of whether a state-owned corporation of the People’s Republic of Angola, a country with which the United States had no diplomatic relations, was entitled to access to U.S. courts. This Court held that because “the purpose of denying the privilege of suit to governments not recognized by the executive branch is solely to give full effect to that branch’s sensitive political judgments,” a determination by the executive branch that the unrecognized government, or its instrumentality, should be allowed to sue would naturally free a court from any restrictions placed on the exercise of its jurisdiction. Id. at 863-64.

Regardless of how repugnant the current Libyan Government may be to this Court and the American public, President Bush has not derecognized it. Instead, his Administration has seen fit to issue NOC a license to bring this suit. The Court has no choice here but to defer to the foreign policy wisdom of the Executive Branch.

II. Treasury Regulations As A Bar To This Suit

In January of 1986, President Reagan declared that the policies and actions of the Libyan Government posed a sufficient *808 threat to U.S. national security and foreign policy so as to constitute a “national emergency.” Thus, pursuant to his delegated authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (West Supp.1989), 8 the President issued two executive orders imposing economic sanctions on Libya, and authorizing and directing the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate implementing regulations. See Exec. Order No. 12543, 51 Fed.Reg. 875 (Jan. 7, 1986); Exec. Order No. 12544, 51 Fed.Reg. 1235 (Jan. 8, 1986). 9 The regulations subsequently issued by the Secretary, which are those at issue in the instant case, are called the Libyan Sanctions Regulations (“the Regulations”). 51 Fed.Reg. 1354-59 (Jan. 10, 1986); 31 C.F.R. pt. 550 (1986). The Regulations provide, in pertinent part, as follows:

Unless licensed or authorized pursuant to this part, any attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment or other judicial process is null and void with respect to any property in which on or since 4:10 p.m. e.s.t., January 8, 1986, there existed an interest of the Government of Libya. 10

51 Fed.Reg. 2462 (Jan. 16, 1986); 31 C.F.R. pt. 550, § 550.210(e) (1987) (emphasis added). Licenses are issued by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”).

a. License for Initiating Suit

Sun Oil argues that NOC’s petition should be dismissed because NOC filed this action without a license. Even though OFAC has now granted NOC a license to cover this proceeding, Sun Oil claims that the Regulations’ alleged requirement for a license before suit can be filed is jurisdictional in nature, and hence cannot be circumvented by issuance of a license that does not specifically provide for retroactive effect.

NOC argues precisely the opposite. It contends that the Regulations did not require it to obtain a license to initiate this proceeding. It did, however, procure such a license without conceding that it was required to do so. Thus, NOC maintains that the issue of whether a license is necessary for initiation of suit is now moot.

Sun Oil’s arguments are without avail. Although it is true that a license meant to have retroactive effect must state as much, see 31 C.F.R. § 550.501(a), the fact is that the license issued to NOC does just that. License number 00595 specifically authorizes all of the transactions or acts necessary for initiating this particular lawsuit in this particular Court. (See Exhibit 2E, D.I. 15A.) A license could hardly be more specific.

Sun Oil’s claim that a license to initiate suit is a jurisdictional requirement that cannot be cured retroactively is similarly without merit, and has been rejected by numerous courts. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Fernandez, 741 F.2d 355, 360 (11th Cir.1984); cf. National Airmotive v. Gov’t & State of Iran, 499 F.Supp. 401, *809 404-05 (D.D.C.1980). The regulations do not deprive this Court of jurisdiction. Rather, to the extent they apply, they merely effect a change in the governing substantive law. Here, the Court need not decide what, if any, effect the lack of a license for initiating a lawsuit would have because the Court finds, as NOC urges, that this issue is now moot.

b. License for Entry of Judgment

Sun Oil argues that even if NOC’s license is valid for initiating suit, judgment cannot be entered in favor of NOC without a further license. Sun Oil contends that, since judgment cannot be entered, NOC lacks standing because its claim cannot be redressed by this Court.

To support its position that the Regulations forbid the entry of judgment in this case, Sun Oil relies on the language contained in the Regulations, especially in section 550.210(e), as well as the language in the specific license obtained by NOC. The license issued to NOC on October 6, 1989, by OFAC, grants permission for “[a]ll transactions necessary for the initiation and conduct” of these and related legal proceedings begun in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. (Lie. No. L-00595, Exhibit 2E, D.I. 15.) However, the license also expressly states that it is not to “be construed as authorizing the transfer of any blocked funds, or entry or execution of any judgment.” (Id. [emphasis added].) A letter from the director of OFAC that accompanies the license, and is addressed to counsel for NOC, also states that “no entry of judgment or execution thereon may be made with respect to either case without a further specific license” from OFAC. (Letter of October 6, 1989 from R. Richard Newcomb, Director of OFAC, to Preston Brown, Esq., Attorney for NOC, Exhibit 2E, D.I. 15 [emphasis added].)

NOC argues that the Regulations do not require a license to allow a judgment to be entered in its favor in this case. It contends that the Regulations bar only the unlicensed execution of any judgment entered by this Court. According to NOC, Sun Oil’s interpretation, that mere entry of judgment is barred, would render the Regulations unconstitutional. NOC acknowledges that OFAC’s position is, like Sun Oil’s, that any judgment entered by this Court will be null and void, unless NOC obtains a license for this particular purpose. (See D.I. 15 at 21-22 n.*.) But NOC maintains that OFAC’s interpretation of the effect of the Regulations is incorrect. (Id.)

In support of its reading of the Regulations, NOC proffers cases interpreting analogous foreign asset control regulations. All of these cases support the proposition that foreign blocking regulations bar only those judicial proceedings that effect a transfer of foreign property or property interests. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 741 F.2d at 361-62. Not too surprisingly, therefore, in none of these cases were the applicable blocking regulations found to bar the mere entry of judgment. 11

Sun Oil does not cite a single case to support its interpretation of the Regulations. More importantly, it does not distinguish, or even discuss, the long line of authority relied on by NOC. The Court’s own research uncovered numerous cases, in addition to those cited by NOC, that interpreted analogous blocking regulations as barring only judicial acts that would effect a transfer of foreign property or property interests. See, e.g., Itek Corp. v. First National Bank of Boston, 704 F.2d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir.1983). In only one case did a court read blocking regulations as prohibiting an unlicensed entry of judgment. See Chase Manhattan Bank v. United China Syndicate, Ltd., 180 F.Supp. 848, 849 (S.D.N.Y.1960) (construing Foreign Assets Control Regulations as prohibiting the entry of a default judgment against Chinese defendant). That court’s reasoning has been severely criticized, see Goodman, United *810 States Government Foreign Property Controls, 52 Geo.L.J. 767, 796-98 (1964) (characterizing the decision as “erroneous”); Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. 77 Civ. 1251 (RLC), slip op. at 15 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1978) (“this case is no longer consistent with the weight of authority”), and does not apply to the facts of this case.

The sheer volume of cases supporting NOC’s view is impressive. But its constitutional arguments are equally compelling. NOC contends that since only Congress can interfere with this Court’s jurisdiction, any reading of the Regulations that would prevent the entry of judgment would be unconstitutional. See National Airmotive, 499 F.Supp. at 405 n. 9. NOC further argues that Congress has not and cannot delegate its exclusive constitutional authority to expand or abridge the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Whether Congress can ever delegate its power over the jurisdiction of the federal courts need not be addressed. In this case the Court finds, as NOC urges, that Congress has not attempted to do so.

1. President’s Authority Under the IEEPA

In Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 101 S.Ct. 2972, 69 L.Ed.2d 918 (1981), the Supreme Court examined the scope of the power Congress granted the President under the IEEPA, the statute pursuant to which foreign blocking regulations are promulgated. Dames & Moore involved a challenge to the validity of the President’s suspension of claims against the Iranian Government still pending in U.S. courts, and his nullification of attachments obtained against Iranian assets in the United States. After reviewing the statutory and regulatory framework under which the President acted, the Court held that the IEEPA specifically authorized the President to nullify the attachments and order the transfer of blocked Iranian assets. Id. at 674, 101 S.Ct. at 2983-84. The Court further noted that the President also had the “authority to prevent or condition attachments ...” in the first place. Id. at 674 n. 6, 101 S.Ct. at 2983-84 n. 6. But the statute could not also be read to authorize the suspension of claims pending in U.S. courts. Id. at 675, 101 S.Ct. at 2984. The latter holding is pertinent to the present case because barring the entry of an unlicensed judgment is similar to suspending claims. The Court reasoned the following:

We conclude that although the IEEPA authorized the nullification of the attachments, it cannot be read to authorize the suspension of the claims. The claims of American citizens against Iran are not in themselves transactions involving Iranian property or efforts to exercise any rights with respect to such property. An in personam lawsuit, although it might eventually be reduced to judgment and that judgment might be executed upon, is an effort to establish liability and fix damages and does not focus on any particular property within the jurisdiction. The terms of the IEEPA therefore do not authorize the President to suspend claims in American courts. This is the view of all the courts which have considered the question.

Id. (citations omitted). The President’s suspension of claims was eventually upheld on other grounds. 12 See id. at 688, 101 S.Ct. at 688.

In interpreting the extent to which the Iranian Regulations were authorized by Congress under the IEEPA, the Court emphasized that “the congressional purpose in authorizing blocking orders is ‘to put control of foreign assets in the hands of the President_’” Id. at 673, 101 S.Ct. at 2983 (quoting Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 493, 69 S.Ct. 1333, 1345, 93 L.Ed. 1480 *811 (1949)). Because these “frozen assets serve as a ‘bargaining chip’ to be used by the President when dealing with a hostile country,” the Court found it would not make sense “to allow individual claimants throughout the country to minimize or wholly eliminate this ‘bargaining chip’ through attachments, garnishments, or similar encumbrances on property.” Id. But the same reasoning did not apply to the suspension of claims because the President’s control over foreign property would not be similarly threatened or diminished by in personam lawsuits that merely seek to establish liability. See id. at 675, 101 S.Ct. at 2984.

The logic of Dames & Moore dictates the conclusion that the IEEPA cannot be read as authorizing the President to direct the promulgation of regulations that bar the mere entry of judgment in a case such as this. NOC is asserting an in personam claim that consists of nothing more than an effort to establish liability and fix damages. 13 No property in the United States would be affected by the mere entry of judgment. Therefore, the IEEPA does not provide statutory authority for Executive regulations that would prevent the entry of judgment by this Court. 14

2. President’s Power to Settle Claims

Sun Oil makes an alternative argument that does not depend solely on the IEEPA. Essentially, Sun Oil contends that the combination of factors 15 that led the Supreme Court in Dames & Moore to uphold the President’s suspension of claims, brought by American citizens against Iran, should be sufficient to uphold what it terms as “the more limited action at issue here,” namely the “regulation of the entry of judgment relating to the claim of a hostile foreign regime_” (D.I. 25 at 12.) Sun Oil mischaracterizes both the Court’s opinion in Dames & Moore, and the implications of the reading of the Regulations it advocates.

Although in Dames & Moore the Court did uphold the suspension of claims, it did so only on fairly narrow grounds:

[W]e re-emphasize the narrowness of our decision. We do not decide that the President possesses plenary power to settle claims, even as against foreign governmental entities ... But where, as here, the settlement of claims has been determined to be a necessary incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute between our country and another, and where, as here, we can conclude that Congress acquiesced in the President’s action, we are not prepared to say that the President lacks the power to settle such claims.

Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 688, 101 S.Ct. at 2991. The Court concluded, in light of Congress’s apparent acquiescence, that the President had the power to settle claims pursuant to an executive agreement negotiated with a foreign government to resolve a foreign policy crisis. It was critical that the contested Executive action was taken pursuant to an executive agreement designed to settle the claims of U.S. citizens against a foreign power because the Court determined “that Congress has implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by executive agreement.” Id. at 680, 101 S.Ct. at 2987. Although “[p]ast practice does not, by itself, create power ...,” id. at 686, 101 S.Ct. at 2990, the *812 Court concluded that in Dames & Moore there was more: namely, “ ‘a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned ... [that could] be treated, as a gloss on “Executive Power” vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.’ ” Id. (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11, 72 S.Ct. 863, 897, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)) (emphasis added).

The Dames & Moore rationale for upholding the President’s suspension of claims is inapplicable to what Sun Oil calls the Libyan Regulations’ reasonable control over the entry of judgment on a claim brought by Libya. President Bush has not entered into any executive agreement to settle the claims of U.S. citizens against Libya. Thus, that the President might have the power, not employed here, to settle or suspend a claim between Sun Oil and NOC, through negotiation of an executive agreement with Libya, is simply irrelevant. Moreover, contrary to Sun Oil’s contentions, regulating the entry of judgments is not a more modest power than suspending claims pursuant to an executive agreement. But even if it were a more modest power, Sun Oil has not pointed to any evidence that Congress has acquiesced in the President’s use of it. Similarly, Sun Oil has not demonstrated that the Executive has exercised its allegedly modest power to regulate the entry of judgments in the requisite systematic, unbroken, and unquestioned manner. 16 See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686, 101 S.Ct. at 2990. Accordingly, the Court concludes that in this case the President does not have the power to prohibit the mere entry of judgment by this Court. 17

3. President’s Power to Change the Governing Law

Sun Oil’s final argument is that interpreting the Regulations as barring the entry of judgment would not render them unconstitutional because such a reading would not improperly divest this Court of jurisdiction. Rather, Sun Oil contends that the bar against entry of judgment would simply be, such as the suspension of claims in Dames & Moore, a legitimate Executive action that creates new substantive rules of law. 18

Sun Oil misses the critical issue. It is true that, given Dames & Moore, the President arguably has the power to enter into an executive agreement with Libya which settles claims existing between U.S. and Libyan citizens. It is also true that such an agreement would change the law governing claims between Americans and Libyans, and this Court would be bound to apply the substantive rule of law created by the executive agreement. The President must, however, have in the first place the power to do the act that produces the alleged change in the governing law. Cf. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 685, 101 S.Ct. at 2989 (noting examples of how the President changes the governing law by doing acts that he is empowered to do).

In this case, the Court has already concluded that the President’s statutory authority is limited to regulating those judicial processes that would effect a transfer of foreign property or property interests. Moreover, any power he may have under Dames & Moore is not applicable here. The Court therefore rejects this argument.

*813 III. Denial of Sun Oil’s Motion to Dismiss

Having rejected all of the arguments offered by Sun Oil in support of its interpretation of the Regulations, the Court will read the language here in dispute as virtually every court before it. The Libyan Regulations prohibit only those judicial acts that transfer Libyan property or property interests. Thus, the Libyan Regulations do not bar this Court from entering judgment in this case, and Sun Oil’s standing arguments must fail. Furthermore, for the reasons previously mentioned, this Court has already determined that NOC should not be barred from U.S. courts because of the state of U.S.-Libyan relations. Therefore, having found all of its arguments without merit, the Court will deny Sun Oil’s motion to dismiss NOC’s petition.

THE MOTION TO ENFORCE THE ARBITRAL AWARD

The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards attempts “to encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries.” Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n. 15, 94 S.Ct. 2449, 2457 n. 15, 41 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). This Court must recognize the award rendered by the ICC Arbitral Tribunal in NOC’s favor unless Sun Oil can successfully assert one of the seven defenses enumerated in Article V of the Convention. Cf. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generate de l’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 973 (2d Cir.1974). Sun Oil has invoked three of the seven defenses against recognition. (D.l. 12 at 23-24.) It bears the burden of proving that any of these defenses is applicable. Imperial Ethiopian Gov’t v. Baruch-Foster Corp., 535 F.2d 334, 336 (5th Cir.1976); Al Haddad Bros. Enterprises, Inc. v. M/S Agapi, 635 F.Supp. 205, 209 (D.Del.1986), aff'd without opinion, 813 F.2d 396 (3d Cir.1987).

After considering the evidence and arguments of the parties, this Court, for the reasons outlined below, rejects Sun Oil’s defenses and concludes that the arbitral award is entitled to recognition and enforcement under the Convention.

I. Use of “False and Misleading” Testimony

Sun Oil’s first ground for asserting that the arbitral award should not be recognized revolves around the Arbitral Tribunal’s reliance on the t