In Re. General Growth Properties, Inc.

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Before the Court are five motions (the “Motions”) to dismiss certain of the Chapter 11 cases filed by one or more debtors (the “Subject Debtors”) that are owned directly or indirectly by General Growth Properties, Inc. (“GGP”). One of the Motions was filed by ING Clarion Capital Loan Services LLC (“ING Clarion”), 1 as special servicer to certain secured lenders; 2 one of the Motions was filed by Helios AMC, LLC (“Helios”), 3 as special *47 servicer to other secured lenders; 4 and three of the Motions were filed by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and KBC Bank N.V. (together, “Metlife”, and together with ING Clarion and Helios, the “Movants”). 5 Each of the Movants is a secured lender with a loan to one of the Subject Debtors. The primary ground on which dismissal is sought is that the Subject Debtors’ cases were filed in bad faith. It is also contended that one of the Subject Debtors was ineligible to file. The above-captioned debtors (the “Debtors”) and the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors appointed in these cases (the “Committee”) object to the Motions. Based on the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Motions are denied.

BACKGROUND

GGP, one of the Debtors, is a publicly-traded real estate investment trust (“REIT”) and the ultimate parent of approximately 750 wholly-owned Debtor and non-Debtor subsidiaries, joint venture subsidiaries and affiliates (collectively, the “GGP Group” or the “Company”). 6 The GGP Group’s primary business is shopping center ownership and management; the Company owns or manages over 200 shopping centers in 44 states across the country. These include joint venture interests in approximately 50 properties, along with non-controlling interests in several international joint ventures. The GGP Group also owns several commercial office buildings and five master-planned communities, 7 although these businesses account for a smaller share of its operations. The Company reported consolidated revenue of $3.4 billion in 2008. 8 The GGP Group’s *48 properties are managed from its Chicago, Illinois headquarters, and the Company directly employs approximately 8,700 people, exclusive of those employed at the various property sites.

I. Corporate Structure

The corporate structure of the GGP Group is extraordinarily complex, and it is necessary to provide only a broad outline for purposes of this opinion. GGP is the general partner of GGP Limited Partnership (“GGP LP”), the company through which the Group’s business is primarily conducted. 9 GGP LP in turn controls, directly or indirectly, GGPLP, L.L.C., The Rouse Company LP (“TRCLP”), and General Growth Management, Inc. (“GGMI”). 10 GGPLP L.L.C., TRCLP and GGMI in turn directly or indirectly control hundreds of individual project-level subsidiary entities, which directly or indirectly own the individual properties. The Company takes a nationwide, integrated approach to the development, operation and management of its properties, offering centralized leasing, marketing, management, cash management, property maintenance and construction management. 11

11. Capital Structure

As of December 31, 2008, the GGP Group reported $29.6 billion in assets and $27.3 billion in liabilities. 12 At that time, approximately $24.85 billion of its liabilities accounted for the aggregate consolidated outstanding indebtedness of the GGP Group. Of this, approximately $18.27 billion constituted debt of the project-level Debtors secured by the respective properties, $1.83 billion of which was secured by the properties of the Subject Debtors. 13 The remaining $6.58 billion of unsecured debt is discussed below.

A. Secured Debt

The GGP Group’s secured debt consists primarily of mortgage and so-called mezzanine debt. The mortgage debt is secured by mortgages on over 100 properties, each of which is typically owned by a separate corporate entity. The mortgage debt can in turn be categorized as conventional or *49 as debt further securitized in the commercial mortgage-backed securities market.

(i) Conventional Mortgage Debt

The conventional mortgage debt is illustrated, on this record, by three of the mortgages held by Metlife. Each of the three mortgages was an obligation of a separate GGP subsidiary. There is no dispute that some of the Subject Debtors that issued the Metlife mortgages were intended to function as special purpose entities (“SPE”). 14 SPE’s typically contain restrictions in their loan documentation and operating agreements that require them to maintain their separate existence and to limit their debt to the mortgages and any incidental debts, such as trade payables or the costs of operation. (See, e.g., Metlife MTD White Marsh Debtors ¶ 12, ECF Doc. No. 631.) 15 Metlife asserts, without substantial contradiction from the Debtors, that SPE’s are structured in this manner to protect the interests of their secured creditors by ensuring that “the operations of the borrower [are] isolated from business affairs of the borrower’s affiliates and parent so that the financing of each loan stands alone on its own merits, creditworthiness and value .... ” (Metlife MTD Providence Debtors, ¶ 14., ECF Docket No. 629.) In addition to limitations on indebtedness, the SPE’s organizational documents usually contain prohibitions on consolidation and liquidation, restrictions on mergers and asset sales, prohibitions on amendments to the organizational and transaction documents, and separateness covenants. Standard and Poor’s, Legal Criteria for Structured Finance Transactions (April 2002). 16

The typical SPE documentation also often contains an obligation to retain one or more independent directors (for a corporation) or managers (for an LLC). The Met-life loans did not contain any such requirement, but for example, the Amended and Restated Operating Agreements of both Faneuil Hall Marketplace, LLC (“FHM”) and Saint Louis Galleria L.L.C. (“SLG”), in a section entitled “Provisions Relating to Financing,” mandate the appointment of “at least two (2) duly appointed Managers (each an ‘Independent Manager’) of the Company ...” (Joint Trial Ex. 34, 35, Art. XIII(o)). The Company’s view of the independent directors and managers is that they were meant to be unaffiliated with the Group and its management. (See Hr’g Tr. 227: 8-14, June 17, 2009.) It appears that some of the secured lenders believed they were meant to be devoted to the interests of the secured creditors, as asserted by a representative of Helios. (See Altman Test. 159:7-13, June 5, 2009.) In *50 any event, this aspect of the loan documentation is discussed further below.

Although each of the mortgage loans was typically secured by a separate property owned by an individual debtor, many of the loans were guaranteed by other GGP entities. One of the Metlife loans, for example, was guaranteed. Moreover, many loans were advanced by one lender to multiple Debtors. For example, in July 2008, the GGP Group received a loan from several lenders led by Eurohypo AG, New York Branch, as administrative agent, the outstanding principal of which totaled $1.51 billion as of the Petition Date (the “2008 Facility”). GGP, GGP LP and GGPLP, L.L.C. are guarantors, and 24 Debtor subsidiaries are borrowers under the 2008 Facility, which is secured by mortgages and deeds of trust on 24 properties. The loan was set to mature on July 11, 2011, but was in default as of the Petition Date due to a cross-default provision triggered by the default of another multi-Debtor loan called the 2006 Facility. One of the last financings the Debtors were able to obtain before bankruptcy, in December 2008, was a group of eight non-recourse mortgage loans with Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America, in the total amount of $896 million, and eollateralized by eight properties (the “Teachers Loans”). 17

The typical mortgage loan for the GGP Group members had a three to seven-year term, with low amortization and a large balloon payment at the end. Some of the mortgage loans had a much longer nominal maturity date, but these also had an anticipated repayment date (“ARD”), at which point the loan became “hyper-amortized,” even if the maturity date itself was as much as thirty years in the future. Consequences of failure to repay or refinance the loan at the ARD typically include a steep increase in interest rate, a requirement that cash be kept at the project-level, with excess cash flow being applied to principal, and a requirement that certain expenditures be submitted to the lender for its approval. 18 The Debtors viewed the ARD as equivalent to maturity and the consequences of a loan becoming hyper-amortized as equivalent to default, and historically sought to refinance such loans so as to avoid hyper-amortization.

(ii) Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities

Many of the GGP Group’s mortgage loans were financed in the commercial mortgage-backed securities (“CMBS”) market, represented on these Motions by *51 each of the loans serviced by ING Clarion and Helios, as special servicers. In a typical CMBS transaction, multiple mortgages are sold to a trust qualified as a real estate mortgage conduit (“REMIC”) for tax purposes. The REMIC in turn sells certificates entitling the holders to payments from principal and interest on this large pool of mortgages. (Mesterharm Decl., April 16, 2009, ¶ 43.) The holders of the CMBS securities typically have different rights to the income stream and bear different interest rates; they may or may not have different control rights. See generally Talcott J. Franklin and Thomas F. Nealon III, Mortgage and Asset Backed Securities Litigation Handbook § 1.6 (April 2008).

The REMIC is managed by a master servicer that handles day-to-day loan administration functions and services the loans when they are not in default. A special servicer takes over management of the REMIC upon a transfer of authority. Such transfers take place under certain limited circumstances, including: (i) a borrower’s failure to make a scheduled principal and interest payment, unless cured within 60 days, (ii) a borrower’s bankruptcy or insolvency, (iii) a borrower’s failure to make a balloon payment upon maturity, or (iv) a determination by the master ser-vicer that a material and adverse default under the loan is imminent and unlikely to be cured within 60 days. 19 While a master servicer is able to grant routine waivers and consents, it cannot agree to an alteration of the material terms of a loan or mortgage. A special servicer has the ability to agree to modify the loan once authority has been transferred, but often only with the consent of the holders of the CMBS securities, or in some cases the holders of certain levels of the debt.

(iii) Mezzanine Debt

The Debtors are also obligors on so-called mezzanine loans from at least four lenders, of which one, Metlife, is a Movant on these motions to dismiss. In these transactions generally, and in the Metlife mezzanine loan in particular, the lender is the holder of a mortgage on the property held by one of the Subject Debtors. The lender makes a further loan, ordinarily at a higher interest rate, to a single-purpose entity formed to hold the equity interest in the mortgage-level borrower. The loan to the single-purpose entity is secured only by the stock or other equity interest of the mortgage level borrower. The single-purpose entity typically has no other debt and its business is limited to its equity interest in the property-owning subsidiary.

B. Unsecured Debt

In addition to secured debt, members of the GGP Group were obligated on approximately $6.58 billion of unsecured debt as of the Petition Date. Other than trade debt incurred by some of the project-level Debtors, most of this debt was an obligation of one or more of the holding companies, generally at the top levels of the corporate chart. The principal components of this debt were as follows:

Under an indenture dated April 16, 2007, GGP LP issued $1.55 billion of 3.98% Exchangeable Senior Notes (the “GGP LP Notes”). The notes are senior, unsecured obligations of GGP LP and are not guaranteed by any entity within the GGP Group. The outstanding principal was $1.55 billion *52 as of the Petition Date, with interest payable semi-annually in arrears. 20

Under an indenture dated February 24, 1995, TRCLP issued five series of public bonds (collectively, the “1995 Rouse Bonds”), which were unsecured obligations of TRCLP, not guaranteed by any other entity in the GGP Group. Four of the five series remain outstanding. Additionally, under an indenture dated May 5, 2006, TRCLP and TRC Co-Issuer, Inc., issued one series of private placement bonds, in the face amount of $800 million (the “2006 Rouse Bonds”). The 2006 Rouse Bonds are unsecured obligations of TRCLP and TRC Co-Issuer, Inc. and are not guaranteed by any other entity in the GGP Group. The total aggregate outstanding amount due on the Rouse Bonds as of the Petition Date was $2,245 billion. TRCLP was unable to pay the outstanding balance of one series of the Rouse Bonds upon maturity in March 2009 and received a notice of default. This default in turn triggered defaults for each of the other series of Rouse Bonds.

In February 2006, GGP, GGP LP and GGPLP, L.L.C. became borrowers under a term and revolving credit facility with Eurpohypo AG, New York Branch serving as administrative agent (the “2006 Facility”). The 2006 Facility is guaranteed by Rouse L.L.C., with GGP LP pledging its equity interest in GGPLP, L.L.C., TRCLP and Rouse LLC and Rouse LLC pledging its general partnership interest in TRCLP to secure the obligations under the 2006 Facility. Each of the borrower, guarantor and pledgor entities is a Debtor, the current outstanding balance on the term loan is approximately $1.99 billion, and the outstanding balance on the revolving loan is $590 million. The facility was not scheduled to mature until February 24, 2010, but fell into default in late 2008 through a cross-default provision triggered by the default of one of the GGP Group’s property-level mortgage loans.

On February 24, 2006, GGP LP issued $206.2 million of junior subordinated notes to GGP Capital Trust I (“the Junior Subordinated Notes”). GGP Capital Trust I, a non-Debtor entity, subsequently issued $200 million of trust preferred securities (“TRUPS”) to outside investors and $6.2 million of common equity to GGP LP. The Junior Subordinated Notes are unsecured obligations of GGP LP, one of the Debtors, and are not guaranteed by any entities within the GGP Group. The current outstanding principal amount on the notes is $206.2 million and the notes mature on April 30, 2036. The Junior Subordinated Notes are subordinate in payment to all indebtedness of GGP LP, other than trade debt.

C. Other Debt

The GGP Group had entered into five interest-rate swap agreements as of December 31, 2008. The total notional amount of the agreements was $1.08 billion, with an average fixed pay rate of 3.38% and an average variable receive rate of LIBOR. The Company made April 2009 payments to only one of the counter-parties, and two of the swaps have been terminated. Additionally, as of December 31, 2008, the Company also had outstanding letters of credit and surety bonds in the amount of $286.2 million.

With respect to the Company’s joint venture interests, GGP LP is the promis-sor on a note in the principal amount of $245 million, payable to the Comptroller of *53 the State of New York, as trustee for the New York State Common Retirement Fund, and due on February 28, 2013. It is secured by a pledge of GGP LP’s member interest in the. GGP/Homart II L.L.C. joint venture. Additionally GGP LP is the promissor on a note in the amount of $93,712,500, due on December 1, 2012, payable to Ivanhoe Capital, LP, and secured by a pledge of GGP LP’s shares in the GGP Ivanhoe, Inc. joint venture.

D. Equity

GGP had 312,352,392 shares of common stock outstanding as of March 17, 2009. 21 GGP is required, as a REIT, to distribute at least 90% of its taxable income and to distribute, or pay tax on, certain of its capital gains. During the first three quarters of 2008, GGP distributed $476.6 million, or $1.50 per share, to its stockholders and GGP LP unitholders, but it suspended its quarterly dividends as of the last quarter of 2008.

III. The Events of2008-2009

Historically, the capital needs of the GGP Group were satisfied through mortgage loans obtained from banks, insurance companies and, increasingly, the CMBS market. As noted above, these loans were generally secured by the shopping center properties and structured with three to seven-year maturities, low amortization rates and balloon payments due at maturity. (Nolan Deck, June 16, 2009, ¶ 9.) There is no dispute that the Company’s business plan was based on the premise that it would be able to refinance the debt. The testimony of Thomas Nolan, the President and Chief Operating Officer of GGP, is that “[t]his approach was standard in the industry, so for many years, it has been rare to see commercial real estate financed with longer-term mortgages that would fully amortize.” (Nolan Deck, June 16, 2009, ¶ 9.)

However, in the latter half of 2008, the crisis in the credit markets spread to commercial real estate finance, most notably the CMBS market. This in turn affected the ability of the GGP Group to refinance its maturing debt on commercially acceptable terms. (Mesterharm Deck, April 16, 2009, ¶ 10.) The GGP Group attempted to refinance its maturing project-level debt or obtain new financing, contacting dozens of banks, insurance companies and pension funds. It also contacted national and regional brokers and retained the investment banking firms of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley to attempt to securitize and syndicate the loans. Despite these efforts, the only refinancing the GGP Group was able to obtain during this period was with Teachers Insurance, which is described above.

The GGP parent entities also attempted to find refinancing for their own mostly unsecured debt, but efforts to raise debt or equity capital were similarly unsuccessful. (Nolan. Deck, June 16, 2009, ¶ 20.) GGP hired an investment banking firm that specializes in the restructuring of debt, Miller Buckfire & Co., LLC (“Miller Buckfire”), to attempt to renegotiate the debt, but the lenders were unwilling to consent to additional forbearance, which in turn led to defaults and cross-defaults. Furthermore, the GGP Group was generally unable to sell any of its assets to generate the cash necessary to pay down its debts, as potential purchasers were themselves unable to acquire financing.

The Debtors claim that the CMBS structure caused additional roadblocks to the Company’s attempts to refinance its debt *54 or even talk to its lenders. In January-2009, the GGP Group contacted the master servicers of those loans that were set to mature by January 2010, seeking to communicate with the special servicers regarding renegotiation of the loan terms. The response from the master servicers was that the Company could not communicate with the special servicers until the loans were transferred, and that the loans had to be much closer to maturity to be transferred. The GGP Group subsequently attempted to communicate with the master servicers regarding only those loans set to mature through May 2009, but received the same response. The Debtors then attempted to contact the special servicers directly, only to be referred back to the master servicers. Finally, in February 2009, the GGP Group attempted to call a “summit” of special servicers to discuss those loans due to mature through January 2010, but only one servicer was willing to attend and the meeting was cancelled. (Nolan. Deck, June 16, 2009, ¶¶ 18-19.)

Unable to refinance, the Company began to tap more heavily into its operating cash flow to pay both its regular expenses and financial obligations. This in turn left the Company short of cash to meet prior commitments towards development and redevelopment costs. As additional mortgage loans began to mature, the Company’s liquidity problems grew worse. For example, two large loans from Deutsche Bank matured on November 28, 2008. In return for brief extensions of the maturity date, Deutsche Bank required the Debtors to increase the rate of interest 3.75%, from LIBOR plus 225 basis points to LIBOR plus 600 basis points, 75 basis points over the prior default interest rate. Additionally, Deutsche Bank required excess cash flow from the properties to be escrowed in a lockbox account and applied entirely to the relevant properties, with surplus used to amortize the principal on the relevant loan.

Based on the state of the markets, the GGP Group began to contemplate the necessity of a Chapter 11 restructuring. Several of the loans went into default and one of the lenders, Citibank, commenced foreclosure proceedings on a defaulted loan on March 19, 2009. 22 On April 16, 2009, 360 of the Debtors filed voluntary petitions under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. An additional 28 of the Debtors filed for protection on April 22, 2009, for a total of 388 Debtors in the above-captioned Chapter 11 cases.

*55 Upon filing, the Debtors did not dispute that the GGP Group’s shopping center business had a stable and generally positive cash flow and that it had continued to perform well, despite the current financial crisis. Specifically, they stated “[t]he Company’s net operating income ('NOI’), a standard metric of financial performance in the real estate and shopping center industries, has been increasing over time, and in fact increased in 2008 over the prior year despite the challenges of the general economy.” (Mesterharm Decl., April 16, 2009, ¶ 8.) 23 Despite this, faced with approximately $18.4 billion in outstanding debt that matured or would be maturing by the end of 2012, the Company believed its capital structure had become unmanageable due to the collapse of the credit markets.

The Debtors filed several conventional motions on the Petition Date. The only motion that was highly contested was the Debtors’ request for the use of cash collateral and approval of debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) financing. By the time of the final hearing on May 8, 2009, numerous project-level lenders had objected, based on concerns that the security of their loans would be adversely affected. Many of these parties argued that it would be a violation of the separateness of the individual companies for the Debtors to upstream cash from the individual properties for use at the parent-level entity. After hearing extensive argument, the Court ruled that the SPE structure did not require that the project-level Debtors be precluded from upstreaming their cash surplus at a time it was needed most by the Group. The final cash collateral order, entered on May 14, 2009 (ECF Docket No. 527), however, had various forms of adequate protection for the project-level lenders, such as the payment of interest at the non-default rate, continued maintenance of the properties, a replacement lien on the cash being up-streamed from the project-level Debtors and a second priority lien on certain other properties. DIP financing was arranged, but the DIP lender did not obtain liens on the properties of the project-level Debtors that could arguably adversely affect the lien interests of the existing mortgage lenders, such as the Movants.

At an early stage in the cases it became clear that several lenders intended to move to dismiss, and the Court urged all parties who intended to move to dismiss any of the cases to coordinate their motions. Six motions were filed (three by Metlife), with one party subsequently withdrawing its motion. ING Clarion and Helios, which hold CMBS debt, argued that their cases should be dismissed because they were filed in bad faith in that there was no imminent threat to the financial viability of the Subject Debtors. ING Clarion also contended that Lancaster Trust, one of the Subject Debtors, was ineligible to be a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code. Met-life, which holds conventional mortgage debt, similarly argued that the Subject Debtors were not in financial distress, that the cases were filed prematurely and that there was no chance of reorganization as there was no possibility of confirming a plan over its objection.

DISCUSSION

I. Bad Faith Dismissal

The principle that a Chapter 11 reorganization case can be dismissed as a *56 bad faith filing is a judge-made doctrine. In the Second Circuit, the leading case on dismissal for the filing of a petition in bad faith is C-TC 9th Ave. P’ship v. Norton Co. (In re C-TC 9th Ave. P’ship), 113 F.3d 1304 (2d Cir.1997), which in turn relied on Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs. (In re Cohoes Indus. Terminal, Inc.), 931 F.2d 222 (2d Cir.1991). Under these decisions, grounds for dismissal exist if it is clear on the filing date that “there was no reasonable likelihood that the debtor intended to reorganize and no reasonable probability that it would eventually emerge from bankruptcy proceedings.” In re C-TC 9th Ave. P’ship, 113 F.3d at 1309-10, quoting In re Cohoes, 931 F.2d at 227 (internal citations omitted). One frequently-cited decision by Chief Judge Brozman of this Court has restated the principle as follows: “[T]he standard in this Circuit is that a bankruptcy petition will be dismissed if both objective futility of the reorganization process and subjective bad faith in filing the petition are found.” In re Kingston Square Assocs., 214 B.R. 713, 725 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.1997) (emphasis in original); see also In re RCM Global Long Term Capital Appreciation Fund, Ltd., 200 B.R. 514, 520 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1996).

No one factor is determinative of good faith, and the Court “must examine the facts and circumstances of each case in light of several established guidelines or indicia, essentially conducting an ‘on-the-spot evaluation of the Debtor’s financial condition [and] motives.’ ” In re Kingston Square, 214 B.R. at 725, quoting In re Little Creek Development Co., 779 F.2d 1068, 1072 (5th Cir.1986). “It is the totality of circumstances, rather than any single factor, that will determine whether good faith exists.” In re Kingston Square, 214 B.R. at 725, citing Cohoes, 931 F.2d at 227. Case law recognizes that a bankruptcy petition should be dismissed for lack of good faith only sparingly and with great caution. See Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693, 700 (4th Cir.1989); see also In re G.S. Distrib., Inc., 331 B.R. 552, 566 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.2005).

C-TC 9th Ave. P’ship, like many of the other bad faith eases, involved a single-asset real estate debtor, where the equity investors in a hopelessly insolvent project were engaged in a last-minute effort to fend off foreclosure and the accompanying tax losses. See also Little Creek Development Co., 779 F.2d 1068. Thus, many of the following factors listed by the C-TC Court as evidencing bad faith were characteristics of this type of case:

(1) the debtor has only one asset; (2) the debtor has few unsecured creditors whose claims are small in relation to those of the secured creditors; (3) the debtor’s one asset is the subject of a foreclosure action as a result of arrear-ages or default on the debt; (4) the debtor’s financial condition is, in essence, a two party dispute between the debtor and secured creditors which can be resolved in the pending state foreclosure action; (5) the timing of the debt- or’s filing evidences an intent to delay or frustrate the legitimate efforts of the debtor’s secured creditors to enforce their rights; (6) the debtor has little or no cash flow; (7) the debtor can’t meet current expenses including the payment of personal property and real estate taxes; and (8) the debtor has no employees.

In re C-TC 9th Ave. P’shp., 113 F.3d at 1311. Relatively few of these factors are relevant to the cases at bar, and two of the Movants, ING Clarion and Helios, expressly disavowed reliance on the C-TC bad faith formulation at the hearing on the Motions, conceding in effect that there was a reasonable likelihood that the Debtors intended to reorganize and could successfully emerge from bankruptcy. (See Hr’g *57 Tr. 18:2-3; 18:14-19:22; 44:1-2.) These Movants instead argue that the filings, when examined from the perspective of the individual Debtors, were premature. The third Movant, Metlife, did not expressly disavow reliance on the C-TC formulation. However, its contentions were not based on the argument that the debtors did not intend to reorganize. Metlife argued that the Debtors could never confirm a plan over its objection, implying that Metlife would never agree to a plan proposed by the Debtors. Then, having staked out a position that the Debtors might characterize as evidence of bad faith, Metlife contended that the Subject Debtors’ subjective bad faith was evidenced by the prematurity of the filing and various actions taken by the Debtors that are further analyzed below.

A. Objective Bad Faith: Prematurity

All three Movants support their contention that the Chapter 11 filings of these Debtors were, in effect, premature by reliance on the few cases that have dismissed Chapter 11 petitions where the debtor was not in financial distress at the time of filing, where the prospect of liability was speculative, and where there was evidence that the fifing was designed to obtain a litigation advantage. The leading decision is In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154 (3d Cir.1999), in which the debtors filed Chapter 11 petitions for the express purpose of protecting themselves from antitrust litigation. At the same time they published a press release touting their financial health, as well as their denial of any antitrust liability. The Third Circuit held that “the mere possibility of a future need to file, without more, does not establish that a petition was filed in ‘good faith.’ ” Id. at 164. The principle of SGL Carbon was followed by this Court in In re Schur Mgmt. Co., 323 B.R. 123 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.2005), where two debtors filed for bankruptcy to avoid a possible judgment from a personal injury suit in which they denied all liability and which had yet to go to trial. In Schur Mgmt, this Court noted that “[i]t would be sheer speculation to guess as to the amount of a judgment, whether it would be imposed on one or both debtors and whether it would impair healthy companies with only $14,075 in aggregate liabilities and a net positive cash flow.” 323 B.R. at 127.

In SGL Carbon and Schur Mgmt., the prospect of any liability from pending litigation was wholly speculative. By contrast, the Subject Debtors here carry an enormous amount of fixed debt that is not contingent. Movants argue nevertheless that none of the Subject Debtors had a mortgage with a maturity date earlier than March 2010, and that the Subject Debtors should have waited until much closer to the respective maturity dates on their loans to file for bankruptcy. Movants contend in effect that the prospect of liability was too remote on the Petition Date for the Subject Debtors, and that the issue of financial distress and prematurity of fifing cannot be examined from the perspective of the group but only on an individual-entity basis. Accepting for the moment this latter proposition, the question is whether the Subject Debtors were in actual financial distress on the Petition Date and whether the prospect of liability was too remote to justify a Chapter 11 fifing.

(i) The Financial Distress of the Individual Project Debtors

The record on these Motions demonstrates that the individual debtors that are the subject of these Motions were in varying degrees of financial distress in April 2009. Loans to four of the Subject Debtors had cross-defaulted to the defaults of affiliates or would have been in default as *58 a result of other bankruptcy petitions. 24 Of the loans to the remaining sixteen Subject Debtors, one had gone into hyper-amortization in 2008. Interest had increased by 4.26%. Five of the Subject Debtors had mortgage debt maturing or hyper-amortizing in 2010, two in 2011, and one in 2012. The remaining seven Subject Debtors were either guarantors on maturing loans of other entities or their property was collateral for a loan that was maturing, or there existed other considerations that in the Debtors’ view placed the loan in distress, such as a high loan-to-value ratio.

The Debtors’ determination that the Subject Debtors were in financial distress was made in a series of Board meetings following substantial financial analysis. The Debtors established that in late 2008 they hired a team of advisors to assist in the evaluation of either an in-court or an out-of-court restructuring. The team included Miller Buckfire as restructuring ad-visor, AlixPartners LLP as financial advis- or, and both Weil Gotshal & Manges and Kirkland & Ellis as legal advisors. The process of evaluating the Company’s restructuring options took approximately six weeks and encompassed a total of seven Board meetings and three informational sessions. During these meetings, the Boards discussed general considerations applicable to the project-level companies, as well as specific facts relating to the individual properties, with both GGP personnel and the financial, restructuring and legal advisors available. The Boards spe-cifieally focused on: “the collapse of the commercial real estate financing market; the challenges facing the CMBS market and the practical difficulties of negotiating with CMBS servicers to meaningfully modify loan terms; integration of the project entities with GGP Group and requirements for securing DIP financing; and the consequences of filing an entity for bankruptcy individually, outside a coordinated restructuring with other GGP entities.” (Nolan Deck, June 16, 2009, ¶¶ 29-35; Board Minutes-Joint Trial Ex. 1-7.) The Boards also concentrated on three of the above-referenced filing factors: “(i) defaults or cross-defaults with other loans; (ii) loans that were maturing in the next three to four years; and (iii) other financial considerations indicating that restructuring would be necessary, including a loan-to-value ratio above 70 percent.” (Id. at ¶ 38.) 25

In addition to these general considerations, the Boards discussed each project-level entity individually. For each entity, Robert Michaels, the Vice Chairman of GGP, “provided an overview of its financial and operational considerations, including the property’s performance, outlook, and projected capital needs. In addition, for each entity, the Boards received written materials consisting of a fact sheet on the property, an income statement, and a draft board resolution.” (Nolan Deck, June 16, 2009, ¶ 45.) In these meetings, the Debtors divided the various property-level enti *59 ties into separate groups to evaluate whether to file each individual entity. (See Helios Trial Ex. 16; Nolan Decl., June 16, 2009, ¶ 38.) 26 On April 15, 2009 the Boards separately voted to put most of the project-level Debtors into bankruptcy. Certain Subject Debtors acted by written consent of the directors or managers. 27 Fourteen entities were left out of the filing, as none of the ten filing factors was applicable. (Nolan Decl., June 16, 2009, ¶ 49; Helios Trial Ex. 16; Hr’gTr. 196: 9-21, June 17, 2009.)

Movants contend that, in the name of the “doctrine” of “prematurity,” the Debtors had a good faith obligation to delay a Chapter 11 filing until they were temporally closer to an actual default. For the following reasons, these Debtors were justified in filing Chapter -11 petitions when they did.

We start with the statute. Chapter X of the former Bankruptcy Act expressly required that a petition be filed in good faith, providing that “[u]pon the filing of a petition by a debtor, the judge shall enter an order approving the petition, if satisfied that it complies with the requirements of this chapter and has been filed in good faith, or dismissing it if not so satisfied.” Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 141, 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1976) (repealed 1978). Neither Chapter XI nor XII contained a similar good faith requirement, and the good faith provisions were one of the many parts of Chapter X that debtors avoided by filing *60 under Chapter XI and that Congress rejected when it structured Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.

Indeed, when Congress adopted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPC-PA”), 28 it significantly strengthened the provisions of § 1112, requiring the Court to dismiss or convert an abusive Chapter 11 case. 29 BAPCPA added several factors to the prior list of grounds for dismissal. Significantly, it did not provide expressly that a Chapter 11 ease should be dismissed for bad faith in filing, and all of the listed grounds for dismissal relate to a debtor’s conduct after the filing, not before. Similarly, in 2005 Congress added several provisions designed to shorten Chapter 11 cases, 30 but it omitted any requirement that the Court hold an initial hearing on a Chapter 11 debtor’s bona fides or good faith.

The Code’s omission of any such hearing, which would doubtless invite significant litigation at the start of every Chapter 11 case, is nevertheless consistent with another of the Code’s innovations, ordinarily leaving the debtor in possession and not appointing a trustee. These provisions carry out the goal of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code to incentivize a debtor to file earlier rather than later, so as to preserve the value of the estate. 31

In light of the statute, this Court declines the invitation to establish an arbitrary rule, of the type desired by Movants, that a debtor is not in financial distress and cannot file a Chapter 11 petition if its principal debt is not due within one, two or three years. The Movants did not establish that the Debtors’ procedures for determining whether to file the individual Subject Debtors were unreasonable or that the Debtors were unreasonable in concluding that the disarray in the financial market made it uncertain whether they would be able to refinance debt years in the future. There was no evidence to counter the Debtors’ demonstration that the CMBS market, in which they historically had financed and refinanced most of their properties, was “dead” as of the Petition Date, 32 and that no one knows when or if that market will revive. Indeed, at the time of the hearings on these Motions, it was anticipated that the market would worsen, and there is no evident means of refinancing billions of dollars of real estate debt coming due in the next several years. The following testimony of Allen Hanson, an officer of Helios, is telling: “Q. Helios is aware that there are debt maturities that will occur in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 that *61 the CMBS market will not be able to handle through new CMBS issuances, correct? A. Based on the circumstances we see today, yes.” (See Hanson Dep. Tr. 155: 25-156:6, June 5, 2009; Hanson Dep. Tr. 144:14-145:10.)

It is well established that the Bankruptcy Code does not require that a debtor be insolvent prior to filing. See In re The Bible Speaks, 65 B.R. 415, 424 (Bankr.D.Mass.1986). In U.S. v. Huebner, 48 F.3d 376, 379 (9th Cir.1994), the Court noted a corollary that is equally applicable here: “The Bankruptcy Act does not require any particular degree of financial distress as a condition precedent to a petition seeking relief.” Many other cases have denied motions to dismiss, despite the fact that the subject debtors were able to meet current expenses. In In re Century/ML Cable Venture, 294 B.R. 9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.2003), for example, the Court denied a motion to dismiss because, despite being able to meet current expenses, the debtor had “a huge financial liability which it does not have the ability to pay out of current cash flow, and without a substantia