Nintendo of America Inc. v. Magnavox Co.

OPINION

This is a declaratory judgment action brought by plaintiff Nintendo of America Inc. (“Nintendo”) seeking, inter alia, a declaration of invalidity and non-infringement of U.S. Patent No. Re 28,507 (“the ’507 patent”) and U.S. Patent No. Re 32,305 (“the ’305 patent”). Both patents are owned by defendant Sanders Associates, Inc. (“Sanders”), which granted an exclusive license with a right to sublicense to defendant Magnavox Company (“Magna-vox”). 1 In its counterclaims, Magnavox al *720 leges that several of the video games manufactured by Nintendo infringe its patents.

The action was bifurcated for purposes of trial, with the Court having held a hearing on the threshold issue of whether the ’507 and ’305 patents are unenforceable because of alleged inequitable conduct by Magnavox during the patent application process.

The inequitable conduct claimed by Nintendo relating to the ’507 patent, which was issued by the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) on August 5, 1975, includes the following allegations:

¶ the deliberate failure to disclose to the Patent Examiner known relevant prior art, including the computer/video game Space War;

¶ the applicants’ failure to investigate their knowledge of the Space War game;

¶ an improper off-the-record meeting with the Patent Examiner prior to filing the ’507 patent application;

11 and the deliberate failure to inform the Patent Examiner that U.S. Patent No. 3,728,480 had issued and the submission of misleading information to cover up that fact. Plaintiff’s Contentions (Pre-Trial Order 113(b)) at 11111-2.

The inequitable conduct claimed by Nintendo relating to U.S. Patent No. 3,829,095, which issued on August 13, 1974, and its corresponding ’305 reissue patent, which issued on December 16, 1986, includes the following allegations:

11 the failure to disclose Space War in connection with the ’095 patent application despite its materiality;

11 the concealment of the Glaser patent, U.S. Patent No. 3,151,248, despite its materiality to the light gun claims;

11 the concealment of the fact that, during the prosecution of the reissue of the ’095 patent, the German Patent Office rejected a corresponding German patent application based, in part, on the Glaser patent. Id. at 113.

Nintendo also alleges that Magnavox’s conduct with respect to a number of other patents — particularly U.S. Patent No. 4,395,045, which previously in this litigation Magnavox alleged to be infringed by Nintendo — is further evidence of Magnavox’s inequitable conduct with respect to its video game patents. Id. at 114.

Magnavox denies all allegations of wrongdoing in the prosecution of the patents and claims that the patent examiner had before him all material prior art references. Defendants’ Contentions at 11111-9.

This action calls upon us to revisit the early days of the video game industry, when a simple ping-pong game captured the imagination of America. Children nowadays — weaned on sophisticated video games that replicate laser wars and magical kingdoms and boxing matches — would scoff at the idea of playing such a primitive game. But without the pioneering work that is at issue in this litigation, television sets today would do no more than receive broadcast signals.

In brief, this action presents the issue of whether the patents received on those first video games were procured by inequitable conduct. The principal Nintendo claim is that one of Magnavox’s patent attorneys had seen an experimental computer/video game called Space War while an undergraduate at Stanford University in the early 1960s and intentionally hid the existence of that game from the PTO during the prosecution of the ’507 and ’095 patent applications (SN ’256 and SN ’691 respectively) in the mid-1970s.

THE APPLICABLE LAW

Inequitable conduct vitiates a patent when a patent applicant fails to disclose material information, or submits false material information, with an intent to deceive the PTO. Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872 (Fed.Cir.1988). The party challenging the patent must prove the elements of materiality and intent by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Nintendo and Magnavox agree that the test stated in FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411 (Fed.Cir.1987), is controlling:

*721 One who alleges a “failure to disclose” form of inequitable conduct must offer clear and convincing proof of:

(1) prior art or information that is material;

(2) knowledge chargeable to applicant [or applicant’s attorneys] of that prior art or information and of its materiality; and

(3) failure of the applicant to disclose the art or information resulting from an intent to mislead the PTO.

That proof may be rebutted by a showing that:

(a) the prior art or information was not material (e.g., because it is less pertinent than or merely cumulative with pri- or art or information cited to or by the PTO);

(b) if the prior art or information was material, a showing, that applicant did not know of that art or information;

(c) if applicant did know of that art or information, a showing that applicant did not know of its materiality;

(d) a showing that applicant’s failure to disclose art or information did not result from an intent to mislead the PTO.

835 F.2d at 1415 (footnote omitted and paragraphing added). In other words, inequitable conduct is not established upon a mere showing that art or information having some degree of materiality was not disclosed. To be guilty of inequitable conduct one must have intended to act inequitably. Id.

The requirement that a patent applicant disclose material information primarily refers to information that would be covered under the standard applied by the PTO, which is codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a): “[I]nformation is material where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent.” See American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct. 95, 83 L.Ed.2d 41 (1984) (calling the PTO standard “an appropriate starting point for any discussion of materiality”). Although Rule 56(a) was not enacted until 1977, which is subsequent to the relevant period of this litigation, the rule was merely a codification of the PTO’s longstanding policy on fraud and inequitable conduct and of the existing case law. Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878, 884-85 (Fed.Cir.1984); see also Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1152 (Fed.Cir.1983) (applying the § 1.56(a) standard to conduct that occurred from 1968 to 1971).

An applicant cannot avoid the requirement that he disclose material prior art by ignoring clear indications that such prior art exists. The Federal Circuit has stated:

As a general rule, there is no duty to conduct a prior art search, and thus there is no duty to disclose art of which an applicant could have been aware. However, one should not be able to cultivate ignorance, or disregard numerous warnings that material information or prior art may exist, merely to avoid actual knowledge of that information or prior art. When one does that, the “should have known” factor becomes operative.

FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Industries, Inc., 836 F.2d 521, 526 n. 6 (Fed.Cir.1987) (citations omitted). It is self-evident that the effective functioning of the patent system requires that all reasonable doubts about the materiality of a prior art reference be resolved in favor of disclosure. See Manual of Patent Examining Procedures (“MPEP”) § 904.02 (“if doubt exists as to the inclusion of a reference, it is better to err in citing too much art rather than too little”). 2 This duty of disclosure continues until the patent actually issues.

Since the parties briefed the issue, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, clarified the intent requirement for a showing of inequitable conduct:

We adopt the view that a finding that particular conduct amounts to ‘gross negligence’ does not of itself -justify an inference of intent to deceive; the involved conduct, viewed in light of all the *722 evidence, including evidence indicative of good faith, must indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding of intent to deceive.

Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd., 863 F.2d at 876 (en banc in part). Previous opinions of the Federal Circuit have held that inferences of intent may be drawn from considerations touching on materiality and an applicant’s knowledge thereof.

No single factor or combination of factors can be said always to require an inference of intent to mislead; yet a pat-entee facing a high level of materiality and clear proof that it knew or should have known of that materiality, can expect to find it difficult to establish “subjective good faith” sufficient to prevent the drawing of an inference of intent to mislead.

FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d at 1416. Thus, the presence or absence of inequitable conduct is determined by balancing overlapping considerations of materiality, knowledge and intent. Id.

DISCUSSION

In the Pre-Trial Order the parties stipulated to many of the relevant facts surrounding this dispute, which stipulation is adopted and set forth as Appendix 1 hereto (“Stipulated Facts”). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), the Court makes the following supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law.

I. Allegations Concerning the ’507 Patent

The ’507 reissue patent describes an apparatus and method for playing games on the screen of television receivers. As explained in the Background of the Invention, a major purpose of the ’507 reissue patent and the ’284 original patent was to make video games accessible to people in their homes: “Since most homes are equipped with television receivers, the only expense required to provide added family enjoyment is the expense of a control unit of one type or another.” Prior to the invention, video games required hookups to large computers.

Although a wide variety of games are described in the ’507 patent (including bowling and baseball), the focus of the invention was on “ball and paddle”-type games like ping-pong and hockey. In ball and paddle games an object such as a ping-pong ball or a hockey puck (described in the patent as “hit spot”) shuttles back and forth between objects representing ping-pong paddles or hockey sticks (described in the patent as “hitting spots”). Upon coincidence between the hit spot and a hitting spot, the hit spot changes direction. If there is no coincidence between a hit spot and a hitting spot, the hit spot either disappears off the edge of the screen (representing, for example, the end of the table in the ping-pong game or the goal in the hockey game) or rebounds off of a wall (representing, for example, the boards in the hockey game).

A. Failure to Disclose or Investigate Space War

The parties agree that the ’284 patent was reissued as the '507 patent on August 5, 1975, without Space War ever having been brought to the attention of the PTO. Stipulated Facts at If 44. Nintendo alleges that Space War would have been material to the PTO’s consideration of claims 25, 45, 51 and 60 of the ’507 patent and that Mag-navox intended to deceive the PTO by failing to disclose the game. The relevant claims of the ’507 patent state:

25. In combination with a standard television receiver, apparatus for generating symbols upon the screen of the receiver to be manipulated by at least one participant, comprising:

means for generating a hitting symbol, and

means for generating a hit symbol including means for ascertaining coincidence between said hitting symbol and said hit symbol and means for imparting a distinct motion to said hit symbol upon coincidence.

45. Apparatus for playing a hockey type game upon the screen of a cathode ray tube, comprising:

*723 means for displaying a first hitting spot;

means for displaying a second hitting spot;

means for displaying a hit spot; means for controlling the position of said first and second hitting spots;

means for controlling the position of said hit spot including means for ascertaining coincidence between either of said hitting spots and said hit spot and means for imparting a distinct motion to said hit spot upon coincidence.

51. Apparatus for generating symbols upon the screen of a television receiver to be manipulated by at least one participant, comprising:

means for generating a hitting symbol; and

means for generating a hit symbol including means for ascertaining coincidence between said hitting symbol and said hit symbol and means for imparting a distinct motion to said hit symbol upon coincidence.

60. Apparatus for playing games by displaying and manipulating symbols on the screen of a cathode ray tube comprising:

means for generating vertical and horizontal synchronization signals;

means responsive to said synchronization signals for deflecting the beam of said cathode ray tube to generate a raster on said screen;

means coupled to said synchronization signal generating means and said cathode ray tube for generating a first symbol on said screen at a position which is directly controlled by a player;

means coupled to said synchronization signal generating means and said cathode ray tube for generating a second symbol on said screen which is movable;

means coupled to said first symbol generating means and said second symbol generating means for determining a first coincidence between said first symbol and said second symbol; and

means coupled to said coincidence determining means and said second symbol generating means for imparting a distinct motion to said second symbol in response to said coincidence.

In order to find inequitable conduct in the failure to disclose or investigate Space War during the prosecution of the ’507 patent, it is necessary to find by clear and convincing evidence that Space War was material to any of the four cited claims of the '507 patent; that the applicant knew of Space War and its materiality; and that the applicant’s failure to disclose Space War resulted from an intent to mislead the PTO. See FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., supra.

For a brief history of the development of Space War and a description of the game, see Stipulated Facts at 111114-20. We mention here only that the game was developed in 1961-62 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for play on a PDP-1 computer manufactured by Digital Equipment Company ("DEC”). A copy of the game was brought to Stanford University in 1963, where it was played on a PDP-1 in Stanford’s computer center. While an undergraduate at Stanford in the spring of 1963, James T. Williams observed the game being played. As of 1974, Williams was a member of the Chicago law firm of Neu-man, Williams, Anderson & Olson, which was retained as outside patent counsel to Magnavox early that year. At the heart of Nintendo’s inequitable conduct claim are contentions relating to Williams’ recollection of that game and his failure to disclose it at the time the SN ’256 reissue application was being considered by the PTO in 1974-75.

Materiality: Nintendo contends that Space War is material to the four claims of the ’507 patent because both the game and the patent

involved] the operation of symbols on the screen of a cathode ray tube one of which was controllable by a player and another of which was controlled by the game electronics, the detection of coincidence between these two symbols and the imparting of a “distinct motion” to one of the symbols upon coincidence.

*724 Plaintiff’s Post-Trial Brief at 10. Magna-vox argues that their knowledge of Space War was incomplete and, in any event, that Space War is not material to the claims of the ’507 patent. In addition, Magnavox argues that Space War is less material than other prior art that had been disclosed, in particular the ’480 patent. Although the Court finds that Space War would have been material to the claims of the ’507 patent, we discuss the issue briefly because we also find that Nintendo has failed to establish that the applicant either knew of that materiality at the time of the reissue application or intended to deceive the PTO.

The Court’s finding of the materiality of Space War is based primarily on the close study of the language of the patent and the viewing of a videotape of Space War made last year during a demonstration of the game on a PDP-1 computer at the Computer Museum in Boston.

A mere recitation of the important elements of the claims of the ’507 patent illustrates the reasons for our finding of materiality. The elements of hit and hitting symbols are represented in Space War by the spaceship and torpedoes respectively. The object for one player is to aim his spaceship so as to achieve coincidence between the torpedo he fires and the other spaceship. The other player tries to avoid coincidence between the torpedo, the position of which is controlled by the computer, and his own spaceship, which moves under his own control. The element of “imparting a distinct motion” is represented in Space War by the explosion displayed when a torpedo strikes a spaceship. In that explosion, as observed on the videotape, the spaceship and torpedo disintegrate into an expanding ball of tiny dots of light, representing pieces of debris, which then disappears. As in the traditional ball and paddle games, a distinct motion is imparted to the hit object, to wit, the explosion that is imparted to the spaceship.

The arguments Magnavox makes to avoid the logical similarity between the ’507 patent and Space War restrict “imparting a distinct motion” to ball and paddle games where a hit object (e.g. a ping-pong ball) retains its form and moves in a different direction once it achieves coincidence with a hitting object (e.g. a ping-pong paddle). In support of its limited interpretation of the phrase, Magnavox relies on a narrow reading of the patent specifications. But there is no such limitation in the language of the claims, and we see no reason to read one into the patent. Instead, we believe that the claim language “imparting a distinct motion” should be given its traditional English language meaning, which clearly encompasses the explosion in Space War. 3

At the time of the patent application, the patent examiner would have considered the broadest reasonable interpretation of the actual claim language (which forms the basis of the invention that is being granted protection) and not the applicant’s subjective interpretation of the claim language. It is well-established patent law that language from the specification is not to be used to limit the scope of the claims during the prosecution of a patent application. This is addressed by MPEP § 904.01, which provided:

The breadth of the claims in the application should always be carefully noted; that is, the examiner should be fully aware of what the claims do not call for, as well as what they do require. There is always the danger of reading into the *725 claim limitations imported from the specification or drawing.

See also In re Queener, 796 F.2d 461, 464 (Fed.Cir.1986) (Newman, J., concurring) (“It is now beyond debate that limitations from the specification will not, during examination before the PTO, be imputed to claims in order to avoid prior art; such limitations must be specifically stated in the claims.”); In re Lundberg, 44 C.C.P.A. 909, 244 F.2d 543, 548 (1957) (“Limitations in the specification not included in the claim may not be relied upon to impart patenta-bility to an otherwise unpatentable claim.”). But Magnavox’s interpretation would have us do just that.

Even if we look beyond the claims, we find that Magnavox’s limited reading of the claim language is unsupported by the specification. Among the many examples of games cited in the specifications is bowling, where the motion imparted (“If pin (pins) are hit, they disappear”) is more like the explosion in Space War than the ball and paddle action of ping-pong and hockey. Thus, although a patent applicant can be his own lexicographer, we do not find that the language in the SN ’256 reissue application should be given anything other than its everyday meaning.

Magnavox also claims that Space War was not material because the cited prior art included more material references, including the ’480 patent. In the first place, we reject the explanation about the ’480 patent because, as explained below, the applicants never directly cited that patent to the PTO as prior art. More importantly, we reject it because Williams testified that he cannot recall whether he considered the ’480 patent to be a sufficient reason for not citing Space War. Magnavox cannot now claim that the ’480 patent was more material than Space War when that apparently had nothing to do with its decision not to cite it at the time of the application. To allow such a post hoc justification would defeat the purpose of an inequitable conduct claim, which focuses on an applicant’s conduct before the PTO.

As to the other prior art cited by Magna-vox, we believe that Space War still would have been relevant to the claims of the SN ’256 reissue application. For instance, unlike Goldsmith (U.S. Patent No. 2,455,-992), Space War disclosed multiple symbols and coincidence between symbols. In combination with prior art such as Althouse (U.S. Patent No. 2,847,661), it could have been used to disclose the playing of the game on a raster scan. Thus, Space War either best embodied a combination of elements represented in the cited prior art or could have been used in combination with other cited art; either way, it would have been material to the PTO’s consideration of the claims of SN ’256.

We also reject the other explanations offered by Magnavox, including the fact that Space War was played on a point plot display and the ’507 patent specified a raster scan. The technology at the time allowed an inventor to go back and forth between the two types of displays, and Williams acknowledged at trial that the absence of a raster scan was not a sufficient basis for not disclosing Space War to the PTO. Space War, after all, could have been disclosed in combination with other prior art references that taught raster scans. In addition, claim 45 of the ’507 patent specifies “on the screen of a cathode ray tube” and does not require a raster scan.

Thus, we find that the Space War that existed in 1963 would have been material to the PTO’s consideration of the SN ’256 reissue application.

Knowledge of Materiality: The fact that Space War was material to the claims of the ’507 patent does not end our inquiry. There must also be clear and convincing evidence that Williams or others involved in the prosecution of the SN ’256 patent application had knowledge of that materiality and that he withheld it in an attempt to deceive the PTO. The knowledge element is critical in this action, for much of Nintendo’s claim is based on Williams’ eleven-year-old memory of a computer game he briefly saw on one occasion at Stanford’s computer center.

There are several phases during which the applicants’ knowledge can be measured. From the beginning of Williams’ *726 involvement with the reissue application in early 1974 until July 1975, the only information that was known about Space War was that which Williams recalled based on his having seen the game played at Stanford in 1963. Williams’ recollection at that time was, understandably, very sketchy.

Q.: [W]ill you tell us what you recall having seen at Stanford.

A.: What I recall was a PDP-1 computer with a point [plotter] display on it and there was a game which involved two players, each player could manipulate a space ship on the face of the cathode ray tube.

I believe that there were four switches. One switch — each player had four switches, one to cause his spaceship to rotate counterclockwise; one to cause it to rotate clockwise; one to cause thrust to be applied to the ship in the direction in which it was pointed and one to fire missiles or torpedoes at — in the direction in which the spaceship was pointed.

Q.: ... [W]as your recollection distinct enough to know that you did not know about certain elements of the game?

A.: There were things that I didn’t recall, that’s right.

Q.: [D]id you ... recall what happened when a torpedo hit a spaceship?

A.: No, sir, I didn’t.

Transcript at 240-41, 250-52.

Williams further testified that he had a five-minute conversation with Anderson about the relevance of Space War after the filing of the ’284 and ’285 reissue applications (SN ’256 and SN ’023 respectively).

Q.: [I]s it fair to say that you and Mr. Anderson considered together whether you should cite your recollection to the Patent Office?

A.; I think it was fair that — to say that we considered whether we should do anything about it at all, whether it was a matter of concern to us. And I think we decided that it was not a matter of concern and inherent in that was it didn’t have to be cited.

Q.: _ You mean a matter of con-

cern in complying with your duty of candor to the Patent Office, is that what you’re referring to?

A.: Yes.

A.: In my view, that recollection could not have had anything — any real bearing on that application.

A.: The kinds of games we were talking about at that time were, as I said, these games where you could have a hit symbol and a hitting symbol. You maneuver the hitting symbol to cause coincidence with the hit symbol and then the hit symbol bounces off, like the ping-pong game that was talked about this morning.

And those are the kind of symbols that we had in mind and those are the kinds of symbols we were thinking about and we certainly had no reason to think that ... this game that I recalled had any kinds of symbols like that.

We certainly had no reason to think that once the spaceship and the torpedo came into contact with each other that there was any distinct change in motion of the torpedo.

Transcript at 247-48, 256, 262-64. Based on this analysis, Williams and Anderson made a deliberate decision not to disclose Space War to the PTO.

We find Williams’ explanation credible. There is no doubt that his memory some eleven years after seeing Space War at Stanford was incomplete. His recollection of the game showed that he lacked specific knowledge of many elements that would correspond to the patent claims, including the specific representations of hit and hitting symbols and of imparting a distinct motion on coincidence. He also knew the game was not played on a raster scan.

*727 Although Nintendo tries to cast doubt on the extent of Williams’ recollection, we find no reason to believe that after eleven years he would have remembered more specific information, such as the response of a spaceship after it was hit by a torpedo. In addition, we note in passing that we accept Williams’ statement that he is unable to separate out exactly what information he knew of in 1974-75 and what information he picked up over the past fourteen years of litigation involving the patents.

Accepting Williams’ testimony about the extent of his recollection, we find that it was insufficient to warrant disclosure to the PTO both because he failed to appreciate the association between the elements of Space War and the ’507 patent and because his recollection was missing certain key elements. In particular, we find Williams’ claim that he did not know of the materiality of Space War to be convincing because of the conceptual difficulty of reading the hit and hitting symbols of the patent onto Space War.

The issue is so complex that even Nintendo suffered from confusion over the elements throughout the history of this litigation. An affidavit by an expert filed by Nintendo in March 1986 referred to a spaceship as a hit symbol and a torpedo as a hitting symbol. A memorandum filed by Nintendo in January 1987 reversed the elements, referring to a spaceship as a hitting symbol and a torpedo as a hit symbol. At trial, Nintendo went back to its original position that a spaceship is a hit symbol and a torpedo is a hitting symbol, and we agreed with that analysis. But Nintendo’s confusion on this matter underscores the validity of Williams’ claim that he was unaware of the materiality of Space War.

At the time the applicants sought reissue, their attention was focused on other aspects of the SN ’256 patent application, such as the specific types of display used in playing the games. That, after all, was the purpose of seeking reissue in the first place. Magnavox sought to expand the scope of the ’284 patent to insure that it covered video arcade games. Williams testified:

A.: The reason [for the reissue applications] was that in ... licensing discussions with Mr. Briody [Magnavox’s corporate patent counsel], a number of the television game manufacturers had taken the position that the claims were not infringed because those coin operated games used television monitors or television receivers with the portions which enabled them to receive broadcast signals disabled.

We had reviewed the 284 and the 285 patent and thought that the claim should not be that narrowly construed and that they did cover such devices, but in order to make it clear, we thought we would go to the Patent Office and present new claims which would eliminate that type of argument.

Q.: Is it fair to say, sir, that the focus of the reissue application was on the display of the games?

A.: The focus was on whether a television monitor was used or a television receiver was used.

Q.: So the focus of the reissue was on displays?

A.: Yes, the reason it was filed was because of this television monitor/television receiver distinction.

Transcript at 191-93. We accept this explanation and believe it further supports Williams’ contention that he did not think of Space War as being material to the patent application.

We also believe that the applicants were focusing at the time on ball and paddle games such as ping-pong and hockey. It is those games that received the most attention with the public and, understandably, would have been of greatest concern to the applicants. Although, as explained above, the patent covers much more than ball and paddle games, we accept Magnavox’s explanation that that was their focus during the prosecution of the patent application.

Nothing was added to Williams’ knowledge about Space War until July 15, 1975, some three weeks before the ’507 patent issued on August 5, 1975 and nearly three *728 months after the Notice of Allowance was issued on April 24, 1975. During a deposition taken in Palo Alto, California, in connection with Magnavox’s patent infringement actions against other manufacturers, the book II Cybernetic Frontiers was brought to the attention of Williams, Anderson and Briody. See Stipulated Facts at ¶¶ 38-40. Although the book was copyrighted in 1974 and thus was not prior art itself, it contained a description of the game Space War as it existed in 1972 that may have been used as evidence of a prior use or prior knowledge.

The description of Space War in the book was vague and conveyed only basic information:

Rudimentary Spacewar consists of two humans, two sets of control buttons or joysticks, one TV-like display and one computer. Two spaceships are displayed in motion on the screen, controllable for thrust, yaw, pitch and the firing of torpedoes. Whenever a spaceship and torpedo meet, they disappear in an attractive explosion. That’s the original version invented in 1962 at MIT by Steve Russell.

II Cybernetic Frontiers 40 (1974). The book’s most significant disclosure was the fact that upon coincidence the spaceship and torpedo “disappear in an attractive explosion.” We find, however, that this was so nondescriptive that it did not provide the applicants with sufficient additional information about Space War so as to require its disclosure to the PTO.

Nintendo also faults Magnavox’s attorneys for not pursuing an investigation of Space War while they were on the campus of Stanford University. Although the attorneys might have been able to learn relevant information about Space War while they were at Stanford, the information they discovered in II Cybernetic Frontiers did not create any duty to investigate. Nintendo’s claim is also unfair in that the attorneys were preoccupied during their trip to Stanford with their pending infringement actions. Consequently, Nintendo cannot point to information that Magna-vox might have discovered at Stanford and use that as evidence of Magnavox’s inequitable conduct.

On July 23, 1975, Magnavox was informed by Midway Manufacturing Company, a defendant in its pending patent infringement action, that Midway would rely on Space War as prior art to invalidate the ’284 and ’285 patents. Midway’s interrogatory response informing Magnavox of that fact read as follows:

The development, construction and operation of the video game of Spacewar by various persons, not yet identified, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1961 and 1962, and the wide knowledge and use by others at other places, of Spacewar and other video games yet to be determined.

Defendants Midway has not yet determined the exact dates of the acts referred to [above], but they are believed to have occurred between 1961 and May 27, 1969, the filing date of Patent No. 3,659,284.

Magnavox learned no additional information about the materiality of Space War from this vague interrogatory response.

On August 1, 1975, four days before the ’507 patent issued, Williams inspected documents produced by Midway, including a copy of II Cybernetic Frontiers, a Rolling Stone magazine article about the game that was similar in content to the book and an undated DEC brochure describing the PDP-1 computer and the game Space War. Stipulated Facts at ¶ 42. These disclosures also added nothing new to Magnavox’s knowledge to make it aware of the materiality of the game. Although Nintendo properly argues that Magnavox could have disclosed Space War to the PTO at that late date, we repeat that Magnavox’s failure to do so was the result of its good faith belief that the game was not material and not the result of an intent to deceive the PTO.

As further evidence of Williams’ knowledge of the materiality of Space War, Nintendo points to a file he created in 1975 while investigating the claims raised by defendants in Magnavox’s infringement actions that Space War was invalidating prior *729 art. Williams created a file on which he affixed the label “Space War — Prior Art” and kept in it various materials such as the II Cybernetic Frontiers book. Nintendo argues that the wording on the label indicates that Williams considered Space War to be material prior art. Nintendo further argues that Magnavox’s representations that the file was titled simply “Space War” (eliminating the modifier “prior art”), made in this action in Magnavox’s local rule 3(g) statement in support of its cross-motion for summary judgment and in its pretrial proposed findings of fact, is indicative of a pattern of bad faith conduct by Magnavox.

We do not consider the creation of the file label an event of such significance that it reflects Williams’ determination that the game was actually prior art. Rather, we find entirely credible Williams’ explanation that the file was created by someone in his office simply for the purpose of organizing the vast quantities of material that came in during Magnavox’s patent litigation. In other words, we believe the label “Space War — Prior Art” did not represent Williams’ legal conclusion about the game; it merely reflected the contentions of defendants in the patent infringement litigation. As for Magnavox’s representations before this Court that the file was titled simply “Space War,” we find that this error, while regrettable, does not have a bearing on Nintendo’s claims of inequitable conduct in the prosecution of the ’507 reissue patent in 1974-75.

Nintendo also alleges that employees of Sanders knew of the materiality of Space War and withheld it from the PTO. The evidence shows that John Sauter brought a copy of Space War with him from Stanford when he started working at Sanders in 1969. However, Sauter’s familiarity with the game is not relevant to our inquiry; Nintendo must prove inequitable conduct by someone involved in the patent application process. Nintendo’s claims about Louis Etlinger, the head of Sanders’ patent department, also fail. Etlinger was not involved in the patent applications at issue here and had no knowledge of the existence of Space War at Sanders until September 1975, which was over a month after the ’507 patent had issued. See Stipulated Facts at II46. Nintendo has failed to produce evidence that any of the relevant Sanders employees had information about Space War at the time that they were required to disclose to the PTO.

The Court is aware of the difficulties Nintendo faces in proving Magnavox’s intentional failure to disclose a material fact some fifteen years after the patent application was filed and twenty-six years after Williams actually saw the Space War game. However, Nintendo has failed to meet its burden. Although Nintendo argues persuasively that the undisclosed information known to Magnavox was material, there has been an insufficient showing of the applicants’ knowledge of that materiality. Patent applicants have a duty of reasonable inquiry and cannot cultivate ignorance. We do not believe Magnavox’s conduct violated that precept.

Intent to Deceive: We have found that the applicants did not have sufficient information about the materiality of Space War to require its disclosure to the PTO or to create a duty to investigate. Accordingly, we believe that the nondisclosure of Space War was made in good faith and not with an intent to deceive the PTO.

In conclusion, we find that there was not inequitable conduct during the prosecution of the ’507 reissue patent in the applicants’ failure to disclose or investigate Space War.

B. Meeting with Examiner

On April 15, 1974, Magnavox filed suit against video arcade game manufacturers alleging infringement of the ’284 and ’285 patents. Stipulated Facts at ¶ 21. As noted above, Magnavox at that time sought to broaden the scope of its claims to insure that they covered non-television receiver displays such as video arcade games played on monitors. On April 23, 1974, Williams and Seligman conducted an off-the-record interview with Patent Examiner Trafton to discuss the filing of reissue applications for the ’284 and ’285 patents. *730 Time was of the essence, for Magnavox’s right to file for reissue was to expire two days later (two years after the issuance of the patents). Stipulated Facts at 1f 22. Given the time pressure, Williams and Sel-igman sought the Examiner’s reaction to the filing of the reissue applications.

The MPEP provides that an interview prior to filing is improper unless it is for the limited purpose of indicating the field of search to an attorney. See MPEP § 713.02 (“Prior to filing, no interview is permitted. However, in the examiner’s discretion, a limited amount of time may be spent in indicating the field of search to an attorney, searcher or inventor.”). Because Williams and Seligman already knew the relevant field of search for the patent applications, it is clear that the scope of the interview went beyond that. A letter from Etlinger to Briody dated April 23, 1974 confirms this, as does Williams’ trial testimony.

Although the Examiner did not actually look at the application, it was described to him in sufficient detail that he was able to offer his opinion that he would be “favorably inclined” toward the refiling and that the claims, as stated in the existing patents, already cover the video arcade games against which Magnavox sought to protect itself. Furthermore, although Etlinger brought signed copies of the reissue applications with him to the meeting with the Examiner, they were not filed until two days later. In the interim, Williams broadened one claim and added another to the ’285 patent reissue application. We find that there is only one rational explanation for this: the meeting with the Examiner went beyond a discus