United States v. Juvenile K.J.C.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING MOTIONS TO TRANSFER JUVENILE TO ADULT STATUS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND....................................1220

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS......................................................1221

A. The Federal Juvenile Justice And Delinquency Prevention Act...........1221

B. The Act’s Framework ................................................1222

C. Interest of Justice Determination......................................1223

D. Application Of The Section 5032 Factors To This Case ..................1224

1. Age And Social Background.......................................1224

2. Nature Of The Alleged Offense....................................1226

3. Prior Delinquency Record.........................................1228

4. Intellectual Development And Psychological Maturity...............1228

5. Past Treatment Efforts...........................................1229

6. The Availability of Programs For Treatment........................1230

III. CONCLUSION...........................................................1232

Since the beginning of the nineteenth-century, social reformers have promoted the idea that the rehabilitation of juvenile delinquents can prevent them from becoming adult offenders. See Hon. Gordon A. Martin, Jr., The Delinquent and the Juvenile Court: Is There Still a Place for Rehabilitation? 25 Conn. L. Rev. 57, 65-67 (1992) (providing review of the historical views of juvenile treatment in America). Reflecting this philosophy, Congress has attempted to protect juveniles in appropriate circumstances, balancing their prospects of rehabilitation against society’s right to be free from crime. Here, the court is called upon to perform the statutory balancing test called for by the Federal Juvenile Justice And Delinquency Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5032, in order to determine whether the defendant, juvenile K.J.C., will continue to be treated as a juvenile or will be transferred for adult prosecution.

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Defendant juvenile K.J.C. is currently charged with the commission of three offenses: aiding and abetting a bank robbery; possessing LSD with intent to distribute; and aiding and abetting in the distribution of LSD. 1 On July 15, 1997 and August 19, 1997, the government filed motions to transfer the proceedings against K.J.C. to adult criminal prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5032. *1221 The government also filed a certification stating that K.J.C. is charged with a violent felony and that there is a substantial federal interest in this ease which warrants the exercise of federal jurisdiction. 2 An evidentiary hearing on the government’s motions to transfer was held on August 19, 1997, and August 27, 1997, at which the government presented the testimony of Leslie Elaine Nelson, John Spencer Pink, James Leidigh, Noel Washburn, Rich Gardner, Margaret Sellergren, Ann Vestle, Delvin Kling, Geoffrey Piller, Stewart Rowles, and Jack Swiderski. 3 Defendant KJ.C. offered no testimony. Defendant K.J.C. was present at the evidentiary hearing with his parents. The United States was represented by Assistant United States Attorney Richard L. Murphy. Defendant KJ.C. was represented by Mark Brown, Cedar Rapids, Iowa.

The court turns first to a brief review of the history of the Federal Juvenile Justice And Delinquency Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042 (“the Act”). The court will then review the standards applicable to motions to transfer juveniles to adult prosecution, and finally the court will conduct a legal analysis of the six statutorily mandated factors to determine whether the transfer of KJ.C. for adult prosecution is appropriate in this case.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. The Federal Juvenile Justice And Delinquency Prevention Act

The Act was enacted on September 7, 1974. The Act amended the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (“FJDA”) which had remained virtually unchanged since Congressional enactment in 1938. The FJDA granted the Attorney General unlimited discretion in deciding whether to offer prosecution as a juvenile to any defendant under the age of eighteen not surrendered to state officials or charged with offenses punishable by life imprisonment or death. See Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir.) (concluding that Congress could legitimately grant the Attorney General discretion in deciding whether to prosecute a juvenile as an adult and that the exercise of such discretion did not require a hearing), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 869, 94 S.Ct. 183, 38 L.Ed.2d 116 (1973); see also United States ex rel. Bombacino v. Bensinger, 498 F.2d 875, 877 n. 7 (7th Cir.) (noting that “[wjhile it may be highly desirable to commit to the judge of a specialized juvenile court the determination of whether or not a particular juvenile is to be prosecuted criminally, we are aware of no constitutional requirement that a State must do so”) (quoting People v. Jiles, 43 Ill.2d 145, 251 N.E.2d 529, 531 (1969)), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1019, 95 S.Ct. 492, 42 L.Ed.2d 292 (1974). Congress enacted the Act to provide federal courts with jurisdiction over certain juvenile delinquency proceedings. As was pointed out in the Senate Report, the 1974 amendment was “to provide basic procedural rights for juveniles who come under Federal jurisdiction and to bring Federal procedures up to the standards set by various model acts, many state codes and court decisions.” S. Rep. No. 1011, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5284.

The Act made four substantive changes to the FJDA: (1) the Act altered the definition of a juvenile, (2) the Act added the requirement for judicial approval before prosecuting a juvenile as an adult, (3) it placed limits on the number of offenses for which a juvenile could be tried as an adult, and (4) it provided for federal prosecution of juveniles when no state would exercise jurisdiction over the offender. See 18 U.S.C. § § 5031-5032. Congress subsequently amended the Act by its enactment of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473, tit. II, *1222 98 Stat.1976 (1984). Congress expanded the federal role in juvenile justice by authorizing the prosecution of juveniles as adults for additional offenses and mandating adult trial of juveniles in certain eases. 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Congressional passage of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.L. No. 103-323, 108 Stat. 1796, further amended the Act. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act authorizes the criminal prosecution of juveniles as young as thirteen years of age for certain serious felonies, including first and second degree murder, attempted murder, and bank robbery. 18 U.S.C. § 5032. 4

B. The Act’s Framework

The Act provides a special framework for the prosecution of persons who are juveniles at the time a federal crime is committed. 5 The Act’s purpose is to “ ‘remove juveniles from the ordinary criminal process in order to avoid the stigma of a prior criminal conviction and to encourage treatment and rehabilitation.’” United States v. Doe, 94 F.3d 532, 536 (9th Cir.1996) (quoting United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir.1990)); accord United States v. Angelo D., 88 F.3d 856, 858 (10th Cir.1996); United States v. T.F.F., 55 F.3d 1118, 1120 (6th Cir.1995); United States v. Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d 68, 71 (2d Cir.1995); United States v. One Juvenile Male, 40 F.3d 841, 844 (6th Cir.1994). The Act’s purpose, however, must be weighed against “the need to protect the public from ‘violent and dangerous individuals and provid[e] sanctions for anti-social acts. And that balance must be struck by the district court in the context of a transfer hearing.’” Doe, 94 F.3d at 536; (quoting United States v. Alexander, 695 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir.1982) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1108, 103 S.Ct. 2458, 77 L.Ed.2d 1337 (1983)); see T.F.F., 55 F.3d at 1121 (“[A] motion to transfer is properly granted where a court determines that the risk of harm to society posed by affording the defendant more lenient treatment within the juvenile justice system outweighs the defendant’s chance for rehabilitation.”) (quoting One Juvenile Male, 40 F.3d at 844).

In order to proceed against a juvenile in federal court, the Attorney General must certify to the appropriate district court, after investigation,

that (1) the juvenile court or other appropriate court of a State does not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction over said juvenile with respect to such alleged act of juvenile delinquency, (2) the State does not have available programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles, or (3) the offense charged is a crime of violence that is a felony or an offense described in section 841, 952(a), 955, or 959 of title 21, and that there is a substantial Federal interest in the case or the offense to warrant the exercise of Federal jurisdiction.

If the Attorney General does not so certify, such juvenile shall be surrendered *1223 to the appropriate legal authorities of such State.

18 U.S.C. § 5032; see Impounded (Juvenile I.H., Jr.), 120 F.3d 457, 462 (3d Cir.1997). 6

Here, the government has certified defendant K.J.C. for prosecution in federal court pursuant to the third clause. 7 Once federal jurisdiction is obtained over the juvenile, the juvenile is generally subject to be proceeded against in juvenile delinquency proceedings unless the juvenile requests to be proceeded against as an adult or the district court, upon motion by the United States Attorney General and after a hearing, determines that transfer for adult criminal prosecution would be “in the interest of justice.” 8 18 U.S.C. § 5032.

The “substantial Federal interest” category was added to the Act as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 in order to permit federal authorities to proceed against juveniles charged with particularly serious, violent offenses in criminal prosecutions. United States v. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d 298, 303-04 (5th Cir.1997). The government has made such a motion to transfer defendant K.J.C. for adult criminal prosecution. Therefore, the court must address the appropriate standards for making the “interest of justice” determination under § 5032.

C. Interest of Justice Determination

In determining whether transfer would be in the “interests of justice,” the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a district court must consider the six statutory factors identified in § 5032. United States v. A.D.J., 108 F.3d 851, 852 (8th Cir.1997); accord Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 303; United States v. Wellington, 102 F.3d 499, 505 (11th Cir.1996); United States v. I.D.P., 102 F.3d 507, 510 (11th Cir.1996); Doe, 94 F.3d at 536; United States v. Juvenile Male No.1, 86 F.3d 1314, 1321 (4th Cir.1996); United States v. Nelson, 68 F.3d 583, 588 (2d Cir.1995); Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d at 71; United States v. Gerald N, 900 F.2d 189, 191 (9th Cir.1990). As explained in § 5032, those six factors are:

the age and social background of the juvenile; the nature of the alleged offense; the extent and nature of the juvenile’s prior delinquency record; the juvenile’s present intellectual development and psychological maturity; the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile’s response to such efforts; the availability of programs designed to treat the juvenile’s behavioral problems.

18 U.S.C. § 5032; see Juvenile No. I, 118 F.3d at 303; A.D.J., 108 F.3d at 852; Wellington, 102 F.3d at 505; I.D.P., 102 F.3d at 510; Doe, 94 F.3d at 536; Juvenile Male No.l, 86 F.3d at 1321; Nelson, 68 F.3d at 588; Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d at 71.

For purposes of the transfer hearing, a court may assume the juvenile commit *1224 ted the alleged offenses. Nelson, 68 F.3d at 588; One Juvenile Male, 40 F.3d at 845; In re Sealed Case, 893 F.2d 363, 369 (D.C.Cir.1990); United States v. Doe, 871 F.2d 1248, 1250 n. 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 917, 110 S.Ct. 276, 107 L.Ed.2d 257 (1989); In re J. Anthony G., 690 F.Supp. 760, 763 (S.D.Ind.1988); In re T. W., 652 F.Supp. 1440, 1442 (W.D.Wis.1987). The government bears the burden of rebutting the statutory presumption of juvenile treatment. Nelson, 68 F.3d at 588; United States v. T.F.F., 55 F.3d 1118, 1120 (6th Cir.1995); Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d 68, 71; United States v. A.R., 38 F.3d 699, 703 (3d Cir.1994). However, the government need only persuade the court by a preponderance of the evidence. I.D.P., 102 F.3d at 513; Juvenile Male No. 1, 86 F.3d at 1323; T.F.F., 55 F.3d at 1120; United States v. Doe, 49 F.3d 859, 868 (2d Cir.1995); A.R., 38 F.3d at 703; United States v. Parker, 956 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir.1992). “ ‘Thus, a motion to transfer is properly granted where a court determines that the risk of harm to society posed by affording the defendant more lenient treatment within the juvenile justice system outweighs the defendant’s chance for rehabilitation.” United States v. T.F.F., 55 F.3d at 1120 (quoting United States v. One Juvenile Male, 40 F.3d 841, 844 (6th Cir.1994)); see Juvenile Male No. 1, 86 F.3d at 1323 (“The ‘interest of justice’ analysis requires the court to ‘balance the [rehabilitative] purposes against the need to protect the public from violent and dangerous individuals.’”) (quoting United States v. Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d 68, 71 (2d Cir.1995) (citation omitted)).

It is clear that “‘[t]he decision whether to transfer a juvenile to trial as an adult under 18 U.S.C. § 5032 is within the sound discretion of the trial court, provided the court employs and makes findings as to the six criteria outlined in the Code.’ ” Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 307 (quoting United States v. Doe, 871 F.2d 1248, 1255 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 917, 110 S.Ct. 276, 107 L.Ed.2d 257 (1989)); accord Impounded (Juvenile R.G.), 117 F.3d at 737; Wellington, 102 F.3d at 505; I.D.P., 102 F.3d at 513; Doe, 94 F.3d at 536; United States v. A.R., 38 F.3d 699, 702 (3d Cir.1994). In conducting the requisite six-factor analysis, the court is not required to give each factor equal weight. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 307; Wellington, 102 F.3d at 506; Doe, 94 F.3d at 536; Juvenile Male No. 1, 86 F.3d at 1323; United States v. Three Male Juveniles, 49 F.3d 1058, 1060 (5th Cir.1995); Doe, 871 F.2d at 1254-55; United States v. M.H., 901 F.Supp. 1211, 1213 (E.D.Tex.1995). Instead, “[a] court may weigh the statutory factors as it deems appropriate and ‘is free to determine how much weight to give each factor.’ ” Wellington, 102 F.3d at 506 (quoting United States v. T.F.F., 55 F.3d 1118, 1120 (6th Cir.1995)); accord Juvenile Male No.1, 86 F.3d at 1321; Nelson, 68 F.3d at 588; United States v. Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d 68, 71 (2d Cir.1995); A.R., 38 F.3d at 705; Doe, 871 F.2d at 1255; United States v. Hemmer, 729 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub non. Randazza v. United States, 467 U.S. 1218, 104 S.Ct. 2666, 81 L.Ed.2d 371 (1984); United States v. Alexander, 695 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1108, 103 S.Ct. 2458, 77 L.Ed.2d 1337 (1983). “Section 5032 simply requires a finding on the record as to each factor, but does not require that the magistrate judge state specifically whether each factor weighed for or against the transfer.” Wellington, 102 F.3d at 505; accord Three Male Juveniles, 49 F.3d at 1061. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has held that “the procedure established by section 5032 does not require that a district court or magistrate judge provide any explanation as to why it treated any particular finding as weighing in favor of or against transfer.” Wellington, 102 F.3d at 505.

D. Application Of The Section 5032 Factors To This Case

As noted above, the court must consider each of the six factors enumerated in section 5032 when determining whether to transfer the juvenile for adult prosecution. The court will now consider each of the six § 5032 factors seriatim.

1. Age And Social Background

The first of the six statutorily required factors the court must consider in the transfer calculus is the age and social background of the juvenile. The court should focus on the age of the juvenile at the time of *1225 the alleged offense. Doe, 94 F.3d at 536; Nelson, 68 F.3d at 589. The court may also focus on the age of the juvenile at the time of the transfer hearing. Doe, 94 F.3d at 536; Nelson, 68 F.3d at 589.

K.J.C., who was born on September 10, 1979, was seventeen years old at the time of each of the charged offenses, as well as at the time of the transfer hearings. K.J.C.’s age at the time of the offenses weighs in favor of transfer. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 307 (holding that juvenile’s age of seventeen and one-half weighed in favor of transfer); Doe, 49 F.3d at 867 (finding that juvenile was sixteen and one-half at the time of one crime and seventeen at the time of another offense supported transfer); A.R., 38 F.3d at 705 (affirming district court’s conclusion that seventeen-year-old juvenile’s age supported transfer); Gerald N, 900 F.2d at 191 (holding that juvenile’s age weighed in favor of transfer where juvenile was 17 years and 10 months old at time of offense); United States v. Leon D.M., 953 F.Supp. 346, 348 (D.N.M.1996) (holding that because juvenile was three months short of his eighteenth birthday at the time of the crime favored transfer). Although the court believes that the closer a juvenile is to age eighteen the more appropriate it is to consider this factor as weighing in favor of transfer, the juvenile’s age alone is not dispositive, and it must be viewed in the context of the other § 5032 factors. 9

The other portion of this factor requires the court to examine the social background of K.J.C. K.J.C. resides with his parents in Cedar Rapids, Iowa and has just begun his senior year of high school at Washington High School. He has lived in Cedar Rapids his entire life. Both of KJ.C.’s parents are employed outside the home. K.J.C.’s father, Thomas, is a systems analyst and works part-time at an area community college. K.J.C.’s mother, Kristine, is a production manager. K.J.C. has two older siblings, a sister, Heather, and a brother, Brennan. His sister has obtained a graduate degree in sports psychology and is employed in Chicago, Illinois. She is very supportive of K.J.C. Brennan is employed as a teacher in Cedar Falls, Iowa. K.J.C. has a good relationship with his family members, and they are all supportive of K.J.C. K.J.C.’s home environment is positive and suggests that it would support rehabilitative efforts directed toward K.J.C. See Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 308 (affirming district court’s conclusion that the absence of strong family environment “would make rehabilitation prospects for the juvenile unlikely.”); United States v. M.L., 811 F.Supp. 491, 493 (C.D.Cal.1992) (holding that fact that juvenile came from an intact and supportive family weighed in favor of juvenile treatment); United States v. H.M.M.S., 838 F.Supp. 30, 32 (D.P.R.1993) (noting that junvenile’s prospects for rehabilitation “may be strengthened” by active family support); United States v. Means, 575 F.Supp. 1068, 1069 (D.S.D.1983) (holding that lack of strong family environment “militates against transfer.”); cf. T.F.F., 55 F.3d at 1120 (affirming district court’s transfer of juvenile for adult prosecution where district court noted that juvenile “did not have a supportive family environment.”); Doe, 49 F.3d at 867 (affirming transfer where juvenile was estranged from parents and instead associated with gang).

K.J.C. has had some trouble in school. K.J.C. has been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder (“ADD”), and has been treated with Ritalin since the age of seven. He was suspended from high school twice in *1226 his junior year as a result of his involvement in a fight, and for insubordinate behavior in class. Nonetheless, K.J.C. is liked by his teachers and is not viewed as a troublemaker or a disruptive influence in the classroom. 10 Although K.J.C.’s grades have been spotty, he has demonstrated the ability to do excellent work in fields of special interest to him, such as photography. This attests to K.J.C.’s ability to direct his attention and focus on a subject. Both are attributes necessary for the rehabilitative process to have its intended effect.

K.J.C. has been employed the past two years by the Elm Crest Country Club as a counselor in its summer youth activities club. As a counselor, K.J.C. was responsible for the care and supervision of four to five children. He is described by his supervisor, Leslie Nelson, as being a “fantastic” worker. He was always on time and very dependable. Again, these are attributes which may be employed to achieve rehabilitation. K.J.C.’s ability to work within a structured setting also indicates that he is amenable to rehabilitative efforts. The court finds that K.J.C.’s social background would be a major factor in his ability to be rehabilitated. The court reaches this conclusion based on K.J.C.’s supportive family environment, K.J.C.’s positive family relationship with his parents and siblings, his excellent work ethic, and his conduciveness to supervision. Thus, the court concludes that KJ.C.’s social background, taken as a whole, must be considered to weigh against transfer.

Because K.J.C.’s age weighs in favor of transfer while his social background weighs against it, the court concludes that this first factor is neutral in the transfer analysis.

2. Nature Of The Alleged Offense

The second factor the court must consider is the nature of the alleged offenses. For purposes of the transfer hearing, the court has assumed that K.J.C. committed the alleged offenses. Nelson, 68 F.3d at 588; One Juvenile Male, 40 F.3d at 845; In re Sealed Case, 893 F.2d at 369; Doe, 871 F.2d at 1250 n. 1. Concerning this particular factor, section 5032 states:

In considering the nature of the offense, as required by this paragraph, the court shall consider the extent to which the juvenile played a leadership role in an organization, or otherwise influenced other persons to take part in criminal activities, involving the use or distribution of controlled substances dr firearms. Such a factor, if found to exist, shall weigh in favor of a transfer to adult status, but the absence of this factor shall not preclude such a transfer.

18 U.S.C. § 5032.

Additionally, several circuit courts of appeals have held that “a district court is entitled to give more weight to the seriousness of the offense than to other factors when determining the realistic chance for rehabilitation.” Wellington, 102 F.3d at 505 (affirming district court’s giving substantial weight to offense of carjacking in which victim was repeatedly shot); accord Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 307 (holding that the seriousness of the offense can be given more weight than other factors in determining whether a transfer is appropriate); Juvenile Male No. I, 86 F.3d at 1323 (“In the weighing of the various factors, the nature of the crime clearly predominates.”); Nelson, 68 F.3d at 590 (in remanding case, the court of appeals noted that “[t]he heinous nature of the crime of intentional murder certainly may be a factor entitled to special weight.”); One Juvenile Male, 40 F.3d at 845 (affirming district court’s emphasis of the violent nature of the crime where the defendant was charged with carjacking in which a victim was shot in the head and killed); A.R., 38 F.3d at 705 (affirming district court’s decision to give great w