736 S.W.2d 294 (1987)

Everett AKERS et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
Charlotte BALDWIN et al., Defendants, and
Falcon Coal Company et al., Intervening Complainants.
Matthew BAKER et al., Appellants,
v.
Elizabeth WOOTEN et al., Appellees.

Nos. 85-SC-392-CL, 85-SC-422-TG.

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

July 2, 1987. As Corrected July 2, 1987. As Modified on Denial of Rehearing September 24, 1987.

*295 Joe F. Childers, Shepherd & Childers, Lexington, Thomas J. Fitzgerald, Frankfort, David Rubinstein, Prestonsburg, for plaintiffs.

Iris S. Nickell, David J. Obradovich, Mary Katherine Daugherty, Frankfort, for defendants.

*296 John A. Bartlett, Winfrey P. Blackburn, Jr., Stites & Harbison, Louisville, Leon Hollon, Paul R. Collins, Hazard, for appellants.

Joe F. Childers, Shepherd & Childers, Lexington, for appellees.

John S. Palmore, Lexington, Richard W. Iler, Louisville, Richard C. Ward, Lexington, Joseph J. Zaluski, Frankfort, for intervening complainants.

Sidney B. Douglass, Harlan, for amicus curiae: Kentucky Fair Tax Coalition, Inc. & Concerned Citizens of Martin County, Inc.

STEPHENS, Chief Justice.

On this appeal we again consider the legal effect of the so-called "broad form deeds" on the conflicting rights of the owners of the surface to land and the owners of the mineral rights under that land.^[1]

Specifically, we reexamine the doctrine set forth in the seminal case of Buchanan v. Watson,^[2] which allows mineral owners to strip mine^[3] with little or no restriction or liability to the owner of the surface, even to the extent of absolute obliteration of the surface and all its appurtenances. We also address the constitutionality of KRS 381.930 to 381.945 (1984), the ultimate purpose of which is to prohibit strip mining under the provisions of broad form deeds.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Appellants Akers and others filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky against Charlotte Baldwin, Secretary, Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, Commonwealth of Kentucky. An injunction was sought to prevent Baldwin from issuing strip mining permits where the right to strip mine was claimed under an instrument which severed the minerals and the surface, and where said instrument did not specifically give the mineral owner the right to mine in such manner, and where the surface owner objected to, or did not consent to, such method of mining.^[4] The District Court entered a preliminary injunction, partially granting the relief sought. Falcon Coal Company and others filed an intervening complaint, challenging the applicability and constitutionality of KRS 381.930-945 (1984) and claiming that such dispute between the mineral owner and the surface owner does not constitute a legal basis for withholding a strip mining permit. The District Court, pursuant to CR 76.37, requested this Court to certify the constitutional challenge to KRS 381.930 et seq. We granted this request.

In the second case, Baker v. Wooten, appellant Baker, plaintiff below, is the lessee of the mineral rights of a 427 acre tract of land in Perry County. Appellees Elizabeth Wooten and her children and their spouses are the owners of the surface rights to a portion of that land. Baker's lessors trace their title to the coal and other minerals to a 1910 deed which severed the mineral estate from the surface estate. Baker was engaged in strip mining, with a valid permit, on land adjacent to the property owned by appellees. Appellees denied Baker permission to enter on the surface of their property to do geological work prior to beginning strip mining operations thereon.

Baker filed an action in the Perry Circuit Court, seeking a declaration of rights and injunctive relief which would enable him to strip mine on the Wooten property. When the lawsuit was filed there was no legislation in Kentucky which specifically addressed the construction and interpretation of mineral severance deeds. Baker moved for a summary judgment, claiming that *297 existing Kentucky common law gave him the absolute right to strip mine. The Wootens filed a cross-claim and a motion for summary judgment, claiming that KRS 381.930-945^[5] prevented their property from being strip mined. The trial court declared the statute to be constitutional and, following an evidentiary hearing, determined that when the 1910 severance deed was recorded there was no strip mining in the vicinity. Therefore, the trial court reasoned, under the terms of the statutes the owner of the mineral rights or his successor (Baker) could not strip mine on the Wooten property. A notice of appeal was filed by Baker in the Kentucky Court of Appeals. Following this, the appellees filed a motion requesting this Court to transfer the appeal.

We granted the motion and, sua sponte, consolidated the two cases. We also directed that, in addition to the questions presented in the certification request and in the Baker appeal, the parties should address whether a standard broad form deed gives the owner of the mineral rights the right to extract coal by surface mining, as held in Buchanan.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

Not surprisingly, Falcon Coal Company and other coal companies, as intervenors in Akers v. Baldwin, joined with the appellant in the case of Baker v. Wooten in urging that KRS 381.930-945 are unconstitutional and that Buchanan is correct and should not be overruled or disturbed. Equally predictably, Baldwin and Akers joined with Wooten in advocating the constitutionality of the questioned statutes and in urging the overturn of Buchanan and its progeny.

In this opinion we will first consider the issues relative to the respective and often conflicting rights of the owners of the surface of the land and the owners of the minerals that lie under that surface. In so doing, we will perforce reconsider our decision in Buchanan. Secondly, we will examine the constitutionality of the Kentucky General Assembly's attempt to deal with the same issue in the instance of broad form deeds.

The genesis of the conflict between the owner of the surface and the owner of the minerals thereunder is the well-established legal doctrine that surface rights and mineral rights can be separate and distinct legal estates in land. The minerals are legally distinct from the surface under which they lie. Such mineral estates are said to be "severed" from the surface. Duncan v. Mason, 239 Ky. 570, 39 S.W.2d 1006 (1931); see 4 D. Vish, Coal Law and Regulation, Section 80.01 (1983) (hereinafter cited as Vish).

The severance of the minerals and the surface can be achieved by a lease of the mineral rights or by a deed which creates a fee simple title to the minerals. Such separate estate can also be created by the sale of the surface, with a reservation of the minerals by the grantor.^[6] Vish, Section 80.02.

In spite of the theoretical purity of the doctrine of severability,^[7] the two estates are inextricably intermingled. The surface covers the mineral estate, and as a result, there is inherent in the mineral estate a right of access in and through the surface to the minerals. Of what value is a mineral if it cannot be mined? The surface owner has no right in the minerals; the mineral estate is therefore considered to be the dominant estate, and the surface estate is the servient one. E.g., McIntire v. Marian Coal Co., 190 Ky. 342, 227 S.W. 298, 299 (1921).

The conflicting rights of the surface owner and the mineral owner have led to a plethora of litigation, not only in Kentucky *298 but throughout the United States.^[8] In Kentucky, the problem has been exacerbated by the advent of strip mining and this Court's attitude toward the conflicting rights under so-called "broad form deeds".

The somewhat apocryphal term "broad form deed" is loosely defined as a conveyance which severs the mineral estate from the surface estate and which has a long and tedious description of granted rights as opposed to those mineral deeds which grant only necessary and convenient mining rights, or no mining rights at all. It is a particular, if not unique, form of deed which normally conveys all of the minerals under the surface. It may, however, list only certain specific substances. Additionally, such a deed conveys — specifically to the grantee — surface rights the grantee deems necessary or convenient for the full and free exercise and enjoyment of the minerals conveyed. Some deeds, if not most, contain an express waiver of liability for damages arising from the grantee's use of the surface in obtaining the minerals. Lastly, most such deeds reserve to the grantor only such surface rights as may be consistent with the mineral rights conveyed.^[9] It has been left to the Kentucky Court of last resort to interpret those deeds and to identify the rights of the surface owner as opposed to those of the mineral owner.

KENTUCKY CASES PRIOR TO BUCHANAN V. WATSON

In the early part of this century, we declared that a conveyance in a deed of "all the minerals" included any and all diamonds found thereon. Kentucky Diamond Mining and Developing Co. v. Kentucky Transvaal Diamond Co., 141 Ky. 97, 132 S.W. 397 (1910). We said,

"When the language of the deed is broad enough to cover everything that may be found on the land, it is not material to the effect of the deed that the parties in fact contemplated at the time that a particular thing might be found on the land. . . . A deed is to be construed against the grantor, rather than against the grantee because the grantor selects his own words...." Id., at 398, 399 (emphasis added).

Parol evidence that would limit the scope of the grant, if not excluded, was ignored and the broad conveyance of "all the minerals" was given literal effect. The doctrine that a deed is to be strictly construed against the grantor, thus stated, has remained unchanged in our case law.

In the case of Scott v. Laws, 185 Ky. 440, 215 S.W. 81 (1919), we reaffirmed the principle that permitted the legal severance of the surface and the minerals thereunder. We further held that the ownership and right to mine those minerals was not lost by forty years of non-use. The rule of Kentucky Diamond, supra, was reiterated and extended so that if the grantor intends to omit any minerals from the conveyance he must do so explicitly in the deed.

Having clearly and unequivocally established the right to sever the surface and minerals thereunder, and having declared that a conveyance of "the minerals" conveyed all minerals, we turned our attention to the rights of the surface owner as opposed to the rights of the mineral owner. In McIntire v. Marian Coal Co., supra, the deed, following a severance of the minerals, granted the right "to use and operate the said land and the surface thereof" and included the right to use the surface for purposes "deemed necessary and convenient for the full and free exercise and enjoyment of any and all the property." 227 S.W. at 299. There was, however, a *299 reservation to the grantor which preserved "the free use of (the surface of) said land for agricultural purposes so far as such use is consistent with the rights hereby bargained (and) sold." Id.

The basic question presented in McIntire was what right did the mineral grantee have in the surface in the face of the agricultural reservation? We resolved the conflict by allowing the mineral grantee to use as much of the surface as it deemed necessary or convenient to its mining business, including use and occupancy of the entire surface, even that occupied by the surface owner's house and garden. The Court reasoned that where a deed contains no ambiguity it will be construed strictly according to its terms. We repeated the rule of construction that where there is ambiguity, the deed will be construed "most strongly" against the grantor in favor of the grantee. Id.

The Court disposed of the reservation to the surface owner by saying that "the mineral estate is dominant, superior and exclusive in every circumstance or condition when the owner thereof shall deem it necessary and convenient to make such use of the surface as the deed allows." Id. at 300. However, while giving the mineral owner such a broad and subjective right, the Court stated that "such taking would have to be after satisfaction or adjudged compensation for such improvements. . . ." Id. (emphasis added).

This Court thus declared the owner of the minerals to be the "dominant" estate and allowed the mineral owner to use the surface, even in the face of a reservation on behalf of the surface owner. Significantly, however, and too often ignored by many of our later cases, is the fact we provided for an award of damages to the injured surface owner.

In Himler Coal v. Kirk, 205 Ky. 666, 266 S.W. 355 (1924), this Court extended the principles of Kentucky Diamond, Scott v. Laws, and McIntire, supra, to a deed where the grantor conveyed the surface and reserved the minerals to itself. Nothing was said, however, about liability for damages to the surface owner.

In Case v. Elkhorn Coal Corp., 210 Ky. 700, 276 S.W. 573 (1925) we again recognized the dominance of the mineral estate over the surface estate. However, for the first time, a restriction was placed by us on the mineral owner's use of the surface.

"Clearly the defendant (mineral owner) has the paramount right to the use of the surface in the prosecution of its business for any purpose of necessity and convenience, and of this it is to be the judge, and unless it exercised this power oppressively, arbitrarily, wantonly or maliciously, plaintiff (surface owner) cannot complain." Id. at p. 574 (emphasis added).

In addition to the damages allowed in McIntire, supra, this case limited the use of the surface by the mineral owner to all uses which were not oppressive, arbitrary, wanton or malicious. We relied on McIntire, so presumably, the surface owner could recover in damages for acts of the mineral owner that fit in any or all of the above proscribed categories.

Thus, restrictions on the previously unlimited, subjectively defined rights of mineral owners to use the surface estate appeared in our case law.

In Wells v. North East Coal Company, 255 Ky. 63, 72 S.W.2d 745 (1934), under the terms of a grant in a broad form deed, the Court held that a mineral owner could construct a railway across the surface, even though all the coal conveyed had been mined. One wonders why such action was not "oppressive or arbitrary", at the very least. However, the decision of the Court reaffirmed previous rulings that the mineral estate (albeit defunct) was dominant, and extended beyond the pale of a jury the subjective judgment of the mineral owner as to what is necessary to mine minerals. The Court said,

"(W)e are of the opinion that . . . appellee (mineral owner) is not confined in the exercise of its rights in appellant's land (surface owner) to that which may in the opinion of a jury be absolutely necessary." Id. at 746.

In other words, the owner of mineral rights under a broad form deed may use the surface *300 to obtain the minerals in any way it deems necessary, and such judgment cannot be second guessed by a jury. The only limitation is the proscription against action which is oppressive, arbitrary, wanton or malicious. Case v. Elkhorn Coal Company, supra.

The cases discussed above all dealt with mining operations of the shaft, or deep mining, type. In Rudd v. Hayden, 265 Ky. 495, 97 S.W.2d 35 (1930), this Court recognized the rights of the mineral owner to use the surface which "may" include "open cut", "strip" or "hydraulic" methods of mining. Id. at 37.

The strip mining of coal was first presented in the case of Treadway v. Wilson, 301 Ky. 702, 192 S.W.2d 949 (1946). In 1907 the mineral estate was conveyed with "all easements necessary in mining and removing all said minerals. . . ." Nearly 40 years later, the Court permitted the mineral owners to remove the coal by strip mining. The rationale of the opinion was the dominance of the mineral estate, and the only limitation upon that estate was the familiar litany of oppressive, arbitrary, wanton, or malicious conduct. The case was remanded for the trial court to determine whether the proposed method, "dead-lifting," was oppressive. Id. at 951.

The last of the pre-Buchanan cases, Gibson v. Sellars, Ky., 252 S.W.2d 911 (1952), reiterated the long standing rule of construction that, in the interpretation of deeds, parol or other extrinsic evidence is not admissible except where the language of the instrument is "ambiguous or obscure." The specific ruling declared that in a deed excepting coal and "mineral rights", the latter term included oil and gas. Id.

Thus, the Kentucky Court came full circle. Broad form deeds convey all minerals (unless written exceptions are specifically made); the mineral estate is dominant, as are the concomitant rights to mine and use the surface (except for the prohibition against oppressive, arbitrary, wanton, or malicious conduct); and mining refers to and includes all forms of minerals extraction.

If there was ever any doubt under Kentucky law and under the broad form deeds about the ability of the mineral owner to use the strip mining techniques, and if there was ever any doubt about the extent to which the mineral owner could use the surface to retrieve coal and other minerals without liability to the owner of the surface, all such doubts were erased in 1956 with the rendition of Buchanan.

BUCHANAN V. WATSON

The deed involved in that case was executed in 1903, and the grantee was the now famous John C.C. Mayo.^[10] The deed severed the surface from the minerals, conveyed all minerals to the grantee, and provided a specific waiver of damages by the grantor for any injury to the surface caused by the grantee (or his assigns) in removing the minerals. The trial court found as a matter of fact, nearly fifty years later, that the only economical way to mine the coal was by strip mining. It also concluded that the strip mining process would destroy the surface. The surface owner argued that at the time of the execution of the deed there was no strip mining, the parties to the deed had not contemplated such mining techniques, and therefore such was not permitted under the terms of the deed, even though the deed did not address the type of mining that was to be done.

The First Buchanan Opinion

In an unanimous opinion, originally rendered and later withdrawn, this Court held, citing Rudd v. Hayden, supra,

"(S)ince the plaintiff (miner) had the right to remove all the coal in, on and under the surface of this tract, the particular method contemplated by the parties (in the absence of language prohibiting other methods) does not preclude the plaintiff from utilizing a different process made possible by the development *301 of modern machinery, when such process offers the only means of extracting the coal."^[11]

More significantly, the Court, after determining strip mining was permissible under the broad form deed, found that the mineral owner must pay damages to the surface owner for the timber and surface destroyed in the process. To arrive at this result, the Court considered the method of mining contemplated by the parties and stated:

"It is clear from the deed the parties intended the coal would be mined in the customary manner prevailing when it was executed. The grantor relinquished his rights in the surface and any claims for damage he might have with respect to `the use of the land' to the extent that the land (and the timber thereon) was utilized in the process of shaft mining. The release from liability is clearly limited to damage caused by this contemplated mining method.

The use of the surface and the extensive destruction of it are two different things. The new method will result in an invasion of the defendants' surface rights not anticipated by the parties to the deed and not within the scope of the release from liability. For this reason. . . the plaintiff must pay reasonable compensation as damages to the extent he destroys, in the strip mining process, the defendants' interests in the surface and timber."^[12] (emphasis added).

The Court could have, but did not, cite the McIntire case, supra, as authority for this statement.

As stated, however, this opinion was withdrawn. The present opinion was substituted therefor and has become the focal point of much discussion, both pro and con.

The Second Buchanan Opinion

Using logic not too dissimilar to that in the original opinion, an also unanimous court concluded that under the particular deed strip mining was permitted. Following the finding of the trial court that strip mining was the only feasible and economical way to mine the coal and using the authority of Rudd v. Hayden, supra, we affirmed the trial court. We said,

"In the present case, the Chancellor found from a reading of the deed that the parties thereto had not contemplated the strip and auger method of mining nor did they contemplate that any portion of the surface of the land would be destroyed or rendered valueless. . . . The deed by express language did not exclude or include this method of mining, although the proof shows that such mining methods were known and had been used prior to the date of the deed. It seems clear that the parties intended the conveyance of the coal. To deny the right to remove it by the only feasible process is to defeat the principal purpose of the deed." 290 S.W.2d at 42 (emphasis added).

With respect to damages the second opinion disagreed with the original. The Court construed the deed strongly against the grantors and applied what it perceived to be the clear and unambiguous words of the deed.

"The deed in this case conveyed virtually all rights necessary to carry out the mining of the coal, including a waiver of damages. . . . It was obvious that the estate reserved to the grantor was to be subservient to the dominant estate of the grantee. The paramount purpose of the conveyance was to enable the grantee, or his successor in title, to remove the coal from under the surface of this land. The value of the land lay under the surface, not on it." Id. at 43 (emphasis added).

Moreover, the Court declared that the validity and enforceability of a waiver of damages provision was not to be questioned.^[13]*302 Adding a liberal dose of pragmatism to its reasoning, the second opinion stated,

"The rule has become so firmly established that it is a rule of property law giving the rights under many mineral deeds conveying much acreage in Eastern Kentucky. To destroy this rule now would create great confusion and much hardship in a segment of an industry that can ill-afford such a blow." Id. at 43-44.

Thus, under our decision in Buchanan, the owners of mineral rights under a typical broad form deed have the virtually absolute right to mine the minerals by any means, past, present or future, and in the course of such mining to literally obliterate the surface with little or no recourse for the surface owner.^[14]

POST-BUCHANAN CASES

In Bevander Coal Co. v. Matney, Ky., 320 S.W.2d 301 (1959), a suit by a surface owner against a mineral owner for damages, we declared Buchanan to be dispositive and limited damages to any actions of the miner that were oppressive, arbitrary, wanton or malicious. In Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Neace, Ky., 337 S.W.2d 725 (1960), Buchanan was strengthened and expanded. This case involved auger mining under the terms of a broad form deed which contained a waiver of damages provision. The Court, in a suit for damages to the surface, declared that the owner of the mineral rights was entitled to a directed verdict unless its right to mine was exercised in an oppressive, arbitrary, wanton or malicious manner. We further stated:

"The mere exercise of a right to mine in a particular fashion cannot of itself be classified as arbitrary, wanton or malicious. It is the manner of the mining operation, as distinguished from the fact of its being carried on, that determines liability for damages." Id. at 727 (emphasis added).

The attempt by the surface owner to have this Court overrule Buchanan was denied. The Court unanimously declared "it has always been the law that the grant or reservation of minerals carries with it the right to use the surface for the purpose of removing the minerals." Id.

In Kodak Coal Company v. Smith, Ky., 338 S.W.2d 699 (1960), the Buchanan doctrine was unanimously extended. We upheld auger mining under a broad form deed even though the trial court found that the coal could be mined by other methods, thus making auger mining unnecessary. The then status of Kentucky law was described as follows:

"The established law of Kentucky is that under a (broad form) mineral deed. . . . the grantee as the owner of the coal, has the right to extract it by the strip or auger method of mining, and if the operation is conducted properly the necessary use, or destruction of the surface is within the scope of the rights granted under the deed." Id. at 700 (emphasis added).

Wiser Oil Co. v. Conley, Ky., 346 S.W.2d 718 (1960), is arguably a change, aberration, or exception to the damage feature of the Buchanan doctrine. A lease, executed in 1917, gave the lessee oil and gas exploration rights. In the early 1960's the original lessee's successor began using a new technique, "water flooding", which literally flushes out oil beneath the surface estate. This process, though not unknown when the original lease was executed, was not then in general use. As a result of this *303 technique, there was much damage to the surface.

The surface owner sued for damages to his estate. The lessee, using Buchanan logic, argued not only the right to "water flood" to extract the oil, but also to be immune from damages. The Court allowed the new technique but awarded damages saying:

"There is a sound basis for the rule that a deed or lease of minerals carries with it the right to use as much of the surface, or other property, as may be reasonably necessary to exploit the minerals. We also are aware of the well-known concept that where the injury done to the property was of an anticipatory character, such a result would constitute damnum absque injuria. But where, as here, there is no express release of damages and a new method of withdrawing oil is employed, which was not in the minds of the parties at the time the lease was executed and which will destroy or substantially damage the landowners remaining estate, principles of justice and humanity would require that reasonable compensation be paid the landowner for the destruction wrought." Id. at 721 (emphasis added).

The Court distinguished Buchanan by pointing out there was no waiver of damages in the questioned oil and gas lease, as there was in the Buchanan mineral deed. Even though it may be conceded that, technically, Buchanan is distinguishable for the reason given, the problems resulting from using the new water flooding method are identical to those encountered in Buchanan. The surface owner is none the less greatly injured by a method of mining clearly unknown and not contemplated by the parties to the original deed or lease.

A seemingly slight modification of Buchanan and Kodak, supra, appeared in Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Campbell, Ky., 371 S.W.2d 483 (1963). A "Mayo" type broad form deed was involved in a suit for damages by the surface owner against the mineral owner. In discussing the evidence of damage, the Court said,

"(T)here was no evidence even to suggest that these operations (strip and auger mining) were so completely unnecessary or so out of line with customary strip or mining practices as to be considered oppressive, arbitrary, wanton or malicious." Id. at 486.

While the Court hewed the Buchanan damage line, it declared that strip and auger mining could justify damages and were not per se proper if they were "completely unnecessary" or "so out of line".

In Croley v. Round Mountain Coal Co., Ky., 374 S.W.2d 852 (1964), mineral rights were retained under a reservation. Damages were allowed as the result of the mineral owner casting waste material on the surface, where the material came from other mines. This practice was declared to be an action of the mineral owner carrying on auger strip mining in an oppressive, arbitrary, wanton or malicious manner. Buchanan et al. were followed with the exception noted. Again, the Court was unanimous in its view.

In 1968, a serious and major break occurred in the unanimity of the Court with respect to the continuation of the Buchanan doctrine. An action for declaratory judgment alleged that the owner of minerals, under a broad form deed, had no right to remove coal by strip or auger mining. Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Company, Ky., 429 S.W.2d 395 (1968). The trial court followed Buchanan with respect to the right to strip mine but allowed damages for injury to the surface. On appeal, a majority of four judges reversed the trial court's decision with reference to damages. Citing Buchanan and the cases that followed it, the Court refused to reconsider its previous position. Id. at 396-397. After summarizing the arguments, we said:

"We do not mean to discredit the arguments on behalf of the landowners. They have elements of merit and a degree of persuasiveness. However, they do not have the overwhelming force to prevail against the long established rule of our previous cases upon which the property rights have vested." Id. at 399 (emphasis added).

*304 In other words, the principle of stare decisis controls primarily because too many people have property or investment rights which must not be upset or changed. In passing, we note that the Martin Court distinguished Wiser Oil, supra, from Buchanan, for the reason that there was no waiver of damages provision in the oil and gas lease in Wiser. The Court rather churlishly stated:

"Perhaps Wiser is distinguishable from Buchanan on some other basis, other than that stated in the opinion in Wiser, or perhaps it is a departure from Buchanan. In any event we do not feel compelled in this opinion to explain, justify, reconcile or distinguish Wiser. The court has decided to adhere to Buchanan whether or not it conflicts with Wiser." Id. at 399 (emphasis added).^[15]

Finally, we refer to the case of Commerce Union Bank v. Kinkade, Ky., 540 S.W.2d 861 (1976). The surface owners brought an action against the mineral owners, seeking a declaration that the mineral conveyance in question did not grant the right to mine coal by the strip or open pit method. The trial court ruled that the particular conveyance did not grant the right to strip mine or open pit mine. We affirmed. The mineral deed in question was not a broad form deed,^[16] and the Court clearly so stated.

"This court has reexamined those cases in which we have considered the `broad form' deed and has concluded that the deeds involved in this proceeding, and as quoted herein, do not contain language that is so extensive as to subordinate the rights of the surface estate to the demands of the mineral estate." Id. at 864 (emphasis added).

The effect of this case was to restrict the virtually unlimited rights of the mineral owners as to the surface estate to broad form deeds and to require that each challenged deed be considered on a case-by-case basis. The Court clearly affirmed its previous positions on the "Mayo" type deeds, saying:

"We have consistently upheld what has been identified as the `broad form' or `Mayo deed' and in so doing have concluded that those deeds grant such overwhelming mining rights that the mineral owner in fact has the right to use the surface of the land, part or all of it, in recovering the coal acquired by the deeds." Id.

To the extent Commerce Union is inconsistent with the present opinion, Commerce Union is overruled.

SURFACE USE AND DAMAGES

Since Buchanan and its progeny still stand as authority with regard to the rights of mineral owners under broad form deeds as opposed to those of innocent surface owners, we again consider Buchanan.

In any analysis of Buchanan, there are two major points of the decision to be considered. The first deals with the right of mineral owners under a broad form deed to strip mine and to use all of the surface to obtain the minerals. The second deals with the responsibility of the mineral owner to answer to the surface owner, in damages, for the use of that surface.

Very simply stated, under the present status of Kentucky law, the owner of mineral rights under a broad form deed may use the surface — all of it — to acquire the minerals lying thereunder. The only restriction (unless one appears in the deed) is that the use of said surface may not be oppressive, arbitrary, malicious or wanton. We have reexamined the cases which led to this rule of law and frankly find no fault with them. The conveyance of mineral rights for valuable consideration is a valid exercise of the rights of the parties to make an agreement, no matter who prepared the instrument. Extrinsic evidence may not be used to vary or explain these written instruments so long as they are unambigious. The provisions in typical broad form deeds are, beyond cavil, clear and unambiguous. They are, in fact, overwhelming in their language to demonstrate *305 an intent to convey away the rights to the minerals described. The right to the minerals carries with it the right to mine them. That a certain method of mining was known at the time the document was executed is simply not relevant. A sale implies the right to obtain and use the item sold. Without it there is, in effect, no sale. It can be argued that the parties in their wisdom recognized that fertile minds will always seek and achieve new ways of doing things, and therefore generally, if not specifically, contemplated new mining techniques which were faster, cheaper and better.

So long as the method of mining is not oppressive, arbitrary, wanton or malicious, the minerals may be removed by the owner of the mineral rights, which include the right to use the surface. We conclude this part of Buchanan must be affirmed.

However, with the second phase of Buchanan — the damages element — we disagree. As we consider the overruling of any case, or any line of cases, we are not unmindful of the desirability of continuity and its resulting predictability in the body of law. The doctrine of stare decisis impels us to overrule precedent only with considerable thought and care. As we stated in D & W Auto Supply v. Department of Revenue, Ky., 602 S.W.2d 420 (1980):

"The maxim is `Stare decisis et non quieta movere,' which simply suggests that we stand by precedents and not disturb settled points of law. Yet, this rule is not inflexible, nor is it of such a nature as to require perpetuation of error or illogic. As we stated in Daniel's Adm'r v. Hoofnel, 287 Ky. 834, 155 S.W.2d 469, 471-72 (1941) (citations omitted):

The force of the rule depends upon the nature of the question to be decided and the extent of the disturbance of rights and practices which a change in the interpretation of the law or the course of judicial opinions may create. Cogent considerations are whether there is clear error and urgent reasons `for neither justice nor wisdom requires a court to go from one doubtful rule to another,' and whether or not the evils of the principle that has been followed will be more injurious than can possibly result from a change.

Certainly, when a theory supporting a rule of law is not grounded on facts, or upon sound logic, or is unjust, or has been discredited by actual experience, it should be discarded, and with it the rule it supports." Id. at 424 (emphasis added).

When the continuation of a legal doctrine or a precedent is detrimental to the public interest, we must reconsider it. Payne v. City of Covington, 276 Ky. 380, 123 S.W.2d 1045 (1938).^[17] Because we believe that the principles of justice dictate it, and that the public interest will be best served, we overrule that part of Buchanan which literally applies and upholds the waiver of damages provisions in broad form deeds. We also overrule any cases which hold that the mineral owner can use and damage the surface without the payment of damages, even though no waiver of damages claim is present in the deed. We hold that, subject to the applicability of this decision, whenever the owner of minerals under a broad form deed in exercising the right to remove those minerals from under the surface, causes injury to the surface, the mineral owner shall respond in damages to the owner(s) of that surface. The sole exception would be where the conveyance expressly sets out the methods of mining that may be employed and a waiver of damages from the use of such methods. It is common knowledge, and this Court takes judicial notice of the fact, *306 that in many cases the owner of the minerals in exercising the right to mine can and does cause tremendous injury to the surface, even to the extent of obliterating the entire area, including trees, gardens, crops, homes, barns and all improvements. This fact, and the legal doctrine underpinning it, leads to the total destruction of the rights of the surface owner. In effect, the surface owner has nothing to enjoy for the "ownership" of the surface. This interest in the land is not only the servient estate; it is no estate.

Surely it is not fair, surely it is not just, to allow such a situation to exist.

A ray of light was directed to the matter of damages in the Mc