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Full Opinion
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, et al., Defendants.
United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Roanoke Division.
Dick Thornburgh, Atty. Gen., James P. Turner, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., E. Montgomery Tucker, Asst. U.S. Atty., John P. Alderman, U.S. Atty., Roanoke, Va., Nathaniel Douglas, John R. Moore, D. Judith Keith, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Educational, Opportunities Litigation Section, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff.
Walter A. McFarlane, Office of the Governor, Richmond, Va., Benjamin R. Civiletti, John H. Lewin, Jr., James A. Dunbar, Vanable, Baetjer & Howar, Baltimore, Md., for Lawrence Douglas Wilder, Governor.
B. Powell Harrison, Jr., Robert H. Spilman, Samuel E. Woolwine, James W. Enochs, Jr., William A. Hazel, Harvey S. Sadow, Douglas K. Baumgartner, Daniel D. Cameron, Glen N. Jones, John W. Roberts, Members of the Bd. of Visitors of Virginia Military Institute, Gordon K. Davies, Director of the Virginia State Council of Higher Educ. and The Virginia State Council of Higher Educ. and its Members and Officers.
Griffin B. Bell, William A. Clineburg, Jr., King & Spalding, Atlanta, Ga., Robert H. Patterson, Jr., William G. Broaddus, Anne Marie Whittemore, J. William Boland, McGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe, Richmond, Va., William B. Poff, Woods, Rogers & Hazlegrove, Roanoke, Va., for Virginia Military Institute, its Superintendent and its Bd. of Visitors.
James A.L. Daniel, Daniel, Vaughan, Medley & Smitherman, Danville, Va., Joel *1408 I. Klein, Onek, Klein & Farr, Washington, D.C., pro hac vice, for Com. of Va.
MEMORANDUM OPINION[1]
KISER, District Judge.
The Controversy
It was in May of 1864 that the United States and the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) first confronted each other. That was a life-and-death engagement that occurred on the battlefield at New Market, Virginia. The combatants have again confronted each other, but this time the venue is in this court. Nonetheless, VMI claims the struggle is nothing short of a life-and-death confrontationalbeit figurative.
The conflict between the parties arises out of the United States' challenge to VMI's all-male admissions policy. The United States asserts that as a state-supported college, VMI's refusal to admit females to the Institute, regardless of their qualifications, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. VMI counters by saying that although it discriminates against women, the discrimination is not invidious but rather to promote a legitimate state interestdiversity in education. Thus, the issue to be resolved is whether VMI's practice of excluding women can pass muster under the equal protection clause, as glossed by the decisions of the Supreme Court. I find that it can, for the reasons that I hereafter state.
Jurisdiction
This Court's jurisdiction was properly invoked under Title IV of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6, which permits the United States to bring actions alleging discrimination in violation of either the United States Constitution or other federal statutes.
Because single-sex colleges and single-sex military schools are exempted from Title IX of the Civil Rights Act, 20 U.S.C. 1681(a)(4) and (5), the United States alleged only a constitutional violation and no statutory violation. The Department of Justice's authority to bring a suit under Title IV is not limited by Title IX. United States v. Massachusetts Maritime Academy, 762 F.2d 142, 147-51 (1st Cir.1985). Of course, although Congress could deprive the Attorney General of the authority to bring this action, it could not pass a statute that would exempt VMI's alleged equal protection violations from judicial review. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 733, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3340, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982).
Procedural Background
This case originated from a complaint filed by the United States Department of Justice on behalf of a female high school student who wanted to be considered for admission to VMI. The named defendants were the Commonwealth of Virginia; Governor Lawrence Douglas Wilder; Virginia Military Institute, its president, superintendent, and members of its Board of Visitors; and Virginia's State Council of Higher Education and its members. The State Council of Higher Education and its members have been dismissed from the suit. The Commonwealth has been granted a stay relieving it of the duty to appear at trial, under the condition that it be bound by any ruling of this Court. Governor Wilder was relieved of the duty to respond to any subpoenas requiring him to testify at trial. In response to an earlier motion, he stated that he did not oppose entry of summary judgment against himself and the other defendants. The VMI Foundation and the VMI Alumni Association, private organizations associated with VMI, have intervened as defendants in the case over the United States' objection. See ruling of November 27, 1990.
A six-day trial was held beginning April 4, 1991. Nineteen witnesses testified, including four experts on education, one expert on college facilities, and one expert on human physiology. All defendants, except Governor Wilder, were represented by common counsel. Governor Wilder was represented by counsel, but he did not personally appear or participate in the trial.
*1409 Standard of Review
The VMI Board of Visitors decides the admissions policy of VMI. The seventeen members of this Board are appointed by the Governor of Virginia, subject to approval by the General Assembly, including the State Adjutant General, who is a member ex officio. Va.Code § 23-93; Va. Code § 44-11 (Adjutant General also nominated by Governor subject to General Assembly approval). Twelve of the members must be VMI alumni.
All parties recognize that this case concerns educational policy, and the proper standard of review should be derived from cases concerning higher education. The principle of academic freedom, an aspect of the freedom of association guaranteed by the First Amendment, has been recognized by the Supreme Court as a reason to defer to academic decisionmaking by a university. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 2759, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978).[2] The essential freedoms of a university include the freedom to choose who may be admitted to study. Id. (Quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1218, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (Justice Frankfurter concurring)). "[A]ttainment of a diverse student body ... is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education." Id. While Bakke involved diversity within a single graduate program[3], other courts have extended the rationale of that decision to include the freedom to create different missions at different state universities, in order to promote diverse educational opportunities within the state. Williams v. McNair, 316 F.Supp. 134, 137 (D.S.C.1970) (three-judge panel), aff'd, 401 U.S. 951, 91 S.Ct. 976, 28 L.Ed. 235 (1971) (per curiam); Ayers v. Allain, 914 F.2d 676, 687 (5th Cir.1990 en banc), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Mabus, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1579, 113 L.Ed.2d 644 (1991).
However, deference to university decisions is not absolute. The Supreme Court ordered racial integration of graduate programs long before it ordered desegregation of lower public schools. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 59 S.Ct. 232, 83 L.Ed. 208 (1938); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 68 S.Ct. 299, 92 L.Ed. 247 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 70 S.Ct. 848, 94 L.Ed. 1114 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 70 S.Ct. 851, 94 L.Ed. 1149 (1950). Courts have, in some cases, entered injunctions that have the effect of overruling discretionary educational decisions of individual colleges, where those decisions tend to perpetuate unconstitutional discrimination. In Norris v. State Council of Higher Education, 327 F.Supp. 1368 (4th Cir.), aff'd, 404 U.S. 907, 92 S.Ct. 227, 30 L.Ed.2d 180 (1971), a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit entered an injunction preventing Richard Bland College, a two-year branch of the College of William and Mary, from expanding into a four-year college, because that would have impeded desegregation of nearby Virginia State College.
Sex Discrimination
The first court challenge to sex segregation in Virginia higher education appeared in Kirstein v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 309 F.Supp. 184 (E.D.Va.1970) (three-judge panel) (approving consent order). In that case, the court found that "we think it fair to say from the evidence that the most prestigious institution of higher education in Virginia is the University of Virginia in Charlottesville." Id. at 186. The court was reluctant to "interfere with the internal operation of any Virginia college or university," but it encouraged a settlement that required the *1410 university to admit women. But the court refused to enter an order requiring Virginia to admit both sexes to all of its universities:
We are urged to go further and to hold that Virginia may not operate any educational institution separated according to the sexes. We decline to do so. Obvious problems beyond our capacity to decide on this record readily occur. One of Virginia's educational institutions is military in character. Are women to be admitted on an equal basis, and, if so, are they to wear uniforms and be taught to bear arms?
Another early Fourth Circuit decision, affirmed by the Supreme Court, involved Winthrop College in Rock Hill, South Carolina. Williams v. McNair, supra. In that case, male students wanted to attend an all-female college. The Court noted that South Carolina had one public all-male college (The Citadel, which like VMI offers a military program), and several coeducational institutions. The court noted,
It is conceded that recognized pedagogical opinion is divided on the wisdom of maintaining "single-sex" institutions of higher education but it is stipulated that there is a respectable body of educators who believe that "a single-sex institution can advance the quality and effectiveness of its instruction by concentrating upon areas of primary interest to only one sex."
316 F.Supp. at 137. Unlike Kirstein, there was no feature of Winthrop College other than its single-sex status that made it distinctive, and the plaintiffs' interest in attending college in the town where they lived was found to be less than compelling. The denial of admission to them was not an equal protection violation.[4]
Hogan, supra, guides my decision in this case. In Hogan, the Supreme Court conducted a factual inquiry into the justification for the policy of the Mississippi University for Women of allowing men to audit courses in the nursing program, but not granting them academic credit. It concluded that the policy denied equal protection to the plaintiff, who wished to earn credit for advanced nursing courses at the school.
The Hogan court applied the "intermediate scrutiny" test:
[T]he party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the burden of showing an exceedingly persuasive justification for the classification. The burden is met only by showing at least that the discrimination serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.
Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730, 102 S.Ct. at 3339 (citations and punctuation omitted).[5]
Where a state offers an educational opportunity to only one gender,
The issue is not whether the benefitted class profits from the classification, but whether the State's decision to confer a benefit only upon one class by means of a discriminatory classification is substantially related to achieving a legitimate and substantial goal.
Id. at 731 n. 17, 102 S.Ct. at 3340 n. 17. Finally,
[a]lthough the test for determining the validity of a gender-based classification is straightforward, it must be applied free of fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females. Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions. Thus, if the statutory objective is to exclude or *1411 "protect" members of one gender because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate.
Id. at 724-25, 102 S.Ct. at 3336.
Hogan involved admission of a single student into the nursing school, and the Court did not purport to extend its ruling to cover other programs at the school. Id. 458 U.S. at 733, 102 S.Ct. at 3340 (Chief Justice Burger dissenting). These determinations require a fact-intensive examination of the practical considerations underlying the challenged policy.
Many of the facts underlying the Supreme Court's rejection of the justification proferred in Hogan are not present here. In Hogan, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion emphasized that the
uncontroverted record reveals that admitting men to nursing classes does not affect teaching style, ... that the presence of men in the classroom would not affect the performance of the female nursing students, ... and that men in coeducational nursing schools do not dominate the classroom.... In sum, the record in this case is flatly inconsistent with the claim that excluding men from the School of Nursing is necessary to reach any of MUW's educational goals.
Hogan, 458 U.S. at 731, 102 S.Ct. at 3339.[6] The record in this case is directly to the contrary. The record is replete with testimony that single gender education at the undergraduate level is beneficial to both males and females. Moreover, the evidence establishes that key elements of the adversative VMI educational system, with its focus on barracks life, would be fundamentally altered, and the distinctive ends of the system would be thwarted, if VMI were forced to admit females and to make changes necessary to accommodate their needs and interests.
One of the most striking differences in the two cases is the reasons proffered to justify the discrimination. In Hogan, Mississippi maintained that a female-only admission policy at MUW was affirmative action which was justified to compensate women for past discrimination whereas, here, Virginia urges that a male-only admission policy at VMI promotes diversity within its statewide system of higher education. The Court found that Mississippi's proffered explanation failed both prongs of the intermediate scrutiny test, i.e., that it was not an important governmental objective and that the means of advancing the objective were not substantially related to the achievement of that objective. In contrast, diversity in education has been recognized both judicially and by education experts as being a legitimate objective. The sole way to attain single-gender diversity is to maintain a policy of admitting only one gender to an institution.
I also note that the plaintiff in Hogan was a resident of the town where Mississippi University for Women was located. He would have had no opportunity to study his chosen profession (nursing) within commuting distance of his home if he could not attend that school, and moving to a different community would have presented him with a significant hardship. Id. 458 U.S. at 735 n. 1, 102 S.Ct. at 3342 n. 1 (Justice Powell dissenting). VMI does not offer an advantage of close-to-home education to any students, male or female, because it requires all cadets to live on campus for all four years of college. Finding III.F.1. The night and Summer courses, which do serve commuting students, are open to both men and women. Findings I & III. Nor does its policy deny the opportunity to study any particular academic program to anyone, because all of the same courses, including military instruction, are available at VPI. Finding III.H.2.
Single-sex Education is a Constitutionally Legitimate Form of Diversity
A substantial body of "exceedingly persuasive" evidence supports VMI's contention that some students, both male and female, benefit from attending a single-sex *1412 college. Finding VII.B. For those students, the opportunity to attend a single-sex college is a valuable one, likely to lead to better academic and professional achievement. Finding VII.B.10. Astin, Four Critical Years (1977). Most importantly, Dr. Conrad, the United States' expert witness on higher education, called himself a "believer in single-sex education." Finding VII.B.7. He believed that single-sex education should be provided only by the private sector, because he also believes that public institutions should be open to all citizens to the extent possible. He concedes that his public/private dichotomy is a personal, philosophical preference rather than one born of educational-benefit considerations. An opinion based on equity rather than appropriate educational methods is entitled to little weight. Finding VII.B.7.[7]Rostker, 453 U.S. at 79-81, 101 S.Ct. at 2659-60.
One empirical study in evidence, not questioned by any expert, demonstrates that single-sex colleges provide better educational experiences than coeducational institutions. Students of both sexes become more academically involved, interact with faculty frequently, show larger increases in intellectual self-esteem and are more satisfied with practically all aspects of college experience (the sole exception is social life) compared with their counterparts in coeducational institutions. Attendance at an all-male college substantially increases the likelihood that a student will carry out career plans in law, business and college teaching, and also has a substantial positive effect on starting salaries in business. Women's colleges increase the chances that those who attend will obtain positions of leadership, complete the baccalaureate degree, and aspire to higher degrees. Alexander Astin, Four Critical Years, (1977); VMI Ex. 73I; Finding VII.B.10. This research was cited favorably by Justice Powell in his dissenting opinion in Hogan, 458 U.S. at 738-39, 102 S.Ct. at 3343-44. Viewed in the light of this very substantial authority favoring single-sex education, the VMI Board's decision to maintain an all-male institution is fully justified even without taking into consideration the other unique features of VMI's method of teaching and training.
Openness and equal treatment by public institutions is a valid legislative goal, but legislators or other decisionmakers may also take other goals into account, even when adopting a policy that discriminates on the basis of sex. Id. The VMI Board has decided that providing a distinctive, single-sex educational opportunity is more important than providing an education equally available to all.
Effect of Coeducation at VMI
When one considers VMI's methods of education and the effect that admission of women into the institution will have, the Board's decision to remain an all-male institution is further reinforced. Expert testimony established that, even though some women are capable of all of the individual activities required of VMI cadets, a college where women are present would be significantly different from one where only men are present. This is true for a variety of reasons discussed more fully in the Findings of Fact. See Findings VIII.D-J. In addition to converting VMI from a single-gender institution to a coeducational institution, changes in methods of instruction and living conditions would occur.
As West Point's experience in converting to coeducation bears out, the presence of women would tend to distract male students from their studies. It would also increase pressures relating to dating, which would tend to impair the esprit de corps and the egalitarian atmosphere which are critical elements of the VMI experience. Finding VIII.H.
Allowance for personal privacy would have to be made. Doors would have to be locked, and the windows on all of the doors would have to be covered. This would alter the adversative environment that VMI *1413 students must now endure. Finding VIII.D.
Physical education requirements would have to be altered, at least for the women. The current program, where every student must pass precisely the same physical test before graduation, would prevent a disproportionate number of women from graduating, thus forcing VMI either to establish different requirements for women, or to eliminate or substantially reduce the requirements so that they could be applied to both sexes, which would remove one important part of the VMI system of education. Finding VIII.E-G.
The introduction of women into VMI would add a new set of stresses on the cadets, of a very different kind than the cadets now face. The belief that this would affect the educational program is well-founded in empirical evidence, and not based on an archaic stereotype. Finding VIII.1; Williams, supra; Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880, 882 (3d Cir.1976), aff'd by an equally divided court, 430 U.S. 703, 97 S.Ct. 1671, 51 L.Ed.2d 750 (1977); see also Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Hogan, 458 U.S. at 735-46, 102 S.Ct. at 3341-47.
Dr. Riesman testified that the adversative model of education is simply inappropriate for the vast majority of women. He felt that if VMI were to admit women, it would eventually find it necessary to drop the adversative system altogether, and adopt a system that provides more nurturing and support for the students. Evidence supports this theory, including the West Point experience.[8] Dr. Conrad argued that some women will thrive in the adversative environment, and drastic changes in that aspect of the education will not be necessary. But as Dr. Richardson pointed out, educational systems are not designed for the exception but for the mean. Finding VII.B.1. The changes, which all parties agreed would occur, provide sufficient constitutional justification for continuing the single-sex policy.
The United States has asserted that VMI's decision to continue its single-sex policy in 1986, based on the report of its advisory committee, was not based on "reasoned analysis" or on the evidence before it. It is clear that the Committee met with some advocates of coeducation, and that it rejected their recommendations. However, the committee members also had considerable experience in higher education, as well as intimate knowledge of the VMI program.[9] The more thorough self-study undertaken by VMI as part of its accreditation by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools demonstrates that VMI has applied reasoned analysis to all of its policies, including admissions. The Board of Visitors had available to it a substantial amount of "reasoned analysis" when it considered admissions policy.
I find that both VMI's single-sex status and its distinctive educational method represent legitimate contributions to diversity in the Virginia higher education system, and that excluding women is substantially related to this mission. The single-sex status would be lost, and some aspects of the distinctive method would be altered if it were to admit women. VMI has, therefore, met its burden under Hogan of showing a substantial relationship between the single-sex admission policy and achievement of the Commonwealth's objective of educational diversity.
Of What are Women Deprived
Trial testimony established that VMI's military program is absolutely unique. No *1414 other school in Virginia or in the United States, public or private, offers the same kind of rigorous military training as is available at VMI. The military and academic courses are available to women at VPI, but without the intensity of the barracks-centered lifestyle that makes VMI so attractive to many applicants, and so important to its graduates. Finding V.17.
It has been established that if VMI were to admit women, it would become more similar to the military barracks at VPI, so its uniqueness would be lost. Even if this were to occur, VMI would remain the only small college campus in Virginia offering a military program. A woman who wished to live in a military barracks, but preferred a campus of 1,300 students over one of 18,000, would benefit from the availability of VMI.
Considerable speculation, but very little evidence, was presented on the question of whether there would be any demand for a VMI education among women. Because VMI and VMI alumni direct their recruitment efforts only at men, it cannot be precisely determined how much demand there might be among women. Based on the experience at West Point, as well as VMI's experience recruiting black applicants, I conclude that some women, at least, would want to attend the school if they had the opportunity. Hogan seems to teach that the court must consider the constitutionality of the policy without regard to the size of the available applicant pool. The Department of Justice filed this suit on behalf of a potential applicant, and that is all that is required to test the constitutionality of VMI's admissions policy.
Absence of Comparable Opportunity for Women
Ironically, although much of the testimony at trial concerned the ways that men and women are different, my ruling is based on a trait that men and women share: Both men and women can benefit from a single-sex education. Indeed, it appears that demand for single-sex education is greater among women, and that the beneficial effects of single-sex education are stronger among women than among men. Finding II.B.3-4.
Gender discrimination, as a rule, works to the benefit of one group and to the detriment of another. But in a real sense of the word, that is not true in this case because, as the testimony of experts demonstrates, it would be impossible for a female to participate in the "VMI experience." Even if the female could physically and psychologically undergo the rigors of the life of a male cadet, her introduction into the process would change it. Thus, the very experience she sought would no longer be available. Consequently, it seems to me that the criticism which might be directed toward Virginia's higher educational policy is not that it maintains VMI as an all-male institution, but rather that it fails to maintain at least one all-female institution.[10] But this issue is not before the Court.
The relief that the United States seeks in this suit is to require VMI to open its doors to womennot to force Virginia to establish an all-female, state-supported college. Cf. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 94 S.Ct. 3112, 41 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1974) (federal court could not exercise jurisdiction over school districts that had not practiced unconstitutional racial segregation in order to achieve racial balance in another school district). This aspect of the case is very similar to Hogan in that Hogan did not mount a constitutional challenge because there was no corresponding all-male counterpart to the MUW Nursing School but only sought admission to the MUW program. The Court was careful to tailor its decision to the relief sought. Thus, whether Virginia can continue to rely upon private colleges to supply single-gender education to females or whether it must operate *1415 a state-supported, all-female college is not an issue to be resolved in this lawsuit.
Conclusion
In 1970, a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit observed that:
The trend in this country is away from the operation of separate institutions for the sexes, but there is still a substantial number of private and public institutions, which limit their enrollment to one sex and do so because they feel it offers better educational advantages. While history and tradition alone may not support a discrimination, the Constitution does not require that a classification "keep abreast of the latest" in educational opinion, expecially when there remains a respectable opinion to the contrary[.]
Williams, 316 F.Supp. at 137.
Through its Board of Visitors at VMI, Virginia has set an objective of providing single-gender education for males. The evidence in the case, which is virtually uncontradicted, supports Virginia's view that substantial educational benefits flow from a single-gender environment, be it male or female, that cannot be replicated in a coeducational setting. This adds a measure of diversity to Virginia's overall system of education that would be missing if VMI were coeducational. The diversity is further enhanced by VMI's unique method of instruction which was applauded by all of the educational experts who testified. Thus, Virginia has sustained the requirement that gender discrimination serves an important state educational objective.
Virginia also met the second prong of the Hogan test by proving that the objective of diversity of education is met by providing single-gender education. Obviously, the only means of attaining this goal is to exclude women from the all-male institution VMI. But Virginia did not stop there. It enlarged on the single-gender diversity by maintaining an institution whose method of instruction is unique in all the world.
VMI is a different type of institution. It has set its eye on the goal of citizen-solider and never veered from the path it has chosen to meet that goal. VMI truly marches to the beat of a different drummer, and I will permit it to continue to do so.
APPENDIX: FINDINGS OF FACT
I. Witnesses
A. Expert Witnesses
B. Fact Witnesses
II. Public Higher Education in Virginia
A. VMI's Contribution to System-Wide Diversity
B. Role of Private Colleges
C. Public Influence on Private Colleges
III. The Unique VMI Educational Method
A. The Adversative Model
B. Rat line
C. Class System
D. Dyke System
E. Honor Code
F. Barracks
G. Military System
H. Educational System
I. Evening and Summer Sessions
IV. VMI's Mission
A. Character Development
B. Civilian Leadership
C. Military Leadership
D. VMI Mission Study
V. Mission of Military Unit at VPI
VI. Contrasting Mission of Federal Service Academies
VII. Differences between Men and Women
A. Gender-Based Physiological Differences
B. Gender-Based Developmental Differences
*1416 VIII. Anticipated Effects of Coeducation on VMI
A. Demand for VMI Education Among Women
B. VMI's Special Recruitment of Blacks
C. Recruitment of Women at Other Military Institutions
D. Need for Privacy
E. Physical Education
F. Armed Forces Experience
G. West Point Experience
H. Impact of Gender Classes
I. Impact of Cross-Sex Relationships
J. West Point Experience
K. Educational and Military Systems
L. ROTC Programs
M. Physical Facilities
I. Witnesses
Testimony of the following witnesses, together with stipulations and exhibits supplied the evidence from which these Findings of Fact are made:
A. Expert Witnesses
1. Dr. Clifton Conrad testified as the United States' expert witness on education. He is currently Professor of Higher Education and Coordinator of the doctoral program in Higher Education at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and previously had been on the faculties of the University of Denver, the College of William and Mary, and the University of Arizona. He holds a Bachelor's Degree from the University of Kansas and a Ph.D. in higher education from the University of Michigan. His scholarship has focused on academic programs in higher education. His books and monographs include The Undergraduate Curriculum (1978), Liberal Education in Transition (1980, with Jean Wyer), and Curriculum in Transition: Perspectives on the Undergraduate Experience (1990, with Jennifer Haworth). In 1987-88, he served as president of the Association for the Study of Higher Education. He has testified in several other desegregation cases involving higher education on behalf of the United States. U.S. Ex. 160.
2. Mr. James Francis Brewer, III testified as the United States' expert witness on physical facilities. He has been Director of Physical Plant at the University of Maryland at College Park since 1985. He holds B.S. and M.B.A. degrees from the University of Maryland. U.S. Ex. 161.
3. Dr. Richard C. Richardson, Jr. testified as one of VMI's experts on educational institutions. He is Professor of Educational Leadership and Policy Studies at Arizona State University. He holds a B.S. degree in education from Castleton State College, an M.A. from Michigan State University, and a Ph.D. from the University of Texas. After earning his Bachelor's Degree, he served in the Marine Corps for three years, from 1954 to 1957. He taught at a single-sex (women's) college, Vermont College, from 1958 to 1961, and has both professorial and administrative experience at several colleges and community colleges. His publications include Achieving Quality and Diversity: Universities in a Multicultural Society (with E.F. Skinner, 1991), and Fostering Minority Access and Achievement in Higher Education: The Role of Urban Community Colleges and Universities (with L.W. Bender, 1987). He has previously testified on behalf of the United States in discri