Ragusa v. Malverne Union Free School District

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff (“Plaintiff’) Biljana Ragusa filed the present action against defendants Málveme Union Free School District (the “District”), Málveme Union Free School District Board of Education (the “Board”), and Mary Ellen Freeley (“Freeley”) (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging, inter alia, that Defendants discriminated against her based upon her disability, gender, age, and national origin, and retaliated against her for opposing discriminatory practices. Defendants have moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

The material facts, drawn from the Complaint and the parties’ Local 56.1 Statements, are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

Plaintiff was born on April 26, 1955, and is currently 53 years old. Plaintiff was born in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I. School Year 2002-2003; Plaintiff is Hired

Plaintiff began working for the District in September 2002 as a math teacher for a probationary term of two years. Plaintiff is licensed to teach mathematics from grades 7 through 12. The District middle school and the high school are across the street from each other. Within the high school, a teacher can be assigned to more than one classroom. During the school year 2002-2003, Plaintiff taught five periods a day, in two different classrooms, in the high school.

A. Plaintiff’s January 2003 Surgery

In January of 2003, Plaintiff underwent surgery for removal of an accoustic neuro-ma, or benign tumor, in her brain. Although the surgery was viewed as a success, it left Plaintiff with many side effects. According to Plaintiffs sworn declaration, after the surgery, she looked very different. (Pl.’s Deck, dated Jan. 4, 2008 (“Pl.’s Decl.”) at ¶ 7.) She could not blink her *334 right eye, she lost hearing in her left ear, she had difficulties with balance and walking in a straight line, and she couldn’t enunciate properly because of paralysis on the right side of her face. (Id.) “Doctors” installed a gold plate in her eyelid to help her blink and she used, and still uses, eye drops to keep her eye lubricated because her tear ducts are damaged. (Id. ¶ 8.) In April 2003, she had a bone-anchored hearing aid surgically implanted in her skull to help her hearing on the left side. (Id. ¶ 12.)

Although Plaintiff used up all of her sick leave as a result of the surgery, the District allowed her to “borrow” unearned sick leave from school year 2003-2004. Nineteen days following the surgery, Plaintiff returned to school in mid-February 2003. In a letter dated February 11, 2003, Plaintiffs doctor wrote that “[Plaintiff] is now medically cleared to return to work [as of February 14, 2003].” (Compl.Ex.F.) There is no indication by Plaintiffs doctor that any limitations were placed on Plaintiffs abilities.

B. Plaintiff’s February 2003 Return to School

When Plaintiff returned to school, she taught the same classes and students that she taught prior to her surgery. From the time Plaintiff returned to work until the end of the school year, she missed at most one day of work.

At her deposition, Plaintiff testified that her teaching abilities changed after her surgery. Specifically, she had to spend more time preparing her lessons, had problems moving around the classroom, getting from one classroom to another and getting up stairs, and had to lean on the board while writing on it. (Pl.’s Dep., dated July 6, 2007 (“Pl.’s Dep.”) at 129.) In addition, following her surgery, Plaintiff, who speaks English with a foreign accent, feared that it was more difficult for people to understand her because the surgery affected her pronunciation of certain words. (Id. at 130.) She also testified that it was more difficult for her to hear some of the things that were going on in the classroom while she was teaching. (Id. at 132.) She stated that she had to use eye drops three to four times every hour to moisturize her eye and that the drops she used blurred her vision. (Id. at 133.) She developed eye infections that necessitated wearing a patch covering her left eye. (Id. at 133-34.) Both the blurry vision and infections impacted her ability to see what was going on in the classroom. (Id. at 135.) Sometime in 2004 or 2005, she began using a new eye medication which does not cause her to have blurred vision. (Id. at 133-34.) While recovering from the surgery, she used a walker but did not use a walker or cane once she returned to work. (Id. at 136.) Finally, she experienced severe headaches and dizziness after the surgery, which worsened with time. (Id. at 258-61.) According to Plaintiff, these headaches interfered with her ability to teach because they adversely affected plaintiffs ability to function. (Id. at 259.)

Rose Linda Ricca (“Ricca”), the District Chairperson for Mathematics, never had any trouble understanding Plaintiff nor did she ever receive any complaints from parents about student having trouble understanding Plaintiff.

C. Plaintiff’s Alleged Verbal Requests for Accommodation

Immediately following her surgery, Plaintiff did not put into writing any requests about class assignments. 1 (Id. at *335 80.) However, Plaintiff maintains that she made verbal requests to Ricca, including asking for a whiteboard, as opposed to a chalkboard, to avoid chalk dust which irritates and infects her eye. She also allegedly requested to change her schedule so she didn’t have to move from classroom to classroom. According to Plaintiff, Ricca told her that she couldn’t change her schedule in the middle of the year but would try to change it for the next year. In her deposition testimony, Plaintiff testified that although she “preferred to stay on the same floor” throughout the day (Pl.’s Dep. at 83-84), she conceded that none of her doctors told her in writing to “stay off the steps.” {Id. at 80.)

As part of Plaintiffs job duties, she had hall duty where she walked around the halls. Plaintiff was able to walk and perform her hall duty. {Id. at 96.)

D. Classroom Observations

Non-tenured teachers receive six classroom observations per school year. Ricca performs four of them and either the principal or assistant principal performs the others. An observation lasts the entire class period. During the 2002-2003 school year, Plaintiffs evaluators recommended that Plaintiff change activities within the lessons, break the students into small groups, spread questioning throughout the class and discipline students for being late. Although she received a “Meets District Standards” in most categories, the highest grade available, her evaluations were a mix of positive and negative comments.

II. School Year 2003-2004

A.Plaintiff’s Alleged Requests for Accommodation

Plaintiff contends that before the start of the 2003-2004 school year, she made verbal requests to limit the amount she would have to move between rooms and that all of her classrooms contain a white board or an overhead projector. She asserts that the District ignored her former request and that her schedule for that year consisted of classes on two different floors and that she fell twice because of her balance problems.

B. The Hiring of a Substitute to Assisi Plaintiff

During the 2003-2004 school year, the District hired a retired math teacher as a permanent substitute in mathematics, Gail Schindelheim. On days when there were no teachers out, she was assigned to Plaintiffs classes in order to assist and support Plaintiff and her students. According to the District, Ms. Schindelheim reported that students were having difficulty understanding Plaintiff because she was not breaking the material down and was skipping over some of the foundations in mathematics. Plaintiff disputes this allegation, contending that Ms. Schindelheim sometimes read People magazine in the classroom and never mentioned to Plaintiff that the students were having any problems understanding her teaching methods.

C. Change in Plaintiff’s Schedule

In January 2004, the District changed Plaintiffs schedule and took some students from Plaintiffs Math A class and formed another class, allegedly to make Plaintiffs class load lighter. Plaintiff contends that the change was made to accommodate a new younger male teacher and that her load actually got heavier. She also alleges that she requested to take over the classes of a teacher who had left but that her request was denied; instead, a younger male teacher with little teaching experience got the position. Plaintiff does not identify these male teachers.

D. Extension of Plaintiff’s Probationary Period

In the Spring of 2004, toward the end of Plaintiffs two-year probationary term, *336 Plaintiff had a meeting with Ricca and others. The District offered Plaintiff an extension of her probationary term in lieu of termination. According to the District, although Plaintiff was not implementing her supervisors’ recommendations regarding teaching, they hoped she would succeed with a third year of probation. According to Plaintiff, no one at the meeting said anything about her teaching abilities and instead, explained that a new superintendent wanted to be in charge of the tenure decisions so her tenure decision had been delayed. On March 25, 2004, Plaintiff signed an agreement with the District extending her probationary term for one additional year.

E. Plaintiff Assigned to Teach Sixth Grade

At this Spring meeting, Plaintiff was advised that she would be teaching a sixth grade math class in the middle school, which is across the street from the high school, in addition to some high school courses. Ricca testified that she assigned Plaintiff to teach this class in order to make it easier for Plaintiff; sixth grade math is easier to teach than ninth grade math. Both parties agree that Plaintiff told Ricca that she preferred to teach at the high school. However, Defendants contend that Plaintiff never stated that she did not want to teach at the middle school or that she had any objection going from one building to another. Plaintiff asserts that she mentioned her balance problems and the difficulty she would have moving between buildings. Plaintiff also contends that she advised them that sixth grade math fell outside of her certification area of seventh to twelfth grades and asked the District not to give her this assignment. The District counters that the New York State Department of Education has designated the District as an experimental district that is permitted to assign high school teachers to teach middle school students in their specialty area in an attempt to strengthen the middle schools.

F. Classroom Observations

As with the previous year, Plaintiffs classroom observations for the 2003-2004 school year were a mix of positive and negative comments, with a grade of “Meets District Standards” in most categories. Some comments included that Plaintiff had trouble breaking down material in a simplistic manner, had trouble engaging students, had classroom management problems, and did not challenge students.

III. School Year 2004-2005

A. Plaintiff’s Schedule

In September 2004, Plaintiff was teaching an average of five periods. She taught in one classroom in the middle school, which had a white board instead of a chalkboard. According to Plaintiff, because she never taught sixth graders before, it required more preparation on her behalf.

B. Plaintiff’s Alleged Request for Accommodation

In January 2005, Plaintiff contends that she asked to assume the classes of a Ms. Debra Temple, whose schedule was “less physically demanding,” but the District denied her request and gave the assignment to a “brand new teacher.” (Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff does not identify this teacher.

C. Plaintiff’s Classroom Observations

Plaintiffs classroom observations for the 2004-2005 school year detail a lack of improvement on Plaintiffs behalf in areas she was deemed insufficient. Her end of the year evaluation, dated June 17, 2005, notes that Plaintiff did not implement all of *337 the recommendations that were made to her, she did not implement classroom routines to control behavior, she lost control of her students, she did not provide a variety of instructional strategies, and she was unable to explain material in a simple manner for students to grasp.

D. Denial of Tenure

In February 2005, Rieca wrote a memorandum to the deputy superintendent stating that “[d]ue to [Plaintiffs] observations, I do not recommend her for tenure. Her classroom management is poor and her ability to organize and present new material needs work.” (Decl. of Brian S. Soko-loff, dated Nov. 21, 2007, Ex. O.) The deputy superintendent then told Freeley, who had become the superintendent for the District in school year 2004-2005, that she was not recommending Plaintiff for tenure.

On May 10, 2005, Freeley recommended to the Board of Education that Plaintiff be denied tenure. The Board voted to accept Freeley’s recommendation and terminated Plaintiffs employment effective June 30, 2005. On May 11, 2005, Freeley sent Plaintiff a letter advising her of same.

E. Plaintiff’s May 12, 2005 Fall and Workers’ Compensation Claim

Plaintiff crossed the street from the high school to the middle school every day of the 2004-2005 school year. The District had a crossing guard at this crossing. On May 12, 2005, Plaintiff fell from the curb to the street while crossing. It is uncontested that no one pushed Plaintiff, causing her to fall. Following her fall, Plaintiff sought Workers’ Compensation benefits.

On May 25, 2007, the New York State Workers’ Compensation Board denied Plaintiffs request, finding that Plaintiff had voluntarily withdrawn from the labor market.

IV. Plaintiff’s NYSDHR Charge

On October 6, 2005, Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that she was denied tenure on the basis of her disability, national origin, and age. On June 15, 2006, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a right to sue letter and indicated that the EEOC would be closing her case.

V. The Complaint

Plaintiffs Complaint asserts ten causes of action: (1) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-12117 (the “ADA”); (2) violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”); (3) intentional infliction of emotional harm; (4) negligent infliction of emotional harm; (5) violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (the “ADEA”); (6) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”); (7) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (“Section 1985”); (8) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (“Section 1986”); (9) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (“Section 1988”); and (10) violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq. (“NYSHRL”).

DISCUSSION

I. Applicable Law and Legal Standards

Summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is only appropriate where admissible evidence in the form of affidavits, deposition transcripts, or other documentation demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, and one party’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Viola v. Philips Med. Sys. of N. Am., 42 F.3d 712, 716 (2d Cir.1994). The relevant governing law in each *338 case determines which facts are material; “only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). No genuinely triable factual issue exists when the moving party demonstrates, on the basis of the pleadings and submitted evidence, and after drawing all inferences and resolving all ambiguities in favor of the non-movant, that no rational jury could find in the non-movant’s favor. Chertkova v. Conn. General Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir.1996) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).

To defeat a summary judgment motion properly supported by affidavits, depositions, or other documentation, the non-movant must offer similar materials setting forth specific facts that show that there is a genuine issue of material fact to be tried. Rule v. Brine, Inc., 85 F.3d 1002, 1011 (2d Cir.1996). The non-movant must present more than a “scintilla of evidence,” Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174, 178 (2d Cir.1990) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505), or “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Aslanidis v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 7 F.3d 1067, 1072 (2d Cir.1993) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)), and cannot rely on the allegations in his or her pleadings, conclusory statements, or on “mere assertions that affidavits supporting the motion are not credible.” Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir.1996) (internal citations omitted).

The district court, in considering a summary judgment motion, must also be “mindful of the underlying standards and burdens of proof,” Pickett v. RTS Helicopter, 128 F.3d 925, 928 (5th Cir.1997) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505), because the evidentiary burdens that the respective parties will bear at trial guide district courts in their determination of summary judgment motions. Brady v. Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205, 211 (2d Cir.1988). Where the non-moving party will bear the ultimate burden of proof on an issue at trial, the moving party’s burden under Rule 56 will be satisfied if he can point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the non-movant’s claim. Id. at 210-11. Where a movant without the underlying burden of proof offers evidence that the non-movant has failed to establish her claim, the burden shifts to the non-movant to offer “persuasive evidence that [her] claim is not ‘implausible.’ ” Brady, 863 F.2d at 211 (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348).

Summary judgment is generally inappropriate where questions of the defendant’s state of mind are at issue, Gelb v. Board of Elections of the City of New York, 224 F.3d 149, 157 (2d. Cir.2000), and should thus be granted with caution in employment discrimination cases. Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P’ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.1994); Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir.2000). Nonetheless, “summary judgment remains available to reject discrimination claims in cases lacking genuine issues of material fact.” Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 40 (2d Cir.1994). “The summary judgment rule would be rendered sterile ... if the mere incantation of intent or state of mind would operate as a talisman to defeat an otherwise valid motion.” Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir.1985). “[T]he salutary purposes of summary judgment— avoiding protracted, expensive and harassing trials — apply no less to discrimination cases than to commercial or other areas of litigation.” Id. “When no rational jury *339 could find in favor of the nonmoving party because the evidence to support its case is so slight, there is no genuine issue of material fact and a grant of summary judgment is proper.” Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1224.

II. Plaintiff Has Failed to Raise a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to her Discrimination Claims

Plaintiffs claims of discrimination, be they under Title VII, Section 1983, the ADA, the ADEA, or state law, are all analyzed under the now familiar burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-804, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Demoret v. Zegarelli, 451 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir.2006) (Section 1983 claims), overruled on other grounds, Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006); Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir.2006) (ADA claims); Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 76 (2d Cir.2005) (ADEA claims); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir.2005) (state claims). Under McDonnell Douglas and its innumerable progeny, (1) a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions; if the employer does so, the McDonnell Douglas framework and its presumptions and burdens disappear, leaving the sole remaining issue of “discrimination vel non,” and thus (3) the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer’s stated reason is merely pretextual and that race discrimination was an actual reason for the adverse employment action. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). Although intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back and forth under this framework, “[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Id.

A. Plaintiff Has Failed to Establish a Prima Facie Case of Discrimination Based on Gender, Age or National Origin

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she belonged to a protected class, (2) was qualified for the position she held or sought, and (3) suffered an adverse employment action (4) under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent. Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir.2003).

Here, the only evidence in the record to support Plaintiffs allegations that she was discriminated against on the basis of her gender, age or national origin is Plaintiffs own testimony that: (1) she, at an unknown time and date, overheard unidentified people making remarks “[mentioning [her] people from [her] country [and] mentioning the war that was happening over there” (Pl.’s Dep. at 256); (2) the District hired all male teachers after Plaintiff was hired (id. at 333); (3) a young male teacher with little teaching experience was given a teaching assignment that Plaintiff asked for (Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 16); and (4) Plaintiffs schedule was changed to accommodate a new young male teacher. (Id. ¶ 17.) For the reasons stated below, such conclusory assertions, wholly unsupported by the record, are insufficient to create an inference of discrimination.

With regard to Plaintiffs statement that unknown people remarked about her country of origin and the war, it is well-established that stray remarks, even if made by a decision maker, without more, do not constitute sufficient evidence to *340 make out a case of discrimination. See Danzer v. Norden Sys., Inc., 151 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir.1998). When other indicia of discrimination are presented, however, “the remarks can no longer be deemed ‘stray,’ and the jury has a right to conclude that they bear a more ominous significance.” Id. In order for the remarks to be deemed significant, the plaintiff must show their nexus to the adverse employment decision. See, e.g., Pronin v. Raffi Custom Photo Lab, Inc., 383 F.Supp.2d 628, 636-37 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (citing cases). Plaintiffs vague testimony about stray remarks made by unknown people, absent any concrete particulars, is clearly insufficient to support an inference of national origin discrimination.

Plaintiffs allegations regarding the District’s preference for younger, male employees is similarly lacking as Plaintiff has presented no evidence to support these assertions. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiffs discrimination claims are based on age, gender and national origin, they are dismissed. 2

B. Plaintiff Has Failed to Establish a Prima Facie Case of Discrimination Based on Disability 3

In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1) her employer is subject to the ADA; (2) plaintiff was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (3) plaintiff was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of her job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability. See Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192, 198 (2d Cir.2004) (citing Cameron v. Cmty. Aid For Retarded Children, Inc., 335 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir.2003)); Shannon v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 332 F.3d 95, 99 (2d Cir.2003). There is no dispute that the District is a covered entity. The Court finds, however, that Plaintiff is not “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA and therefore fails to satisfy the second element of her prima facie case.

1. Disabled Within the Meaning of the ADA

A person can demonstrate that she has a disability within the meaning of the ADA in any of three ways. She can show that she (1) has a physical or mental impairment that “substantially limits” one or more “major life activities”; (2) has a “record of such impairment”; or (3) is “regarded as” having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Disability determinations are made on a case by case basis. Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs. Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 151-52 (2d Cir.1998). Plaintiff asserts that she qualifies as disabled under the first and third definitions. The Court examines these two below.

a. Does Plaintiff Suffer From an Impairment That Substantially Limits One or More Major Life Activities?

To meet the first ADA definition of disability, (1) a plaintiff must show that she suffers from a physical or mental impair *341 ment; (2) the plaintiff must identify the activity that is claimed to be impaired and establish that such activity constitutes a “major life” activity; and (3) the plaintiff must show that her physical or mental impairment “substantially limits” the identified “major life activity.” Jacques, 386 F.3d at 201; accord Ramirez v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 481 F.Supp.2d 209, 217 (E.D.N.Y.2007).

Plaintiff assets that she suffers from the following impairments:

Because of her brain tumor and its subsequent removal, [Plaintiff] has suffered permanent damage to her eyesight, hearing, mobility and motor functions. Her tumor and surgery has removed her ability to hear out of one ear and substantially limited her ability to blink her eye, perceive depth, hear low sounds, balance, walk, climb or descend stairs, drive, speak, stand, spell, move the right side of her face, and recover from injury.

(PL’s Mem. at 13.) Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff suffers from physical impairments. Defendants also do not dispute that major life activities include walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, and working. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). Defendants do argue, however, that there is no evidence that the side-effects from Plaintiffs brain surgery substantially limited any of her major life activities. The Court agrees.

“In determining whether a limitation is ‘substantial,’ courts consider the nature and severity of the impairment, the duration or expected duration of the impairment, and the permanent or long term impact of or the expected long term impact of or resulting from the impairment.... For purposes of the ADA, short-term, temporary restrictions are not ‘substantially limiting’ and do not render a person ‘disabled.’ ” Conley v. United Parcel Serv., 88 F.Supp.2d 16, 19 (E.D.N.Y.2000); see also Capobianco v. City of N.Y., 422 F.3d 47, 57 (2d Cir.2005) (same). As one court has recently noted:

To establish a disability under the ADA, there must be some proof of permanency. See Adams v. Citizens Advice Bureau, 187 F.3d 315, 316-17 (2d Cir.1999). In other words, the limitation on the claimed major life activity cannot be temporary. Id. (temporary neck, back, and knee injury lasting three and a half months not a disability); Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep’t, 158 F.3d 635, 646 (2d Cir.1998) (temporary impairment of seven months not substantially limiting); McNamara v. Tourneau, Inc., 496 F.Supp.2d 366, 376 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (injury lasting only eight weeks not a qualifying disability); Williams v. Salvation Army, 108 F.Supp.2d 303, 312-13 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (“temporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no long-term or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities.”).

Green v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 2008 WL 144828, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.15, 2008). It is the limitation on the claimed major life activity that must be permanent or have a long term impact. The permanency of the mental or physical condition leading to the impairment is not necessarily sufficient. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002) 4 (diagnosis alone does not establish a disability within the meaning of the ADA; the impairment’s impact must be long term). Moreover, in determining how a particular impairment affects a particular *342 plaintiff, the Court must consider any corrective or mitigating measures taken by that individual. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482-84, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999). 5 For example, an individual who is able to virtually eliminate the effects of an impairment through medication is not considered disabled for purposes of the ADA. See id. at 483, 119 S.Ct. 2139; accord Teachout v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 2006 WL 452022 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.22, 2006).

In addition, to raise an issue of fact as to whether a claimed impairment substantially limits a major life activity, a plaintiff must present more than mere con-clusory allegations. Rather, a plaintiff must provide specific information detailing the nature and length of the limitation, together with supporting medical evidence regarding the duration and severity of the impairment’s impact on the major life activity at issue. See, e.g., Mikell v. Waldbaum, Inc., 2003 WL 21018844 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2003) (conclusory statements about plaintiffs inability to walk, dress herself, and get out of bed, without reference to medical or other evidence regarding the duration and severity of impairment’s impact on these activities insufficient to defeat summary judgment); Mazza v. Bratton, 108 F.Supp.2d 167, 175 (E.D.N.Y.2000) (conclusory assertion in affidavit that plaintiff had difficulty in performing such routine tasks such as cooking, cleaning, shopping and showering insufficient to make a prima facie showing that his ability to care for himself was substantially limited), af f'd, 9 Fed.Appx. 36 (2d Cir.2001) (unpublished summary order). Cf. Teachout, 2006 WL 452022, at *4 (a plaintiff does not satisfy burden under the ADA by showing impairment “merely affected” a major life activity; a plaintiff must demonstrate that impairment substantially limits those activities). See generally Montgomery v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 1233551, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Apr.25, 2007) (“Neither ‘conclu-sory statements, conjecture, [n]or speculation’ suffices to defeat summary judgment.”) (quoting Kulak v. City of New York, 88 F.3d 63, 71 (2d Cir.1996)).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient, non-conclusory information to permit a trier of fact to conclude that her impairments substantially limited the major life activity of hearing, seeing, speaking, walking, working, or any other major life activity. The only ev