Bruce Energy Centre Ltd. v. Orfa Corp. of America (In Re Orfa Corp. of Philadelphia)

OPINION

A. INTRODUCTION

Presently before us for disposition are the following related matters arising out of the case of three related Debtors holding certain valuable licenses of a process for recycling solid waste: (1) confirmation of the Second Amended Consolidated Plan of Reorganization (“the Plan”) filed by Euro American Financial Corp. (“EAFC”) and Corsair Asset Management, Inc. (“Corsair”) (collectively “the Plan Proponents” or “the Proponents”); (2) an adversary proceeding instituted by Bruce Energy Centre, Inc. (“BEC”) under 11 U.S.C. § 506 to determine the nature and extent of its claim (“the Adversary”); (3) a Motion of BEC for relief from the automatic stay (“the BEC Motion”); (4) a Renewed Motion of Security Pacific National Bank (“SPNB”) for relief from the stay (“the Remand Motion”); and (5) a recently-filed Motion of SPNB to convert this case to Chapter 7 (“the Conversion Motion”).

We hold that the Plan cannot be confirmed for the following reasons: (1) it fails to provide an adequate “market rate” of interest to SPNB, which we conclude must be no less than two (2%) percent above the prime rate; (2) it improperly combines what we conclude, in deciding the adversary proceeding, are secured claims of BEC in the same class as unsecured claims; and (3) it apparently fails to provide for sufficient payments to cure the delinquencies owed to Jetzer Technologie, B.V. and Organ-Faser Technology, the li-censors of the Debtors’ recycling process *407 (“the Licensors”), to permit assumption of the executory Licensing Agreement of this process. In so concluding, we reject the following objections to confirmation: (1) the Plan improperly seeks to substantively consolidate the three Debtors’ cases; (2) the Plan improperly places all claims of SPNB, including both secured and potential unsecured claims, in a single class; and (3) the Plan is infeasible.

Since preparation of a further Amended Plan, which cures the enumerated defects, seems within the Proponents’ grasp, the motions of BEC and SPNB seeking relief from the automatic stay and that of SPNB seeking conversion are denied upon the condition that the Proponents (or any other interested party) promptly file a further Amended Plan curing the enumerated defects, with an accompanying Amended Disclosure Statement, and promptly pursue same to confirmation.

B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The filing of voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions by instant Debtors, ORFA CORP. OF PHILADELPHIA (“ORFA-PHIL”), ORFA CORP. OF AMERICA (“ORFAM”), and ORFA CORPORATION OF AMERICA (DEL.) (“ORFADEL”), began in a controversy regarding the composition of the Debtors’ Boards of Directors and the legitimacy of the Boards’ right to file these cases, which is described in an Opinion of this court of June 20, 1990, and an Order of July 20, 1990, reported at 115 B.R. 799 (“Or/a /”). On November 21, 1990, we filed an Opinion in which we denied SPNB’s Motion for appointment of additional creditors’ committees, which is reported at 121 B.R. 294 (“Orfa IP’). In that Opinion, we noted that the Debtors’ incumbent management failed in their efforts to keep the Debtors afloat. Id. at 295-97. We further described how the mantle of reorganization was then taken up by the Proponents, one of which (EAFC) was one of two groups of investors who lost the original skirmish with the incumbents. Id.

Although we refer the reader to Orfa I and Orfa II for detailed histories of the cases through November 21, 1990, we reiterate our description of the three Debtors and the principal players set forth in Orfa II as follows, 121 B.R. at 296:

(1) ORFAM — the parent company, whose Board ran all three Debtors and which paid management’s salary; (2) ORFA-DEL — the holder of two potentially valuable licenses to operate the allegedly ingenious Orfa waste disposal system in the Western Hemisphere; and (3) ORFA [PHIL] ... the owner of a now-non-functioning Orfa plant constructed in southwest Philadelphia. SPNB financed the construction of the plant and hence has a first mortgage on the real estate where it is located and its improvements. BEC [, the second of the two groups of investors, with EAFC,] was and apparently remains interested in acquiring licensing rights to construct an Orfa plant in Toronto, Canada.

The first of the matters before us to be filed was the Renewed 362 Motion, filed on November 5, 1990. The BEC Motion was filed on December 3, 1990. Both of these Motions were consolidated with a hearing to consider confirmation of the Plan on December 19, 20, and 21, 1990. Briefing on these matters was originally completed on January 25, 1991.

The Adversary was filed on December 17,1990. Before it was listed for trial, the first of a series of conferences to attempt to aid the parties in attempting to negotiate a consensual plan was listed before the Honorable Judith H. Wizmur of the District of New Jersey on January 25, 1991. Ultimately, the record in the Adversary was made in testimony of February 20, 1991, and from a factual Stipulation of the parties filed on March 1, 1991.

This court, Judge Wizmur, and the parties had high hopes for settlement. On several occasions, SPNB and the Proponents, the primary protagonists, reported that they were very close to a resolution. However, for reasons of which this court is unaware due to our calculated distance from discussion of the substance of the negotiations before Judge Wizmur, no con *408 sensual plan materialized. A final deadline of June 5,1991, passed without finalization.

In the mean time, on May 25, 1991, SPNB filed the Conversion Motion. The additional record on that Motion was the subject of brief testimony on June 5, 1991, and several stipulated facts. Incorporated into the record were the records of the hearing of August 30, 1990, on SPNB's original stay-relief motion; the hearing of September 12, 1990, on the Trustee’s unsuccessful motion to sell ORFADEL’s license rights to BEC; a hearing of September 28, 1990, on SPNB’s original 362 Motion; the hearing of November 14, 1990, on the motion at issue in Orfa II, see 121 B.R. at 296; and a hearing of October 5, 1990, on a successful motion by the Trustee for a preliminary injunction in Adversary No. 90-0753S (“Adv. 90-753”), to prevent BEC from seizing Canadian sub-licenses of the Orfa process.

On June 5,1991, this court, recognizing a significant lapse in time since the briefing was initially completed in January, gave SPNB and BEC until June 12, 1991, to file Briefs in support of the previously-un-briefed Conversion Motion and the Adversary, respectively. All interested parties were accorded until June 19, 1991, to file any responses or additional submissions of any sort.

The parties must be “briefed out.” After receipt of the Briefs from SPNB and BEC referenced above, all that we received on June 19,1991, was a one and a half page letter from the Proponents responding the BEC’s submission relating to the Adversary.

At the close of the consolidated trial on December 21, 1990, SPNB and BEC stipulated that the automatic stay would remain in place, in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 362(e) and Bankruptcy Rule 4001(a)(2), for 30 days after the submissions of the parties were originally due on January 25, 1991. Being concerned about the potential effect of § 362(e) as settlement negotiations before Judge Wizmur proceeded into March, we entered an Order of February 21, 1991, continuing the stay in effect “pending a final decision in all matters before us in the ... hearings” concluded on December 21, 1990. This Order, plus the Order in Orfa II, and perhaps other matters, are on appeal to the district court, although these matters were apparently also “on hold” until June 5, 1991, pending the prospect of a global settlement.

C. FACTUAL HISTORY

It would exhaust reams of paper, serve little benefit, and be contrary to the parties’ need for a prompt decision of the matters before us to begin this Opinion with a classic review of all testimony and evidence at the prior hearings and express findings as to each disputed point. Except for the single Adversary, which consists largely of a paper record, the matters before us are motions, which we do not believe necessitate strict compliance with the dictates of the first sentence of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). See In re Campfire Shop, Inc., 71 B.R. 521, 524-25 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1987). We do, of course, intend to present a sufficient discussion of all points decided to allow meaningful review. See In re Garrett Road Supermarket, Inc., 95 B.R. 906, 908-09 & n. 2 (E.D.Pa. 1989).

The most important “fact” at issue requiring some description is the Plan. Although the Debtors have never been formally consolidated, the Plan, for the most part, treats the creditors of each of the Debtors as one body, i.e., as if their cases were consolidated. Nevertheless, in a paragraph addressing “revesting of assets,” the Plan provides that the Debtors will operate as separate entities post-petition.

All secured and unsecured claims of SPNB are placed into a single class. SPNB is to receive full payment on the effective date if the Proponents obtain financing sought from Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. (“Chase”). If the Chase loan is not consummated, as has not occurred to date, the Proponents, who are investment brokers and counsellors by profession, will undertake a private placement of preferred stock of the Debtors. From the proceeds of this placement, which, according to the *409 Proponents, cannot be effected until the plan is confirmed, SPNB will be paid interest “at the prime rate” and will receive a final balloon payment after ten years of $8,225,000, which is about $150,000 greater than SPNB’s $8,072,065.76 Proofs of Claim as of the bankruptcy filings (No. 135 in the ORFAM case and No. 23 in the ORFADEL case).

BEC’s claim, though apparently admittedly secured by ORFADEL’s stock, is placed into a class (Class H) including unsecured noteholders and all other unsecured claims of the Debtors. Payment of twenty (20%) percent of such claims is contemplated on the effective date, with the remaining eighty (80%) percent to be paid in quarterly payments extending over five years.

The Debtors’ licenses with the Licensors are to be assumed, and the Licensors are to be paid their claims in full on the effective date.

The Debtors’ report of plan voting, as supplemented, although not having been formally introduced into the record, indicates that all classes have accepted the Plan except the class including SPNB. SPNB, BEC, and the Licensors all filed Objections to confirmation of the Plan.

D. DISCUSSION

1. THE SUCCESS POTENTIAL OF THE ORFA PRODUCT, THE HIGH CALIBRE OF THE PROPONENTS’ PROPOSED MANAGEMENT TEAM, AND THE STRONG LIKELIHOOD THAT THE PROPONENTS CAN MARKET THE PRIVATE PLACEMENT RENDER THE PLAN FEASIBLE.

All three objecting parties — -SPNB, BEC, and the Licensors — contend that the Plan fails to meet the “feasibility” requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(ll), that confirmation is “not likely to be followed by liquidation, or the need for future financial reorganization, ...” Of the three, only SPNB levels an attack at the technological backbone of the Plan, ie., that the Orfa process merits development. However, on February 28, 1988, SPNB agreed to advance as much as $13.55 million to build the Philadelphia plant and thereby promulgate the Orfa process. It own expert, Thomas Vence, a financial consultant who was involved in the process which led to the approval of the earlier loan, admitted that he did not question the viability of the technology behind the Orfa process.

The principal thrust of the criticisms of the technological feasibility of the Plan by SPNB emphasizes skepticism not with the process itself but with the facts that the Debtors’ business has had little earning capacity in the past and that the Debtors have no outstanding written contracts by which they can generate the tipping fees and revenue from sales of the recycled end products which the Proponents’ witnesses project will make its technology profitable in the future. The Philadelphia plant, built with SPNB’s loan funds as a demonstration of the workability of the Orfa process, is of limited effectiveness due to defects in construction. Unless this plant is put into a better condition, the Proponents are capable of demonstrating only the Debtors’ failure to transfer the Orfa process into a workable reality.

However, SPNB’s purported contemporary skepticism is contrary to its own past behavior. In 1988, at a time when the Debtors’ incumbent management, with a track record that all parties agree was unenviable, was in control, SPNB was willing to advance considerable funds to the Debtors. The Proponents are prepared to install, as President and Chief Executive Officer, Joseph G. Munisteri, who has a distinguished record in the engineering construction industry. Munisteri previously served as Chief Executive Officer and Board member of several engineering firms. Having testified at length in several hearings, Munisteri has impressed the court as knowledgeable and realistic in his assessment of the Debtors’ prospects. He identified Lorin B. Ellison, a certified public accountant and previously Vice President of Finance of Bausch & Lomb, as the reorganized Debtors’ proposed Secretary, Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer. The Board of Directors of the Debtors present *410 ly includes William F. Ballhaus, former Chief Executive Officer of Beckman Instruments; John Dutton, Corsair’s Director of Corporate Finance and Senior Vice President of a large healthcare company; and R. Eric Miller, former President for Fluor Constructors, Inc. and Vice President of Bechtel Corporation. Ballhaus testified in prior proceedings and Dutton testified in December proceedings. Both have been optimistic, yet are tempered with a sense of realism, about the Debtors’ prospects. This constellation of individuals is a vast improvement over the group of “dreamers” who were the Debtors’ principals when SPNB made its loan in 1988.

Munisteri, Dutton, and Alexander Cap-pello, EAFC’s principal, acknowledged the basically inoperable status of the Debtors’ Philadelphia plant. Their plan was to hire Fluor Daniel, Inc. and Thyssen AG., European companies of impeccable reputation, to repair and provide guarantees of the operation of the Philadelphia plant, at a cost of $4.5 million.

We accept Cappello’s testimony that the private placement cannot be finalized until plan confirmation occurs. Unless the Chase loan materializes, the funds to repair the Philadelphia plant will therefore not appear until after the private placement is solicited. It is only after the repairs are made to the plant that it is realistic to expect contracts yielding tipping fees and end-product purchases to appear. This proposed progression of development of the Debtors by the Proponents appears reasonable. We accept the Proponents’ assertions that it is unrealistic to expect definite commitments from investors and prospective customers at this juncture.

BEC and the Licensors voice little concern about the technology of the Orfa process. Indeed, BEC attempted several means of obtaining the Orfa license to incorporate it into a proposal for trash disposal in the City of Toronto, reflecting BEC’s confidence in the efficacy of the process. Although the October 1, 1990, deadline by which BEC was compelled to make a presentation to the City of Toronto has passed, BEC has remained an active party in this case, either due to a hope that it can still compete in the Toronto process or a desire to develop the process in other Canadian municipalities. The Licensors of the process could hardly be expected to challenge its technological feasibility.

The thrust of the objection to feasibility from these parties is focused upon the use of the private placement as a means for raising capital. The effective date of the Plan is triggered by the Proponents’ raising at least $7 million within 150 days after confirmation. The total debt of the three Debtors is $19.35 million, according to Dut-ton. The cost to repair the plan will be at least $4.5 million. Operating costs will result in a need for millions more, unless and until operations of the Debtors are profitable. The objectors are troubled because the Debtors have no funds and the Proponents themselves have insufficient resources to fund the plan. Moreover, the source of the funds is not a recognizable financial institution, but an unidentified, amorphous group of individuals who have not been identified and indeed could not be identified because they do not yet exist.

Cappello and Dutton are aware of these aspects (drawbacks, if you will) of the Plan. However, they point out that solicitation of investors is unrealistic and perhaps illegal unless it is first backed by a confirmation order. Cappello points to his Companies’ past success in raising $22 million on the Debtors’ behalf. These funds were raised at a time when the incumbent management was in control. They reason, not illogically, that investments will be more readily obtainable with their proposed competent management team in place.

The standards for determining plan feasibility are not rigorous. See, e.g., In re Temple Zion, 125 B.R. 910, 914-15 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1991); In re 222 Liberty Associates, 108 B.R. 971, 985-86 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1990); In re Orlando Investors, L.P., 103 B.R. 593, 600 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1989); and 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, IT 1129.-2(11), at 1129-36.11.

Caselaw has established that bankruptcy court[s] must consider several factors in making a feasibility determination: (1) *411 the adequacy of the debtor’s capital structure; (2) the earning power of its business; (3) economic conditions; (4) the ability of the debtor’s management; (5) the probability of the continuation of the same management; and (6) any other related matters which determine the prospects of a sufficiently successful operation to enable performance of the provisions of the plan. See, e.g., 222 Liberty Associates, 108 B.R. at 986; In re Gulph Woods Corp., 84 B.R. 961, 973 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1988), aff'd, C.A. No. 88-4081 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 24, 1989); and In re Landmark at Plaza Park, Ltd., 7 B.R. 653, 659 (Bankr.D.N.J.1980).

Temple Zion, supra, 125 B.R. at 915.

The Proponents have made a very strong showing of the fourth factor referenced supra. Since the management team which has been proven unable to accomplish the end of making the Debtors profitable is now out of the picture, the absence of probability that the same management will continue constitutes a positive showing of the fifth factor referenced supra.

The second factor referenced above is another strong element in the Proponents' favor. The possible earning power of the Debtors’ business is very high. The Debtors’ technology is highly regarded. The issue of waste disposal is very important and the prospect of a recycling process is a very attractive prospect at this stage in the history of our planet. In an era when many Chapter 11 cases present real estate developments which often have no upward potential or businesses engaged in industries in which growth potential is neither present nor likely, these Debtors stand out as presenting a relatively high probability of increased future earning power.

The third factor noted supra is difficult to measure, but appears to be positive in light of the type of financial plan offered by the Proponents. Loans from recognizable lending institutions are presently very difficult to obtain. However, the climate for new investments is positive, especially since alternatives such as real estate trusts have become less attractive investments. A plan which proposes a sale of stock is one of the few means of raising capital which has at least the potential for success in the current financial environment. The fact that the Proponents are professionals in the investment field who have not been tainted by past transactions renders them capable candidates to put together a private placement which can succeed. We therefore would classify current economic conditions as conducive to the plan proposed.

The first factor of the facts recited above is, of course, not in the Proponents’ favor. The Debtors have no capital at all, and the focus of the plan is to provide them with capital. However, we believe that the Proponents’ prospect of achieving that end are relatively bright.

No other parties have materialized who have been willing to invest the time, energy, and financial resources into the development of the Debtors that the Proponents have. The Proponents appear to have two strong incentives for doing so: (1) to prevent a loss of their prior investments in this venture; and (2) to obtain placement fees and future financial advantages from being on the ground floor of the Debtors’ new financial life. These incentives, though selfish, assure that their participation will be ongoing. They provide the sort of “other related matters” within the scope of the sixth factor cited supra which are properly to be considered in determining plan feasibility.

The Proponents cite In re American Solar King Corp., 90 B.R. 808, 831-33 (Bankr.W.D.Texas 1988), as an example of a Chapter 11 case in which a plan based upon funding from new investments was deemed feasible and was confirmed. SPNB and BES are quick to point out the distinctions between the instant case and that case. In American Solar King, two large potential investors in the debtor’s private placement were identified, whereas here we have only the investment brokers identified and the large body of investors are faceless. However, the overall picture presented by the Proponents compares favorably with that in American Solar King. The very Proponents of the Plan are invest *412 ment brokers, who, as we noted, appear quite capable of accomplishing a successful placement.

We therefore conclude that the weight of the factors relevant to a feasibility analysis supports the conclusion that the Plan is feasible.

2. THE PLAN’S PROVISION FOR WHAT IS EFFECTIVELY A SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION OF THE THREE DEBTORS IS PERMISSIBLE, SINCE IT RESULTS IN NO HARM TO SPNB, THE ONLY CREDITOR OBJECTING THERETO.

The only party objecting to the Proponents’ joinder of the three Debtors into the single Plan is SPNB. The basis of SPNB’s quarrel with the effort of the Proponents to bring the Debtors together is articulated in Orfa II, 121 B.R. at 296. In addition to having a claim against ORFAPHIL which is secured by the Philadelphia Plant, SPNB has an unsecured claim against ORFADEL arising from ORFADEL’s guarantee of the debt of ORFAPHIL to SPNB. ORFADEL owns the Debtors’ licenses. In a liquidation of the Debtors, these licenses would yield at least some proceeds. Except for a relatively small secured claim of BEC, see pages 421-423 infra, ORFADEL’s assets are not subject to security interests. Therefore, argues SPNB, ORFADEL’s unsecured creditors, of which it is the largest by reason of its guarantee of ORFAPHIL’s debt to SPNB, are adversely compromised by treatment identical with the treatment of unsecured creditors of one Debtor (OR-FAM) which is clearly insolvent, and another (ORFAPHIL) which may be insolvent.

However, the voting reports indicate that ORFADEL’s unsecured creditors (other than SPNB) accepted the Plan. These creditors are apparently of the view that the chance of full payment proposed under the Plan is preferable to what they would receive if the licenses were liquidated.

The Debtors do not argue that SPNB is undersecured, but, rather, have always insisted that the Philadelphia plant is worth more, even if converted to a conventional solid-waste transfer station in a liquidation of the Debtor’s assets, than the amount of SPNB’s debt. The Plan contemplates full payment of SPNB’s claim with interest. If SPNB’s secured claim against ORFAPHIL is in fact liquidated under the terms of the Plan, as proposed, SPNB’s contingent guarantee claim against ORFADEL would be liquidated as well. SPNB’s claim against ORFADEL is therefore contingent only upon the failure of the Plan.

As it had in the context of the dispute over the presence of the single Creditors’ Committee serving all three Debtors appointed by the United States Trustee, SPNB has placed itself in the awkward posture of arguing a cause for unsecured creditors of ORFADEL in which the “pure,” non-contingent unsecured creditors of ORFADEL themselves apparently lack interest.

Consequently, we are inclined to view SPNB’s advocacy on this issue as motivated principally by a desire to destroy the Plan, as we did its motivation in seeking appointment of alternative committees in Orfa II, 121 B.R. at 298, rather than motivated by a good faith concern that the effective consolidation effected by the joint Plan will unfairly prejudice its economic interests. This observation colors our analysis of the issue, as it did in Orfa II, id. at 298-99.

Irrespective of its substantive significance in these cases, which we suggest is nil, the consolidation issue presents several challenging legal issues. Both SPNB and the Proponents devote considerable portions of their respective Briefs to argument on this issue. While this court is ultimately able to allow the Plan to pass muster on this issue, principally because the significance to creditors is slight, the questions are close enough that we could picture another court’s viewing their resolution differently. Since the Proponents will be obliged to prepare a further Amended Plan, they might consider measures which would avoid this problem, such as separate treatment of the creditors of each of the Debtors or possibly even separate Plans. The *413 substance of such changes would not appear to be very great.

Addressing the legal issue presented, we begin by noting that the Proponents are attempting to consolidate the Debtors’ cases in a joint plan of reorganization without previously and successfully filing a separate motion to substantively consolidate the cases. The propriety of this method of effecting consolidation is supported by the decision in In re Continental Vending Machine Corp., 517 F.2d 997, 999 (2d Cir.1975), ce rt. denied sub nom. James Talcott, Inc. v. Wharton, 424 U.S. 913, 96 S.Ct. 1111, 47 L.Ed.2d 317 (1976). There, the court approved an amended reorganization plan proposed by the trustee in bankruptcy that called, for the first time, for a substantive consolidation of the debtors, a parent corporation and its subsidiary. Several bankruptcy commentators have cited the Continental Vending Machine decision in support of the proposition that substantive consolidation can be effected through a plan of reorganization. See Comment, Substantive Consolidation in Bankruptcy: A Primer, 43 VANDERBILT L.R. 207, 225, 239-40 (1990) (consolidation may be achieved by an express proposal in reorganization plan) (cited hereafter as “Comment”). Accord, B. WEIN-TRAUB & A. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, 118.16, at 8-77 (rev. ed. 1986).

However, in In re Silver Falls Petroleum Corp., 55 B.R. 495, 497 (Bankr. S.D.Ohio 1985), the court addressed what it considered to be a question of first impression: whether the court could confirm a reorganization plan that, for the first time in the bankruptcy proceeding, proposed the substantive consolidation of the two debtors. The court rejected the plan on the ground that the debtors did not meet the burdens necessary to justify consolidation. Id. at 498. The court stated that the problems raised by the issue oí whether consolidation could be effected in a plan were "novel” because the burden of proof shifted to the party proposing consolidation, instead of lying with the party objecting to a reorganization plan. Id. at 497. But see In re Richard Buick, Inc., 126 B.R. 840, 851 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1991) (debtor always has burden of proving all elements of 11 U.S.C. § 1129 necessary to sustain an order of confirmation).

Other courts, while not expressly embracing the propriety of achieving substantive consolidation through a reorganization plan, have given tacit approval to this procedure. In In re Apex Oil Co., 101 B.R. 92, 93 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.1989), the debtors filed a substantive consolidation motion, but, before the court set a hearing date on this motion, the debtor filed a reorganization plan that called for the consolidation of the debtors’ estates. The court stated that, since the plan for reorganization requested consolidation, it was unnecessary to address the debtors’ motion prior to plan approval. Id. at 94. But cf. In re Texas Extrusion Corp., 68 B.R. 712, 722 (N.D.Tex.1986), aff'd, 836 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1988) (consolidation of bankruptcy cases through joint plan of reorganization without pleading, proof, or adequate findings under law to support substantive consolidation is prohibited).

We believe that the issue is one which often arises and is sanctioned by silence in furtherance of practical expediency. In Orfa II, 121 B.R. at 297-98, we referenced several well-known cases in which joint plans which informally resulted in substantive consolidations were allowed to go forward. We suspect that bankruptcy courts are rarely inclined to raise the issue of an improper, informal consolidation of cases when the creditors of all of the various debtors appear satisfied. See Richard Buick, supra, 126 B.R. at 846 (while bankruptcy courts have some level of duty to independently review Chapter 11 plans, a sua sponte 'detailed investigation of all aspects of a debtor’s plan is not appropriate).

Passing from the procedural to the substantive issues raised by the Proponents’ effort to achieve a substantive consolidation of the Debtors’ three cases, we begin by observing that the Bankruptcy Code does not specifically authorize a court to grant consolidation. Instead, the court’s power to substantively consolidate cases is *414 derived from its general equitable powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105. See, e.g., In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd., 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir.1988); In re Murray Industries, Inc., 119 B.R. 820, 828 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1990); Comment, supra, 43 VANDERBILT L.REV. at 210-11, 220-31. There is some question, however, as to what equitable purpose consolidation is to serve.

The Second Circuit has stated that the “sole purpose” of consolidation “is to ensure the equitable treatment of all creditors.” Augie/Restivo, supra, 860 F.2d at 518. This view of consolidation appears to bar consolidation unless it benefits all creditors. The reasoning to support this conclusion is that, because of the dangers involved in forcing creditors of one debtor to share with creditors of a less solvent debt- or, consolidation is a measure “vitally affecting substantive rights” that is “to be used sparingly.” Id. at 518.

In contrast, the leading case in this district (and, apparently, this Circuit) concerning consolidation focused on the overall effect that a consolidation will have on a reorganization plan. In In re F.A. Potts & Co., 23 B.R. 569, 572 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1982), Chief Judge Twardowski adopted a two-part test in determining whether consolidation was appropriate:

1. The applicants must demonstrate that there is a necessity for substantive consolidation or a harm to be avoided by the use of the equitable remedy of substantive consolidation; and

2. The benefits of substantive consolidation must outweigh the harm to be caused to objecting creditors.

The debtors in Potts were a parent corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary which, in addition to having the same board of directors, were essentially controlled by one person. Id. at 571. The court characterized the debtors as essentially “one operation.” Id. The two companies had in the past lent substantial sums of money to each other, resulting, at the time of the bankruptcy filing, in a cash surplus in the subsidiary company and a severe cash shortage in the parent company. Id. at 572. The court found that the consolidation of the debtors’ assets and liabilities alleviated the cash shortage problem of the parent company, and thus enabled the debtors' business operations to continue. Id. at 573.

The court concluded that its first articulated criterion for consolidation had been met, finding that “[t]hrough consolidation ... the assets of both debtors will be merged so that the cash can be used where it is needed most.” Id. at 573. The court was also influenced by the fact that the debtors' ability to obtain adequate financing for their reorganization was substantially increased by consolidation. Id.

As to the second criteria, the court found that, because no creditors could prove that consolidation would harm their security interests, the benefits of consolidation outweighed any harm it might cause. Id. at 574. The court’s final conclusion concerning the consolidation issue is indicative of how it viewed consolidation: “we believe that substantive consolidation will inure generally to the benefit of the debtors and their creditors alike by helping the debtors to operate more efficiently and to file a feasible consolidated plan of reorganization.” Id.

In Augie/Restivo, supra, 860 F.2d at 518, the Second Circuit articulated a test involving two critical factors:

(i)whether creditors dealt with the entities as a single economic unit and “did not rely on their separate identity in extending credit;” or (ii) whether the affairs of the debtors are so entangled that consolidation will benefit all creditors.

Other courts have designated as many as seven factors which have been cited as factors to be considered in determination of a motion for consolidation:

(1) The presence or absence of consolidated financial statements;

(2) The unity of interest of and ownership between various corporate entities;

(3) existence of parent and intercorpo-rate guarantees on loans;

*415 (4) degree of difficulty in segregating and ascertaining individual assets and liabilities;

(5) existence of transfers of assets without formal observance of corporate formalities;

(6) commingling of assets; and

(7) profitability of consolidation at a single physical location.

See, e.g., Holywell Corp. v. Bank of New York, 59 B.R. 340, 347 (S.D.Fla.1986); Murray Industries, supra, 119 B.R. at 830; In re Gainesville P-H Properties, Inc., 106 B.R. 304, 305-06 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1989); In re Baker & Getty Financial Services, Inc., 78 B.R. 139, 142 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1987); In re Donut Queen, Ltd., 41 B.R. 706, 709 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1984); and Comment, supra, 43 VANDERBILT L.REV. at 215-16. However, the Comment notes that “the absence of one or more factors will not necessarily defeat a request for consolidation.” Id. at 216-17. “When factors conflict or when critical factors are absent, courts determine whether the benefits of consolidation outweigh any detriment to objecting parties.” Id. at 217, citing In re Auto-Train Corp., 810 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C.Cir.1987).

Arguing that this court should adopt the Augie/Restivo test and that the first factor cited by that court cuts in its favor, SPNB contends that it dealt with the three ORFA companies as separate entities, and relied upon the separate identity of ORFAPHIL and ORFADEL in extending credit. It claims that, because it did not feel that it had sufficient security for its loans to ORFAPHIL, it negotiated with ORFADEL separately in order to have recourse against ORFADEL’s assets. However, the presence of inter-company guarantees, such as the one given to