Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Department of the Interior

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge SENTELLE.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

In August 2005, the United States Department of Interior (Interior) began the formal administrative process to expand leasing areas within the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) for offshore oil and gas development between 2007 and 2012. This new five-year Leasing Program included an expansion of previous lease offerings in the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas off the coast of Alaska. Petitioners filed independent petitions for review challenging the approval by the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) of this Leasing Program on various grounds. Specifically, Petitioners argue that: (1) the Leasing Program violates both the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356a, and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f, because Interior failed to take into consideration both the effects of climate change on OCS areas and the Leasing Program’s effects on climate change (the climate change claims); (2) the *472Leasing Program also violates both OCS-LA and NEPA because Interior approved the Program without conducting sufficient biological baseline research for the three Alaskan seas, and further failed to provide a research plan detailing how it would obtain this baseline data before the next stage of the Program; (3) Interior violated the Endangered Species Act of 1973(ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544, by failing to consult with either the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Fish and Wildlife) or the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) about potential harm to endangered species in the OCS planning areas before it adopted the Leasing Program; and (4) the Leasing Program violates OCSLA because it irrationally relied on an insufficient study by the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (the NOAA study) in assessing the environmental sensitivity of the OCS planning areas in the Leasing Program. We hold that Petitioners’ NEPA-based climate change claim, Petitioners’ NEPA baseline data claim, and Petitioners’ ESA claim are not yet ripe for review. We therefore dismiss the petition with respect to these claims.

Nevertheless, we conclude that Petitioners’ remaining OCSLA-based challenges are all justiciable. Of these three remaining claims, Petitioners’ OCSLA-based climate change claims and their OCSLArooted baseline data challenge ultimately lack merit and must fail. However, we find meritorious Petitioners’ challenge to the Leasing Program on grounds that the Program’s environmental sensitivity rankings are irrational. Accordingly, we vacate the Leasing Program, and remand the Program to the Secretary for reconsideration in accordance with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Introduction

The Outer Continental Shelf is an area of submerged lands, subsoil, and seabed that lies between the outer seaward reaches of a state’s jurisdiction and that of the United States. 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a). The OCS generally extends from 3 miles to 200 miles off the United States coast. This action concerns a Leasing Program approved by Interior that includes a potential expansion of previous lease offerings in the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas off the coast of Alaska. Each of these seas is home to a number of species of wildlife. For instance, the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas are home to two polar bear populations. The North Pacific right whale, an endangered marine mammal, is known to inhabit the Bering Sea. Bowhead whales are also known to feed and migrate through each of these seas. In addition, a number of other species of whale, seals, the Pacific walrus, and various seabirds are indigenous to these seas.

Three petitioners — Center for Biological Diversity, Alaska Wilderness League, and Pacific Environment — are non-profit activist organizations whose members have been working to preserve and protect the waters and living environments off the coast of Alaska. The remaining petitioner — the Native Village of Point Hope, Alaska — is a federally recognized tribal government whose members use the Chukchi Sea coast for subsistence hunting, fishing, whaling, and gathering, as well as cultural and religious activities.

B. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act

OCSLA establishes a procedural framework under which Interior may lease areas of the OCS for purposes of exploring and developing the oil and gas deposits of the OCS’s submerged lands. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1334, 1337; see also California v. Watt (Watt I), 668 F.2d 1290, 1295-1300 (D.C.Cir.1981). In order to ensure “the expeditious but orderly development of OCS resources,” Watt I, 668 F.2d at 1297, *473OCSLA provides that Interior undertake a four-stage process in order to develop an offshore oil well. See Sec’y of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 337, 104 S.Ct. 656, 78 L.Ed.2d 496 (1984). As we noted in Watt I, the leasing program's four-stage process is “pyramidic in structure, proceeding from broad-based planning to an increasingly narrower focus as actual development grows more imminent.” Watt I, 668 F.2d at 1297. This multi-tiered approach was designed “to forestall premature litigation regarding adverse environmental effects that ... will flow, if at all, only from the latter stages of OCS exploration and production.” Sec’y of Interior, 464 U.S. at 341, 104 S.Ct. 656.

First, during the preparation stage, Interior creates a leasing program by preparing a five-year schedule of proposed lease sales. 43 U.S.C. § 1344. At this stage, “prospective lease purchasers acquire no rights to explore, produce, or develop” any of the areas listed in the leasing program. Sec’y of Interior, 464 U.S. at 338, 104 S.Ct. 656. Second, during the lease-sale stage, Interior solicits bids and issues leases for particular offshore leasing areas. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a). Third, during the exploration stage, Interi- or reviews and determines whether to approve the lessees’ more extensive exploration plans. 43 U.S.C. § 1340. Interior allows this exploration stage to proceed only if it finds that the lessees’ exploration plan “will not be unduly harmful to aquatic life in the area, result in pollution, create hazardous or unsafe conditions, unreasonably interfere with other uses of the area, or disturb any site, structure, or object of historical or archeological significance.” 43 U.S.C. § 1340(g)(3). Fourth and final is the development and production stage. During this stage, Interior and those affected state and local governments review an additional and more detailed plan from the lessee. 43 U.S.C. § 1351. If Interior finds that the plan would “probably cause serious harm or damage ... to the marine, coastal or human environments,” then the plan, and consequently the leasing program, may be terminated. 43 U.S.C. § 1351 (h)(1) (D) (i).

The Leasing Program at issue has only completed its first stage — preparation of the five-year program under Section 18 of OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1344. Under Section 18, the Secretary is required to prepare, periodically revise, and maintain “an oil and gas leasing program” that consists of “a schedule of proposed lease sales indicating, as precisely as possible, the size, timing, and location of leasing activity which he determines will best meet national energy needs for the five-year period following its approval or reapproval.” 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a). The Secretary must prepare and maintain a leasing program consistent with several principles. First, the Secretary must ensure that a leasing program is “conducted in a manner which considers economic, social, and environmental values of the renewable and nonrenewable resources contained in the [OCS], and the potential impact of oil and gas exploration on other resource values of the [OCS] and the marine, coastal, and human environments.” 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(1). Second, the Secretary must consider additional factors with respect to the timing and location of exploration, development, and production of oil and gas in particular OCS areas. These factors include, inter alia: a region’s “existing information concerning the geographical, geological, and ecological characteristics”; “an equitable sharing of developmental benefits and environmental risks among the various regions”; “the interest of potential oil and gas producers in the development of oil and gas resources”; “the relative environmental sensitivity and marine productivity of different areas of the [OCS]”; and “relevant environmental and predictive information for different areas of the [OCS].” 43 U.S.C. *474§§ 1344(a)(2)(A), (B), (E), (G), (H). Next, Interior must ensure, “to the maximum extent practicable,” that the timing and location of leasing occurs so as to “obtain a proper balance between the potential for environmental damage, the potential for the discovery of oil and gas, and the potential for adverse impact on the coastal zone.” 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(3). Finally Interior’s leasing activities must ensure that winning lessees receive “fair market value for the lands leased and the rights conveyed by the Federal Government.” 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(4).

Other provisions of OCSLA that are relevant to the leasing process are Sections 18(b) and 20. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1344(b), 1346. Section 18(b) of OCSLA calls for Interior to include estimates of the appropriations and staff required to conduct and prepare the leasing program, including appropriations and staff estimates needed to conduct environmental studies and prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). 43 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(3). Section 20 of OCSLA also provides that, subsequent to a first lease in a given area, the Secretary “shall conduct such additional studies to establish environmental information as he deems necessary and shall monitor the human, marine, and coastal environments of such area or region in a manner designed to provide time-series and data trend information.” 43 U.S.C. § 1346(b).

C. National Environmental Policy Act

NEPA’s requirements are essentially “procedural in character,” and are designed to “ensure solicitude for the environment through formal controls and thereby help realize the substantive goal of environmental protection.” North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 598 (D.C.Cir.1980). Ultimately, NEPA ensures that an agency’s approval of a project is “a fully informed and well-considered decision.” Id. at 599 (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978)). To that end, the statute requires that each agency “assess the environmental consequences of ‘major [federal actions’ by following certain procedures during the decision-making process.” Nevada v. Dep’t of Energy, 457 F.3d 78, 87 (D.C.Cir.2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)). Before an agency may approve a particular project, it must prepare a “detailed statement ... [on, inter alia,] the environmental impact of the proposed action,” “any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,” and “alternatives to the proposed action.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2)(C)(i)-(iii). When faced with a multi-stage, pyramidic program such as the Leasing Program at issue here, NEPA’s regulations allow an agency to conduct a tiered approach to preparing an EIS. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28; see also Nevada, 457 F.3d at 91 & n. 9. Under this approach, an agency may issue a broader EIS at the earlier “need and site selection” stage of a program, and issue subsequent, more1 detailed environmental impact statements at the program’s later, more site-specific stage. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28.

D. Endangered Species Act

The ESA is designed to ensure that endangered species are protected from government action. Under the ESA, each federal agency is required to ensure that any action undertaken by the agency “is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification” of critical animal habitats. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). If an agency concludes that its action “may affect” a listed species or critical habitat, then the agency must pursue either formal or informal consultation with the NMFS or *475Fish and Wildlife. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.13, 402.14. If the agency determines that its action will not affect any listed species or critical habitat, however, then it is not required to consult with NMFS or Fish and Wildlife. See Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 1447 (9th Cir.1996).

E. Leasing Program

The Five-Year Leasing Program in this case was first developed on August 24, 2005. 70 Fed.Reg. 49,669. After developing and publishing a draft proposed plan, see 71 Fed.Reg. 7064 (Feb. 10, 2006), and reviewing commentary to that draft plan, Interior published a “Proposed Plan” and an accompanying draft EIS. Finally, Interior published its “Proposed Final Plan” in April 2007 along with its Final EIS for the approval stage of the Leasing Program. This was submitted to Congress and the President, and was later approved by the Secretary of Interior. In total, the Leasing Program has scheduled 21 potential lease-sales between July 1, 2007 and June 30, 2012 in eight areas of the OCS. Four of those potential leasing areas are in the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas off the Alaska coast. At the time the petitions challenging the approval of the Leasing Program were brought before this court, Interior had not yet conducted any lease-sales in these regions. Since that time, however, Interior has approved one lease-sale in the disputed Alaskan sea areas, Chukchi Sea Lease-Sale 193, which occurred on February 6, 2008. Petitioner Point Hope and others challenged this lease-sale in the federal district court for the District of Alaska.

II. JURISDICTION

The federal judiciary’s role is limited to resolving cases and controversies. U.S. Const. art. Ill, § 2; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). Accordingly, “before we reach the merits of any claim, we must first assure ourselves that the dispute lies within the constitutional and prudential boundaries of our jurisdiction.” Util. Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 320 F.3d 272, 277 (D.C.Cir.2003) (quoting La. Envtl. Action Network v. Browner, 87 F.3d 1379, 1382 (D.C.Cir.1996)). Additionally, we must avoid “premature adjudication ... and also ... protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). We therefore must determine whether Petitioners have standing to bring their claims. We must also ensure that Petitioners’ claims are ripe for review. For the following reasons, we hold that Petitioners’ three OCS-LA-based claims are justiciable. We also hold that Petitioners’ NEPA-based climate change and baseline data challenges, and their ESA claim are not yet ripe for review.

A. Climate Change Claims

Petitioners claim that Interior violated both OCSLA and NEPA because Interior failed to consider both the economic and environmental costs of the greenhouse gas emissions associated with the Program and the effects of climate change on OCS areas. In support of their claims, Petitioners advance two different theories of standing. We address each in turn. We hold that Petitioners lack standing on their substantive climate change theory. We hold, however, that Petitioners have standing to bring their climate change claims under their procedural theory of standing.

1. Petitioners’ Substantive Theory of Standing

Under their substantive theory of standing, Petitioners argue that Interior’s *476approval of the Program brings about climate change, which in turn adversely affects the species and ecosystems of those OCS areas, thereby threatening Petitioners’ enjoyment of the OCS areas and their inhabitants. In other words, Petitioners contend that, absent Interior’s approval of the Program, the OCS areas at issue would not be subject to environmental impacts allegedly brought about by climate change associated with the burning of fossil fuels produced under the Program.

To begin with, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Massachusetts v. EPA 549 U.S. 497, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007), does not govern this issue. Its holding turned on the unique circumstances of that case, which are not present here. In Massachusetts, a group of private organizations petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to begin regulating emissions of four greenhouse gases, arguing that a rise in global temperatures and climatological changes resulted from an increase in the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases. After the EPA denied the petition, the petitioners— joined by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts — sought this Court’s review of the EPA’s denial of their petition. The EPA maintained that the petitioners lacked standing to bring such a petition because the harm that they alleged — the effect of greenhouse gas emissions on global warming — was widespread, and did not individually affect any of the petitioners. Accordingly, the EPA contended, petitioners failed to demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury required to show standing under Article III. After we upheld the EPA’s denial of the petition without reaching a consensus on the standing issue, the Supreme Court decided on review that the petitioners had standing to bring their petition.

In its opinion, however, the Supreme Court made an effort to note that its finding was based on the uniqueness of the case before it. As the Court explained, it was “of considerable relevance that the party seeking review ... is a sovereign State and not, as it was in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), a private individual.” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518, 127 S.Ct. 1438. The Court noted further that it was critical that Massachusetts sought to assert its own rights as a state under the Clean Air Act, and was not seeking to protect the rights of its citizens under the Clean Air Act. Id. at 520 n. 17, 127 S.Ct. 1438. In light of these unique circumstances, the Court afforded Massachusetts “special solicitude” in the Court’s standing analysis due to Massachusetts’s interests in ensuring the protection of the land and air within its domain, and its “well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign territory.” Id. at 519, 520, 127 S.Ct. 1438. With respect to Massachusetts’s injury, the Court found that Massachusetts “owns a substantial portion of the state’s coastal property” that had already been harmed by the EPA’s inaction, and that the EPA’s failure to regulate these gases would cause additional harm to its shoreline. Id. at 523, 127 S.Ct. 1438. Though the Court found that the risks of climate change were widely shared because global sea levels had already begun to rise, it nevertheless concluded that Massachusetts had shown a sufficiently particularized injury because Massachusetts had alleged that its particular shoreline had actually been diminished by the effects of climate change. Id. In other words, by showing that climate change had diminished part of its own shoreline, Massachusetts itself had shown that it had been affected “in a personal and individual way” by the EPA’s failure to regulate greenhouse gases. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Thus, Massachusetts stands only for the limited proposition *477that, where a harm is widely shared, a sovereign, suing in its individual interest, has standing to sue where that sovereign’s individual interests are harmed, wholly apart from the alleged general harm.

Assuming arguendo that Point Hope is a sovereign that might be entitled to “special solicitude” under Massachusetts, it is clear that Massachusetts does not govern this case. Point Hope does not allege anywhere that it has suffered its own individual harm apart from the general harm caused by climate change, and its derivative effects on Point Hope’s members. Point Hope does not allege that Interior’s acts will cause damage to, or otherwise adversely affect, any of its own territory. To the contrary, each of Petitioners’ climate change claims are founded on Interi- or’s Leasing Program actions and the effects of those actions on the climate in general. Moreover, to the extent that Petitioners allege that the Leasing Program caused any actual harm to any territory, this harm is limited to areas of the OCS— areas that are owned by the federal government, not by a state or Native American tribe. Aside from these allegations of generalized harm brought about by climate change, Petitioners have not demonstrated that climate change would directly cause any diminution of Point Hope’s territory any more than anywhere else. Accordingly, without this necessary element being present, we find that Massachusetts’s limited holding does not extend to the standing analysis in this case.

Moreover, it is doubtful that Point Hope would be able to assert a' quasi-sovereign claim on behalf of its members against the federal government, as Massachusetts had against the EPA. Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Massachusetts recognized the general rule that a sovereign is prohibited from bringing an action to protect its citizens from the operation of federal statutes. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520 n. 17, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (majority opinion); id. at 539, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 484-86, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923). Here, Point Hope does not allege any specific harm that it has suffered individually as a result of Interior’s actions in approving the Leasing Program. Instead, Point Hope is suing on behalf of its members and their individual interests. As the Court has long recognized, only the United States, and not the states, may represent its citizens and ensure their protection under federal law in federal matters. See Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485-86, 43 S.Ct. 597.

Outside of the very limited factual setting of Massachusetts, the Supreme Court’s decision in Defenders of Wildlife sets forth the test for standing. See Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C.Cir.1996). In order for a petitioner to establish standing, a petitioner must demonstrate that it has suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is caused by, or fairly traceable to, the act challenged in the litigation and redressable by the court. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130; Fla. Audubon Soc’y, 94 F.3d at 663. In cases such as this, where the petitioner is not the object of an alleged government action or inaction, “standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 758, 104 S.Ct. 3315). In cases such as this, causation and redressability ordinarily hinge on the actions of “independent actors not before the courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume either to control or to predict.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (quoting ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615, 109 S.Ct. 2037, 104 L.Ed.2d 696 (1989) *478(opinion of Kennedy, J.)). Accordingly, the petitioner bears the burden of “ad-ducting] facts showing that those [third-party] choices have been or will be made in such manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)).

Petitioners’ substantive theory of standing fails because Petitioners have not established either the injury or causation element of standing. First, it is well-established that a party must demonstrate that it has suffered an injury that affects it in a “personal and individual way.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Standing analysis does not examine whether the environment in general has suffered an injury. See Fla. Audubon Soc’y, 94 F.3d at 665. And yet Petitioners’ substantive argument focuses on just this type of injury: that climate change might occur in the Arctic environment if the Leasing Program is allowed to proceed. This type of injury is insufficient to establish standing for two reasons. First, Petitioners’ alleged injury runs afoul of the requirement that a justiciable injury must be “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). Petitioners can only aver that any significant adverse effects of climate change “may” occur at some point in the future. This does not amount to the actual, imminent, or “certainly impending” injury required to establish standing. Second, climate change is a harm that is shared by humanity at large, and the redress that Petitioners seek — to prevent an increase in global temperature — is not focused any more on these petitioners than it is on the remainder of the world’s population. Therefore Petitioners’ alleged injury is too generalized to establish standing.

Even if Petitioners were able to demonstrate an injury sufficient for standing, their substantive theory would still fail because Petitioners have failed to demonstrate a causal link between the government action by Interior and Petitioners’ particularized injury. To properly establish causation, the injury must be “‘fairly’ traceable to the challenged action.” Allen, 468 U.S. at 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315. That is, the plaintiff must show that “it is substantially probable ... that the challenged acts of the defendant, not of some absent third party, will cause the particularized injury of the plaintiff.” Fla. Audubon Soc’y, 94 F.3d at 663 (citing Allen, 468 U.S. at 753 n. 19, 104 S.Ct. 3315). The more attenuated or indirect the chain of causation between the government’s conduct and the plaintiffs injury, the less likely the plaintiff will be able to establish a causal link sufficient for standing. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 757-58, 104 S.Ct. 3315.

In this case, Petitioners rely on too tenuous a causal link between their allegations of climate change and Interior’s action in the first stage of this Leasing Program. In order to reach the conclusion that Petitioners are injured because of Interior’s alleged failure to consider the effects of climate change with respect to the Leasing Program, Petitioners must argue that: adoption of the Leasing Program will bring about drilling; drilling, in turn, will bring about more oil; this oil will be consumed; the consumption of this oil will result in additional carbon dioxide being dispersed into the air; this carbon dioxide will consequently cause climate change; this climate change will adversely affect the animals and their habitat; therefore Petitioners are injured by *479the adverse effects on the animals they enjoy. Such a causal chain cannot adequately establish causation because Petitioners rely on the speculation that various different groups of actors not present in this case — namely, oil companies, individuals using oil in their cars, cars actually dispersing carbon dioxide — might act in a certain way in the future. Moreover, Petitioners’ causal chain fails to take into account that, at each successive stage of the Leasing Program, the law requires that Interior conduct additional and more detailed assessments of the Program’s potential effect on the proposed leasing areas. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1340(g)(3), 1351(h)(l)(D)(i). As mentioned previously, these additional analyses could scuttle a leasing program if the environmental effects of that program are found to be excessive. See supra Section I.B. Petitioners therefore also do not have standing because they cannot adequately establish causation. Accordingly, Petitioners’ substantive theory of standing fails.

2. Petitioners’ Procedural Theory of Standing

Alternatively, Petitioners argue that they are injured by Interior’s failure to comply with both OCSLA and NEPA requirements. Specifically, Petitioners claim that Interior violated both OCSLA and NEPA because Interior failed to consider both the economic costs of the greenhouse gas emissions associated with the Program and the effects of climate change on OCS areas. As the Supreme Court noted in Defenders of Wildlife, a plaintiff may have standing if it can show that an agency failed to abide by a procedural requirement that was “designed to protect some threatened concrete interest” of the plaintiff. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 573 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 2130. In such cases, the omission of a procedural requirement does not, by itself, give a party standing to sue. Fla. Audubon Soc’y,