In Re Exide Technologies

OPINION ON CONFIRMATION 2

The Debtor asks that this Court confirm its Fourth Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Plan”). 3 Objections to the Plan have been filed by various parties, including, th'e Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, Smith Management, LLC, HSBC Bank USA as Indenture Trustee, Enersys, Inc., and others. The *53 hearing to consider confirmation of the Debtor’s Plan was held on October 21, 22, 25, 27, and November 1, 6, and 12, 2003. For the reasons set forth below, I conclude that the Debtor’s Plan cannot be confirmed in its present form.

BACKGROUND

1. The Bankruptcy Filing.

On April 15, 2002 (the “Petition Date”), Exide Technologies, f/k/a Exide Corporation, Exide Delaware, L.L.C., Exide Illinois and RBD Liquidation, L.L.C. (the “Original Debtors”) filed voluntary petitions for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. On November 21, 2002, Dixie Metals Company and Refined Metals Corporation (the “Additional Debtors”) also filed voluntary petitions for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. An order consolidating the cases for the Original Debtors and the Additional Debtors (collectively, the “Chapter 11 Cases”) was entered by the Court on November 29, 2002. The Debtor continues in possession of its properties and is operating and managing its businesses as a debtor and debtor in possession pursuant to §§ 1107(a) and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code.

On April 29, 2002, the United States Trustee appointed the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Creditors Committee”). On September 23, 2002, the Court entered an order appointing the Official Committee of Equity Security Holders of Exide Technologies (the “Equity Committee”). 4

2. Summary of the Debtor’s Business, 5

The Debtor manufactures and supplies lead acid batteries for transportation and industrial applications worldwide, with operations in Europe, North America and Asia. The Debtor’s operations outside the United States are not included in the chapter 11 proceedings. The Debtor’s transportation segment represented approximately 63% of its business in fiscal year 2003. Transportation batteries include starting, lighting and ignition batteries for cars, trucks, off-road vehicles, agricultural and construction vehicles, motorcycles, recreational vehicles, boats, and other applications. In North America, Exide is the second largest manufacturer of transportation batteries. In Europe, Exide is the largest manufacturer of transportation batteries.

The Debtor’s industrial business consists of two segments: motive power and network power. Sales of motive power batteries represented approximately 20% of the company’s net sales for fiscal year 2003. Exide is a market leader in this segment of the worldwide industrial battery market. The largest application for motive power batteries is the materials handling industry, including forklifts, electric counter balance trucks, pedestrian pallet trucks, low level order pickers, turret trucks, tow tractors, reach trucks and very narrow aisle trucks.

Sales of network power batteries represented approximately 17% of the company’s net sales for fiscal year 2003. Network power (also known as standby or stationary) batteries are used for back-up power application to ensure continuous power supply in case of main (primary) power failure.

On September 29, 2000, the Debtor acquired GNB Technologies, Inc. (“GNB”), a U.S. and Pacific Rim manufacturer of both industrial and transportation batteries, from Pacific Dunlop Limited.

3.Prepetition and DIP Lending.

On the Petition Date, the Debtor and certain lenders (the “DIP Lenders”) entered into the Secured Super Priority *54 Debtor in Possession Credit Agreement (the “DIP Agreement”). Also on the Petition Date, the Debtor, its foreign non-debtor affiliates and the Prepetition Lenders 6 executed the Standstill Agreement and Fifth Amendment to the Credit Agreement (the “Standstill Agreement”), in which the Prepetition Lenders agreed to forbear from exercising any of their rights and remedies relating to defaults under the prepetition credit agreement against the Debtor’s non-debtor affiliates until December 18, 2003. 7 The Standstill Agreement contains a cross-default provision, which provides that a default under the DIP Agreement also constitutes a default under the Standstill Agreement. On April 17, 2002, the Court approved the DIP Agreement on an interim basis, and by Order dated May 10, 2002, the DIP Agreement was approved on a final basis (the “Final DIP Order”). 8

4. The Creditors Committee’s Adversary Proceeding.

In the Final DIP Order, the Debtor agreed with the Prepetition Lenders not to investigate the conduct or claims of the Prepetition Lenders and waived any claims it might have against the Prepetition Lenders. Thereafter, the Creditors Committee negotiated for and obtained the right to pursue investigations of and causes of action against the Prepetition Lenders as part of the Final DIP Order. After conducting its own investigation and analysis, the Creditors Committee took the position that the estate had significant causes of action against the Prepetition Lenders and, on January 16, 2003, the Creditors Committee commenced a suit against the Prepetition Lenders in the adversary proceeding styled Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, et al v. Credit Suisse First Boston et al. (No. 03-50134-KJC)(the “Adversary Proceeding”). 9 The Adversary Proceeding alleges that, in financing the Debtor’s purchase of GNB in 2000, the Prepetition Lenders were able to obtain significant control over the Debtor, enabling the Prepetition Lenders to force the Debtor to provide them with additional collateral and to control the Debtor’s bankruptcy filing. The Adversary Proceeding complaint included counts to recharacterize part of the Prepetition Credit Facility as an equity contribution, to equitably subordinate the Prepetition Credit Facility Claims to the payment of general unsecured claims, to avoid certain transfers from the Debtor to the Prepetition Lenders as insider preference payments and/or as fraudulent transfers, to find that the Prepetition Lenders aided and abetted the Debtor’s breach of its fiduciary duties to the Debtor’s unsecured creditors, and for deepening insolvency.

*55 On February 27, 2003, the Prepetition Lenders filed a motion to dismiss the Adversary Proceeding. By this Court’s Order and Memorandum dated August 21, 2003, the motion to dismiss was granted, in part, and denied, in part, so that R2 was dismissed as a party plaintiff and Count I (Recharacterization) and Count XVIII (objection to the Prepetition Lenders’ claims under § 502) were dismissed. 10 Other Counts were dismissed with leave to amend and the Creditors Committee filed an amended complaint on September 4, 2003 (the “Amended Complaint”). 11 Discovery was limited during the pendency of the Prepetition Lenders’ motion to dismiss and, although intense discovery activity took place prior to the confirmation hearing, the Creditors Committee argues that yet more discovery is necessary in connection with claims raised in the Adversary Proceeding.

5. The Debtor’s Plan.

On September 8, 2003, the Debtor filed the Second Amended Disclosure Statement for the Debtor’s Third Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Disclosure Statement”) and the Third Amended Plan. On September 10, 2003, this Court entered the Order (A) Approving the Debtor’s Disclosure Statement; (B) Scheduling a Hearing to Confirm the Plan; (C) Establishing A Deadline for Objecting to the Debtor’s Plan; (D) Approving Form of Ballots, Voting Deadline and Solicitation Procedures; and (E) Approving Form and Manner of Notices (the “Disclosure Statement Order”). The Disclosure Statement Order, among other things, approved the Disclosure Statement and authorized the Debtor to solicit acceptances of the Plan.

The Plan summarized its classification and treatment of claims and equity interests as follows:

Summary of Classification and Treatment of Claims and Equity Interests: Ex-ide 12

Class_Claim_Status_Voting Right

PI_Other Priority Claims_Unimpaired_Deemed to Accept

P2_Other Secured Claims_Unimpaired_Deemed to Accept

P3_Prepetition Credit Facility Claims_Impaired_Entitled to vote

P4_General Unsecured Claims Impaired_Entitled to vote

P5_2,9% Convertible Note Claims_Impaired_Deemed to reject

P6_Equity Interests_Impaired_Deemed to reject

*56 Summary of Classification and Treatment of Claims and Equity Interests: Subsidiary Debtor 13

Class_Claim_ Status_Voting Right

51_Other Priority Claims_Unimpaired_Deemed to Accept

52_Other Secured Claims_Unimpaired_Deemed to Accept

53_Prepetition Credit Facility Claims_Impaired_Entitled to vote

54_General Unsecured Claims_Impaired_Deemed to Reject

P5_Equity Interests_Impaired_Deemed to reject

See Plan, Section III.A.1.

The Plan provides holders of Prepetition Credit Facility Claims with two options for treatment. Prepetition Lenders who select “Election A” receive a combination of a Pro Rata share of New Exide Preferred Stock and a Pro Rata distribution in cash, all calculated as described more in Section III.B.3 of the Plan. Prepetition Lenders who select “Election B” receive a Pro Rata share of the “Class P3 Election B Distribution,” which includes New Exide Preferred Stock as calculated and as described more fully in Section III.B.3 of the Plan. Each election provides for different treatment of the Prepetition Lenders’ Pre-petition Foreign Secured Claims (i.e., pre-petition credit facility claims as to which any of the “Foreign Subsidiary Borrowers” are obligors).

The Plan also splits Exide’s General Unsecured Claims (Class P-4) into two subclasses for purposes of distribution. 14 Class P4-A consists of Non-Noteholder General Unsecured Claims and Class P4-B consists of 10% Senior Note Claims. 15 The Plan provides that Class P4-A, the General Unsecured Claims, will receive a Pro Rata distribution of the Class P4-A Cash Pool. The Class P4-A Cash Pool consists of cash in the amount of $4.4 million. The Debtor projects claims in this class to be in the approximate amount of $322.5 million, resulting in a projected recovery of 1.4%. 16 See Disclosure Statement, p. 4. The Plan provides that Class P4-B, the 10% Senior Noteholders, will receive, in part, a Pro Rata distribution of New Exide Common Stock. There are approximately $300 million in claims in Class P4-B, and the Debtor values the common stock distribution in the amount of $4.1 million, so that the subclasses of Class P-4 are to receive an equivalent recovery of 1.4% of their claims. See Disclosure Statement, pp. 4-6.

6. Objections to the Plan.

The Debtor received more than twenty-five responses and objections to the Plan. *57 At the hearing on November 6, 2003, the Debtor presented the Court with a report describing which objections were withdrawn, resolved or still pending. At this time, the objections that remain are those filed by the United States Trustee, Ener-sys, Inc., Bank of New York, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, Smith Management, LLC, HSBC Bank USA as Indenture Trustee, the Official Committee of Equity Security Holders, and the United States Environmental Protection Agency (to the extent it supports the Creditors Committee’s position arguing that the proposed “settlement” payment being offered to unsecured creditors is unfair). 17

7. Plan Voting.

On November 20, 2003, the Amended Declaration Of Voting Agent Regarding Tabulation of Votes In Connection with Debtor’s Third Amended Joint Plan Of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Plan Voting Report”) was filed. The Plan Voting Report showed that more than 90% in number and amount of the votes received by the Pre-petition Credit Facility Claims (Class P3/ S3) voted in favor of the Plan, while 71.82% in number and 96.14% in claim amount of the aggregate General Unsecured Claims (Class P4) voted against the Plan. The voting is summarized as follows:

Impaired Class # votes # and % # and % amount and % amount and % and Description counted accept reject accepting rejecting

Class P3/S3 54 51 3 $602,549,235 $14,189,921.11 Prepetition Credit (94.44%) (5.56%) (97.70%) (2.30%) Facility Claims

Class P4 2179 614 1565 $18,744,534.77 $466,759.34 General Unsecured (28.18%) (71.82%) (3.86%) (96.14%) 18 Claims, Aggregate 19

Class P4-A 1612 467 1145 $9,822,205.77 $424,636,302.34 General Unsecured (28.97%) (71.03%) (2.26%) (97.74%) Claims 20

Class P4-B 567 147 420 $8,922,329.00 $42,123,000.00 General Unsecured (25.93%) (74.07%) (17.48%) (82.52%) Claims 21

The Voting Report clearly shows that Class P3 (Prepetition Credit Facility Claims) voted overwhelmingly in favor of the Plan, while Class P4 (General Unse *58 cured Claims) voted overwhelmingly against the Plan (regardless of how General Unsecured Claims are grouped).

DISCUSSION

1. Plan Confirmation Requirements and Remaining Objections.

The requirements for confirmation are set forth in § 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code. The plan proponent bears the burden of establishing the plan’s compliance with each of the requirements set forth in § 1129(a), while the objecting parties bear the burden of producing evidence to support their objections. Matter of Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 266 B.R. 591, 598-99 (Bankr.D.Del.2001); Matter of Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 251 B.R. 213, 221 (Bankr.D.N.J.2000) (citations omitted). In a case such as this one, in which an impaired class does not vote to accept the plan, the plan proponent must also show that the plan meets the additional requirements of § 1129(b), including the requirements that the plan does not unfairly discriminate against dissenting classes and the treatment of the dissenting classes is fair and equitable. Id.

The chief issues raised in the remaining objections to the Debtor’s Plan include the following:

(i) whether the Plan was proposed by self-interested management for the purpose of maximizing value and benefits to the Prepetition Lenders, who, it is alleged, will receive in excess of the full value of their claims, at the expense of the unsecured creditors, thereby violating § 1129(a)(3), (b)(1) and (b)(2);

(ii) whether the Plan’s proposed settlement of the Creditors Committee’s .. Adversary Proceeding fails to comply with the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and was not proposed in good faith, thereby violating § 1129(a)(1), (a)(3), (b)(1) and (b)(2);

(iii) whether the proposed post-confirmation release and injunction provisions in the Plan violate applicable bankruptcy law, thereby violating § 1129(a)(2); and

(iv) whether the Plan discriminates unfairly in its treatment of unsecured creditors, thereby violating § 1129(a)(2) and 1129(b)(1) and (b)(2).

Because the parties’ competing views of Exide’s enterprise value permeate all of these issues, I first consider valuation.

2. The Debtor’s Enterprise Valuation.

The Debtor and the Creditors Committee each offered their own expert to testify about the Debtor’s enterprise value. The Debtor presented the expert testimony and valuation analysis of Arthur B. Newman (“Newman”), a senior managing director and founding partner of the Restructuring and Reorganization Group of The Blackstone Group, L.P. (“Blackstone”), who has over 38 years of experience in the merger and acquisitions market for restructuring companies. The Creditors Committee presented the expert testimony and analysis of William Q. Der-rough (“Derrough”), a managing director and co-head of the Recapitalization and Restructuring Group of Jefferies & Company, Inc. (“Jefferies”), who also was qualified as an expert based upon his experience in numerous restructuring, fi-nancings, and merger and acquisition transactions. 22

*59 Both experts used the same three methods to determine the Debtor’s value: (i) comparable company analysis; (ii) comparable transaction analysis; and (Hi) discounted cash flow. However, the end results of their valuations were far from similar. Newman, the Debtor’s expert, set the Debtor’s value in a range between $950 million and $1.050 billion, while Derrough, the Creditors Committee’s expert, set the value in a range between $1.478 billion and $1.711 billion. 23 It becomes necessary, therefore, to delve deeper in the parties’ respective approaches to valuation, so that the court may make its own determination.

The Debtor argues that its expert used a “market-based approach” to valuation that determines value on a going concern basis by analyzing the price that could be realized for a debtor’s assets in a realistic framework, assuming a willing seller and a willing buyer. Travellers Int’l AG v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (In re Trans World Airlines, Inc.), 134 F.3d 188, 193-94 (3d Cir.1998). The Debtor claims that Newman’s application of the valuation methods in this case “reflects the manner in which he believes real world purchasers will view the Company.” Debtor’s Post-Trial Brief in Support of Confirmation (Docket # 3092), p. 3-4. The Debtor also argues that Newman’s value is confirmed by the “private equity process” conducted by the Debtor during the chapter 11 case, during which offers were solicited from potential purchasers, including private equity firms and one strategic buyer. The Debtor claims that the process fixed the total enterprise value of the Debtor in a range of $782 million and $950 million. See The Newman Report, pp. 6, 17-18. 24

*60 The Creditors Committee, on the other hand, argues that the most accurate way to determine the enterprise value of a debtor corporation is by the straight-forward application of the three standard valuation methodologies. To support its position, the Creditors Committee presented expert testimony of Professor Edith Hotchkiss (“Hotchkiss”), a professor of finance at Boston College who, in addition to teaching the topic of how to value companies, has performed research and written articles specifically related to valuation of companies in bankruptcy. 25 Hotchkiss agreed with the Creditors Committee’s argument in favor of objective application of the valuation methods, and opined that although determining the “inputs” for the methods of valuation tends to involve some subjectivity (e.g., choosing the comparable companies or transactions), the mechanics of the calculating value based upon standard methods should not. Tr. 10/25/03, pp. 120-21. Hotchkiss noted that, in this case, the input information chosen by the experts was not significantly different; what caused the variance was that Newman made a subjective determination to reduce further the multiples determined from the input information prior to applying the valuation formula. Tr. 10/25/03, pp. 121— 25.

The Creditors Committee argues, too, that Hotchkiss’ research also supports its argument that the Debtor has undervalued the company. In her research, Hotchkiss compared the value of chapter 11 debtor companies prior to confirmation, which she determined by applying the valuation methods to the cash flows in the Debtor’s disclosure statements, to the market price of the debtor companies after exiting chapter 11. o Tr. 10/25/03, p. 113. Her research showed that, in some cases, the debtors’ disclosure statement cash flows were significantly overvaluing or undervaluing the debtors and, from those findings, she extrapolated certain factors that tended to predict when debtors were being overvalued or undervalued. Tr. 10/25/03, pp. 115-16. She noted that plans providing management and/or senior creditors with the majority of stock or options in the reorganized company (as in the Debtor’s Plan) is a strong indicator that the company is being undervalued, resulting in a windfall for management and the senior creditors. 26 Tr. 10/25/03, p. 116-17.

A determination of the Debtor’s value directly impacts the issues of whether the *61 proposed plan is “fair and equitable,” as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). Section 1129(b)(2) sets forth the “absolute priority rule,” applicable to unsecured creditors, which provides that a plan may be confirmed despite rejection by a class of unsecured creditors if the plan does not offer a junior claimant any property before each unsecured claims receives full satisfaction of its allowed claim. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii); Genesis Health Ventures, 266 B.R. at 612. Courts have decided that “a corollary of the absolute priority rule is that a senior class cannot receive more than full compensation for its claims.” Id. citing In re MCorp Financial, Inc., 137 B.R. 219, 225 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.1992). The Creditors Committee argues that the Debtor’s expert has undervalued the company and that the Plan will result in paying the Prepetition Lenders more than 100% of their claims to the detriment of the unsecured creditors. The Debtor, on the other hand, argues that the Creditors Committee’s expert has overvalued the company and that the Plan is fair and equitable in its treatment of unsecured creditors. The following is a detailed review of the competing experts’ valuation reports, keeping in mind each side’s incentive to either overvalue or undervalue the Debtor.

A. Comparable Company Analysis.

The key components of a comparable company analysis are the Debtor’s EBIT-DA (i.e., earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) and the selection of an appropriate multiple to apply to the EBITDA to arrive at enterprise value. The appropriate multiple is determined by comparing the enterprise value of comparable publicly traded companies to their trailing twelve months EBITDA. 27 A subjective assessment is required to select the comparable companies and, here, the parties argue about which comparable companies are more appropriate to use.

However, as pointed out by the Creditors Committee, regardless of the compa-rables used, both experts arrived at similar EBITDA multiples, with Newman at 7.2x and Derrough at 7.7x. However, Newman then reduced his multiple to a range between 5.0x and 6.0x, because he determined that his comparable for the Debtor’s industrial division (C & D Technologies) should be given less weight. The Debtor also argues that Newman’s reduced multiple is more in line with the implied EBIT-DA multiples that can be derived from the Debtor’s private equity process. See, Newman Report, p. 18.

The experts significantly differed on their choice of the data to use for the Debtor’s EBITDAR. 28 Newman used the EBITDAR for the twelve months ending June 30, 2003, ($179.4 million) as set forth in the Debtor’s revised five-year plan prepared in October 2003 (Ex. D-18) Newman explained that using the “historical” EBIT-DAR is appropriate in this case since it is the latest date for which actual EBITDAR is available for both the Debtor and the comparable companies. Derrough, however, used the EBITDAR based on projected earnings for the trailing twelve months ending December 31, 2003 ($196 million). Derrough’s figure is based upon the Debt- or’s business plan that was prepared in December 2002 because he did not have access to the revised October 2003 business plan.

*62 Hotchkiss testified that a comparable company analysis for companies emerging from chapter 11 should use the first year’s projected EBITDAR because the historical EBITDAR does not reflect any of the benefits from the debtor’s restructuring. (Tr. 10/25/08, p. 125), which results in understating value. Id. Derrough’s use of the December 31, 2003 figure uses half historical and half projected EBITDAR, so it is an arguably more conservative approach than that suggested by Hotchkiss. Tr. 10/25/03, p. 128.

In determining the Debtor’s value for purposes of deciding whether the Debtor’s Plan is fair and equitable, it is appropriate to include the benefit of the Debtor’s restructuring. Part of the purpose of this exercise is to determine whether the Debtor’s intent to give common stock to the Prepetition Lenders results in paying the Prepetition Lender more than 100% of the value of their claims. This requires a forward-looking valuation and I conclude that it is appropriate to use projected, rather than historic, EBITDAR. 29 Because the Debtor has revised its projections, the most appropriate EBITDAR to use would be for the trailing twelve months ending December 31, 2003 as set forth in the October 2003 business plan ($188.2 million).

Based on the foregoing comparable company analyses, Newman determined that the Debtor’s enterprise value was a range between $897 million to $1,076 billion, while Derrough determined that the Debt- or’s enterprise value was $1,515 billion. 30 However, because I find that it is appropriate to calculate value based upon the EBITDAR for the trailing twelve months ending December 31, 2003 ($188.2 million), and the appropriate multiple is between 7.2 (the multiple calculated by Newman before subjectively reducing it) and 7.7x (Derrough’s multiple), the comparable company value should be in the range between $1,355 billion (using 7.2x) and $1,449 billion (using 7.7x).

B. Comparable Transaction Analysis.

The comparable transaction analysis is similar to the comparable company analysis in that an EBITDA multiple is determined from recent merger and acquisition transactions in the automotive and industrial battery industries and that multiple is then applied to the appropriate trailing twelve months of the Debtor. Newman calculated multiples for two transactions that took place in 2002 (6.0x and 7.2x) and set his multiple in a range of 5.5x to 6.0x, after adjusting the comparable transaction *63 multiples due to his knowledge of the companies involved in the 2002 transactions and his opinion that a similar strategic acquisition was not likely for the Debtor because of antitrust concerns. See The Newman Report, pp. 11, 26. Derrough, on the other hand, looked at more than a dozen merger and acquisition transactions occurring between May 1998 and November 2002 to derive an EBITDA multiple of 7.0x. However, Derrough’s “comparable transactions” for 1998 and 1999 probably are not useful in this matter since the experts agreed that the market had changed considerably since 2000. (See Tr. 10/22/03, pp. 234-35 (Newman); Tr. 10/25/03, pp. 138-39 (Hotchkiss); Tr. 10/25/03, pp. 308-09 (Derrough)).

Therefore, for the reasons discussed above regarding the comparable company analysis, a straightforward application of the multiple derived from Newman’s comparable transactions before his adjustment should be applied here. The Committee argues that a proper weighting of the multiples derived from Newman’s 2002 transactions would result in a multiple of approximately 6.4x. See Creditors Committee Post-trial Brief, p. 15.

As in the comparable company analysis, Newman then applied his multiple to the Debtor’s revised latest twelve months ending June 30, 2003 ($179.4 million), while Derrough applied his multiple to the Debt- or’s trailing twelve months ending December 31, 2003 ($196 million) as set forth in the December 2002 five-year plan. Also, for the reasons discussed in the comparable company analysis above, I have concluded that the trailing twelve months ending December 31, 2003, as updated in October 2003 plan, should be used ($188.2 million). Applying the 6.4x EBITDA multiple to the trailing twelve months ending December 31, 2003 results in a valuation of $1.204 billion.

C. Discounted Cash Flow.

The experts’ valuations based on a discounted cash flow analysis differed greatly, with Newman calculating value in a range between $1.023 and $1.254 billion and Der-rough calculating value in a range between $1.583 and 1.837 billion. Derrough applied the discounted cash flow analysis in a straight-forward manner (see Tr. 10/25/03, pp. 135-36 (Hotchkiss)), while Newman adjusted his formula based upon his “market-based approach” to valuation to account for the manner in which he believed prospective purchasers would view the Debt- or.

The discounted cash flow (“DCF”) analysis has been described as a “forward-looking” method that “measure[s] value by forecasting a firms’ ability to generate cash.” Pantaleo, supra, n. 29, at 427. DCF is calculated by adding together (i) the present value of the company’s projected distributable cash flows (i.e., cash flows available to all investors) during the forecast period, and (ii) the present value of the company’s terminal value (i.e., value of the firm at the end of the forecast period). In this case, the experts relied on the Debtor’s projected cash flows for the fiscal years ending March 31, 2004 through March 31, 2008, as set forth in the Debt- or’s five-year business plans. 31 The DCF factors which the parties dispute are (1) the discount rate; and (2) the multiple used to calculate terminal value. See, generally, 7 Collier On BanKruptoy ¶ 1129.06[2][a][ii] (15th ed. rev.2003).

Newman used a discount rate in the range of 15% to 17%, while Derrough used *64 a discount rate in the range of 10.5% and 11.5%. Both experts relied on a weighted average cost of capital (the “WACC”) to determine the discount rate, which is based upon a combined rate of the cost of debt capital and the cost of equity capital. In determining the cost of equity, Der-rough used the generally accepted method known as the capital asset pricing model or “CAPM.” 32 Newman, however, chose not to use CAPM because he noted that CAPM can be inaccurate when applied to company that is not publicly traded. Tr. 10/22/03, pp. 236-38. See also Tr. 10/27/03, pp. 86-87 (Pfieffer agreeing). However, in such cases, comparable companies are used to determine the “beta” for a CAPM valuation (see Tr. 10/25/03, pp. 212-13 (Derrough)), but Newman felt that comparable companies are inappropriate in this instance because the Debtor is emerging from chapter 11 and will face substantial risk in executing its five-year projected business plan. See Tr. 10/22/03, pp. 238-39.

Therefore, Newman determined cost of equity based upon information showing the rate of return on equity that a prospective purchase would demand. Based upon the private equity process (and, the Debtor argues, supported by the testimony of John Craig of Enersys, Inc), Newman used a cost of equity between 20% and 30%; while the standard CAPM method employed by Derrough resulted in a cost of equity between 13.6% and 14.6%. 33

Furthermore, in calculating WACC, Newman determined the cost of debt at 7.5%, while Derrough’s calculation resulted in a cost of debt at 5.9%. The Debtor’s own five-year plan assumes a cost of debt at 6.2%. (Tr. 10/22/03, pp. 322-23).

Discounted cash flow analysis has been used to determine valuation in many chapter 11 cases. See, e.g., In re Zenith Elecs. Corp., 241 B.R. 92, 103-05 (Bankr.D.Del.1999); and In re Cellular Information Systems, Inc., 171 B.R. 926, 930-37 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1994). Newman’s numerous subjective adjustments to the analysis stray too far from the generally accepted method of determining the discount rate. Therefore, I will rely on Derrough’s more straight forward determination of the discount rate.

Newman determined the terminal value in his discounted cash flow analysis by *65 using the same adjusted EBITDA multiple as used in his comparable company analysis (i.e., 5.0x to 6.0x). Derrough, however, used the actual multiple which he derived from his comparable company analysis. Again, Newman’s terminal value multiple was adjusted, causing his calculation to depart from the standard discounted cash flow methodology.

The Debtor argues that in the final determination of enterprise value, Derrough accorded too much weight to his DCF analysis. Derrough elected to attribute 60% of his total valuation to his DCF analysis. The Debtor argues that a DCF analysis is dependent on a company’s ability to meet long-range projections, in this case the Debtor’s FY 2008 projections. Because the long-range projections are the most speculative and uncertain, and because testimony of the Debtor’s officers showed that the Debtor’s past and current performance has not met the projections in its business plans (see Tr. 10/21/03, pp. 218-19 (Donahue); Tr. 11/1/03, p. 126 (Muhlhauser)), the Debtor argues that Derrough’s strong reliance on his DCF is misplaced.

Courts often rely upon DCF analyses in valuing reorganizing debtors. I conclude that it is appropriate to consider DCF when detennining such value and no less weight should be accorded to DCF because it relies upon projections. When other helpful valuation analyses are available, as in this case, each method should be weighed and then all methods should be considered together.

D. Valuation Summary.

There are many approaches to valuation, but value “gathers its meaning in a particular situation from the purpose for which a valuation is being made.” 7 Collier On Baniuiuptcy § 1129.06[2], at 1129-154 (15th ed. rev.2003) quoting Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 523, 540, 63 S.Ct. 727, 738, 87 L.Ed. 959, 994 (1943). The Supreme Court has held that a reorganized debtor’s value should be based upon earning capacity. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 526, 61 S.Ct. 675, 685, 85 L.Ed. 982 (1941)(“The criterion of earning capacity is the essential one if the enterprise is to be freed from the heavy hand of past errors, miscalculations or disaster, and if the allocation of securities among the various claimants is to be fair and equitable.”) As discussed in a leading treatise, this view was “not a rejection of the market; rather, this reflected a notion that markets undervalued entities in bankruptcy, and that the taint of the proceeding would adversely affect what someone would pay.” 7 Collier on Bankruptcy § 1129.06[2][a], at 129-155 (15th ed. rev. ■2003). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals also agreed with this approach, writing:

That argument [that market value should not be used] has considerable force when the securities in issue represent equity in, or long term interest bearing obligations of, a reorganized debtor. In such cases, the market value of the security will depend upon the investing public’s perception of the future prospects of the enterprise. That perception may well be unduly distorted by the recently concluded reorganization and the prospect of lean years for the enterprise in the immediate future. Use of a substitute “reorganization value” may under the circumstances be the only fair means of determining the value of the securities distributed.

Matter of Penn Central Transportation Co., 596 F.2d 1102, 1115-16 (3d Cir.1979). Collier’s notes that “modern finance has caught up with” the Supreme Court’s directions in Consolidated Rock by providing *66 courts with valuation methodologies that focus upon earning capacity, such as the comparable company analysis and the discounted cash flow analysis used in this case. 7 Collier On Bankruptcy § 1129.06[2][a], at 1129-156 (15th ed. rev. 2003); Pantaleo, supra, n. 29, at 420-21.

The stated purpose for Newman’s numerous adjustments to the valuation methodologies were to bring value calculations in line with current market value. This is not appropriate when seeking to value securities of a reorganized debtor since the “taint” of bankruptcy will cause the market to undervalue the securities and future earning capacity of the Debtor. See Penn Central, 596 F.2d at 1115-16. The more appropriate method, in this instance, is a straight forward application of the valuation methodologies to arrive at a better understanding of whether the Debt- or’s Plan treats creditors fairly and equitably.

E. Valuation Conclusion.

The Debtor advocates an enterprise value in the range of $950 million to $1,050 billion; the Creditors Committee advocates a range of $1.5 billion to $1.7 billion. After considering the various methods employed by the experts and their resultant valuations, the competing incentives of the parties to either overvalue or undervalue the company, and the extensive, divergent evidence offered in support of valuation, and consistent with the above analysis of all of these, I determine the Debtor’s enterprise value to be in the range of $1.4 billion to $1.6 billion.

3. Proposed Settlement of the Adversary Proceeding.

The Creditors Committee and other objecting parties argue that the Debtor’s Plan cannot be confirmed because a key element of the Plan is the settlement of the Creditors Committee’s Adversary Proceeding by including a broad release of claims related to the Prepetition Credit Facility (see Article X of the Debtor’s Plan) in exchange for a distribution to the General Unsecured Creditors in the maximum amount of $8.5 million. The Creditors Committee and Smith Management argue that the proposed settlement (i) was made by the Debtor, who is not a party to the litigation and has no standing or right to settle the litigation; and (ii) falls far below the “range of reasonableness” for settlement of the Adversary Proceeding.

A plan may include a provision that settles or adjusts any claim belonging to the debtor or the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(A). See also Protective Comm. For Independent Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424, 88 S.Ct. 1157, 1163, 20 L.Ed.2d 1 (1968)(“Compromises are ‘a normal part of the process of reorganization.’ ”) (citations omitted). The unsecured creditors, however, argue that the Debtor does not have standing or authority to control and settle the Adversary Proceeding. The unsecured creditors draw attention to the Stipulation and Consent Order signed by the Debtor, in which it waived all claims against the Prepetition Lenders in exchange for debtor-in-possession financing, and ceded authority to the Creditors Committee and the investors to pursue claims against the Prepetition Lenders. Order (Consent) Approving Stipulation, Docket # 1174 (November 29, 2002). Because the Debtor did not reserve any rights with respect to the claims, the unsecured creditors argue that the Debtor gave up any right to settle, dismiss or participate in the litigation.

The unsecured creditors also argue that allowing the Debtor to control and settle the Adversary Proceeding directly contravenes the purpose and ruling of the Third *67 Circuit’s recent decision Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Chinery (In re Cybergenics Corp.), 330 F.3d 548 (3d Cir.2003), in which the Court determined that the Bankruptcy Code allowed a creditors committee to bring a derivative avoidance action on behalf of