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Full Opinion
P.V., by her Guardians Ad Litem T.V. and L.V. and T.V. and L.V., Individually, Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
CAMP JAYCEE, Defendant-Appellant, and
"A" Through "Z" Doe (fictitious names actual names being unknown), Defendants.
Supreme Court of New Jersey.
*455 Walter F. Kawalec, III, Cherry Hill, argued the cause for appellant (Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, attorneys).
Philip G. Auerbach, Red Bank, argued the cause for respondents (Lomurro, Davison, Eastman & Munoz, attorneys).
Justice LONG delivered the opinion of the Court.
This choice-of-law case involves the question of whether New Jersey's charitable immunity statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7 to -11, applies to a tort committed in Pennsylvania. In 2003, a mentally disabled New Jersey resident was sexually abused at a summer camp located in Pennsylvania but operated by a New Jersey charity. Her parents sued the camp individually and on her behalf for negligent supervision at the campsite. The trial judge granted the camp's motion for summary judgment based on the doctrine of charitable immunity to which New Jersey adheres by statute. The Appellate Division reversed, declaring that Pennsylvania law governs the action because the commonwealth, which has abrogated charitable immunity and is the state in which the tortious conduct and injury occurred, has the greater governmental interest in the case. The camp filed a petition for certification that we granted.
Although we have traditionally denominated our conflicts approach as a flexible "governmental interest" analysis, we have continuously resorted to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) in resolving conflict disputes arising out of tort. See, e.g., Erny v. Estate of Merola, 171 N.J. 86, 95-96, 792 A.2d 1208 (2002); Fu v. Fu, 160 N.J. 108, 119-39, 733 A.2d 1133 (1999). That approach is the "most significant relationship" test. Under that standard, the analysis in a personal injury case begins with the section 146 presumption that the local law of the state of the injury will apply. Once the presumptively applicable law is identified, that choice is tested against the contacts detailed in section 145 and the general principles outlined in section 6 of the Second Restatement. If another state has a more significant relationship to the parties or issues, the presumption will be overcome. If not, it will govern.
Examining the facts of this case as they relate to the contacts and principles articulated in the Second Restatement, we conclude *456 that Pennsylvania, the state in which the charity chose to operate and which is the locus of the tortious conduct and injury, has at least as significant a relationship to the issues as New Jersey, and that the presumptive choice of Pennsylvania law therefore has not been overcome.
I.
Over thirty years ago, New Jersey Camp Jaycee, Inc. (Camp Jaycee) was organized as a not-for-profit corporation to operate a summer program for mentally challenged individuals.[1] Although Camp Jaycee was incorporated in New Jersey and maintains an administrative office here, it has chosen to carry out its primary charitable mission in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania at a campsite in the town of Effort.
In 2003, one of Camp Jaycee's campers was P.V., a twenty-one-year-old female from New Jersey with Down syndrome and mental and emotional handicaps. P.V. had attended the camp for at least three consecutive summers. According to the complaint, in August 2003, P.V. was sexually assaulted by another camper, as a result of which she sustained injuries requiring medical treatment.
P.V.'s parents, T.V. and L.V., as guardians ad litem and individually, instituted a personal injury action in New Jersey against Camp Jaycee and several fictitious defendants. They alleged that Camp Jaycee and its agents, servants, and employees were careless and negligent in the supervision of P.V. "at the camp" in Pennsylvania. Camp Jaycee filed a motion to dismiss, asserting immunity from suit under the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act (CIA). N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7 to -11.
The trial judge granted Camp Jaycee's motion for summary judgment on the ground that, under the CIA, the camp is immune from suit by a beneficiary. The Appellate Division reversed, declaring that the CIA is not the governing law of the case because Pennsylvania, the state of the wrongful conduct and injury, has abrogated charitable immunity and has a greater interest in regulating the conduct of entities operating within its borders than New Jersey has in immunizing not-for-profit corporations. P.V. v. Camp Jaycee, 393 N.J.Super. 19, 21-22, 922 A.2d 761 (App.Div.2007). In ruling, the Appellate Division relied in part on the exceptions that have been carved out of the CIA (e.g. the CIA does not immunize charities against actions for intentional conduct) as diluting New Jersey's interest. We granted Camp Jaycee's petition for certification, 192 N.J. 295, 927 A.2d 1293 (2007), and now affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division.
II.
Camp Jaycee argues that New Jersey has a transcendent interest in the application of its charitable immunity law because the camp was organized under the laws of New Jersey; both parties are domiciled in New Jersey; Pennsylvania has no interest in the post-event rights and liabilities of two New Jersey domiciliaries; Pennsylvania is merely "the happenstance of the situs of the accident"; and no Pennsylvania citizen was injured.
P.V. counters that Pennsylvania, the state in which Camp Jaycee chose to operate; in which the tortious conduct and injury occurred; and in which the relationship of the parties was centered, has at *457 least as great if not a greater interest than New Jersey in the resolution of this matter because of its concerns over conduct-regulation and redress to tort victims.
III.
The background of our present approach to conflict of laws is helpful to this analysis. Traditionally, our courts, like those of most jurisdictions, followed the bright-line rules embodied in the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws (1934). Those rules applied the law of the jurisdiction where a right was said to have "vested." William L. Reynolds, Legal Process and Choice of Law, 56 Md. L.Rev. 1371, 1376 (1997).
A tort right vested, for example, in the state where the injury occurred (rather than, say, where the wrongful conduct occurred); a contract right vested in the state where the last act necessary to make the contract took place (usually the acceptance), and so on. The system purported to solve all choice-of-law problems by isolating a key fact (such as where the plaintiff was injured); once the location of that fact is identified, the law to be applied follows ineluctably. On the surface, at least, the judge exercises no discretion; choosing applicable law is a routine, humdrum enterprise. [Ibid.]
Under that system, courts could choose between competing laws simply by applying concepts such as lex fori, lex loci, and lex contractus, without analyzing the content of the laws, the specific facts of a case, or the contacts the parties may have had with other states. That approach often resulted in the application of the law of a state with no real connection to the litigation and led to the downfall of the First Restatement. Id. at 1380-85.
During the 1950s, "legal realists" attacked the vested rights theory and countered that, in choosing between conflicting laws, courts should take into account the policies behind those laws and the facts of the cases that gave rise to the conflict. Id. at 1380 (citing Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law: Interest Analysis and Its "New Crits", 36 Am. J. Comp. L. 681, 682 (1988) (noting early criticisms of First Restatement)).
In 1967, we joined with other jurisdictions in abandoning the First Restatement approach to tort cases, embracing the modern governmental interest analysis, for which Professor Brainerd Currie is generally credited.[2]See Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 234-35, 229 A.2d 625 (1967) (foregoing application of lex loci approach). The governmental interest test has traditionally been described as an approach by which courts seek to assess countervailing state laws through statutory construction and other interpretative mechanisms to determine whether the states' policies are aligned with either party in the litigation. Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Vicissitudes of Choice of Law: The Restatement (First, Second) and Interest Analysis, 45 Buff. L.Rev. 329, 349-50 (1997). See generally Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws 627 (1963). Under the governmental interest test, where an actual conflict exists, courts must "identify the governmental policies underlying the law of each state and how those policies are affected by each state's contacts to the litigation and the parties." Veazey v. Doremus, 103 N.J. 244, 248, 510 A.2d 1187 (1986).
Four years after our adoption of the governmental interest analysis, and seventeen *458 years after the reform effort had been undertaken, the Second Restatement was finalized. To a great extent, it embraced the "reasoned elaboration" school of judicial analysis that requires a thorough explanation of every judicial decision, tied closely to the facts of the case, and an articulation of why the decision is just. Reynolds, supra, 56 Md. L.Rev. at 1387 (quoting Henry Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 145-52 (William Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)). In place of black letter law, the Second Restatement contains presumptions and detailed considerations that bear on conflicts analyses. The philosophy underlying the Second Restatement has been described as follows:
to provide guidance for judges by reminding them of things to consider in making a choice-of-law decision. The judge then would weigh the factors in light of the facts and explain why she reached the particular result. The listed factors certainly do not control the decision; rather, they merely suggest items upon which the judges should reflect. In other words, the Second Restatement provides judges with a starting point: a set of presumptions and a list of concerns worth addressing. It is then up to the judge to make it all work. The judge has to choose which law to apply, not which theory. Indeed, theory has relatively little to do with decisionmaking under the Second Restatement.
[Id. at 1388.]
Section 6, which has been described as the "cornerstone of the entire Restatement," Eugene F. Scoles et al., Conflict of Laws 2.14 (4th ed.2004), prescribes that
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in determination and application of the law to be applied.
[Restatement, supra, 6.]
The Second Restatement also provides specific guidance for resolving particular types of cases. See, e.g., Restatement, supra, ch. 8 ("Contracts"). In connection with tort, section 145 of chapter 7 is entitled "The General Principle" and prescribes that: "The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in 6." Restatement, supra, 145(1). The contacts that are weighed in making that assessment include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
*459 [Restatement, supra, 145(2)(a)-(d).][3]
Although the Second Restatement eschews the bright lines established by its predecessor, it does not abandon all rules:
Once one ventures past section 145, however, the chapter dramatically changes character. Instead of infinitely open-ended sections, the Second Restatement, for the most part, articulates reasonably definite rules. To be sure, these succeeding sections contain escape valves that refer to section 6. Many of the rules echo the First Restatement's preference for choosing the law of the injury state. Others do not refer to the injury state directly, but choose connecting factors very likely, if not certain, to lead to the application of the law of the injury state. . . . Only a relatively few sections refer solely to the general formula of section 145 without providing some presumptive choice.
[Patrick J. Borchers, Courts and the Second Conflicts Restatement: Some Observations and an Empirical Note, 56 Md. L.Rev. 1232, 1239-40 (1997) (footnotes omitted).]
In a personal injury case, the relevant presumption is contained in section 146, which provides:
In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.
[Restatement, supra, 146.]
As is evident, a pure governmental interest analysis is distinct from the Second Restatement approach. In the former, the strength of the countervailing governmental interests is dispositive. The latter
does not focus solely on the state interests; instead, it directs courts to apply the law of the jurisdiction with "the most significant relationship" to the issue before the court. In making this determination, the court is required to consider all of the contacts that each jurisdiction has with the issue.
[Earl M. Maltz, Do Modern Theories of Conflict of Laws Work? The New Jersey Experience, 36 Rutgers L.J. 527, 530 (2005) (footnotes omitted).]
In other words, "rather than the Second Restatement being intended to provide a metric for determining the strength of state interests, the respective strength of the states' interests is a factor to be considered in measuring the significance of the contacts of the relevant states." Id. at 546.[4]
Following the promulgation of the Second Restatement, we again modified our analysis, using the Second Restatement framework as our methodology in Fu, supra, *460 160 N.J. at 119-39, 733 A.2d 1133. Indeed, although dissenting on the merits, Justice Pollock explicitly declared what the majority had implicitly acknowledged by resorting to the Second Restatement: "New Jersey's governmental-interest test is substantially similar to the most-significant-relationship test adopted by the American Law Institute in Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (the `Restatement') (1971). Thus, New Jersey now adheres to the method of analysis set forth in Restatement sections 6 (Section 6) and 145 (Section 145)." 160 N.J. at 144, 733 A.2d 1133 (Pollock, J., dissenting).
More recently, in Erny, supra, this Court specifically cited the presumption in section 146 and also identified and applied the section 145 contacts and section 6 principles to resolve a choice-of-law issue. 171 N.J. at 95-97, 792 A.2d 1208. Although continuing to denominate our standard as a kind of governmental interest test, we now apply the Second Restatement's most significant relationship standard in tort cases. Under that standard, the law of the state of the injury is applicable unless another state has a more significant relationship to the parties and issues.
The Second Restatement assessment takes place on an issue-by-issue basis. Id. at 95, 792 A.2d 1208. It is qualitative, not quantitative. Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 508 F.2d 28, 32 (3d Cir.1975). In other words, the inquiry does not focus solely on the number of contacts with each state, although that can be persuasive. We also look to the principles in section 6 to measure the significance of the contacts in order to determine whether the presumption has been overcome. Viewed through the section 6 prism, the state with the strongest section 145 contacts will have the most significant relationship to the parties or issues, and thus its law will be applied.
IV.
Procedurally, the first step is to determine whether an actual conflict exists. That is done by examining the substance of the potentially applicable laws to determine whether "`there is a distinction'" between them. Lebegern v. Forman, 471 F.3d 424, 430 (3d Cir.2006) (quoting Grossman v. Club Med Sales, Inc., 273 N.J.Super. 42, 49, 640 A.2d 1194 (App.Div. 1994)). If not, there is no choice-of-law issue to be resolved. Rowe v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 189 N.J. 615, 621, 917 A.2d 767 (2007); Gantes v. Kason Corp., 145 N.J. 478, 484, 679 A.2d 106 (1996).
Here, it is clear, as the parties have conceded, that an actual conflict exists between the laws of Pennsylvania and New Jersey. By enacting the CIA, the New Jersey Legislature has carved charitable corporations out of its tort law system and declared them to be free from most tort liability. That statute provides:
No nonprofit corporation, society or association organized exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes or its trustees, directors, officers, employees, agents, servants, or volunteers shall, except as is hereinafter set forth, be liable to respond in damages to any person who shall suffer damage from the negligence of any agent or servant of such corporation, society or association, where such person is a beneficiary, to whatever degree, of the works of such nonprofit corporation, society or association. . . .
[N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(a).]
Contrary to New Jersey's policy of immunization, Pennsylvania has definitively abrogated its charitable immunity laws and has chosen to subject charitable corporations to the same tort liability as all *461 others. Flagiello v. Pa. Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193, 207-08 (1965). Essentially then, the conflicting laws of New Jersey and Pennsylvania are two sides of the same coinÔÇöbasically comprehending polar opposite positions regarding immunity from tort liability. If New Jersey law applies, the case will be dismissed. If Pennsylvania law applies, it will proceed. Because there is an evident conflict, we turn to the Restatement analysis.
V.
Once a conflict is established, our point of departure is section 146, which, in this matter, presumes that Pennsylvania law (the local law of the state where the injury occurred) will govern the rights and liabilities of the parties. See Erny, supra, 171 N.J. at 95, 792 A.2d 1208 (commencing analysis from section 146 presumption). In that respect, Camp Jaycee makes a fundamental misstep in its analysis by misconceiving our turn away from the black letter law of lex loci as rendering the place of injury of little importance. Nothing could be further from the truth, as the presumption in section 146 underscores. Indeed, "the simple old rules can be glimpsed through modernity's fog, though spectrally thinned to presumptions." Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842, 844 (7th Cir.1999).
Section 146 recognizes the intuitively correct principle that the state in which the injury occurs is likely to have the predominant, if not exclusive, relationship to the parties and issues in the litigation. Restatement, supra, 146 comment d. It is from that vantage point that we turn to the remaining contacts set forth in sections 145 and the cornerstone principles of section 6 to determine whether New Jersey has "a more significant relationship . . . [with] the occurrence and the parties" than Pennsylvania. Restatement, supra, 146. Only such a finding would overcome the presumptive rule of section 146.[5]
VI.
Under section 145, the first contact is the place where the injury occurredÔÇö Pennsylvania, Although Camp Jaycee characterizes the place of injury as Pennsylvania's only contact with the case, nothing could be further from the truth. Indeed, the second section 145 contact is the place where the conduct causing the injury occurredÔÇöthat also is Pennsylvania. Despite our dissenting colleagues' contrary suggestion, the only allegation of negligence in the complaint is negligent supervision at the Pennsylvania campsite. In that respect,
*462 [w]hen both conduct and injury occur in a single jurisdiction, with only "rare exceptions, the local law of the state where conduct and injury occurred will be applied" to determine an actor's liability. That is so because "a state has an obvious interest in regulating the conduct of persons within its territory and in providing redress for injuries that occurred there." The place of injury becomes less important when it is simply fortuitous.
[Fu, supra, 160 N.J. at 125-26, 733 A.2d 1133 (quoting Restatement, supra, 145 comment d) (internal citations omitted).]
The place of the injury is fortuitous when "it bears little relation to the occurrence and the parties with respect to the particular issue." Restatement, supra, 145 comment e (citing Restatement, supra, 146 comments d-e). Here, the happening of the tortious conduct and injury in Pennsylvania was not a fortuity, as Camp Jaycee contendsÔÇöPennsylvania was the only location in which Camp Jaycee operated its camp for mentally disabled persons. It was a permanent fixture in that location. P.V. resided in Pennsylvania for at least three summers under the control of the camp. From that standpoint, Pennsylvania was not an unanticipated detour on the way to another location; it was the final destination. See Fu, supra, 160 N.J. at 137, 733 A.2d 1133 (citing Reale v. Herco, Inc., 183 A.D.2d 163, 589 N.Y.S.2d 502, 508 (1992) (noting infant plaintiff's decision to vacation at Hershey Park had direct and substantial nexus with Pennsylvania)).
The third contact is "the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties." Restatement, supra, 145(2)(c). To be sure, P.V. is a New Jersey domiciliary, and Camp Jaycee is a New Jersey not-for-profit corporation. However, P.V. chose to attend the camp in Pennsylvania. Moreover, as the Second Restatement underscores, the use of the term "domiciliary" when referring to corporations is imprecise. See id. 145 comment e. Courts should focus not only on an entity's place of incorporation but also on its principal place of business. Ibid. Indeed, in balancing those two epicenters, "[a]t least with respect to most issues, a corporation's principal place of business is a more important contact than the place of incorporation, and this is particularly true in situations where the corporation does little, or no, business in the latter place." Ibid.
In this case, Camp Jaycee was incorporated for the primary purpose of running a camp for mentally disabled children and adults. As far as this record reveals, Camp Jaycee has chosen to perform that function solely in Effort, Pennsylvania, and, although it does maintain an administrative office in New Jersey, the principal place of the business for which it was incorporated is Pennsylvania.
The final section 145 contact is the place where the relationship between the parties is centered. Even if P.V. signed on as a camper through Camp Jaycee's administrative office in New Jersey (and the record is silent on that issue), it is of little consequence because this is not a contracts case. Rather, it is a tort action and, from that perspective, there is no question that P.V.'s relationship with Camp Jaycee was centered on her camp experience in Effort, Pennsylvania.
In sum, on one side of the contacts ledger, P.V. and Camp Jaycee are co-domiciliaries of New Jersey. On the other side of the ledger, Camp Jaycee chose to perform the sole charitable function for which it was organized in Pennsylvania; P.V. chose to attend a camp in Pennsylvania; the relationship between P.V. and Camp Jaycee was centered on the camp experience *463 in Pennsylvania; the tortious conduct (negligent supervision) took place solely in Pennsylvania; and P.V. was injured in Pennsylvania.
Standing alone, New Jersey's contacts are certainly no greater than those of Pennsylvania. However, because our analysis is not merely quantitative, we also look to the principles of section 6 to measure the significance of those contacts. In other words, do the section 6 considerations gin up or diminish the values to be ascribed to the contacts relative to the issue presented?
VII.
Reduced to their essence, the section 6 principles are: "(1) the interests of interstate comity; (2) the interests of the parties; (3) the interests underlying the field of tort law; (4) the interests of judicial administration; and (5) the competing interests of the states." Erny, supra, 171 N.J. at 101-02, 792 A.2d 1208 (quoting Fu, supra, 160 N.J. at 122, 733 A.2d 1133).
A.
The competing interests of the states and relevant tort law principles overlap in this case. Both Pennsylvania and New Jersey have established tort law systems intended to compensate tort victims and deter wrong-doing. However, from that scheme, New Jersey has carved out charitable corporations and declared them to be free from most tort liability. The Legislature has determined that the proper way to encourage charity in New Jersey and to guarantee continuance of the good works charities provide is to insure they will not have to expend their resources on litigation. "[T]he essence of the public policy favoring charitable immunity is the preservation of private charitable contributions for their designated purposes." Bieker v. Cmty. House of Moorestown, 169 N.J. 167, 178, 777 A.2d 37 (2001) (quoting Parker v. St. Stephen's Urban Dev. Corp., Inc., 243 N.J.Super. 317, 326, 579 A.2d 360 (App.Div.1990)).
As previous rulings have declared, New Jersey's public policy in enacting the CIA is "strong" and is to be "considered remedial and be liberally construed." Monaghan v. Holy Trinity Church, 275 N.J.Super. 594, 598, 646 A.2d 1130 (App.Div.1994). Although there are exceptions to the immunity provided,[6] those exceptions do not, in any measure, water down the importance of the policy to our state, and to the extent that the Appellate Division suggested otherwise, it was wide of the mark. In any event, our focus is not on the importance of the policy to the state but on the relationship between the policy and the contacts.
Pennsylvania, on the other hand, has explicitly rejected the policy of charitable immunity. Flagiello, supra, 208 A.2d at 207-08. It is the characterization of Pennsylvania's policy that is at issue in this case. Camp Jaycee denominates Pennsylvania's abrogation of charitable immunity as nothing more than a post-event loss-allocation construct, which it argues renders the conduct-related contacts in Pennsylvania essentially irrelevant. In framing the issue that way, Camp Jaycee suggests that Pennsylvania's interest will not be impaired if we apply New Jersey law to bar the suit of a New Jersey citizen.
*464 It is not surprising that, in support of that view, Camp Jaycee has relied on the decision in Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90, 480 N.E.2d 679 (1985). There, two members of a New Jersey Boy Scout troop were sexually abused by their scoutmaster on an outing in New York. Id. 491 N.Y.S.2d 90, 480 N.E.2d at 681. Their parents sued in New York, and the Court of Appeals of New York held the suit barred by the New Jersey doctrine of charitable immunity to which New York does not subscribe. Ibid. In ruling, the Court characterized New York's abrogation of charitable immunity as a loss-allocation measure. Id. 491 N.Y.S.2d 90, 480 N.E.2d at 686. It concluded that New York, the place of the conduct and injury, had no true interest in the outcome because the victims and defendant were New Jersey residents, thus making New Jersey the state with the preeminent interestÔÇö immunity. Id. 491 N.Y.S.2d 90, 480 N.E.2d at 688-89.
The dissenting judge disagreed with that characterization:
There can be no question that this State has a paramount interest in preventing and protecting against injurious misconduct within its borders. This interest is particularly vital and compelling where, as here, the tortious misconduct involves sexual abuse and exploitation of children, regardless of the residency of the victims and the tort-feasors. (See, New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-60, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3354-3356, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113, on remand 57 N.Y.2d 256, 455 N.Y.S.2d 582, 441 N.E.2d 1100.) Despite the majority's denial, New York's law in question is intimately connected to this overriding interest.
. . . .
Indeed, this deterrence function of tort law, whether it be in the form of imposing liability or denying immunity, is a substantial interest of the locus state which is almost universally acknowledged by both commentators and the courts to be prominent factor deserving significant consideration in the resolution of conflicts problems.
[Schultz, supra, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90, 480 N.E.2d at 691-92.][7]
That is our conclusion as well. The proper characterization of Pennsylvania's policy is that it is a measure limned for the purpose of "prevent[ion], protect[ion] and compensat[ion]." Id. 491 N.Y.S.2d 90, 480 N.E.2d at 691. Indeed, when a state decides to abrogate its charitable immunity law, it typically does so with the intention of insuring due care: "[I]t both assures payment of an obligation to the person injured and gives warning that justice and the law demand the exercise of care." Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8 (1957). In Flagiello, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court used strong language to describe its conduct-regulating interest in abolishing charitable immunity:
Human nature being what it is, administrators of a hospital, cognizant that the hospital is insulated from tort liability, *465 may be less likely to exercise maximum scrutiny in selecting personnel than if the hospital were held monetarily liable for slipshod, indifferent, and neglectful conduct of employees. As Justice Rutledge said in the Georgetown case, [President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 824 (D.C.Cir.1942),] "immunity tends to foster neglect while liability tends to induce care and caution."
[Flagiello, supra, 208 A.2d at 202; see also Molitor v. Kaneland Cmty. Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89, 95 (1959) ("[W]e believe that abolition of such immunity may tend to decrease the frequency of school bus accidents. . . ."), superseded by statute, 745 ILCS 10/1-101 to 10-101, as recognized in Harrison v. Hardin County Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 1, 197 Ill.2d 466, 259 Ill.Dec. 440, 758 N.E.2d 848, 851 (2001); Silva v. Providence Hosp. of Oakland, 14 Cal.2d 762, 97 P.2d 798, 802, 805 (1939) (holding a nonprofit hospital liable to an injured party because "[California] should not be added to the list of those whose courts have encouragedÔÇöas in some degree they surely haveÔÇöthe agents of charitable institutions to render less than due care for the security of life, limb, and property, the very things which it is the sole purpose of such institutions to preserve and protect.").]
Our dissenting colleagues' suggestion that the heart of Flagiello was the transformation of hospitals into "big business" and the protection of Pennsylvania residents says too little. Post at 173-74, 962 A.2d at 478-79. Flagiello devoted equal, if not more, attention to the notion that every wrong has a remedy and the paradoxical and unjust results generally produced by the charitable immunity doctrine. Id. at 195, 197, 203, 204-05.
Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has since extended Flagiello to include torts occurring to non-paying patients in hospitals, Siewicz v. Wyo. Valley Hosp., Additional Information