Campbell v. Motors Liquidation Co.

*45 MEMORANDUM & ORDER

On June 1, 2009, facing financial distress so severe that liquidation of the company was an imminent threat, and following extended negotiations with the United States Department of Treasury regarding the financing and sale of the company’s assets, General Motors Corporation and certain of its affiliates (collectively, “GM” or “Debtors”) commenced cases under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. Simultaneously, GM moved for approval of the sale of substantially all of its assets to a United States Treasury-sponsored purchaser, NGMCO, Inc. (the “Purchaser” or “New GM”), pursuant to section 363 of title 11, United States Code (hereinafter, the “Bankruptcy Code”), (the “363 Motion” or “363 Transaction”). As the underlying transaction and instant appeal involve the interplay of certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, a brief sketch of this statutory landscape is warranted at the outset.

Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code describes the rights and powers of the trustee or debtor-in-possession with respect to the use, sale or lease of property of the bankruptcy estate. See 3 CollieR on Bankruptcy ¶ 363.01 (15th ed. rev.2009). Specifically, section 363(b) authorizes the sale of property of the estate other than in the ordinary course of business, subject to notice and hearing requirements. See id. at ¶ 363.02. Section 363(f) permits the sale of estate property “free and clear” of an interest in the property under certain *46 circumstances. See id. at ¶ 368.06. Finally, section 363(m) limits the scope of appellate review of unstayed section 363 sale orders to the issue of the purchaser’s good faith — generally mooting appeals brought on other grounds and thus protecting good faith purchasers from the effects of reversal or modification on appeal once the sale has closed. See id. at ¶ 363.11.

Appellants here (“Appellants” or “Campbell Appellants”) are five products liability claimants whose contingent claims arise from injuries sustained prior to Debtors’ chapter 11 filing and 363 Motion. These injuries allegedly involve GM vehicles. Prepetition, Appellants had each commenced litigation proceedings against GM in various state and federal courts. Appellees are the Debtors, including Motors Liquidation Company, the Purchaser (collectively, “MLC”), and the United States on behalf of the Department of Treasury (“USA,” or, together with MLC, “Appellees”). In the Bankruptcy Court, Appellants objected to Debtors’ 363 Motion, arguing (i) that section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize a sale “free and clear” of potential post-Closing in personam products liability claims against New GM and, further, (ii) that the Bankruptcy Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin post-Closing disputes between, inter alia, products liability claimants and New GM. 1 On July 5, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court approved the 363 Transaction over the objections of Appellants and others. That Transaction has since closed and been consummated.

Presently before the Court is an appeal from the Bankruptcy Court’s Sale Order. The appeal is directed specifically to the provisions authorizing the sale of the Purchased Assets “free and clear” of Appellants’ existing products liability claims and enjoining any successor liability claims they may have against New GM. For the reasons discussed below, the appeal is denied as moot, and the judgment of the Bankruptcy Court is affirmed.

BACKGROUND 2

To preserve the going-concern value of GM’s assets and business, and consistent with the over $19 billion in financing provided by the Treasury, Debtors filed the 363 Motion to approve the sale of substantially all of GM’s assets, and the assumption of certain contracts and leases and their assignment, to the Treasury-sponsored Purchaser for over $90 billion in consideration. MLC Br. 8, Appellants Br. 7. The Purchaser would acquire the subject assets, assume certain specified liabilities, and not assume other liabilities that were not deemed “commercially necessary for the viability ... [of] New GM.” See, *47 e.g., MLC CD-141 (July 1, 2009 Hr’g Tr. 135:16-20, Dkt. No. 3205).

Specifically, the over $90 billion in consideration to GM consisted of: a section 363(k) credit bid equal to the amount of indebtedness owed to the Purchaser as of the closing under certain credit facilities defined in the MPA (the UST Credit Facilities and the DIP Facility) less the amount of indebtedness under the DIP Facility; the cancellation of warrants issued by GM to the Treasury; the issuance by the Purchaser to the Debtors of 10% of the common stock of the Purchaser as of the closing; the issuance by the Purchaser to the Debtors of warrants to purchase up to an additional 15% of the shares of common stock of the Purchaser; and the assumption by the Purchaser of certain Assumed Liabilities (a defined term in the parties’ agreement and proposed Sale Order), which removed tens of billions of dollars of claims against the Debtors from the chapter 11 cases. Sale Op., 407 B.R. at 482.

Following notice and hearing, numerous objections to the 363 Transaction were served and considered but no other offers of any kind were received by GM, no alternative to the Sale was proffered, nor was it argued that the sale was not in GM’s best interest. Id. at 494. 3 Indeed, the Bankruptcy Court found that the only alternative to an immediate sale was liquidation. Only the United States Treasury was prepared to finance Debtors’ chapter 11 administration, and their DIP financing was expressly conditioned upon GM’s seeking and obtaining expedited approval of the 363 Transaction. Id. at 480. As the Bankruptcy Court found, liquidation would have been “a disastrous result for GM’s creditors, its employees, the suppliers who depend on GM for their own existence, and the communities in which GM operates”— since, in the event of liquidation, creditors such as Appellants and other objectors who were trying to increase their incremental recoveries “would get nothing.” Id. at 474.

Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Court found, and Appellants do not dispute, that the 363 Transaction, as contemplated by the Master Sale and Purchase Agreement and the Amended and Restated Master Sale and Purchase Agreement (collectively, the “MPA”), see Appellants Br., App. B, was the product of good-faith negotiations between Debtors and their key stakeholders, including the Treasury and the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (the “UAW”). Id. at 494-95; see also Tr. 33:17 (Appellants’ counsel conceding that the Purchaser was a purchaser in good faith).

The allocation of certain liabilities, such as contingent products liability claims based on accidents or losses already sustained (the “Existing Products Claims,” which include those of Appellants here) and potential products liability claims based on accidents or losses not yet sustained but projected to arise in the future (the “Future Products Claims”), was preliminarily determined during the initial rounds of negotiations. It was agreed that the assets would be sold free and clear of *48 such liabilities, but that, should the Purchaser later agree to assume more of certain liabilities, including the products claims, there would be no downward adjustment in the consideration received by the Debtors. See Appellants Br. 5-7 (discussing “politically sensitive” liabilities). Negotiations continued following the filing of the 363 Motion and, prior to the Sale Hearing, the MPA was amended to provide that (i) New GM would indemnify GM’s dealer network for any Existing or Future Products Claims successfully asserted against the dealers, Sale Op., 407 B.R. at 505 n. 110, and (ii) New GM would assume liability for all Future Products Claims that arose post-Closing, regardless of whether the vehicle involved was manufactured pre-Closing. Id. at 481-82. However, the transfer of the Purchased Assets was to remain free and clear of any Existing Products Claims.

The agreement between the Debtors and the Purchaser, as embodied in the MPA and the Sale Order itself, made clear that the Purchaser would not pursue the 363 Transaction unless the assets were sold free and clear of those liabilities the Purchaser had not agreed to assume, including the Existing Products Claims of Appellants here:

The Purchaser would not have entered into the MPA and would not consummate the 363 Transaction (i) if the sale of the Purchased Assets was not free and clear of all liens, claims, encumbrances, and other interests (other than Permitted Encumbrances), including rights or claims based on any successor or transferee liability or (ii) if the Purchaser would, or in the future could, be liable for any such liens, claims, encumbrances, and other interests, including rights or claims based on any successor or transferee liability, other than, in each case, the Assumed Liabilities. The Purchaser mil not consummate the 863 Transaction unless [the Bankruptcy Court] expressly orders that none of the Purchaser, ... or the Purchased Assets will have any liability whatsoever with respect to. any liens, claims, encumbrances, and other interests, including rights or claims based on any successor or transferee liability, ... other than as expressly provided herein or in agreements made by the Debtors and/or the Purchaser on the record at the Sale Hearing or in the MPA.

Appellants Br., App. B (Sale Order) ¶ DD (emphasis added). Furthermore, section 7.1 of the MPA expressly provided:

The respective obligations of Purchaser and Sellers to consummate the transactions contemplated by this Agreement are subject to the fulfillment or written waiver (to the extent permitted by Law), prior to or at the Closing, of each of the following conditions:

(a) The Bankruptcy Court shall have entered the Sale Approval Order and Sale Procedures Order on terms acceptable to the Parties ....

Appellants Br., App. B(MPA) Art. VII § 7.1 (emphasis added).

Accordingly, the principal relevant provisions 4 of the Sale Order, negotiated by the parties, authorized by the Bankruptcy Court, and presently challenged on appeal, provided:

• Except for the Assumed Liabilities, pursuant to sections 105(a) and 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Purchased Assets shall be transferred to the Purchaser in accordance with the MPA, and, upon the Closing, shall be free and clear of all liens, claims, encumbrances, and other interests of any *49 kind or nature whatsoever ... including rights or claims based on any successor or transferee liability ... [which] shall attach to the net proceeds of the 363 Transaction in the order of their priority....

Sale Order ¶ 7; see also id. ¶ AA, 10; Sale Op., 407 B.R. at 500 n. 92 (citing Proposed Order).

• Purchaser shall not be deemed ... to: (i) be a legal successor ... to the Debtors.., (ii) have, de facto or otherwise, merged with or into the Debtors; or (iii) be a mere continuation or substantial continuation of the Debtors or the enterprise of the Debtors.... Purchaser shall not have any successor, transferee, derivative, or vicarious liabilities of any kind or character for any claims including, but not limited to, under any theory of successor or transferee liability, ... and products or antitrust liability.

Sale Order ¶ 46.

• [A]ll persons and entities, including but not limited to litigation claimants holding liens, claims, encumbrances, and other interests of any kind or nature whatsoever, including rights or claims based on any successor or transferee liability, against or in a Seller or the Purchased Assets (whether legal or equitable, secured or unsecured, matured or unmatured, contingent or noncontingent, senior or subordinated), arising under or out of, in connection with, or in any way relating to, the Sellers, the Purchased Assets, the operation of the Purchased Assets prior to the Closing, or the 363 Transaction, are forever barred, es-topped, and permanently enjoined from asserting against the Purchaser, its successors or assigns, its property, or the Purchased Assets, such persons’ or entities’ liens, claims, encumbrances, and other interests, including rights or claims based on any successor or transferee liability.

Sale Order ¶ 8; see also id. ¶ 47; Sale Op., 407 B.R. at 500 n. 92 (citing Proposed Order).

The Sale Order further provided that its provisions were “nonseverable and mutually dependent on each other.” Sale Order ¶ 69; see id. ¶ 47. 5

On July 5, 2009, following a three-day evidentiary hearing on the 363 Motion, the Bankruptcy Court entered the Sale Order and Sale Opinion, authorizing the 363 Transaction free and clear of claims and barring successor liability and other disputes between, inter alia, products liability claimants and Purchaser New GM as provided in the foregoing excerpts. While the Bankruptcy Court’s Sale Opinion did not expressly address the jurisdictional objection of the Campbell Objectors-Appellants in such terms, the court noted generally that “[b]ankruptey courts have the power to authorize sales of assets at a time when there is still value to preserve — to prevent the death of the patient on the operating table.” Sale Op., 407 B.R. at 474. In determining the scope of the Bankruptcy Court’s authority under section 363(f) to authorize the sale “free and clear” of the Existing Products Claims, and to authorize the injunctive provisions barring any successor liability claims, the Bankruptcy Court acknowledged the split among the circuits on this statutory interpretation is *50 sue, and analyzed persuasive (and, at that time, controlling) precedent, including the recent decision of the bankruptcy court in In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.2009), which had been summarily affirmed by the Second Circuit. 6 See Sale Op., 407 B.R. at 499-506. In addition, the Bankruptcy Court noted that injunctions of the character requested in the Proposed Order had been issued by the bankruptcy courts in both Chrysler and In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d 283, 286-87 (3d Cir.2003) (“TWA”), the latter being “the leading case on the [section 363(f) ] issue.” Sale Op., 407 B.R. at 504; see id. at 506 n. 111 (citing In re Chrysler, No. 09-50002 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2009) (Order Granting 363 Sale ¶¶ W-BB, 9-23), and TWA 322 F.8d at 286-87). 7

In approving the 363 Transaction and Sale Order, the Bankruptcy Court expressly found that the Purchaser was a good faith purchaser, both for sale approval purposes and “for the purpose of the protections section 363(m) provides.” Sale Op., 407 B.R. at 494; see also Sale Order ¶ 55. 8 The July 5, 2009 Sale Order provided for a four-day stay of its effectiveness to allow objectors to appeal, while authorizing Debtors and the Purchaser to close the 363 Transaction on or after Noon on July 9, 2009. Sale Order ¶ 70. The Sale Order also included a provision emphasizing that “[a]ny party objecting to this Order must exercise due diligence in filing any appeal and pursuing a stay or risk its appeal being foreclosed as moot in the event Purchaser and the Debtors elect to close prior to this Order becoming a Final Order.” Id. at ¶ 70.

On July 6, 2009, Appellants and the Ad Hoc Asbestos Claimants’ Committee (“Asbestos Committee”) filed separate motions under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2) for certification of a direct appeal of the Sale Order to the Second Circuit. See In re General Motors Corp., 409 B.R. 24, 27 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2009) (“Stay Op.”). The Asbestos Committee — but not Appellants here — also moved in the alternative for a stay of the Sale Order pending appeal pursuant to Rule 8005 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Id. at 29. The Bankruptcy Court denied both motions in a July 7, 2009 decision. Id. at 35. 9

*51 The following day, on July 8, 2009, the Asbestos Committee — but, again, not Appellants here — filed an emergency motion in this Court for an expedited appeal and a stay of the Sale Order pending appeal. On July 9, 2009, Judge Kaplan denied the Asbestos Committee’s motion for a stay in all respects. Dist. Stay Op., 2009 WL 2033079 at *2. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Kaplan noted, inter alia, that the terms of MPA conditioned the purchaser’s obligation to close upon the Sale Order’s not having been stayed and that even a brief stay would constitute a default under the DIP Agreement. Id. at *1. However, and notwithstanding “the significant possibility that the appeal will be mooted by the consummation of the sale,” Judge Kaplan granted the Asbestos Committee’s motion in the alternative for an expedited appeal in the District Court. Id. at *2. 10

Although Appellants’ counsel had observed the July 9 hearing before Judge Kaplan on the Asbestos Committee’s motions, Appellants did not join in those motions or participate in the hearing. In addition, Appellants’ counsel chose not to participate in the expedited briefing schedule set in the District Court’s July 9, 2009 opinion, explaining by letter to Judge Kap-lan that the Campbell Appellants instead planned to appeal pursuant to Rule 8006 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, USA Br., Ex. D (July 14, 2009 Jaku-bowski Letter). The appeal was timely filed in this Court and has since been fully briefed and supplemented with letters from Appellants and MLC Appellees regarding the Supreme Court’s December 14, 2009 decision vacating the Second Circuit’s judgment in Chrysler. 11 The Court heard oral argument on March 24, 2010, and has since received additional letters from Appellants and MLC Appellees. 12 Following extensive briefing, oral argument, and supplemental submissions, the appeal is ripe for decision.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

District courts are vested with appellate jurisdiction over bankruptcy court rulings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), and may “affirm, modify, or reverse a bankruptcy judge’s judgment, order or decree.” Fed R. Bankr.P. 8013. We review the legal conclusions of the Bankruptcy Court de novo, and its findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. See Bay Harbour Mgmt., L.C. v. Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc.), 415 B.R. 77, 83 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (citing AppliedTheory Corp. v. Halifax Fund, L.P. (In re AppliedTheory Corp.), 493 F.3d 82, 85 (2d Cir.2007)). The approval of a sale of assets under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. See In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 119 (discussing the discretionary test of Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir.1983)). A bankruptcy court abuses its discretion when it arrives at “(i) a decision resting on an error of law (such *52 as application of the wrong legal principle) or a clearly erroneous factual finding, or (ii) a decision that, though not necessarily the product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding, cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Schwartz v. Aquatic Dev. Group, Inc. (In re Aquatic Dev. Group, Inc.), 352 F.3d 671, 678 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation and alteration marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Appellants essentially press their objections to the 363 Motion in the Bankruptcy Court, namely, that (i) section 363(f) does not authorize a sale free and clear of their in personam products liability claims; and (ii) the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to bar or enjoin disputes between the products liability claimants and New GM based on successor liability or other theories. Appellants Br. 11-13. Appellants ask this Court to order the revision of the Sale Order to modify or strike what they frame as its offending provisions authorizing the sale of the Purchased Assets free and clear of their contingent products liability claims and barring Appellants from pursuing successor liability claims against New GM. Appellants Br. 11, 20; Appellants Reply Br. 3.

While the issues of statutory interpretation underlying these objections may be debatable, the response to Appellants’ objections on appeal is straightforward: we cannot grant the requested relief because the appeal is moot. The law in this context is clear and well settled. Because the Sale Order was not stayed pending appeal, and the 363 Transaction has since closed, the issues Appellants seek to raise on appeal are statutorily moot under Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(m). Moreover, the appeal is equitably moot because Appellants have not made the requisite showing to overcome the Second Circuit’s presumption that an appeal of an unstayed, substantially consummated sale order is moot. See Frito-Lay, Inc. v. LTV Steel Co., Inc. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 10 F.3d 944, 949-50, 952 (2d Cir.1993) (“Chateaugay II").

Appellants struggle mightily to overcome the dispositive effect of Section 363(m) by advancing the argument that the Bankruptcy Court lacked “colorable” jurisdiction to enjoin their successor liability claims against New GM. However, Appellants do not advance a colorable argument in support of their position. Even taking Appellants’ jurisdictional argument at face value, the contention that the Bankruptcy Court lacked “colorable” jurisdiction would fly in the face of persuasive historic and recent precedent. Moreover, it is clear that Appellants’ purported jurisdictional challenge is nothing more than the inverse of their merits arguments regarding the interpretation of section 363(f).

Second, Appellants’ efforts to avoid equitable mootness fail for several reasons. For example, the very nature of the requested relief, to the extent it could even be granted, would result in an inequitable rewriting of the Sale Order. The ability to interlinéate the Sale Order was never within the power of the Bankruptcy Court in the first instance. At this stage, Appellants’ requested revisions would unscramble the terms of the 363 Transaction, since, try as Appellants might, the relief they seek based on alleged jurisdictional defects could not be limited without creating an inequitable result.

As we are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments to overcome the mootness of this appeal, we do not proceed to further analysis of the merits of the Bankruptcy Court’s interpretation of section 363(f).

*53 I. Section 363(m) Mootness

A. General Limitation of Appellate Issues

Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code limits appellate jurisdiction over an unstayed sale order issued by a bankruptcy court to the narrow issue of whether the property was sold to a good faith purchaser. 11 U.S.C. § 363(m); Contratian Funds LLC v. Aretex LLC (In re WestPoint Stevens, Inc.), 600 F.3d 231, 247-48 (2d Cir.2010); Licensing by Paolo, Inc. v. Sinatra (In re Gucci), 105 F.3d 837, 839 (2d Cir.) (“Gucci I”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1196, 117 S.Ct. 1552, 1553, 137 L.Ed.2d 701 (1997); see also United States v. Salerno, 932 F.2d 117, 123 (2d Cir.1991). Specifically, section 363(m) provides that

[t]he reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization ... of a sale or lease of property does not affect the validity of a sale or lease under such authorization to an entity that purchased or leased such property in good faith, whether or not such entity knew of the pendency of the appeal, unless such authorization and such sale or lease were stayed pending appeal.

11 U.S.C. § 363(m). The Second Circuit, like the majority of other circuits, strictly enforces this so-called statutory mootness rule of section 363(m), such that, “regardless of the merit of an appellant’s challenge to a sale order, [a reviewing court] may neither reverse nor modify the judicially-authorized sale if the entity that purchased or leased the property did so in good faith and if no stay was granted.” Gucci I, 105 F.3d at 840; see In re Lehman Bros., 415 B.R. at 85. The Court of Appeals’ recent decision in In re West-Point Stevens, Inc. emphasized that section 363(m) imposes a jurisdictional limitation on appeals of unstayed section 363 sale orders. See 600 F.3d at 247-48 (“We adhere to our holding in Gucci I that ... we lack jurisdiction to review the entire Sale Order — not just the actual sale transaction.”). 13

“This limitation of the issues on appeal generally is warranted where an appellant did not seek a stay pending appeal and reflects the view that an appellant is rightly burdened with the risks associated with challenging a sale authorization when that appellant did not first seek to stay the sale.” Gucci I, 105 F.3d at 840. Moreover, section 363(m) applies even when a stay was denied by the district court after a motion for a stay was timely made because statutory mootness recognizes that a reviewing court “may be powerless to undo or rewrite the terms of the consummated sale.” Id. (citing Salerno, 932 F.2d at 123). The rule thus furthers the policy of finality in bankruptcy sales and assists the bankruptcy court to secure the best price for the debtor’s assets. In *54 re WestPoint Stevens, Inc., 600 F.3d at 248-49; Salerno, 932 F.2d at 123.

In this case, Appellants did not even seek a stay of the Sale Order, and neither the Bankruptcy Court nor the District Court granted the Asbestos Committee’s application for a stay pending appeal. The 363 Transaction closed in July 2009. Thus, under section 363(m), this Court’s review of the Sale Order is limited to the sole issue of whether the Purchaser acted in good faith. E.g., Gucci I, 105 F.3d at 840. Since Appellants do not contest the Bankruptcy Court’s finding that the Purchaser was acting in good faith, see Tr. 33:17-18; see also Sale Op., 407 B.R. at 494; Sale Order ¶ 55, and this Court sees no indication that the good-faith finding was erroneous, this appeal is moot.

B. Appellants’ Jurisdictional Challenge

Rather than challenging the good faith of the purchaser, Appellants counter that the rule of section 363(m) applies only to the extent that a bankruptcy court has acted within the scope of its limited subject-matter jurisdiction, and argue that the Bankruptcy Court lacked “colorable” authority “under its ‘related to’ jurisdiction to order a sale ‘free and clear’ of Appellants’ in personam products liability claims against New GM.” See Appellants Br. 14. However, a substantial body of both historic and immediate precedent shows that Appellants’ jurisdictional arguments are merit less.

1. Foreclosure of Jurisdictional Challenges by Section 363(m)

As a threshold matter, while the Second Circuit has not expressly decided the issue, other circuits have held that section 363(m)’s strict limitation of issues on appeal of an unstayed sale order does not distinguish between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional challenges. Pittsburgh Food & Bev., Inc. v. Ranallo (In re Ranallo), 112 F.3d 645, 650 (3d Cir.1997) (“[S]ection 363(m) does not distinguish between a challenge to an order approving a sale predicated on jurisdictional grounds and a challenge based on other grounds.”); see also In re Sax, 796 F.2d 994, 997 (7th Cir.1986) (“Section 363(m) does not say that the sale must be proper under § 363(b); it says the sale must be authorized under § 363(b).”); Parker v. Goodman (In re Parker), 499 F.3d 616, 622-624 (6th Cir.2007) (surveying case law, including Sax and Ranallo, and rejecting jurisdictional attack as moot); In re Wieboldt Stores, Inc., 92 B.R. 309, 311-12 (N.D.Ill. 1988) (applying Sax to find challenge to 363(f) “free and clear” provision moot). Moreover, the limitation of jurisdictional challenges by section 363(m) is consistent with existing Second Circuit authority emphasizing the importance of finality in bankruptcy sales and recognizing a reviewing court’s “place in the statutory scheme.” In re WestPoint Stevens, Inc., 600 F.3d at 247-48; cf. id. at *14 (distinguishing challenge to an appealing party’s standing from the issue of a reviewing court’s application of section 363(m), and rejecting the purported standing challenge as moot); Salerno, 932 F.2d at 122 (rejecting challenge to propriety of section 363 sale distribution as moot, and declining to address challenge to appellate jurisdiction in light of section 363(m) mootness); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Best Prods. Co. (In re Best Prods. Co.), 177 B.R. 791, 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (dismissing jurisdictional challenge as equitably moot under Chateaugay II).

With respect to the interaction of section 363(m) and jurisdictional challenges, the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Sax is instructive. Appellant was a lien claimant on property sold as an asset of the debtor’s estate pursuant to section 363. The appel *55 lant argued that the subject property was not part of the debtor’s estate and that the sale order therefore exceeded the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction. Sax, 796 F.2d at 996. The court of appeals held that the appeal was moot because the appellants failed to obtain a stay and the court “[could not] reach the question of whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to order and approve the sale.” Id. at 998. Noting that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to determine the issue of its own jurisdiction and that such a decision stands unless it is appealed properly, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that, “[d]espite the maxim that ‘subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time,’ valid procedural rules cannot be ignored just because the jurisdictional decision is being challenged rather than the decision on the merits.” Id.

Appellants here likewise failed to appeal the Sale Order properly because they failed even to seek, much less obtain, a stay. Appellants’ direct appeal of the Sale Order — whether based on jurisdictional or other grounds — is therefore moot. See id. To hold otherwise not only would “ignore valid procedural requirements,” see id., but also would be inconsistent with the Second Circuit’s clear policy of finality in bankruptcy sales and the reality, discussed further below, that this Court is powerless to rewrite the terms of the 363 Transaction. See, e.g., Gucci I, 105 F.3d at 840; Salerno, 932 F.2d at 123. 14

Second, this case does not fall within the potential narrow exception to section 363(m) mootness suggested in the dicta of Ranallo, the Third Circuit case upon which Appellants’ seem to premise their entire jurisdictional counterargument. See 112 F.3d at 650. In Ranallo, the court of appeals noted that “it might be claimed that a bankruptcy court usurped power so that even absent a stay, notwithstanding section 363(m), an order reversing an order approving a sale permissibly could affect the validity of the sale of assets” where “the bankruptcy court approved the sale of assets not even eolorably within its jurisdiction.” Id. Notwithstanding this statement, however, the Ranallo Court actually held that the appeal before it was moot under 363(m) because the bankruptcy court had at least colorable jurisdiction over the assets, which the debtor-appellant indirectly owned. Id.; see also In re Parker, 499 F.3d at 624 (finding the potential exception recognized in Ranallo inapplicable).

Since there is no argument on this appeal that the Purchased Assets were not property of the Debtors’ estate, 15 the theoretical distinction posited in the Ranallo dicta plainly does not apply here. Insofar as Appellants use Ranallo as the foundation for their “colorable jurisdiction” argument, that case becomes a one-legged stool: its dicta is inapposite; and its statutory mootness holding was basically the opposite of the outcome Appellants seek here — notwithstanding that the purported jurisdictional challenge in Ranallo went to a more fundamental issue (namely, whether the assets sold were property of the estate) than the arguments advanced in this appeal. Moreover, Appellants have not cited, and this Court’s research has not found, a single case that has applied or *56 extended Ranallo’s “colorable jurisdiction” dicta to hold that section 363(m) did not moot a jurisdictional challenge to an un-stayed section 363 sale. 16 As Appellants have not offered a persuasive reason to depart from precedent, we decline their invitation to do so here.

2. The Bankruptcy Court’s Authority to Issue the Challenged Provisions

Even assuming, arguendo, that Appellants’ challenge to the Bankruptcy Court’s authority is not itself mooted by section 363(m), their arguments regarding “colorable” jurisdiction nonetheless lack merit. “Colorable” means “appearing to be true, valid, or right.” Black’s Law Dictionary, colorable (8th ed.2004); cf. Tr. 16:18-17:5 (colloquy regarding “color-able”). Appellants do not challenge the Bankruptcy Court’s “inherent [or core] jurisdiction” to determine “whether the ‘free and clear’ provisions of the sale apply to in personam claims.” Appellants Reply Br. 3 (citing Back v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 213 B.R. 633, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)). Having conceded this point, as they must under well-settled law, see Jamaica Shipping Co. v. Orient Shipping Rotterdam, B.V. (In re Millenium Seacarriers, Inc.), 458 F.3d 92, 95 (2d Cir.2006) (“ ‘[0]rders approving the sale of property’ constitute core proceedings [under] 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(N)”), Appellants’ arguments focus instead on the Bankruptcy Court’s alleged lack of “related to” jurisdiction over successor liability actions against the Purchaser. See Appellants Br. 17-18 (citing In re Chateaugay Corp., 213 B.R. at 639; Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir.1984); Zerand-Bernal Group, Inc. v. Cox, 23 F.3d 159, 162 (7th Cir.1994)).

Appellees counter, and the Court agrees, that Appellants’ focus on “related to” (that is, non-core) jurisdiction is misplaced. 17 The jurisdictional issue here, if any, is the Bankruptcy Court’s “core” or “arising under” jurisdiction to approve the 363 Transaction and issue the Sale Order. It is well-settled that bankruptcy courts have core jurisdiction to ap *57 prove section 363 sales, see 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(N) (“[C]ore proceedings include ... orders approving the sale of property.”), and corollary jurisdiction to interpret and enforce their own orders carrying out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a); cf. also 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (“All Writs Act”). Moreover, courts have characterized the injunc-tive authority of bankruptcy courts as “core” when the rights sought to be enforced by injunction are based on provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, such as the “free and clear” authority of section 363(f). See In re Millenium Seacarriers, Inc.,