716 A.2d 759 (1998)

STATE
v.
Alejandro YANEZ.

No. 97-110-C.A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

August 4, 1998.

*760 Aaron L. Weisman, Asst. Attorney General, for plaintiff.

Mary June Ciresi, Providence, for defendant.

Before WE ISBE RGE R, C.J., and LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS and GOLDBERG, JJ.

OPINION

GOLDBERG, Justice.

The principal issue presented by this case is whether a reasonable mistake of fact concerning a complainant's age may be asserted as a defense to a charge of statutory-rape. For the reasons articulated in this opinion, we hold that with respect to the age requirement first-degree child-molestation sexual assault is a strict-liability offense. Consequently a defendant charged with this offense may not introduce evidence that he or she was mistaken regarding the child's age, nor is a defendant entitled to a jury instruction regarding the same. A recitation of the facts is in order.

Facts

The defendant, Alejandro Yanez (Yanez), was eighteen-years-old when he engaged in consensual sexual intercourse with Allison (a fictitious name), the victim in this case, who was thirteen-years-old at the time. The two were first introduced to each other, albeit ever so briefly, in August 1992, nearly a year before this incident. Allison testified that she was attending a Portuguese festival with a girlfriend when she saw her aunt's boyfriend, Victor Yanez (Victor), defendant's brother. According to Allison, who at that time was only twelve-years-old, Victor introduced her to Yanez. For the next eleven months Allison and Yanez had virtually no contact with each other except for the obligatory "Hello" in passing. Then one day in mid-July 1993, while Allison was walking to the local park to meet friends, she saw Yanez cruise by in his white Trans Am convertible with the top down. She testified that she waved to Yanez, who proceeded to turn the Trans Am around and offer her a ride. Since the park was only across the street, Allison declined Yanez's invitation, but when he persisted. Allison acceded. The two briefly talked during the quarter-mile trip. Yanez gave Allison his name and telephone number, and the two conversed again briefly that night on the telephone.

The next day Allison received a telephone message from either her mother or her sister that Yanez had called her and asked that she call him back. Allison returned Yanez's telephone *761 call, and the two made arrangements to meet in the parking lot behind St. Joseph's Church in West Warwick. From the church

the two left in Yanez's car and went for a ride. According to Allison, they proceeded to the home of a friend of Yanez's where they engaged in consensual sexual intercourse on the floor in a back bedroom.

Following the conclusion of their first "date" Allison returned home quite late. After entering the house, Allison proceeded directly to the bathroom to shower whereupon she was subsequently confronted by her mother. While in the bathroom, Allison's mother noticed her underwear on the floor and asked if she had engaged in sexual intercourse. Allison initially denied having had sexual intercourse that evening but later admitted the truth. Subsequently Allison's mother contacted the police, whereupon Allison admitted that she had engaged in sexual intercourse but named as her partner a person

called Derek. Allison later explained that she had lied about Yanez's identity because she did not want her mother to know that she had engaged in sexual intercourse with Yanez. A subsequent police investigation revealed that Yanez admitted having had sexual intercourse with Allison but insisted that Allison had told him that she was sixteen-years-old. Allison denied having told Yanez that she was sixteen years of age and, in fact, testified that on the two or three occasions when Yanez had inquired about her age, she had responded that she was only thirteen.

Yanez was indicted on one count of firstdegree child-molestation sexual assault in violation of G.L.1956 §§ 11-37-8.1 and 11-37-8.2, although the trial testimony would later reveal that this was not an isolated incident and that there were two more equally sordid, uncharged encounters.^[1] At trial defense *762 counsel made numerous attempts to introduce evidence not only demonstrating Yanez's mistaken belief concerning Allison's age but also evidence concerning Allison's apparent maturity in light of her appearance, physical development, and demeanor. The trial justice rejected this evidence and determined that in cases in which conduct is made criminal because the victim is a minor, the defense of ignorance or mistaken belief with respect to the victim's age is not available. The trial justice further indicated that he intended to charge the jury with respect to the unavailability of this defense and consequently declined to charge in accordance with Yanez's requested mistake of fact instructions. The pertinent portion of the trial justice's charge to the jury reads as follows:

"The defendant is accused that on a day and dates between July 14, 1993 and July 15, 1993, at West Warwick, Alejandro Yanez did engage in sexual penetration, to wit sexual intercourse, with [Allison], a person under 14 years of age, in violation of the laws of the State of Rhode Island. Now a person is guilty of first degree child molestation, sexual assault, if he or she engages in sexual penetration with a person 14 years of age or under. Sexual penetration includes sexual intercourse. By law, sexual intercourse is defined as the penetration of the vagina by the penis. There are two essential elements to first degree child molestation sexual assault. First, the defendant must engage in sexual intercourse with the alleged victim. And second, the victim is under the age of 14 years.

"Now under the terms of this law, the State need not prove that the act of sexual intercourse was committed against the wishes of the victim. Thus, in order for you to return a verdict of guilty, the State is required to prove, number one, that this defendant, Alejandro Yanez; two, on or about July 15, 1993, at West Warwick; three, did in fact engage in sexual intercourse with [Allison]; and four, that at the time, if you are satisfied he did engage in sexual intercourse with [Allison], at the time she was under the age of 14 years. The law also states when conduct is made criminal because the victim is a minor, and in Rhode Island [in the context of this case] that age being 14, it is no defense that the defendant was ignorant of or mistaken as to the victim's age. And it matters not that his mistaken belief was reasonable."

Following deliberations a Superior Court jury convicted Yanez of first-degree childmolestation sexual assault. The trial justice sentenced Yanez to the minimum twenty year sentence but suspended eighteen years of the sentence with probation. The trial justice also ordered that Yanez have no contact with Allison for twenty years and, as required by law, that Yanez register with the local police authorities as a convicted sex offender. Yanez was released on bail pending the outcome of this appeal.

We note that even though we do not agree with the account of the facts set forth by the dissent—and reiterate that we saw no evidence that Allison and Yanez were actually *763 dating—we are satisfied that even if this version was true, the General Assembly never intended that a charge of statutory-rape should be sorted out by a jury. With this assertion in mind we begin our analysis.

I

Mistake of Fact Defense

The crime of statutory-rape was legislatively created in England during the thirteenth century in order to afford special protection to those society had deemed too young to appreciate the consequences of their actions. See Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw. 1, c. 13 (1275); 1E. Coke, The Second Part of the Institute of the Laws of England 179 (1797). See also United States v. Ransom, 942 F.2d 775, 777 (10th Cir.1991); State v. Jordan, 528 A.2d 731, 732 n. 4 (R.I.1987). Thus English courts, which had generally recognized the mistake of fact defense in criminal prosecutions since 1638, did not begin to discuss this defense in the context of statutory-rape cases until the later half of the nineteenth century. See United States v. Brooks, 841 F.2d 268, 269 (9th Cir.1988). At that time, the mistake of fact defense was rejected by courts both in England and in the United States. Id.^[2]

Characterizing statutory-rape as a strictliability offense remained the law in every American jurisdiction until 1964. See id. at 270 (observing California as the first state to recognize the mistake of fact defense judicially). But see People v. Olsen, 36 Cal.3d 638, 205 Cal.Rptr. 492, 685 P.2d 52, 59 (1984) (rejecting the mistake of fact defense in cases involving lewd and lascivious conduct

with a minor). Although some states have followed California's lead—most through legislative enactments—the majority of courts that have considered this issue continue to reject the reasonable mistake of a victim's age as a defense to statutory-rape and maintain their allegiance to the common law.^[3] We note that our research involving statutory-rape cases has revealed that the highest appellate courts of only four states have judicially recognized the mistake of fact defense. See Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 632 A.2d 797, 803 (1993). All four of these cases, however, are distinguishable from the case at bar.

The courts in People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal.2d 529, 39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673 (1964), and State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 727 (Utah 1984), both expressly relied upon the text of their respective criminal codes, which required the concurrence of an act and a mental state in order to constitute a crime, as well as language in their codes that unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact negates a culpable mental state. Furthermore the Elton court relied upon a provision of the Utah Criminal Code, which stated that an offense may be a strict-liability crime only if a statute expressly provides that a mental state is not required. See Elton, 680 P.2d at 728. Our General Laws are entirely devoid of any provisions similar to those relied upon in Hernandez and Elton; therefore, these cases are of no aid to Yanez.

The other two cases in which the mistake of fact defense was judicially recognized are State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836 (Alaska 1978), *764 and Perez v. State, 111 N.M. 160, 803 P.2d 249 (1990). In both of these cases, however, the age of the victims (fifteen) closely approached the age of consent (sixteen). See Guest, 583 P.2d at 837; Perez, 803 P.2d at 250. In addition the court in Perez observed that even though the mistake of fact defense is available if the victim is between the ages of thirteen and sixteen, a defendant is precluded from raising this defense when the victim is under the age of thirteen. See Perez, 803 P.2d at 251. See generally Hernandez, 39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d at 676 n.3 (observing that the disallowance of the mistake of fact defense when a girl is of tender years is not illogical, although as the age limits are raised to sixteen and above, this reasoning begins to lose its persuasiveness).

Unlike the circumstances in Guest and Perez in which the victims were fifteen, however, Allison was only thirteen years of age. Furthermore, our Legislature has drawn distinctions based upon the age of the victim. For example, § 11-37-8.2 provides a minimum penalty of twenty years in prison for the sexual penetration of a person fourteen years of age or younger, while § 11-37-7 prescribes a maximum penalty of five years in prison for the sexual penetration of a person over the age of fourteen but under the age of sixteen, provided that the accused is over the age of eighteen. Compare § 11-37-8.2 with §§ 11-37-6 and 11-37-7. We therefore conclude that these two cases are also of no help to Yanez.

Notwithstanding this historical perspective Yanez argues that in light of this Court's interpretation of the term "sexual penetration" (the first element of § 11-37-8.1) in cases involving digital penetration, see State v. Griffith, 660 A.2d 704 (R.I.1995), and our interpretation of the term "sexual contact" (the first element of § 11-37-4) in cases involving second-degree sexual assault, see State v. Tobin, 602 A.2d 528 (R.I.1992), we are constrained to imply a mens rea requirement with respect to the age requirement (the second element of § 11-37-8.1) in a charge of first-degree child-molestation sexual assault. We disagree.

A. Statutory Interpretation

[2] "It is well established that the Legislature may, pursuant to its police powers, define criminal offenses without requiring proof of a specific criminal intent and so provide that the perpetrator proceed at his own peril regardless of his defense of ignorance or an honest mistake of fact." People v. Cash, 419 Mich. 230, 351 N.W.2d 822, 826 (1984). See also Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228, 78 S.Ct. 240, 242, 2 L.Ed.2d 228, 231 (1957). As the final arbiter on questions of statutory interpretation, we have it as our purpose to establish and to effectuate the Legislature's intent. See State v. Powers, 644 A.2d 828, 830 (R.I.1994). "[I]n the absence of an ambiguity, this [C]ourt must give the words of the statute `their literal and plain meaning.'" Id. Against this backdrop we examine our first-degree child-molestation sexual assault statute.

Section 11-37-8.1 provides that:

"[a] person is guilty of first degree child molestation sexual assault if he or she engages in sexual penetration with a person fourteen (14) years of age or under."

The term "sexual penetration" is defined in § 11-37-1(8) as follows:

"`Sexual penetration'—sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, and anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, by any part of a person's body or by any object into the genital or anal openings of another person's body, but emission of semen is not required."

Clearly the plain words and meaning of § 11-37-8.1 prohibit the sexual penetration of an underaged person and make no reference to the actor's state of mind, knowledge, or belief. In our opinion this lack of a mens rea results not from negligent omission but from legislative design.

Yanez correctly asserts that this Court has previously declared the existence of an implied mens rea element with respect to the term "sexual contact" in cases of seconddegree sexual assault, see State v. Tobin, 602 A.2d 528 (R.I.1992), and to some but not all acts of "sexual penetration" in cases of firstdegree child-molestation sexual assault. See State v. Griffith, 660 A.2d 704 (R.I.1995). *765 These opinions represent our determination that conduct that the Legislature has included within the definitions of "sexual contact" or "sexual penetration," other than sexual intercourse, anal intercourse, cunnilingus, or fellatio, may in the absence of a mens rea element embrace conduct that is intended for an innocent purpose and not for purposes of sexual arousal or gratification. See In re Odell, 672 A.2d 457, 460 (R.I.1996); State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776, 783 (R.I.1996); State v. Girouard, 561 A.2d 882, 889 (R.I.1989).

For instance, in Bryant with respect to the count of the indictment charging the defendant with first-degree child-molestation sexual assault for engaging in the digital penetration of the victim, we declared that necessity required "an instruction concerning sexual arousal or gratification in order to preclude the possibility that a defendant could be convicted because of an innocent touching." Bryant, 670 A.2d at 783. However, with respect to the count charging penile penetration, we held that this mens rea instruction was not necessary because purposeful penile penetration precludes a finding of innocent touching. Id. Likewise we have declined to imply such a mens rea element to cases that would be considered rape at common law, see id., as well as to cases involving cunnilingus or fellatio. See Girouarcl, 561 A.2d at 889. Thus in most but not all cases of statutory-sexual assault, and except in the most limited instances of child-molestation sexual assault, the "legiglative focus is not dependent upon the question of whether, the perpetrator at the time of the penetration was sufficiently aroused and gratified." Bryant, 670 A.2d at 785 (Bourcier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

However, this debate concerning penetration but not gratification should in no way suggest our willingness to imply an element

of mens rea with respect to the child's age. We decline to permit a defendant charged with the sexual penetration of a child fourteen years of age or younger to escape responsibility on the basis of the purported consent of the victim or a defendant's mistaken, albeit reasonable, belief that the child was over the age of consent. Our position has both historical and legislative support.

The Rhode Island General Assembly has divided sexual offenses into two main categories—sexual assault and child-molestation sexual assault. An examination of the pertinent provisions reveals that the Legislature has carefully distinguished between the two, explicitly requiring a mens rea for sexual assaults that were either unknown at common law or for those acts of sexual abuse that did not involve sexual intercourse, anal intercourse, cunnilingus, or fellatio while electing to maintain the common law's strictliability for child-molestation sexual assault. For example, the Legislature has defined first-degree sexual assault in these words:

"A person is guilty of first degree sexual assault if he or she engages in sexual penetration with another person, and if any of the following circumstances exist:

"(1) The accused, not being the spouse, knows or has reason to know that the victim is mentally incapacitated, mentally disabled, or physically helpless.

* * *

"(4) The accused engages in the medical treatment or examination of the victim for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or stimulation." Section 11-37-2 (Emphases added.)

The definition of second-degree sexual assault contains similar language and also requires that the accused possess a mens rea.^[4]*766 Conversely, when the Legislature drafted the child-molestation sexual assault statutes, it utilized essentially the same language without reference to intent. The clear and unambiguous words of § 11-37-8.1 state that "[a] person is guilty of first degree child molestation sexual assault if he or she engages in sexual penetration with a person fourteen (14) years of age or under." Similarly, second-degree child-molestation sexual assault prohibits sexual contact with another person under the age of fourteen, also without regard to the accused's mens rea. See § 11-37-8.3.

It can be inferred from this statutory classification that the child-molestation sexual assault statutes' silence with regard to a mens rea "is designed to subserve the state interest of protecting female children from the severe physical and psychological consequences of engaging in coitus before attaining the age of consent in the statute."^[5]State v. Ware, 418 A.2d 1, 4 (R.I.1980). Cf. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-52, 42 S.Ct. 301, 302, 66 L.Ed. 604, 605 (1922) ("While the general rule at common law was that the scienter was a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime * * * there has been a modification of this view in respect to prosecutions under statutes the purpose of which would be obstructed by such a requirement"). Had the Legislature intended not only to punish the act of child-molestation sexual assault but also to require a mental state, the Legislature could easily have provided for such an element. But its decision to include a mens rea requirement in the sexual assault statutes while declining to provide a mens rea requirement in the child-molestation sexual assault statutes, demonstrates that the Legislature's omission was intentional. This is a sensible and pragmatic objective with which we shall not interfere by engrafting a mens rea requirement where one was not intended. See generally Michael M. v. Superior Court

of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 471-73, 101 S.Ct. 1200, 1205-06, 67 L.Ed.2d 437, 443-45 (1981) (observing risks attendant to young women engaging in sexual intercourse).

B. Due-Process Argument

Despite the Legislature's design Yanez nonetheless continues to argue that § 11-37-8.1 contains an implicit element that the accused must have knowledge that the victim is fourteen years of age or younger. Yanez suggests that § 11-37-8.1 violates his dueprocess rights because he had neither the opportunity to learn Allison's true age nor the opportunity to present a meaningful defense concerning his reasonable mistake. In support of this argument Yanez relies on Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252, 72 S.Ct. 240, 244, 96 L.Ed. 288, 294 (1952), in which the Supreme Court observed "that intent was so inherent in the idea of the offense that it required no statutory affirmation," and on Griffith in which we relied on Morissette and declared that § 11-37-8.1 contains an implicit mens rea requirement that a defendant "act with the intent of sexual arousal or gratification" and that this statute "is not a strict liability offense." 660 A.2d at 706.

Indeed Yanez correctly states that "[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence." Tobin, 602 A.2d at 534 (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500, 71 S.Ct. 857, 862, 95 L.Ed. 1137, 1147 (1951)). In Morissette the Supreme Court stated:

"The contention that any injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil. A relation between *767 some mental element and punishment for a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child's familiar exculpatory Tut I didn't mean to,' and has afforded the rational basis for a tardy and unfinished substitution of deterrence and reformation in place of retaliation and vengeance as the motivation for public prosecution." Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250-51, 72 S.Ct. at 243, 96 L.Ed. at 293-94.

Despite this well-recognized judicial principle, in order for Yanez to prove that the Legislature's exercise of its power runs afoul of the protections guaranteed by the dueprocess clause, Yanez must demonstrate that this practice "offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Ransom, 942 F.2d at 777 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934)). Yanez cannot satisfy this test.

Indeed in nearly the same breath that the Supreme Court proclaimed the "[u]nqualified acceptance" of the doctrine requiring a mens rea for every crime, the Morissette Court also observed several exceptions to this rule, including "sex offenses, such as rape, in which the victim's actual age was determinative despite defendant's reasonable belief that the girl had reached age of consent."^[6]Morissette, 342 U.S. at 251 n. 8, 72 S.Ct. at 244 n. 8, 96 L.Ed. at 294 n. 8. Furthermore, "Mlle Supreme Court has never held that an honest mistake as to the age of the prosecutrix is a constitutional defense to statutory rape." Nelson v. Moriarty, 484 F.2d 1034, 1035 (1st Cir.1973). See also Brooks, 841 F.2d at 270; State v. Stiffler, 114 Idaho 935, 763 P.2d 308, 310 (App.1988). We therefore conclude that Yanez's due-process attack is without merit.

In addition we are of the opinion that Griffith is distinguishable from the case at bar. Prior to our opinion in Griffith we stated that in order to obtain a conviction for first-degree child-molestation sexual assault, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt only that (1) the accused engaged in the sexual penetration of the victim and (2) the victim was thirteen (now fourteen) years of age or younger. See Girouard, 561 A.2d at 889.

In Griffith, a case involving digital penetration, as distinguished from sexual intercourse, we addressed the first element of first-degree child-molestation sexual assault codified in § 11-37-8.1, namely, that the accused must engage in the sexual penetration of the victim. 660 A.2d at 705. With respect to this first element we held that first-degree child-molestation sexual assault contained an implied mens rea requirement that the accused act for the purposes of sexual arousal or gratification. See id. at 706. We further stated that "first-degree child-molestation sexual assault, which carries a minimum twenty-year sentence, is not a strict liability offense." Id. Yanez relies on this dictum and invites us to extend the mens rea requirement to the second element of the statute. We do not read Griffith this broadly, however, since we have subsequently determined that this implied mens rea is applicable only in cases that do not involve penile penetration. See In re Odell, 672 A.2d at 460; Bryant, 670 A.2d at 783. Thus the mens rea necessary in cases involving penile penetration is implicit in the intentional doing of the act. Therefore, in the context of this case we emphatically decline Yanez's invitation and hold that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt only that Yanez engaged in sexual intercourse with a person who was fourteen years of age or younger. See Girouard, 561 A.2d at 889.

The dissent cites Tobin, Griffith, Bryant, and State v. Tevay, 707 A.2d 700 (R.I.1998), to support the proposition that this Court has previously required a mens rea for childmolestation sexual assault crimes and only "now throws itself into reverse gear and *768 starts backpedaling furiously" from our prior precedent. Naturally we disagree.

These cases refer to situations in which we have been required to interpret chapter 37 of title 11 following the 1979 amendment to the sexual assault statutes. At common law the crime of rape consisted of "the act of sexual intercourse committed by a man with a woman not his wife and without her consent, committed when the victim's resistance is overcome by force or fear, or under other prohibited conditions." State v. Golden, 430 A.2d 433, 435 (R.I.1981). "In 1979 the General Assembly amended chapter 37 of title 11, which had provided penalties for rape and seduction and substituted for these terms the crime of `sexual assault.'" State v. Mc-Donald, 602 A.2d 923, 926 (R.I.1992). This 1979 amendment broadened the definition of sexual penetration by force to include, in addition to sexual intercourse, the intrusion of any part of a person's body into one's anal or genital cavities. State v. Babbitt, 457 A.2d 1049, 1054 (R.I.1983). Likewise, the amended version also created an offense unknown to the common law, second-degree sexual assault, which criminalized "sexual contact," as that term is defined. See §§. 11-37-1(7); 11-37-4.

As the dissent points out, over the past years this Court has been required to interpret the meaning of the terms "sexual penetration" and "sexual contact" with respect to the crimes of sexual assault as well as the subsequently enacted offenses of child-molestation. See Bryant, 670 A.2d at 783 (interpreting sexual penetration); Griffith, 660 A.2d at 706 (extending Tobin to sexual penetration); Tobin, 602 A.2d at 534 (interpreting sexual contact). However, the common law crime of rape has always been embodied in the first-degree sexual assault statute, see Babbitt, 457 A.2d at 1054, and this crime has always been considered a general-intent crime and has never been interpreted by this Court as requiring a mens rea. See Bryant, 670 A.2d at 783. We have never deviated from the general principle "that purposeful penile penetration precludes a finding of innocent touching." Id.

In addition we do not read our recent opinion in Tevay so broadly as the dissent does and strongly disagree that Tevay "reaffirmed the requirement that the prosecution must prove intentional wrongdoing for the defendant to be guilty of child molestation and specifically endorsed a mistake-of-fact defense." Not only was that question not before us in Tevay, but Tevay simply does not stand for that proposition.

Tevay concerned a challenge to the adequacy of a jury instruction in light of the fact that the defendant presented testimony in which he denied engaging in any inappropriate conduct with his twelve-year-old stepdaughter, even though he did acknowledge being a heavy sleeper who would occasionally pull his wife into bed when she attempted to wake him. 707 A.2d at 701. Tevay then conceded that there was a "ten percent chance'" that the charged incident (pulling his stepdaughter into bed, touching her buttock, and forcing her to touch his penis) could have occurred without his knowledge. Id. The trial justice instructed the jurors that in order to find Tevay guilty of second-degree child-molestation sexual assault, they must find that "Tevay's conduct was intentional and had as its purpose sexual arousal or gratification." Id. at 702. The trial justice added that Tevay might not be found guilty "`of conduct which you feel from the evidence, causes you to conclude that the conduct was accidental.'" Id. Tevay's request for a mistake of fact instruction was denied, and this Court not only approved the jury instruction as a whole but found no error in the trial justice's refusal to give an instruction on mistake of fact as well. Id.

We determined that in the context of the factual scenario as alleged by Tevay, accident and mistake of fact related to the same defense theory, and we therefore concluded that "the jurors were adequately informed that if