Bothwell v. Republic Tobacco Co.

*1223 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before me for consideration is a motion (filing 50), submitted by plaintiffs appointed counsel, Paula Metcalf, seeking reconsideration and vacation of my order appointing her to represent plaintiff in this case (filing 49). For the reasons set forth below, I shall grant the motion and vacate my order of appointment.

BACKGROUND

In March 1994 plaintiff Earl Bothwell, who at the time was incarcerated at the Hastings Correctional Center, submitted to this court a request to proceed in forma pauperis (filing 1), a civil complaint (filing 3), and a motion for appointment of counsel (filing 4). I provisionally granted plaintiffs request to proceed in forma pauperis, pending receipt of trust account statements from his correctional institution. (Filing 2.) I then ordered that plaintiffs complaint be filed. (Id.)

In his complaint plaintiff alleged that he “immediately ceased” purchasing and smoking factory-manufactured cigarettes after Congress enacted the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertisement Act of 1969 (“FCLAA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1333 et seq, which mandated that a warning label be conspicuously placed on packages of such cigarettes. (Filing 3, at 3.) Plaintiff alleged that he thereafter switched to “roll your own” cigarettes, which were not covered by the FCLAA. (Id.) Defendants Republic Tobacco Company and Brown & Williams Tobacco Corporation produce and distribute the shredded, “loose” tobacco which plaintiff used in making his “roll your own” cigarettes. (Id. at 2-3.) Plaintiff alleged that he switched to the defendants’ products on the belief that, because the government had not mandated warning labels on loose tobacco and because the defendants had not voluntarily issued such warnings, those products were not harmful or hazardous. (Id. at 3-4.) Plaintiff alleged that in 1986 he became aware that he suffered from emphysema, asthma, heart disease, and “bronchial and other respiratory diseases.” (Id. at 4.) He later learned that the loose tobacco products he had been using “were stronger that [sic] [factory-produced] cigarettes and were twice as harmful and deadly.” (Id. at 5.)

Upon consideration of the complaint I noted that plaintiff had raised two claims under this court’s diversity jurisdiction. (Filing 5.) Specifically, I noted that plaintiffs complaint raised claims under the following theories of Nebraska tort law: (1) failure to warn under a negligence theory; and (2) fraudulent misrepresentation. (Id.) I concluded that it did not appear that those claims were preempted by the FCLAA.' (Id.) However, I further concluded that plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (Id.) I deferred ruling on plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel and granted plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. (Id.)

Subsequently, plaintiff submitted ■ institutional trust account statements (filing 7), paid the $120 filing fee (filing 8), and filed an amended complaint (filing 8). I reviewed the amended complaint and noted that plaintiff had raised the following claims: (1) failure to warn; (2) strict liability; (3) breach of implied warranty of fitness; (4) fraudulent misrepresentation; and (5) FCLAA labeling claim. (Filing 10.) I concluded that plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted with respect to claims (1), (4), and (5). (Id.) I thus recommended dismissal of those claims pursuant to Federal *1224 Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 1 (Id.) I further concluded that the defendants should respond to plaintiffs strict liability and breach of implied warranty of fitness claims (claims (2) and (3)). (Id.) I granted plaintiffs request for appointment of counsel and ordered issuance of summons. (Id.)

Following a series of motions to withdraw and appointments of substitute counsel, I appointed Paula Metcalf as plaintiffs counsel. (Filing 24.) Metcalf then filed a “Statement of Appeal” (filing 27) of my appointment order and sought to stay enforcement of that order. (Filing 31.) The Honorable Richard G. Kopf granted the motion for stay and remanded the matter to me for consideration of the issues raised in the Statement of Appeal. (Filing 33.) On remand, I noted that because plaintiff was apparently no longer incarcerated, his eligibility to proceed in for-ma pauperis was in question. (Filing 35.) I ordered Metcalf to confer with plaintiff regarding his financial status and to submit the pertinent information to the court. (Id.) In response to that order, Metcalf submitted a motion to reconsider and vacate (filing 36), a motion to stay (filing 38), and a statement of appeal (filing 39). Judge Kopf granted the motion to stay and the statement of appeal, “thereby relieving [Metcalf] of any obligation to comply” with my order to confer with the plaintiff. (Filing 40.) Judge Kopf also directed plaintiff to provide the court with information regarding his whereabouts and financial status. (Filing 41.)

Thereafter, plaintiff submitted a letter informing the court of his present address, stating that he was unable to afford counsel, and requesting appointment of same. (Filing 43.) I then granted plaintiff twenty days to file a financial affidavit and a statement concerning his efforts to obtain counsel. (Filing 44.) As plaintiff failed to comply with my order in a timely fashion I denied plaintiffs request for appointment of counsel and granted him thirty days to either obtain an attorney or notify the court of his intention to proceed pro se. (Filing 45.) Plaintiff subsequently notified the court that he wished to proceed in forma pauperis, indicating that he was physically unable to work and that he was receiving Supplemental Security Income. (Filing 46.) I granted plaintiff provisional leave to proceed in forma pauperis subject to receipt of further information concerning plaintiffs financial status. (Filing 47.) Plaintiff provided the necessary information (filing 48) and I granted him leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Filing 49.)

Additionally, I re-appointed Paula Metcalf to represent plaintiff. (Filing 49.) Metcalf then filed a motion requesting that I reconsider and vacate that order. (Fifing 50.) Metcalf also filed a “Statement of Appeal” (fifing 51) and a motion for a stay of the appointment order (fifing 52). Judge Kopf granted the motion for stay and held the appeal in abeyance pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration. (Fifing 53.) I then invited several interested parties to submit amicus curiae briefs on the questions raised in the motion for reconsideration and deferred my ruling on that motion. (Filing 55.) Metcalf and the amici have since submitted briefs. 2

DISCUSSION

In her brief in support of her motion to reconsider and vacate, Metcalf contends that my order appointing her as counsel is “contrary to law and clearly erroneous” because “a federal court has no statutory or inherent authority to force an attorney to take an ordinary civil case for no compensation.” (Metcalfs Brief, at 8-15.)

Statutory Authority

Insofar as concerns statutory authority, Metcalf is correct. Plaintiff in this case is proceeding in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). In Mallard v. United *1225 States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 104 L.Ed.2d 318 (1989), the United States Supi’eme Court held, in a 5-4 decision, that section 1915(d) 3 does not authorize a federal court to require an unwilling attorney to represent an indigent litigant in a civil case. Id. at 300-08, 109 S.Ct. at 1817-22. In so holding, the Court focused on the language of section 1915(d), which provides that a court may “request” an attorney to accept a court appointment. Id. at 300-07, 109 S.Ct. at 1817-21. The Court examined other-statutes and reasoned that, when Congress wanted to require compulsory service, it knew how to do so explicitly. 4 The Court concluded that by using the term “request,” Congress was demonstrating its desire not to require such service of attorneys who are appointed to represent indigent litigants. 5 Id. However, the Court in Mallard left open the question of whether federal courts possess the inherent power to require an unwilling attorney to accept an appointment:

[n]or do we express an opinion on the question whether the federal courts possess inherent authority to require lawyers to serve. Although respondents and their amici urge us to affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment on the ground that the federal courts do have such authority, the District Court did not invoke its inherent power in its opinion below, and the Court of Appeals did not offer this ground for denying Mallard’s application for a writ of mandamus. We therefore leave that issue for another day.

Id. at 310,109 S.Ct. at 1823.

Inherent Authority

After conducting an extensive review of authority and commentary addressing this issue, I am convinced that a federal district court does possess the inherent power to compel an unwilling attorney to accept a civil appointment. 6 The origin and scope of that power are discussed below.

Since its inception the federal judiciary has maintained that federal courts possess inherent powers which are not derived from statutes or rules. See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34, 3 L.Ed. 259 (1812) (“our courts no doubt possess powers not immediately derived from statutes”); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1388, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962) (stating that inherent powers are “governed not by rule or statute”). These inherent powers vest in the courts upon their creation. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227, 5 L.Ed. 242 (1821) (“[cjourts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum,, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates”); Link, 370 U.S. at 630, 82 S.Ct. at 1389 (inherent powers are “necessarily vested in courts to manage .their own affairs”).

While it is clear that federal courts possess inherent powers, the concept “has *1226 been described as nebulous and its bounds as ‘shadowy.’ ” Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3rd Cir.1985) (en banc). In Eash, the Third Circuit attempted to distill the judicial exercise of inherent powers into three categories. Id. at 562-64. The first and narrowest category was termed “irreducible inherent authority.” Id. at 562. The powers in this category, which are vested in federal courts by Article III of the Constitution, are those “fundamental to the essence of the court as a constitutional tribunal.” Id. at 562; see also Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 820-21, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 2144-45, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the “Judicial Branch[ ] must ... possess those powers necessary to protect the functioning of its own processes”); Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215, 1218 (11th Cir.) (discussing inherent power of a court to protect the integrity of its process), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948, 106 S.Ct. 347, 88 L.Ed.2d 294 (1985); Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 593 F.Supp. 1371, 1380 (D.D.C.1984) (noting that the judiciary has the inherent power to govern itself in a way that assures the integrity and independence of the judicial branch), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 770 F.2d 1093 (D.C.Cir.1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 904, 106 S.Ct. 3273, 91 L.Ed.2d 563 (1986). The inherent authority in this category is grounded in the separation of powers doctrine and thus may be exercised even in the face of contrary legislation. Eash, 757 F.2d at 562.

The second category identified by the court in Eash includes those powers which are “necessary to the exercise of all others.” Id.; Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 2463, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980) (quoting Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Craneh) at 34.). A court’s power to sanction for contempt falls within this category because that power is deemed “absolutely essential” to the functioning of the judiciary. Eash, 757 F.2d at 562-63 (quoting Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616, 80 S.Ct. 1038, 1042, 4 L.Ed.2d 989 (1960)); see also Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510, 22 L.Ed. 205 (1873) (noting that “power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts”); Michaelson v. U.S. ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 266 U.S. 42, 65, 45 S.Ct. 18, 20, 69 L.Ed. 162 (1924) (same); cf. Ex Parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531, 6 L.Ed. 152 (1824) (discussing inherent power to control admission to the bar and to discipline attorneys); Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281, 77 S.Ct. 1274, 1276, 1 L.Ed.2d 1342 (1957) (discussing inherent power to admit, suspend, or disbar attorneys in federal courts).

The third category contains those powers which arise from notions of equity and which are necessary “in the pursuit of a just result?’ 7 Eash, 757 F.2d at 563; see ITT Community Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 1359 (5th Cir.1978) (federal courts possess inherent powers to “process litigation to a just and equitable conclusion”). As an example of an exercise of the authority in this category, the court in Eash cited Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 40 S.Ct. 543, 64 L.Ed. 919 (1920). In Peterson, the Supreme Court held that it was appropriate to appoint an auditor to aid the court in its decisionmak-ing. Id. at 312, 40 S.Ct. at 547. The Court in Peterson recognized that “[cjourts have ... inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the performance of their duties” and to appoint “persons unconnected with the court to aid judges in the performance of specific judicial duties.” Id. Thus, Peterson demonstrates that, in seeking to administer justice and bring about a fair and just result, a court must sometimes exercise its inherent power to appoint individuals to act as “instruments” of the court. See Barton, 569 F.2d at 1359 (citing Peterson for proposition that courts possess inherent powers to ensure fairness and justice); see also United States v. Bertoli, 994 F.2d 1002, 1016-17 (3rd Cir.1993) *1227 (court in criminal action has inherent power to “require standby counsel for the purpose of advancing its own interest in the fair, speedy and efficient disposition of cases on its criminal docket”); Reilly v. United, States, 863 F.2d 149, 154 (1st Cir.1988) (court possesses inherent power to appoint technical advisers); Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 737, 746 (6th Cir.1979) (court has inherent authority to appoint “expert advis-ors or consultants”). 8

Some commentators have asserted that a court’s inherent power to compel an attorney to represent an indigent litigant most readily falls into the third Eash category containing those equitable powers necessary to bring about a fair and just result. Note, Invoking the Inherent Powers Doctrine to Compel Representation of Indigent Civil Litigants in Federal Court, 10 Rev.Litig. 769, 782 (1991); Note, Mallard v. United States District Court: Attorney May Refuse Federal Judge’s Request to Represent Civil Plaintiff Proceeding In Forma Pauperis, 35 Vill. L.Rev. 1175, 1233 (1990). However, as further discussed below, the power to conscript lawyers to represent the indigent is necessary not only to achieve fairness and justice in individual cases, but also to protect the integrity and proper functioning of the judicial branch. See Tigran W. Eldred & Thomas Sehoenherr, The Lawyer’s Duty of Public Service: More than Charity?, 96 W.Va. L.Rev. 367 (1993); David Luban, Lawyering and Justice: An Ethical Study (1988). As such, that power can also be said to fall within the first two Eash categories. Eash, 757 F.2d at 562-63. Specifically, then, this court’s inherent power to compel representation of the indigent exists for two primary purposes: (1) to ensure a “fair and just” adjudicative process in individual cases; and (2) to maintain the integrity and viability of the judiciary and of the entire civil justice system. These two purposes mirror the dual functions that lawyers serve in the civil justice system. First, they act as advocates in individual cases working to peacefully resolve civil disputes between citizens. Second, by their ready availability to act in that capacity, they preserve the credibility of the courts as a legitimate arm of the civil justice system. The following discussion explores the court’s inherent authority to conscript unwilling counsel to achieve each of the foregoing purposes.

(1) “Fair and Just” Process in Individual Cases

As noted above, in seeking to bring about the fair and just resolution of a ease, a court may exercise its inherent power to appoint individuals to act as “instruments” of the court. While it is established that a plaintiff has no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case, Wiggins v. Sargent, 753 F.2d 663, 668 (8th Cir.1985); Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1048 (7th Cir.1982) (en bane), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1214, 103 S.Ct. 1212, 75 L.Ed.2d 451 (1983); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir.1980); Cook v. Bounds, 518 F.2d 779, 780 (4th Cir.1975), counsel nevertheless may be necessary in a particular civil proceeding to ensure fairness and justice in the proceeding and to bring about a fair and just outcome. Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761, 764 (7th Cir.) (“Merritt I ”) (holding that particular circumstances in a civil ease “may make the presence of counsel neeessary”), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986, 104 S.Ct. 434, 78 L.Ed.2d 366 (1983).

The American legal system is adversarial in nature. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 796, 9.L.Ed.2d 799 *1228 (1963); Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 Colum.L.Rev. 1322, 1331 (1966) (noting that the “American legal system is built upon .the adversarial model”). The adversarial system has been embraced because it is believed that truth is best divined in the crucible of cross examination and adversarial argument. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 377, 113 S.Ct. 838, 847, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that without the “ ‘crucible of meaningful adversarial testing,’ there can be no guarantee that the adversarial system will function properly to produce just and reliable results”), quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2045, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). Attorneys, because they are trained in the advocacy skills of cross examination and argument, are a necessary component in a properly functioning adversarial system. See Johnson v. Williams, 788 F.2d 1319, 1323 (8th Cir.1986) (because lawyers are trained in the presentation of evidence and cross-examination they are best able to present and argue the issues so that the truth will be exposed and justice administered), citing Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 888 (7th Cir.1981). Thus, the notion that the adversarial system is an effective method for ferreting out the truth presumes that both sides have relatively equal access to adequate legal assistance from those trained in the art of advocacy. Merritt I, 697 F.2d at 764 n. 3; Former Emp. of Rocky Mt. Off. of Terra Res. v. United States, 13 CIT 427, 713 F.Supp. 1433, 1435 (1989).

Where one side is without adequate legal representation, the adversarial system may not be effective. Merritt I, 697 F.2d at 764 n. 3; see Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 826, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1497, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977) (“even the most dedicated trial judges are bound to overlook meritorious cases without the benefit of an adversary presentation”); McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1323 (1982) (“[w]e firmly believe that our adversary system of justice works best when both sides are zealously and competently represented”); see also Marrero, Committee to Improve the Availability of Legal Services— Final Report to the Chief Judge of the State of New York, 19 Hofstra L.Rev. 755, 782 (1991). As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explained:

In some civil eases meaningful access [to the courts] requires representation by a lawyer. In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 63-64, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932), Justice Sutherland observed that:

The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.

Id. at 763 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, supra).

If the lack of legal representation is the free ehoiee of the unrepresented party or if it results from factors unrelated to the indigen-cy of the plaintiff, our system is not offended. Where, however, one party is unable to obtain legal representation because of indigen-cy, the resulting disparity of advocacy skills clearly offends the principle of “equality before the law” underlying our system. Luban, supra, at 251-54; see also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19, 76 S.Ct. 585, 591, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956) (“[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of a trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has”). Further, a substantial disparity in access to legal representation caused by the indigency of one of the parties threatens the adversarial system’s ability to produce a just and fair result. 9 See Merritt I, 697 F.2d at 764 n. 3.

Access to legal representation in this country is gained primarily through the private market. For the most part, the market is an effective mechanism for providing legal services to those who need them. However, the market sometimes fails to provide counsel regardless of the merits of the claims at issue. Where the person whose claims have been rejected by the private market is indigent, he or she may seek representation *1229 through a legal aid organization. However, the ability of such organizations to meet the needs of the indigent has taken a serious hit over the past fifteen years in the form of reduced funding to the Legal Services Corporation (“LSC”), the federal entity responsible for funding state and local legal aid offices. In 1981 the LSC had almost reached its stated goal of providing two legal services lawyers for every 10,000 poor persons. Richard L. Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism, 32 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 474, 547 (1985). In 1982, the LSC budget was slashed from $321 million to $241 million. Eldred & Sehoenherr, supra. Those funding cuts resulted in a drastic reduction in the number of legal services attorneys, as well as the closing of many legal aid offices nationwide. Id. The effect of those cuts is still felt today; to attain the 1981 ratio of lawyers to poor people, it is estimated that the current Legal Services Corporation budget would have to be nearly doubled. Matthew Diller, Poverty Law in the Golden Age, 93 Mieh.L.Rev. 1401, 1432 n. 80 (1995). Id. Rather than increasing that budget, however, the current Congress is considering further cuts in legal services funding. 10 Jon New-berry, Temporary Reprieve for the LSC, ABA Journal, at 18-19 (December 1995). Also being considered are greater restrictions on the types of practice which legal aid organizations can provide to the indigent. Id. Compounding the problem of legal access for the poor is the growing apathy of the private bar to the plight of many indigent litigants. See Eldred & Sehoenherr, supra. The inevitable net result of these factors is that the poor, indeed most of the so-called “middle class,” have less realistic access to advocacy services from lawyers.

The foregoing discussion establishes that: 1) courts possess the inherent power to bring to their assistance those “instruments” necessary to ensure a “fair and just” adjudicative process in individual cases; 2) in many, if not most, cases, due to the adversarial nature of our system, lawyers are a neees-sary component in ensuring such a “fair and just” process; 3) .to a significant degree, neither the private marketplace nor public or charitable efforts provide indigent litigants with adequate access to legal assistance; and 4) to that extent, such failure threatens the reliability of the results of the adversarial process. On these bases, I conclude that, when indigency is the principal reason for disparate access to the civil justice system in an individual case, a federal court does possess the inherent authority to bring about a fair and just adjudicative process by conscripting an unwilling lawyer to represent the indigent party. A further basis for the existence of such authority is set forth below.

(2) Preserving the Integrity of the Civil Justice System.

The very purposes for the establishment of the judicial branch of government included the peaceful resolution of private disputes between citizens and the protection of the minority from loss of their rights to the majority, either at the ballot box or through force. See Talamini y. Allstate Insurance Company, 470 U.S. 1067, 1070-71, 105 S.Ct. 1824, 1826, 85 L.Ed.2d 125 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“courts provide the mechanism for peaceful resolution of disputes that might otherwise give rise to attempts at self-help”); The Federalist No. 10, at 104 (J. Madison) (Hamilton ed. 1868) (warning against a society in which “measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority”).

In order to be viable in delivering on these goals, a justice system must be both trustworthy and trusted. The judicial branch of our government was created powerless to enforce its own decisions; it relies on the respect of litigants for adherence to the law it declares, or, if necessary, actions of the executive branch. See The Federalist No. 78, at 393-94 (G. Willis ed. 1982) (“[t]he judiciary ... may truly be said to have nei *1230 ther FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment”). It is, to be sure, a living example of “the consent of the governed.” See The Declaration of Independence. To be ac