Pfeiffer v. Toll

OPINION

Plaintiff Milton Pfeiffer is a stockholder of nominal defendant Toll Brothers, Inc. (“Toll Brothers” or the “Company”). He brought this action to recover damages suffered by Toll Brothers resulting from alleged insider trading by the defendants. The defendants have moved to dismiss his Verified Amended Shareholder Derivative Complaint (the “Complaint”). I deny the motion.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

I assume the following facts to be true for purposes of the motion to dismiss. The facts are drawn from the allegations of the Complaint, from publicly available documents it incorporates by reference, and from information subject to judicial notice, such as the historical prices at which securities traded on the public markets.

A. The Individual Defendants

The individual defendants account for eight of the eleven members of the board of directors of Toll Brothers (the “Board”) at the time this action was filed. The eight individual defendants all sold significant amounts of stock during the period from December 2004 through September 2005. The Complaint alleges they did so while in possession of material, non-public information about Toll Brothers’ future prospects.

Defendant Robert I. Toll (“R.Toll”) and his brother, defendant Bruce E. Toll (“B.Toll”), co-founded the Company’s predecessor in 1967. The current entity was incorporated in May 1986 in preparation for an initial public offering in June 1986. R. Toll has served since 1986 as the Company’s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer. B. Toll served from 1986 until 1998 as the Company’s President and Chief Operating Officer. B. Toll continues to serve as a director and as a paid consultant to the Company.

Defendants Zvi Barzilay and Joel H. Rassman are senior officers of the Company. Barzilay joined Toll Brothers’ predecessor in 1980 and has been the Company’s Chief Operating Officer since 1998. He has been a director since 1994. Rassman joined Toll Brothers’ predecessor in 1984 and has been the Company’s Executive Vice President, Treasurer, and Chief Financial Officer since 2002. He has been a director since 1996. I refer to R. Toll, Barzilay, and Rassman as the “Officer Defendants.”

Defendants Robert S. Blank, Richard Braemer, Carl Marbach, and Paul E. Shapiro are outside directors of Toll Brothers. I refer to them as the “Outside Director *685 Defendants.” B. Toll is sui generis. He is not currently an officer of the Company; nor is he an independent, outside director.

B. Toll Brothers

Nominal defendant Toll Brothers is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in Horsham, Pennsylvania. The Company designs, builds, markets, and arranges financing for single-family homes in luxury residential communities throughout the United States. Its shares trade publicly on the New York Stock Exchange under the symbol “TOL.”

Toll Brothers’ business model turns on developing residential communities, and a key operating metric is the number of communities where Toll Brothers is actively selling homes. Relatedly, a key driver of the Company’s future performance is the number of communities where Toll Brothers has received regulatory approval to build homes. Toll Brothers can then start taking orders for homes, which in turn generate the Company’s earnings three to four quarters later, when the sales close.

Toll Brothers’ senior management closely monitors a range of metrics relating to the Company’s core business. The Complaint quotes from Toll Brothers’ 2004 annual report, which describes a process by which the entire senior management team reviews in detail three times per year the progress of each community owned or controlled by Toll Brothers. The Complaint alleges that on earnings calls R. Toll referred to written reports comparing community traffic by year and by month, stated that senior management closely monitored the Company’s backlog on a weekly basis, and noted that senior management received weekly sales reports from each selling community. In addition to these Company statements, the Complaint quotes an article from the April 8, 2005 issue of Fortune that further describes the Company’s internal monitoring of core business metrics.

C. Toll Brothers’ Projections Of 20% Net Income Growth

In 2003 and 2004, the luxury residential market experienced booming growth. Toll Brothers rode the wave to record financial performance. Revenues in 2003 increased by 19% oyer 2002, then increased again in 2004 by another 40% over 2003. 1 Closings in 2003 were up 11% over 2002, then up another 35% in 2004. Backlog in 2003 was up 39% over 2002, then grew by another 44% in 2004. Toll Brothers announced record earnings per share for the fourth quarter of 2004, up 87% over fourth quarter 2003.

Against the backdrop of this parabolic trend, Toll Brothers predicted greater things to come. In the letter to stockholders in the Company’s 2004 annual report, Toll Brothers projected “at least 20%” growth in net income for 2006. This projection was based on the Company adding 20 new communities by the end of 2005, thereby increasing its total communities from 220 to 240. The letter to stockholders rejected the notion that there was a “housing bubble” that was about to pop. Signed by R. Toll, B. Toll, and Barzilay, the letter stated: “We strongly disagree: we believe demand is being driven by fundamental demographics and home prices are rising due to the imbalance between supply and demand.” The letter explained that Toll Brothers’ “luxury brand” was *686 “less affected by rising mortgage rates” and stated that “it should be a long time before rates make a difference to our luxury home buyers.”

Throughout the first eleven months of 2005, Toll Brothers reiterated its projection of 20% net income growth in 2006 and again in 2007. The Complaint describes Toll Brothers’ public filings and quotes relevant statements. Even as Toll Brothers’ operating results continued their parabolic trend, Toll Brothers stood by the projections of 20% net income growth in both 2006 and 2007.

The Complaint describes in detail the Officer Defendants’ efforts to buttress the projections against market concern. As the markets became worried about a housing bubble during mid-2005 and began to question the ability of homebuilders to maintain their red-hot performance, the Officer Defendants expressed all the more confidence in Toll Brothers’ projections. They asserted that they did not perceive any downturn in the housing market, and they represented that the Company was uniquely positioned to weather any problems that might occur. According to the Officer Defendants, Toll Brothers catered to a niche market of luxury home buyers who were not affected by rising interest rates. They discounted indications that traffic in the Company’s communities was slowing and that the rate at which new contracts were signed was declining. They downplayed regulatory delays that were hampering Toll Brothers’ efforts to open new communities.

For example, in May 2005, Toll Brothers reported record earnings for both the second quarter and the six-month mark. R. Toll reiterated his expectation that the Company would open 20 new selling communities in 2005 and end the year with approximately 240 communities. Rassman reiterated the projection of another 20% growth in net income for 2006. Although sales in California fell, the Officer Defendants explained that the decline “was not due to a lack of demand, but rather to a lack of supply as we’ve sold out of several communities at a faster pace than we have been able to open up new ones.” In a conference call to discuss the results, R. Toll stated:

We believe Toll Brothers marches to a different beat in the housing market, in general, due to our luxury market rates and the land we control in some of the most desired locations. We believe luxury buyers are less impacted by interest rate hikes than less affluent buyers are affected.

During the same call, he asserted that Toll Brothers’ sales were not being driven by speculative investors: “[W]e try not to sell to speculators. We train our sales associates how to spot them.” He admitted that more buyers were using interest-only loans to purchase Toll Brothers’ homes and that Toll Brothers encouraged the practice.

In July 2005, Rassman appeared on CNBC. When asked about the risk of a decline in home sales, he replied that Toll Brothers “[doesn’t] currently see any indications on a national basis that that’s happening, either slowdown in regulation or a change in the balance between supply and demand.” Rassman reiterated his views in an interview a day later with Bloomberg News, where he stated: “We don’t see any let-up in terms of demand or our ability to produce profits.”

In August 2005, Toll Brothers announced third quarter preliminary results. R. Toll projected that Toll Brothers would end 2005 with 287 selling communities and would have 265 selling communities by the end of 2006. He reaffirmed the Company’s previous projections of 20% growth in net income for 2006, and yet another 20% *687 net income growth in 2007. In a conference call to discuss the preliminary results, R. Toll said he did not believe the pace of sales had slowed down at all. Rassman also said that the sales pace had not slowed. R. Toll stated that demand on the West Coast was “very strong” and that while two isolated markets had cooled a bit, they were “still hotter than a normal market.” R. Toll claimed the decline in sales was initiated by Toll Brothers. According to him, the “buyer appetite [was] so healthy” that Toll Brothers had “chosen to hold off taking new home sale contracts ... to ration our supply to maximize profit.”

Analysts latched on to these statements. On August 4, 2005, J.P. Morgan issued a report stating: “[Critically, [the Company] reaffirmed its [2005 and 2006] net income guidance of 70% and 20% respectively.” An analyst with Susquehanna Group stated: “Our post conference call view actually brightens a bit despite some conservative posturing by management.” Another analyst stated: “We believe even more strongly about the positive three-year outlook for [the Company] following the call.”

On August 16, 2005, R. Toll appeared on CNBC to discuss the Company’s third quarter results. He stated: “We don’t see a housing bubble. The market is fantastic. We’re enjoying exactly where we are.” Six days later, on August 21, The New York Times published an article about Yale economist Robert Shiller, who had written a book about the possible housing bubble. R. Toll was quoted as saying, “Shiller is predicting the mountain goes into the sea. He’s selling himself.”

On August 25, 2005, Toll Brothers announced its third quarter results. R. Toll stated that the Company was “on track” for “approximately 20% net income growth in both 2006 and 2007.” In the quarterly earnings call, R. Toll suggested that the third quarter results “should give confidence to investors that our results and prospects are not as cyclical as the market seems to be anticipating.” He reaffirmed the projection of 20% growth for 2006.

After the quarterly earnings call, Rass-man appeared on several television shows. In an interview on August 25, 2005, Rass-man stated that the Company “firmly believe[s] that the price of the stock will continue to go up.” In another interview that day, he described the Company’s business prospects as “spectacular.” He elaborated: “Everything looks like we will have another record year this year and another record year next year. So, we are already projecting records for 2006 and an additional 20% growth in 2007.”

On October 3, 2005, USA Today published an article on Toll Brothers. R. Toll was quoted as saying: “We expect 2005 to be 80% up over '04, and we expect an approximately 20% increase for '06 [and in] '07 ... we expect[ ] a 20% increase over '06. So that’s pretty good moving and grooving.” On October 16, The New York Times published an article on Toll Brothers. R. Toll was cited as expecting Toll Brothers to “grow by 20 percent for the next two years and then will strive for 15 percent annually after that.”

D. The Downward Revisions In December 2005

On November 8, 2005, Toll Brothers announced its preliminary fourth quarter results for 2005. Although the Company again reported record net income, management’s tone was tempered. R. Toll was quoted as saying that despite the Company’s record performance for the quarter, “we believe a shortage of selling communities, coupled with some softening of demand in a number of markets, negatively impacted our contract results.” He blamed “an increasingly complex regulato *688 ry process” for delays in opening new communities and announced that the Company had reached only 230 selling communities by October 31, short of the 237 communities he had projected on August 25. He added that the Company would stay at 230 selling communities through the end of the first quarter of 2006. During management’s conference call to discuss the numbers, they cited “softening” demand that was being seen “pretty much across the board.” R. Toll stated that foot traffic-— people visiting the Company’s selling communities — had been “down for about a year.”

On December 8, 2005, Toll Brothers reported its 2005 results. The release explained that despite “record fiscal year and fourth-quarter results for earnings, revenues, backlog and contracts,” the housing market was “not as robust today as it was throughout 2004.” Management lowered its annual growth projections for 2006 to just 0.5% and reiterated that Toll Brothers would stay at 230 selling communities through the first quarter of 2006. This was the first time Toll Brothers modified its projection of 20% net income growth in 2006, and the number fell off a cliff to 0.5%.

The reaction from the media and analysts was profoundly negative. Susquehanna Financial Group issued a report titled, “TOL Creates an Unforgettable Day in the Homebuilder Universe.” Susquehanna noted that order growth and selling-communities growth had “disappear[edj” and that the negative results were “completely unexpected.” The Dallas Morning News reported that “toxic words crossed the wires: ‘softening demand.’ ”

The Complaint explains that Toll Brothers’ actual results for 2006 and 2007 were even more disappointing than the downwardly revised projections anticipated. I do not dwell on the actual results in 2006 and 2007 because the claims in this action must rise or fall based on what the defendants knew in 2005, not whether they accurately foresaw what would happen in 2006 and 2007.

E. The Defendants’ Knowledge Prior to December 2005

The Complaint alleges that from December 2004 on, the defendants knew their representations about 2006 and 2007 had no reasonable basis in fact. The defendants admitted in December 2005 that foot traffic was down for “about a year” and fewer prospective customers were visiting Toll Brothers’ communities. They also knew that the rate at which new contracts were signed was trending lower throughout 2005, although they attempted to explain it away and even claimed that Toll Brothers caused the trend by “ration[ing] supply to maximize profit.” They also knew that the regulatory approval process was becoming increasingly complex and time consuming, such that their projections about the number of selling communities that could be opened were no longer accurate. Without new communities, Toll Brothers could not make sales or achieve projected earnings growth. Because the community approval process takes months, the defendants knew those trends well before they reduced their projections.

F. The Performance Of Toll Brothers’ Stock Price

During the period of time when Toll Brothers’ management was projecting 20% growth in net income for 2006 and 2007, Toll Brothers’ common stock significantly outperformed the S & P Homebuilders Index, a peer index of large, national homebuilders. Prior to late 2004, when Toll Brothers began to make its 20% projections, Toll Brothers traded in line with the index. During the time that Toll *689 Brothers was projecting 20% growth in net income for 2006 and 2007, the trading price of Toll Brothers’ stock more than doubled, from $28.50 in December 2004 to over $58.00 in July 2005.

During this same period, and particularly during the summer and fall of 2005, the defendants sold shares. The eight defendants collectively sold 14 million shares for proceeds of over $615 million. Barzilay sold 92% of his shares. Blank sold 93% of his shares. Shapiro sold 84% of his shares. Marbach sold 82% of his shares. Rassman sold 68% of his shares. Braemer sold 52% of his shares. B. Toll and R. Toll, who during their long tenures as co-founders of the Company had not previously sold significant amounts of stock, respectively sold 37% and 29% of then-shares. These trades were inconsistent with the past trading patterns and are suspicious in timing and amount.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

The Complaint sets forth two counts. Count I asserts a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 70 A.2d 5 (Del.Ch.1949), which recognized the right of a Delaware corporation to recover from its fiduciaries for harm caused by insider trading. Count II asserts a generalized claim for contribution and indemnification. The defendants (including Toll Brothers as nominal defendant) have moved to dismiss these claims. First, all defendants contend that the Complaint fails to plead demand futility for purposes of Court of Chancery Rule 23.1. Second, all defendants contend that the statute of limitations bars any claims based on the individual defendants’ stock sales. Third, the Outside Director Defendants argue that a claim for breach of fiduciary duty has not been pled as to them. Finally, and most boldly, the defendants argue that Delaware should abandon its traditional role of policing against breaches of the duty of loyalty by fiduciaries of Delaware corporations, at least where the underlying wrong involves insider trading, and that Brophy is an outdated precedent that should be rejected. 2

A. The Complaint Adequately Pleads Demand Futility.

I start with demand futility. In 2003, Vice Chancellor Strine explained how the demand futility analysis operates when a plaintiff contends that a majority of a board of directors sold stock based on confidential corporate information. Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 499-507 (Del. Ch.2003). For reasons he ably set forth at some length, the demand futility inquiry is governed by Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927 (Del.1993). The operative question is whether the Board could impartially consider the merits of a demand without being influenced by improper considerations. Guttman, 823 A.2d at 501.

As the Guttman decision explains, directors can be compromised for purposes of considering a demand if they face a significant likelihood of liability relating to the subject matter of the complaint. Id. at 503. The test is “whether the plaintiffs have pled facts that show [the] directors face a sufficiently substantial threat of per *690 sonal liability to compromise their ability to act impartially on a demand.” Id.

Guttman considered this issue solely with respect to the claims asserted in the derivative action itself. Vice Chancellor Strine did not need to consider the implications of a companion federal securities action because, as he observed, “none of [the outside director] defendants is even named as a defendant in the pending federal securities suits.” Id. at 504. Moreover, at the time Vice Chancellor Strine ruled, the federal securities lawsuits had been dismissed. Id.

Later in 2003, Vice Chancellor Noble considered the existence of pending federal securities actions while determining whether plaintiffs adequately pled demand futility for a breach of fiduciary duty claim to recover for insider trading. Rattner v. Bidzos, 2003 WL 22284323, at *1 (Del.Ch. Sept.30, 2003). He noted:

The only particularized facts contained in the Amended Complaint regarding the federal securities class action lawsuits are that such suits were filed and are pending in the Northern District of California. One is left to guess at which of the Individual Defendants, indeed if any of the Director Defendants, are defendants in the federal securities class action lawsuits.

Id. at *14. Vice Chancellor Noble held that “conclusory and cryptic allegations” about a companion federal securities action were insufficient to merit demand excusal under Rales. Id.

This case is different. All of the individual defendants, including the four Outside Director Defendants, are named defendants in a companion federal securities action. The complaint in that action survived a motion to dismiss under the rigorous standards for pleading securities fraud. City of Hialeah Employees’ Ret. Sys. and Laborers Pension Trust Funds v. Toll Bros., Inc., 2008 WL 4058690, at *1 (E.D.Pa. Aug.29, 2008). The district court held that the complaint sufficiently alleged that the defendants “made material representations and omissions of material fact” in connection with “future projections” for 2006 and 2007 that were “knowingly unreasonable” at the time they were made. Id. at *2. The district court further held that the insider trading of the individual defendants — essentially the same trades at issue here—raised a “powerful and cogent inference of scienter ” and was “unusual in scope and timing.” Id. at *5.

In light of the federal securities action, it is not possible for the defendants in this case, who comprised a majority of the Board when the suit was filed, to consider a demand impartially. If the Company pressed forward with its rights of action against the defendants in this case, then the Company’s efforts would undercut or even compromise the defense of the federal securities action. Under Rales, Gutt-man, and Rattner, demand is futile.

B. The Complaint Adequately Pleads A Basis For Tolling The Statute Of Limitations.

I next consider the defendants’ contention that the statute of limitations bars any claim based on the defendants’ trading. The plaintiff filed this action on November 4, 2008. The Complaint challenges stock sales made by the defendants between December 2004 and September 2005. A three year statute of limitations applies to claims for breach of fiduciary duty. 10 Del. C. § 8106; In re Tyson Foods, Inc., 919 A.2d 563, 584 (Del.Ch. 2007). In applying the equitable doctrine of laches, this Court typically follows the analogous statute of limitations. Reid v. Spazio, 970 A.2d 176, 183 (Del.2009). Absent a basis for tolling, this action was not timely filed.

*691 I am satisfied for pleadings purposes that a basis for tolling exists. This Court has stated:

Under the theory of equitable tolling, the statute of limitations is tolled for claims of wrongful self-dealing, even in the absence of actual fraudulent concealment, where a plaintiff reasonably relies on the competence and good faith of a fiduciary. Underlying this doctrine is the idea that even an attentive and diligent investor may rely, in complete propriety, upon the good faith of fiduciaries.

Weiss v. Swanson, 948 A.2d 433, 451 (Del. Ch.2008). Moreover, in a well-known decision issued last year, Vice Chancellor Strine held:

The obvious purpose of the equitable tolling doctrine is to ensure that fiduciaries cannot use their own success at concealing their misconduct as a method of immunizing themselves from accountability for their wrongdoing.

Many of the worst acts of fiduciary misconduct have involved frauds that personally benefited insiders as an indirect effect of directly inflating the corporation’s stock price by the artificial means of cooking the books. To allow fiduciaries who engaged in illegal conduct to wield a limitations defense against stockholders who relied in good faith on those fiduciaries when their disclosures provided no fair inquiry notice of claims would be inequitable.

In re Am. Int’l Group Inc., 965 A.2d 763, 813 (Del.Ch.2009) (hereinafter “AIG ”).

In discussing Toll Brothers’ prospects from December 2004 until December 2005, senior management remained positive and consistently reaffirmed their growth projections. Whenever Toll Brothers management mentioned negative factors, such as cooling in some markets, they balanced them with positive and reassuring statements. In light of this mix of communications, “it is a reasonable inference that the public was not aware of [the Company’s] true predicament because its problems— even if they had been partially disclosed— were likely overshadowed by the public hyperbole of [the Company’s] executives.” Zimmerman v. Braddock, 2005 WL 2266566, at *8 (Del.Ch. Sept.8, 2005), rev’d on other grounds, 906 A.2d 776 (Del.2006).

It was not until December 8, 2005, that management officially abandoned the projection of 20% growth that forms the centerpiece of the Complaint. I hold that the statute was equitably tolled until December 8, 2005. This action was thus timely filed.

C. The Complaint Adequately Pleads That The Defendants Engaged In Insider Trading.

The Outside Director Defendants argue that the Complaint fails to state a claim against them for breach of the duty of loyalty based on insider trading. I disagree.

“[A] plaintiff seeking to prevail on a Brophy claim ultimately must show that: 1) the corporate fiduciary possessed material, nonpublic company information; and 2) the corporate fiduciary used that information improperly by making trades because she was motivated, in whole or in part, by the substance of that information.” In re Oracle Corp., 867 A.2d 904, 934 (Del.Ch.2004) (hereinafter “Oracle ”), aff'd, 872 A.2d 960 (Del.Supr.2005) (TABLE). This case is now at the pleadings stage.

The Complaint is not subject to any heightened pleading standard. The Outside Director Defendants contend that “[b]eeause an insider trading claim is a species of fraud, the heightened pleading requirements of Chancery Court 9(b) ap *692 ply.” Def. Op. Br. at 23. The defendants cite no authority for this proposition, and I reject it. The insider trading claim is not a fraud claim, but rather a breach of fiduciary duty claim. Rule 9(b) does not apply. Although a plaintiff must plead with particularity when attempting to establish demand futility, that is not the issue here. I have already held that demand is futile in light of the companion federal securities action, which brings the role of Rule 23.1 to a close. In AIG, when Rule 23.1 was similarly inapplicable, Vice Chancellor Strine evaluated the Brophy allegations under the plaintiff-friendly Rule 12(b)(6) standard, not a particularity standard. 965 A.2d at 800-01, 811. I will do the same.

When a plaintiff alleges that insiders traded on internal information inconsistent with projections previously provided to the market, the complaint must allege that the defendants possessed information about the company’s performance that created a substantial likelihood of an extreme departure from projected results. Oracle, 867 A.2d at 939^40. The internal information known to the defendant can be hard, in the sense of actual historical operating results, or soft, in the sense of trends or projections. “The relative firmness of the information is simply one factor in the overall determination of materiality, albeit an important one.” Id. at 939. This standard recognizes that good faith projections are just that — projections—and therefore subject to some degree of revision or variation as a matter of course. Id. at 939-40.

The “substantial likelihood” standard does not apply to the “slightly, but importantly, different question than is presented when plaintiffs seek damages by alleging that a forward-looking statement was itself materially misleading.” Oracle, 867 A.2d at 935-37. Our Supreme Court addressed this latter question in Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5 (Del.1998), holding squarely that: “[D]irectors who knowingly disseminate false information that results in corporate injury or damage to an individual stockholder violate their fiduciary duty, and may be held accountable in a manner appropriate to the circumstances.” 722 A.2d at 9. “When the directors are not seeking shareholder action, but are deliberately misinforming shareholders about the business of the corporation, either directly or by a public statement, there is a violation of fiduciary duty.” Id. at 14.

The Outside Director Defendants argue that the Complaint does not plead facts showing that they “actually had knowledge of the purported material non-public information.” Def. Op. Br. at 23. Even when Rule 9(b) applies—and here it does not— “knowledge or other condition of mind of a person can be averred generally.” Ct. Ch. R. 9(b). Outside of the procedural context of Rule 23.1, a complaint need only plead a reasonable basis from which knowledge can be inferred.

The Complaint alleges that beginning in October 2004, Toll Brothers consistently and repeatedly projected 20% growth in net income during 2006 and 2007. The Complaint credibly alleges that based on Toll Brothers’ own statements about the limits of the Company’s visibility into its future prospects, and based on internal and closely monitored metrics, the defendants knew Toll Brothers could not meet those projections. The Complaint alleges that in November and December 2005 the Officer Defendants finally came clean to the public markets and admitted that throughout 2005 their internal metrics had been trending down.

The Complaint further alleges that to mollify market concern, the Officer Defendants expressed all the more confidence in their projections, engaging in behavior that more closely resembled unabashed *693 and unrestrained cheerleading. The Complaint describes statements by R. Toll to the effect that rising interest rates did not concern him, because the Company had continued to “blast and rock and roll” in other periods of interest rate hikes. At another point, when asked about substantial short-selling of Toll Brothers’ stock, R. Toll responded: “The shorts are going to get crushed. You ain’t seen nothing yet.” R. Toll described the stock as a “fabulous” and “tremendous” buy at the same time he was unloading large blocks of his shares. He dismissed “bubble mania” and described Toll Brothers’ business as “a match made in heaven.”

A senior executive can be bullish about his company without sounding like he is auditioning to replace Jim Cramer on Mad Money. Juxtaposed against the allegations about the underlying trends in Toll Brothers’ business, these statements are striking. Coupled with massive sales of securities, they amount to a red flag. They are sufficient to plead a claim for breach of fiduciary duty both under Oracle and Malone.

I recognize the need to distinguish between the Officer Defendants (along with B. Toll who signed on to the 2004 annual letter to stockholders) and the Outside Director Defendants. Several factors combine to convince me that knowledge and use of inside information is adequately pled under the plaintiff-friendly Rule 12(b)(6) standard. Principal among these factors is the nature of the information in question. The Complaint does not contend that outside directors should have uncovered financial fraud, second-guessed technical accounting judgments, or known about concerns expressed by low-level employees within the organization. The Complaint turns on information about the core operations of the Company and the basis for projections that it consistently provided to the markets for over a year. The projections were issued in preliminary earnings releases, final earnings releases, Form 10-Qs, and the 2004 Form 10-K. Senior management discussed the projections on earnings calls, during media appearances, and in interviews. The Complaint alleges that the projections were false for reasons that likewise relate to the core operations of the Company. Toll Brothers itself has described its focus on key metrics — like traffic through its communities, signed contracts, and the number of selling communities. Two of the Outside Director Defendants served on the audit committee, which had specific responsibility under its charter for earnings releases and earnings guidance.

Under Section 141(a) of the General Corporation Law, directors have the statutory power and responsibility to direct and oversee the business and affairs of the corporation. 8 Del. C. § 141(a). It would afford an ostrich-like immunity to directors not to grant the plaintiff a Rule 12(b)(6) inference that the Outside Director Defendants knew about core information of this type.

To defeat the Complaint’s allegations of knowledge, the Outside Director Defendants rely on Guttman and Rattner. Both cases were decided under Rule 23.1’s particularity standard and in a procedural posture where the plaintiff sought to establish demand futility by showing that the directors faced a substantial risk of liability. Guttman, 823 A.2d at 499; Rattner, 2003 WL 22284323, at *7-9. Both cases are therefore distinguishable. Both decisions also involved quite different types of inside information. Each arose out of accounting improprieties brought to light by a subsequent restatement. In addition to duty of oversight claims based on the accounting restatements, the plaintiffs in those cases challenged sales of stock by *694 senior officers and directors during the period covered by the restatements, claiming that knowledge of the improper accounting constituted inside information. Neither complaint explained how the directors would have known about the accounting problems. In Guttman, Vice Chancellor Strine declined to infer that the outside directors knew about the particular accounting misstatements at the time of the trades. 823 A.2d at 503-05. Facing a similar situation in Rattner, Vice Chancellor Noble followed Guttvian. 2003 WL 22284323, at *9-11. Neither case involved the type of core operational information at issue here.

I also regard the trades made by the Outside Director Defendants as sufficiently unusual in timing and amount to support a pleading-stage inference that the sellers took advantage of confidential corporate information not yet available to the public to unload significant blocks of shares before the market’s view of Toll Brothers’ prospects dramatically changed. I thus find that the Complaint supports an inference that all of the individual defendants, including the Outside Director Defendants, made trades that were motivated, in whole or in part, by their knowledge of Toll Brothers’ prospects. Oracle, 867 A.2d at 934; accord AIG, 965 A.2d at 800.

I reject the Outside Director Defendants’ contention that inside information about Toll Brothers’ true prospects was not material. Toll Brothers’ consistent reiteration of its 20% net income growth projection, its performance relative to the S & P Homebuilders Index during the period the projection was being maintained, and the market reaction when Toll Brothers revised its projections in December 2005 all point to the materiality of that information. The Complaint sufficiently alleges that the defendants possessed material information about critical metrics that undercut the projection and indicated that it could not be achieved. Customer traffic, signed contracts, and active selling communities were measures that Toll Brothers monitored closely and that the Officer Defendants referred to in their public communications. I have no difficulty concluding at the pleadings stage that internal information about trends in these metrics was material to the 20% net income growth projection at some point pri- or to the cliff-like drop on December 8. Although the plaintiffs candidly concede that they cannot establish the exact moment in time when the defendants knew their projections could not be achieved, they have pled a claim that merits discovery. The defendants’ actions during summer and fall 2005 are the most questionable, but I will not attempt to determine precisely when the defendants breached their fiduciary duties on a motion to dismiss.

I also reject the Outside Director Defendants’ suggestion that they could have done a better job at insider trading. They point out that they sold their shares at a weighted-average price more than 20% below Toll Brothers’ peak, arguing that if they were seeking to exploit inside information, “they presumably would have timed their sales to maximize their profits.” Def. Op. Br. at 30. The fact that a defendant could have misused inside information more effectively does not defeat an otherwise valid inference of insider trading. AIG, 965 A.2d at 801. The Outside Director Defendants’ fact-laden arguments about the materiality of their sales and different methods of calculating how much they sold require the resolution of factual disputes that are inappropriate for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

I therefore hold that the Complaint states a claim under Brophy against all of the defendants, including the Outside Di *695 rector Defendants. This does not mean, of course, that the plaintiff will succeed on his claim. The Rule 12(b)(6) inference that I have granted will not aid the plaintiff at later stages of this litigation. He must ultimately prove his case, and the defendants (and particularly the Outside Director Defendants) will likely have strong defenses. See, e.g., 8 Del. C. § 141(e).

D. Brophy Remains Good Law.

Having rejected the defendants’ other arguments for dismissal, I must confront their assertion that Brophy is no longer good law. The defendants characterize Brophy as a persistent anachronism from a time before the current federal insider trading regime, when this Court felt compelled to address insider trading because of the absence of any other remedy. The defendants thus view Brophy as a well-meaning stretch that is no longer needed and, worse, conflicts with federal policies and enforcement mechanisms. These are views I do not share.

Brophy was not a one-off decision. Ten years before