C.G. Ex Rel. A.S. v. Five Town Community School District
U.S. Court of Appeals1/18/2008
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Full Opinion
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 07-1708
C.G. AND B.S., AS PARENTS AND NEXT FRIENDS OF A.S., A MINOR,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
FIVE TOWN COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. George Z. Singal, U.S. District Judge]
[Hon. David M. Cohen, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
Before
Lynch, Circuit Judge,
Campbell and Selya, Senior Circuit Judges.
Staci K. Converse, with whom Richard L. O'Meara and Murray,
Plumb & Murray were on brief, for appellants.
James C. Schwellenbach, with whom Drummond Woodsum & MacMahon
was on brief, for appellees.
January 18, 2008
SELYA, Senior Circuit Judge. This case requires us to
examine the rights of a disabled child under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1415. The
principal issue, scantily addressed in the case law, involves how
judicial review should proceed when the last individualized
education program (IEP) proposed by the school system is
incomplete.
Here, the district court found that the IEP's
incompleteness was due to the parents' obstruction of the
developmental process. It proceeded to consider extrinsic evidence
and concluded that, had the parents permitted the process to run
its course, the school system would have provided the child with a
satisfactory IEP. On that basis, it decreed that the parents were
not entitled either to reimbursement for costs incurred in a
private placement or to compensatory education benefits.
The parents now appeal. We conclude that the lower court
committed no clear error in weighing the facts. While we reach the
same ultimate conclusion as did the court below, that court's
meticulous factfinding allows us to take a different, more direct
analytic path. In the end, we affirm the judgment below.
I. BACKGROUND
The district judge, in the first instance, referred this
case to a magistrate judge for a report and recommendation. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The magistrate judge
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canvassed the record, made extensive findings of fact, and set
forth various conclusions of law. C.G. & B.S. v. Five Town Cmty.
Sch. Dist., Civ. No. 05-237 (D. Me. Feb. 12, 2007) [2007 WL
494994]. The district judge, in a summary order, adopted the
magistrate judge's recommended analysis in its entirety and entered
judgment accordingly. C.G. & B.S. v. Five Town Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
Civ. No. 05-237 (D. Me. Apr. 6, 2007). For simplicity's sake, we
do not distinguish further between the magistrate judge and the
district judge but, rather, take an institutional view and refer
only to "the district court."1
We recount the background facts as supportably found by
the district court. C.G. and B.S. are the parents of A.S., a
teenage girl who suffers from an emotional disability. The family
resides in Camden, Maine. Five Town Community School District (the
School District) is the school system in which A.S. is entitled to
receive public education.
The parents first met formally with Five Town about
A.S.'s potential to qualify for services under the IDEA on March 3,
2004. They requested that the School District pay for A.S., who
1
The district court appropriately engaged in a bounded,
independent review of the hearing officer's decision, see, e.g.,
Hampton Sch. Dist. v. Dobrowolski, 976 F.2d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 1992),
giving due deference to the hearing officer's determinations.
Because the district court's findings and conclusions were
essentially the same as those of the hearing officer, we for the
most part eschew separate reference to the hearing officer's
decision.
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was then fourteen years old, to enroll in a private residential
placement. Before the School District could evaluate the bona
fides of this request, A.S. hit a crisis point and her parents
unilaterally transferred her into a private residential placement
outside of Maine. The parents do not seek to recover the costs of
that placement in this appeal, so we make no further mention of it.
Notwithstanding efforts on the part of the School
District to re-start the IDEA eligibility process, nothing of
consequence happened for well over a year. In the interim
(unbeknownst to the School District), A.S. returned to Maine,
enrolled for several months as a residential student in a private
school, and upon leaving spent two additional months without any
scholastic affiliation.
In June of 2005, A.S.'s parents demanded a due process
hearing under the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). The School
District sought to meet with them in order to resume the earlier
eligibility discussions. The due process hearing was deferred
pending the completion of this attempt to reach a consensus.
The common practice is to form a team of parents,
teachers, school administrators, and others to evaluate a child
with a disability and, if she is found eligible for remedial
services, to develop an IEP. See id. § 1414(d)(1)(B) & (d)(3). In
Maine, this cohort is called a Peer Evaluation Team (PET). See 05-
071-101 Me. Code R. §§ 1.4, 8.1. The School District assembled
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such a team and scheduled the initial PET meeting for September 1,
2005. During that session, the parents agreed that an independent
evaluator, Dr. Frank McCabe, could assess A.S.
After the PET participants received the evaluator's
report, the School District scheduled a second PET meeting for
October 12, 2005. At that session, the participants discussed the
evaluator's assessment, concluded that A.S. qualified for services
as a disabled child, and began work to develop an IEP. The
participants jointly delineated the main components to be included
in the IEP and noted areas of the IEP that would require additional
input from A.S., her therapist, and her parents.
During the same meeting, some placement options were
discussed. The independent evaluator indicated that A.S. could
receive an adequate and appropriate education in a public school
day program. In response, the School District described some
public school options, including Camden Hills Regional High School
(CHRHS) and the Zenith program. A.S. previously had attended
CHRHS, and her parents expressed concern about a placement there.
They seemed willing, however, to learn more about the Zenith non-
residential day program or any similar regime.
The School District indicated that it would send the
parents a copy of a proposed IEP prior to the next PET meeting. On
October 18, 2005, it transmitted an IEP document to the parents by
facsimile. The October 18 version of the IEP included the main
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components of the program to which the participants previously had
agreed. Consistent with the discussions at the October 12
conclave, however, the IEP left open other areas for later
development. It is nose-on-the-face plain from even a cursory
inspection of the October 18 submission that the IEP was not
intended to constitute a completed IEP.2
The next PET meeting took place on October 20, 2005. At
that session, the participants discussed placement options. The
meeting was "very contentious." Five Town, 2007 WL 494994, at *18.
The participants quickly reached an impasse: the parents insisted
that A.S. be educated in a therapeutic residential setting, whereas
the School District insisted that a non-residential public school
placement could provide A.S. with an adequate and appropriate
education. The meeting ended abruptly when the parents announced
that they had decided to send A.S. to the F.L. Chamberlain School
(an out-of-state residential institution) and would seek
reimbursement for the costs incurred. The meeting never progressed
to a discussion either of the IEP or of how to fill the gaps in it.
A.S.'s parents memorialized their unilateral placement
decision in a letter sent the following week to the School
2
For example, the October 18 IEP referenced an attached
behavior plan but (as the parents knew) no such plan had yet been
developed and, thus, none was annexed. This area of the IEP was
intentionally left incomplete pending input from Dr. Miller (A.S.'s
therapist). The IEP displayed several other inchoate provisions
that obviously were meant to be fleshed out during further
iterations of the IEP.
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District. Given this parting of the ways, the due process hearing
moved forward. Arguing that the School District's proposed IEP and
refusal to sanction a residential placement betokened a failure to
provide A.S. with a free and appropriate public education (FAPE),
the parents sought compensatory education and/or reimbursement for
the expenses incurred in educating A.S. at Chamberlain. The School
District denied any breach of its duties under the IDEA. The
hearing went forward, and the hearing officer ultimately rejected
the parents' entreaties.
Undaunted, the parents shifted the battleground to the
federal district court. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). As
previously noted, the district judge, on de novo review of the
magistrate judge's report and recommendation, upheld the hearing
officer's ukase. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
In IDEA cases, as elsewhere, we review the district
court's answers to questions of law de novo and its findings of
fact for clear error. Lenn v. Portland Sch. Comm., 998 F.2d 1083,
1087 (1st Cir. 1993); Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d
983, 990-91 (1st Cir. 1990). Clear-error review demands
substantial deference to the trier; under that standard, we may
reverse only if the record, read as a whole, gives rise to a
"strong, unyielding belief that a mistake has been made." Lenn,
998 F.2d at 1087 (quoting Cumpiano v. Banco Santander P.R., 902
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F.2d 148, 152 (1st Cir. 1990)). Whether an IEP is adequate and
appropriate is a mixed question of law and fact. Thus, appellate
review involves a degree-of-deference continuum, which takes into
account whether particular aspects of that determination are fact-
dominated or law-dominated. Mr. I. v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No.
55, 480 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2007); see In re Extradition of
Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1327-28 (1st Cir. 1993).
Here, the parents' chief argument is that the district
court applied an improper legal rule in evaluating the October 18
IEP. In turn, this argument depends on whether the IEP was
complete (and if not, why not). In addressing it, we will first
step back and sketch the architecture of the IDEA. Once this is
done, we will consider the completeness of the proffered IEP, the
cause of its stunted growth, whether the die was cast at that
point, and the parents' prayers for relief.
A. The IDEA.
Congress designed the IDEA as part of an effort to help
states provide educational services to disabled children. Each
state receiving federal funding through its provisions must ensure
that every disabled school-age child receives a FAPE. 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(1)(A). A FAPE encompasses special education and support
services provided free of charge. See id. § 1401(9). A school
system has met this obligation as long as the program that it
offers to a disabled student is "reasonably calculated" to deliver
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"educational benefits." Hendrick Hudson Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley,
458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982); see Lt. T.B. v. Warwick Sch. Comm., 361
F.3d 80, 83 (1st Cir. 2004).
At bottom, this obligation is an obligation to provide an
adequate and appropriate education. The IDEA does not place school
systems under a compulsion to afford a disabled child an ideal or
an optimal education. See Lenn, 998 F.2d at 1086.
If a school system is unable to furnish a disabled child
with a FAPE through a public school placement, it may be obliged to
subsidize the child in a private program. See Burlington Sch.
Comm. v. Mass. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985). In such
circumstances, the school system will be responsible for the
reasonable costs incident to that private placement. See id. at
369; Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 31 (1st Cir. 2006).
It is common ground that the IDEA manifests a preference
for mainstreaming disabled children. See, e.g., Rowley, 458 U.S.
at 202; Roland M., 910 F.2d at 987. This entails ensuring, "[t]o
the maximum extent appropriate," that disabled children are taught
with nondisabled children. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). The goal,
then, is to find the least restrictive educational environment that
will accommodate the child's legitimate needs. See id.; see also
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 321 (1988); Kathleen H. v. Mass. Dep't
of Educ., 154 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1998).
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The method of the IDEA is straightforward. Under it,
school systems must take steps to identify children who may qualify
as disabled, evaluate each such child to determine his or her
eligibility for statutory benefits, and develop a customized IEP
designed to ensure that the child receives a level of educational
benefits commensurate with a FAPE. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(3)-(4),
1414(a)-(b). The IEP must include information about the child's
disabilities, a statement of educational goals, a description of
the measures that will be used to determine whether the child has
met those goals, and a compendium of special education and related
services that will be furnished to the child. See id. §
1414(d)(1)(A); see also Roland M., 910 F.2d at 987 (describing IEP
requirements under the precursor to the IDEA). Those related
services typically will consist of individualized services tailored
to address the child's particular needs. See 20 U.S.C. §
1414(d)(1)(A); see also Burlington Sch. Comm., 471 U.S. at 368.
The development of an IEP is meant to be a collaborative
project. A team must be identified for that purpose. It should
include the parents, teachers representing various parts of the
educational spectrum (that is, teachers with training in both
regular and special education), officials of the school system, and
sometimes others with expertise in the nature of the disability or
the provision of particular services. See 20 U.S.C. §
1414(d)(1)(B).
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If no consensus emerges from these collective endeavors,
the parents may challenge either the school system's handling of
the IEP process or the IEP itself. The first step in this
adversarial pavane is a due process hearing. See id. § 1415(f).
Either party may then seek judicial review of the hearing officer's
decision by prosecuting an appeal to a state or federal court. Id.
§ 1415(i)(2)(A).
To determine whether an IEP provides the requisite
educational benefit in a given case, some courts will in some
circumstances consider only the final version of the IEP that the
school system offered during the IEP process. See, e.g., County
Sch. Bd. of Henrico v. Z.P., 399 F.3d 298, 306 n.5 (4th Cir. 2005);
Knable v. Bexley City Sch. Dist., 238 F.3d 755, 768 (6th Cir.
2001). The thinking behind this so-called "four corners" rule is
that when the IEP process has run its course and the school system
has made its last, best offer of an IEP, a reviewing court faced
with a substantive challenge will have a clear record of what
placements and educational services were offered. See Union Sch.
Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1526 (9th Cir. 1994); see also A.K.
v. Alexandria City Sch. Bd., 484 F.3d 672, 682 (4th Cir. 2007).
This circuit has yet to decide whether or not to adopt the four
corners rule and, as we explain below, we have no occasion to
consider the advisability of that course today.
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If there is no last, best offer — that is, if the parents
have initiated the adversary process in advance of the development
of a final IEP — it makes very little sense to consider only the
latest version of the IEP. This is especially true where the
school system has acted expeditiously and the development of a
final IEP has been frustrated by the parents' refusal to cooperate
fully in the collaborative process. See Loren F. v. Atlanta Indep.
Sch. Sys., 349 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003); MM v. Sch. Dist.
of Greenville Cty., 303 F.3d 523, 535 (4th Cir. 2002). In such
circumstances, it would be wrong to put blinders on a reviewing
court and restrict its inquiry to the partially completed IEP. Cf.
Roland M., 910 F.2d at 995 (warning that courts ought not to allow
parents to prevail when the inadequacy of an IEP was "created by
their own obstructionism").
When this sort of scenario arises, the court should
proceed to consider issues such as the way in which the IEP process
unfolded and the relative responsibility of the participants for
the breakdown of the process. In exploring such issues, the court
is entitled to look at the totality of the circumstances, consider
extrinsic evidence if necessary, and judge the parents' claims
accordingly.
B. Incompleteness of the IEP.
In this case, the district court determined that the
October 18 IEP was not "final" because the parents had disrupted
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the IEP process midstream. Five Town, 2007 WL 494994, at *33.
Having made that finding, the court proceeded to consider
information outside the IEP to assure itself that the School
District's partially formulated position was consistent with its
responsibilities to A.S. under the IDEA. See id. It concluded
that, had the parents continued to cooperate and allowed the School
District to fill in the gaps, the result would have been a
satisfactory IEP that provided A.S. with a FAPE. See id. at *34.
The parents' primary challenge to this conclusion
contests the finding that the IEP was incomplete. In that regard,
they point out that the School District's special education
director, Cindy Foreman, stated during the October 20 PET meeting
that the October 18 IEP was "final." Based largely on that
utterance, the parents assert that the district court's inquiry
should have been restricted as a matter of law to the four corners
of the October 18 IEP. The School District rejoins that Foreman's
comment cannot be taken literally, that the October 18 IEP was
obviously incomplete, and that the district court acted
appropriately in looking beyond the four corners of that document.
The parents cannot be heard to complain about the incompleteness of
the IEP, the School District adds, because their refusal to
cooperate in the IEP process obstructed the development of a full-
fledged IEP.
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The district court, like the hearing officer, resolved
this contretemps in favor of the School District. As a matter of
fact, we discern no clear error in that ruling: on its face, the
October 18 IEP was manifestly incomplete. While it contained the
main components of an individualized plan, it was missing several
subsidiary components (such as the behavioral support and crisis
management plans). On this record, the district court's finding
that the IEP was incomplete was virtually inevitable.
Foreman's comment that the IEP was "final" does not
require a different result. Taken in context, that remark does not
seem to mean what the parents suggest. Conversation is not
trigonometry, and in informal settings spoken language is rarely
used in mathematically precise ways. In that connection, we have
acknowledged that "words are like chameleons; they frequently have
different shades of meaning depending upon the circumstances."
United States v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 74 (1st Cir. 2004).
Here, the record considered as a whole plainly indicates
that while the main components of the IEP (including the School
District's decision to accommodate A.S.'s needs in a non-
residential setting) may have been final in mid-October, the IEP
most assuredly was not. Given the obvious gaps in the IEP, it
would have been absurd for the district court to have treated
Foreman's awkward locution as sufficient to transmogrify a
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partially completed IEP into a fully completed one.3 Therefore,
even in those jurisdictions that have adopted the four corners
rule, the rule would not apply.
C. Obstructive Conduct.
The district court also found, as had the hearing
officer, that the parents' precipitous actions had prevented the
consummation of the IEP. See Five Town, 2006 WL 494994, at *33.
The court found that the parents harbored a fixed purpose: to
effect a residential placement for their daughter at the School
District's expense, come what may. See id. at *18, *33. Once the
parents realized that the School District was focused on a non-
residential placement, they essentially lost interest in the IEP
process. See id. That finding, which was not clearly erroneous,4
supported an inference of parental obstruction. See MM, 303 F.3d
at 535. In turn, the finding of obstructionism, coupled with the
finding of incompleteness, underbraced the court's decision to
consider extrinsic evidence.
3
The parents note that the October 12 meeting minutes suggest
at one point that a "completed" IEP would be sent to the parents.
Their reliance on this aspirational phrase suffers from the same
shortcomings as their reliance on Foreman's infelicitous use of the
word "final."
4
To be sure, the parents presented evidence that they made a
good-faith effort to visit the Zenith program prior to the last PET
meeting. But under the applicable standard of review, the district
court was entitled to choose among conflicting inferences suggested
by the evidence. See Lenn, 998 F.2d at 1087.
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Viewed in context, that decision makes perfect sense:
while considering extrinsic information in the adequacy calculus
may not be appropriate in the mine-run of cases, that course is
peculiarly appropriate where, as here, the record reveals with
conspicuous clarity that all the participants in the October 12 PET
meeting wanted Dr. Miller's input in order to develop a proper
crisis plan and positive behavior support plan for A.S. as part and
parcel of a final IEP. Neither plan had been formulated when the
School District transmitted the October 18 IEP to the parents. The
parents cannot ignore these facts, nor expect a reviewing court to
blind itself to them. Cf. Doe v. Defendant I, 898 F.2d 1186, 1190
(6th Cir. 1990) (approving consideration of extrinsic information
when parents, as part of the team, "had all of the information
required," even though all the particulars were "not contained
within the four corners of the IEP").
From this point forward, the court, like the hearing
officer, considered whether a public school day placement was
appropriate and what benefits a finalized IEP would have provided.
See Five Town, 2007 WL 494994, at *34. It supportably concluded
that a public school non-residential placement constituted the
least restrictive environment. It also concluded that, had the
parents allowed the process to run its course, the School District
would have developed a sound behavioral support plan and formulated
a menu of psychiatric services to be offered to A.S. (which were in
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line with the goals limned in the proposed IEP). Id. at *34-35.
And, finally, it held that because the resultant IEP would have
been adequate to afford A.S. a FAPE, the parents' claim failed.
Id. at *35.
In the last analysis, we need not probe too deeply into
the adequacy of the IEP. Given the district court's comprehensive
factual findings, we can decide this case on a less nuanced ground.
We explain briefly.
Congress deliberately fashioned an interactive process
for the development of IEPs. In so doing, it expressly declared
that if parents act unreasonably in the course of that process,
they may be barred from reimbursement under the IDEA. See 20
U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(III) (providing that "[t]he cost of
reimbursement . . . may be reduced or denied . . . upon a judicial
finding of unreasonableness with respect to actions taken by the
parents").
Here, the School District argues persuasively that the
parents' conduct was unreasonable and that this unreasonableness
precludes relief. Although the district court drew no conclusions
with regard to this provision of the IDEA, we are free to affirm
its decision on any alternative ground that is evident from the
record. See InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 141 (1st Cir.
2003); United States v. Flemmi, 225 F.3d 78, 91 (1st Cir. 2000).
Moreover, where the evidence supports a district court's findings
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of fact, we may realign those findings under a different legal
matrix and decide the case on that basis. See, e.g., Wine &
Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 481 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.
2007) (explaining that "[a] trial court's findings of fact, made in
connection with one legal theory, may often be treated as fungible
in connection with another [legal theory]"); Ferrara v. United
States, 456 F.3d 278, 281 (1st Cir. 2006) (relying on district
court's subsidiary findings of fact to decide appeal under a
different articulation of the applicable rule of law); see also
Societé des Produits Nestle v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633,
642 (1st Cir. 1992).
This is such a case. The district court supportably
found that the parents' actions disrupted the IEP process, stalling
its consummation and preventing the development of a final IEP.
Moreover, the court found, the parents did so despite their
knowledge that the School District planned to complete the
unfinished portions with the parents' help. Tellingly, the court
determined that the cause of the disruption was the parents'
single-minded refusal to consider any placement other than a
residential one. Five Town, 2007 WL 494994, at *33. Such
Boulwarism, whether or not well-intentioned, constitutes an
unreasonable approach to the collaborative process envisioned by
the IDEA. See Roland M., 910 F.2d at 995. Here, that attitude
sufficed to undermine the process.
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To sum up, the district court found that the October 18
IEP was incomplete and that the parents' unreasonable actions had
frustrated the completion of the IEP process.5 Given these
warrantable findings of fact, section 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(III)
provides a solid ground for resolving the case against the parents.
Their unreasonable obstruction of an otherwise promising IEP
process fully justifies a denial of reimbursement under the IDEA.
See M.S. v. Mullica Tp. Bd. of Educ., 485 F. Supp. 2d 555, 568
(D.N.J. 2007) (denying reimbursement because parents failed to
cooperate in completion of IEP).
D. Substantive Adequacy.
The parents' challenge to the lower court's decision has
a further dimension. They assert that the IEP process, whether or
not still ongoing, had effectively reached a dead end: in their
view, the partially completed IEP includes so many wrong choices
that a finding of inadequacy would have been inevitable (and so,
completing the IEP process would have been an exercise in
futility). The force of this assertion hinges on the parents'
insistence that the School District arbitrarily ruled out a
5
The parents' argument that the School District engaged in a
"bait and switch" tactic by calling the IEP "final" and then
backtracking at the due process hearing, Appellants' Reply Br. at
6, is meritless. As we have said, there is substantial evidence in
the record that the School District expressed the need for further
development of the IEP prior to the time of the parents' unilateral
decision to relocate A.S. to a private residential placement.
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residential placement even though such a placement was the only
feasible way to provide A.S. with a FAPE.
This insistence flies in the teeth of the School
District's evidence and the independent evaluator's
recommendations. After canvassing the record, we conclude that the
need for a residential placement was fairly debatable. Crediting
the independent evaluator's views and the School District's
testimony, the district court — like the hearing officer — found
that the least restrictive educational environment would have been
in a public non-residential placement. Five Town, 2007 WL 494994,
at *35. Given the truism that courts should recognize the
expertise of educators with respect to the efficacy of educational
programs, Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207-08, we see no clear error in this
finding (and, thus, no basis for setting aside the district court's
decision).
The parents' remaining arguments on this issue need not
occupy us for long. The few themes that they spin either
mischaracterize the IEP's provisions or seek to have us undertake
a de novo balancing of the facts. We are not swayed by the former,
nor are we permitted to indulge the latter.
In all events, the best that can be said for the parents'
position is that the evidence may support competing viewpoints.
That circumstance dooms their challenge: we are not at liberty to
reject the district court's plausible interpretation of the facts
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simply because the record also might sustain a conflicting
interpretation. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574
(1985) ("Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the
factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.").
Nor may we reject an adequate public school placement for an
optimal private placement. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200; see also
Lenn, 998 F.2d at 1086 (explaining that federal law requires school
districts to provide a reasonable level of educational benefit to
disabled children, not an optimal level).
E. Requests for Relief.
This essentially ends our inquiry. Although
reimbursement of parental expenses for private residential
placements sometimes is available under the IDEA, such
reimbursement is contingent upon a showing that the parents
diligently pursued the provision of appropriate services from the
public school system, yet the school system failed to provide those
services; and that the private placement is a suitable alternative.
See Florence Cty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 12 (1993);
Burlington Sch. Comm., 471 U.S. at 370. When the parents make a
unilateral choice, they must bear the associated risk: if the
conditions for reimbursement are not met, the financial burdens are
theirs. Burlington Sch. Comm., 471 U.S. at 373-74; Roland M., 910
F.2d at 1000.
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That is precisely what transpired here. The parents made
a unilateral choice to abandon the collaborative IEP process
without allowing that process to run its course. Thus, the parents
are precluded from obtaining reimbursement for the costs of the
Chamberlain School placement, see supra Part II(C), and a fortiori,
they have not satisfied that prong of the reimbursement analysis.6
The parents' alternative claim for compensatory education
is easily dispatched. Compensatory education is a surrogate for
the warranted education that a disabled child may have missed
during periods when his IEP was so inappropriate that he was
effectively denied a FAPE. See Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35 v. Mr.
& Mrs. R., 321 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2003). However, compensatory
education is not an automatic entitlement but, rather, a
discretionary remedy for nonfeasance or misfeasance in connection
with a school system's obligations under the IDEA. See Pihl v.
Mass. Dep't of Educ., 9 F.3d 184, 188 (1st Cir. 1993); see also G
v. Ft. Bragg Dependent Schs., 343 F.3d 295, 309 (4th Cir. 2003)
(stating that "[c]ompensatory education involves discretionary . .
. relief crafted by a court" to correct a school district's failure
under the Act).
As we have explained, the parents have failed to
establish any violation by the School District of its duties under
6
This result obtains whether or not the Chamberlain School
offered a desirable placement for the child (a matter on which we
take no view).
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the IDEA. Their claim for compensatory education cannot surmount
this barrier.
III. CONCLUSION
We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,
we uphold the district court's judgment.
Affirmed.
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