Astro-Med, Inc. v. Nihon Kohden America, Inc.

Astro-Med, Inc. (Astro-Med) and Nihon Kohden America, Inc. (Nihon Kohden) are rivals in the highly competitive life sciences equipment market, and in October 2006, when Nihon Kohden hired away Kevin Plant, a valuable Astro-Med employee, Astro-Med reviewed its legal options. When first hired at Astro-Med in 2002, Plant signed an employee agreement that contained non-competition and nondisclosure provisions. Relying in large part on those provisions, in December 2006, Astro-Med filed suit against Plant alleging breach of contract and misappropriation of trade secrets. Astro-Med later added a third claim of unfair competition against Plant and joined Nihon Kohden as a defendant, against whom it alleged claims of tortious interference and misappropriation of trade secrets.1 The lawsuit was especially hard-fought, and Nihon Kohden and Plant were disappointed on April 7, 2008, when a jury returned a verdict against them, awarding $375,800 in damages in favor of Astro-Med. Following the verdict, on July 25, 2008, the district court awarded exemplary damages *6against Nihon Kohden and Plant in the amount of $560,000, added an award of attorney’s fees and costs, and imposed a sanction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. All told, the judgment against Nihon Kohden and Plant equals $1,159,823.60. On appeal, Nihon Kohden and Plant wage a frontal assault against the judgment, itemizing nine separate claims of legal error. After careful consideration, we reject each of Nihon Kohden’s and Plant’s contentions and affirm.

I.

Background

Astro-Med is a Rhode Island corporation with its principal place of business in West Warwick, Rhode Island. Its Grass Technologies product group manufactures, sells, and distributes instruments for sleep and neurological research and clinical applications of sleep science and brain wave recording and analysis. Although the identity of some of its customers is well known, Astro-Med’s financial arrangements with its sales people, its marketing strategy, and its pricing and cost structures are all highly confidential, and Astro-Med makes strenuous efforts to protect its trade secrets and other confidential information.

In October 2002, even though Plant had no prior experience in the medical industry or in medical equipment sales, Astro-Med hired him as a Product Specialist, responsible for the demonstration and training of its Grass Technologies product line. Astro-Med provided Plant with extensive training about its business, products, customers, and competitors, and it was AstroMed’s training that later made him marketable to Nihon Kohden. When AstroMed hired Plant, he signed an Employee Agreement, which contains a non-competition clause:

I recognize that the Company sells its products throughout North America and Europe; as such, upon termination of my employment at the Company, for whatever reason, I shall not directly or indirectly enter into or engage in a business that competes with the Company, in a territory consisting of North America, and Europe, either as an individual, partner, joint venturer, employee, agent or salesman for any person, or as an officer, director or stockholder of a corporation or otherwise, for a period of one year thereafter.

And a trade secrets clause:

[I hereby agree] [t]hat any inventions, discoveries or improvements and any technical data, trade secrets, (including, but not limited to, customer lists), information or know-how, made, discovered or conceived or acquired by me during the period of my employment, whether patentable, patented or not, are to be and remain the property of the Company; that, without the written authorization of the Company, I will neither use nor disclose to any person other than my superiors in the Company, any information, trade secrets, technical data or know-how relating to the Company’s products, processes, methods, equipment and business practices, which I have acquired during my employment.

The Employee Agreement also contained a choice-of-law and forum-selection clause, which stated that it shall be governed by the laws of the state of Rhode Island and that Plant consented to jurisdiction in Rhode Island for any dispute arising out of the Agreement.

Subsequently, Plant asked to be transferred to the state of Florida and become a field sales representative; Astro-Med granted his request and paid to relocate him to Florida. On July 12, 2004, AstroMed promoted Plant to District Sales *7Manager for sales of Grass Technologies products. As District Sales Manager, Plant had access to and used Astro-Med’s trade secrets, including confidential marketing, pricing, and customer information. He became intimately familiar with AstroMed’s customers and their preferences as well as Astro-Med’s pricing strategy and cost data. He also learned about AstroMed’s suppliers, products they supplied, and the customers who purchased these products. Finally, he was informed about Astro-Med’s research and development efforts with respect to its Grass Technologies product line.

Nihon Kohden, a California corporation, has its principal place of business in Foothill Ranch, California. As a manufacturer of instrumentation for patient monitoring, sleep assessment, and neurology, Nihon Kohden competes directly with Astro-Med. In 2006, Brian Kehoe, the Florida sales representative for Nihon Kohden, was about to leave the company, and on July 21, 2006, he emailed Gary Reasoner, the Director of the Neurology Business Unit for Nihon Kohden, and informed him that he had met a man, Kevin Plant, who was a potential replacement for the Florida sales territory. Plant was indeed interested in employment with Ni-hon Kohden and in subsequent discussions, he emphasized his Astro-Med experience. He reminded Nihon Kohden that he was “coming from the industry and one of the competitors in the field” and in his employment application, he touted his “in-depth knowledge of neurology-based applications.”

In September 2006, Plant sent a resume to Reasoner, and Reasoner interviewed Plant several times over the telephone. In late September 2006, Plant traveled to Foothill Ranch and met with Michael Ohsawa, the Director of Operations for Nihon Kohden, and with Reasoner. Directly after the interview, Nihon Kohden made Plant a job offer, which he accepted. After Plant accepted the Nihon Kohden position, Kehoe emailed Plant: “I will be interested in seeing what you have in the works with Grass [Technologies].” Plant replied, “Sounds good.”

Before offering Plant employment, Ni-hon Kohden became aware of the AstroMed Employment Agreement with Plant and referred the contract to counsel for review. Nihon Kohden’s lawyer advised Nihon Kohden that there was some minimal risk in hiring Plant; notwithstanding that advice, Nihon Kohden hired Plant to sell its products in competition with AstroMed in the sales territory he had covered for Astro-Med.

II.

Discussion

A. The Jurisdictional Issue

From the very outset of this litigation, Nihon Kohden has vigorously maintained that, as a California business, it should not have been haled into court in Rhode Island to defend its hiring of a Florida resident to sell its product in Florida.2 In support of its contention that it lacks sufficient contacts with Rhode Island to be subjected to jurisdiction, Nihon Kohden marshals evidence that it contends demonstrates an absence of any contacts between it and Rhode Island, between Plant and Rhode Island, and between its deal with Plant and Rhode Island.

*81. Legal Standards

To hear a case, a court must have personal jurisdiction over the parties, “that is, the power to require the parties to obey its decrees.” United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 191 F.3d 30, 35 (1st Cir.1999). Early on, Nihon Kohden moved to dismiss the lawsuit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) on the ground that the district court did not have personal jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion. On a motion to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff ultimately bears the burden of persuading the court that jurisdiction exists. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936); Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Amer. Bar Ass’n, 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir.1998). Faced with a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a district court “ ‘may choose from among several methods for determining whether the plaintiff has met [its] burden.’ ” Adelson v. Hananel, 510 F.3d 43, 48 (1st Cir.2007) (quoting Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 50-51 (1st Cir.2002)).

Here, the district court used the “prima facie method” or the “prima facie evidentiary standard,” rather than adjudicating the jurisdictional facts. Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Can., 46 F.3d 138, 145-47 (1st Cir.1995) (describing the prima facie, preponderance, and likelihood standards). The district court considered “only whether the plaintiff has proffered evidence that, if credited, [was] enough to support findings of all facts essential to personal jurisdiction.” Daynard, 290 F.3d at 51. Where, as here, the district court employed the prima facie standard, we review “both the district court’s decision to use the prima facie standard and its conclusion under that standard de novo.” Adelson, 510 F.3d at 48; Daynard, 290 F.3d at 51; Nowak v. Tak How Invs., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 712 (1st Cir.1996). In this case, the parties “do not object to the court’s choice of method; the defendant contends only that it was misapplied.” Adelson, 510 F.3d at 48.

Applying the prima facie standard, we “ ‘must accept the plaintiffs (properly documented) evidentiary proffers as true for the purpose of determining the adequacy of the prima facie jurisdictional showing.’ ” Id. (quoting Foster-Miller, 46 F.3d at 145). We “accept those facts as true, irrespective of whether the defendant disputes them, and in so doing, construe them in the light most congenial to the plaintiffs jurisdictional claim.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). The facts put forward by the defendant “become part of the mix only to the extent that they are uncontradicted.” Id.

In assessing personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction is “the functional equivalent of a state court sitting in the forum state.” N. Laminate Sales, Inc. v. Davis, 403 F.3d 14, 24 (1st Cir.2005) (internal quotation omitted). To establish personal jurisdiction over Nihon Kohden, Astro-Med must demonstrate that Rhode Island’s long-arm statute grants jurisdiction and that the exercise of jurisdiction under the statute is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Daynard, 290 F.3d at 52. The Rhode Island long-arm statute is coextensive with the permissible reach of the Due Process Clause.3 N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Cardinale, 567 F.3d 8, 16 (1st Cir.2009); Nicholas v. Buchanan, 806 F.2d 305, 306-07 (1st Cir.1986); Cerberus Partners, L.P. v. *9Gadsby & Hannah, LLP, 836 A.2d 1113, 1118 (R.I.2003); Almeida v. Radovsky, 506 A.2d 1373, 1374 (R.I.1986). Thus, the due process inquiry controls. Due process “requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940)); N. Laminate Sales, 403 F.3d at 25.

There are two means of establishing jurisdiction over a defendant’s person available under the Fourteenth Amendment: specific and general jurisdiction. For specific jurisdiction, the plaintiffs claim “must be related to the defendant’s contacts.” Harlow v. Children’s Hosp., 432 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir.2005). For general jurisdiction, “in which the cause of action may be unrelated to the defendant’s contacts, the defendant must have continuous and systematic contacts with the state.” Id. Here, the district court concluded that it had both specific and general jurisdiction. Since we conclude that the district court correctly concluded it had specific jurisdiction, we will address only that issue.

2. Specific Jurisdiction

This circuit “divides [the] minimum contacts analysis into three inquires: relatedness, purposeful availment, and reasonableness.” N. Laminate Sales, 403 F.3d at 25; Cardinale, 567 F.3d at 16 (stating that “personal jurisdiction under International Shoe, allowing jurisdiction to be asserted as to a specific claim, can be established where the defendants availed themselves of the opportunity to do business in the state, the claim in question is related to that access and the so-called gestalt factors are consistent with requiring an out of-state defendant to defend within the state”); Phillips v. Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir.2008); Children’s Hosp., 432 F.3d at 57. “Questions of specific jurisdiction are always tied to the particular claims asserted.” Phillips Exeter Acad. v. Howard Phillips Fund, Inc., 196 F.3d 284, 289 (1st Cir.1999). Astro-Med’s claims against Nihon Kohden sound in tort,4 and in tort cases, a court “charged with determining the existence vel non of personal jurisdiction must probe the causal nexus between the defendant’s contacts and the plaintiffs cause of action.” Id.

(a) Relatedness

The first inquiry, relatedness, asks whether “ ‘the claim underlying the litigation ... directly arise[s] out of, or relate[s] to, the defendant’s forum-state activities.’ ” N. Laminate Sales, 403 F.3d at 25 (quoting United Elec. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1089 (1st Cir.1992)). The relatedness test is a “ ‘flexible, relaxed standard.’ ” Id. (quoting Pritzker v. Yari, 42 F.3d 53, 61 (1st Cir. 1994)).

Focusing on the tortious interference with a contractual relationship claim, to prove such a claim, a plaintiff in Rhode Island must establish the following elements: “ ‘(1) the existence of a contract; (2) the alleged wrongdoer’s knowledge of the contract; (3) his intentional interference; and (4) damages resulting there*10from.’ ” Jolicoeur Furniture Co. v. Baldelli 653 A.2d 740, 752 (R.I.1995) (quoting Smith Dev. Corp. v. Bilow Enters., Inc., 112 R.I. 203, 308 A.2d 477, 482 (1973)). Before Nihon Kohden hired Plant, it knew that Astro-Med was located in Rhode Island, that Plant had entered into the Employee Agreement in Rhode Island, that the contract specified it would be governed by Rhode Island law, that the contract contained non-competition and non-disclosure provisions, and that by virtue of the contract, Plant had consented to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Rhode Island over any disputes related to the contract. Further, Nihon Kohden had sought and obtained legal advice that by hiring Plant, it was exposing itself to some legal risk. Thus, Nihon Kohden knew that by employing Plant, it was running the risk that Plant would thereby have breached his Rhode Island contract with a Rhode Island company and any ensuing suit would be initiated in Rhode Island and interpreted under Rhode Island law.

Despite this formidable array of Rhode Island connections, Nihon Kohden insists that because it is a California corporation and because all its direct dealings with Plant, a Florida resident, took place either in Florida or in California, jurisdiction cannot lie in Rhode Island. Nihon Kohden’s argument, however, emphasizes too fine a point. Consistent with Colder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984), a defendant “need not be physically present in the forum state to cause injury (and thus ‘activity’ for jurisdictional purposes) in the forum state.” N. Laminate Sales, 403 F.3d at 25. Nihon Kohden’s conduct in Florida and California was a cause of the breach of contract — the actual injury — that occurred in Rhode Island. That in-forum injury was clearly related to Astro-Med’s tortious interference claim, satisfying the first prong of the minimum contacts analysis.

(b) Purposeful Availment

To satisfy the second requirement, “the defendant’s in-state contacts must represent a purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of that state’s laws and making the defendant’s involuntary presence before the state’s courts foreseeable.” N. Laminate Sales, 403 F.3d at 25 (quoting United Elec. Workers, 960 F.2d at 1089). The focus is on “voluntariness and foreseeability.” Id. (quoting Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1391 (1st Cir.1995)).Here, Nihon Kohden was fully aware of the Astro-Med — Plant Employee Agreement, including its Rhode Island provisions, and persisted in negotiations in the face of legal advice from its own counsel that to do so would pose a risk. It must have been foreseeable to Nihon Kohden that it “might be held accountable for [its actions] in a [Rhode Island] forum.” Id. at 26.

(c) Reasonableness

To evaluate the reasonableness requirement, the Supreme Court has provided a set of “gestalt factors” to consider. N. Laminate Sales, 403 F.3d at 26; United Elec. Workers, 960 F.2d at 1089. These factors include: the defendant’s burden of appearing, the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the controversy, and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985); N. Laminate Sales, 403 F.3d at 26. *11Nihon Kohden contends that Rhode Island’s assertion of jurisdiction imposed a substantial burden on Nihon Kohden, because inter alia it has no offices or employees in the state of Rhode Island and all percipient witnesses to the hiring of Plant and other information about the misappropriation of trade secrets were located either in California or Florida.

Nihon Kohden’s position becomes manifestly untenable when Astro-Med’s companion litigation against Plant is factored into the mix. As Nihon Kohden concedes, Astro-Med had the legal right to initiate a lawsuit for breach of the Employment Agreement against Plant in Rhode Island, the state where the contract was formulated and executed. Once Rhode Island asserted uncontested jurisdiction over the breach of contract claim and the related misappropriation of trade secrets and unfair competition claims, the Florida and California witnesses and evidence were heading for trial in Rhode Island. Nihon Kohden’s earnest complaint about undue burden rings hollow, when its alternative would have resulted in two separate cases in two jurisdictions on opposite ends of the country — either Rhode Island and Florida or Rhode Island and California. Contrary to Nihon Kohden’s position, the gestalt factors militate strongly in favor of jurisdiction in Rhode Island.

(d) Specific Jurisdiction — Conclusion

Applying the specific jurisdiction tripartite analysis, we conclude that the district court properly asserted jurisdiction over Astro-Med’s claims against Nihon Kohden. We need go no further.

B. Venue

Nihon Kohden argues that Rhode Island was not the proper venue for Astro-Med’s lawsuit, and the district court should have either dismissed the claim or transferred the case to a different district in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1404.5

1. Determining Venue

The applicable venue provision of Title 28 states:

A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). Although Nihon Kohden is a California business, it resides for purposes of venue in Rhode Island.6 Plant is a resident of Florida. As the defendants reside in different states, subsection (1) does not apply.

Under subsection (2), the question becomes whether the District of Rhode *12Island is “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events ... giving rise to the claim occurred.” Id. In determining whether Rhode Island is a district in which a substantial part of the events occurred, we look “not to a single ‘triggering event’ prompting the action, but to the entire sequence of events underlying the claim.” Uffner v. La Reunion Francaise, S.A., 244 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir.2001) (quoting First of Mich. Corp. v. Bramlet, 141 F.3d 260, 263-264 (6th Cir.1998)). In addition, we do not focus on the actions of one party. Rather, our approach takes a “holistic view of the acts underlying a claim.” Id. at 43 n. 6. Furthermore, we are not required to determine the best venue, merely a proper venue. See id. at 42 (quoting Bates v. C & S Adjusters, Inc., 980 F.2d 865, 867 (2nd Cir.1992), for the proposition that venue may be proper in any number of districts). Thus, even though Plant was a resident of Florida when he was hired by Nihon Kohden, a California corporation, venue in Rhode Island may still be proper. Id. at 43 (stating that “§ 1391 contemplates that venue may be proper in several districts”).

Astro-Med and Plant entered into an employment contract in Rhode Island, the district in which Astro-Med was headquartered, that contained the non-compete and non-disclosure clauses at issue here. With full knowledge of the Employee Agreement and its contents, Nihon Kohden hired away Plant, thereby interfering with Astro-Med’s contract and misappropriating its trade secrets. Because AstroMed was headquartered in Rhode Island, this district is one of the places where the tortious interference and misappropriation of trade secrets occurred and where the harms from these torts were felt. See Bates, 980 F.2d at 868 (2nd Cir.1992). In addition, Rhode Island was the forum selected by the Employee Agreement to resolve disputes. See Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110, 1118 n. 11 (1st Cir.1993) (upholding forum selection clause). Taken together, these facts constitute a substantial part of Astro-Med’s claims against Nihon Kohden.

Further, Plant did not contest venue in Rhode Island and that portion of the lawsuit was, for venue purposes, going to proceed in Rhode Island. Thus, the convenience of the parties strongly militated in favor of retention of venue in Rhode Island. Uffner, 244 F.3d at 43 (“[T]he general purpose of the venue rules is ‘to protect the defendant against the risk that a plaintiff will select an unfair or inconvenient place of trial.’ ”) (quoting Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 183-84, 99 S.Ct. 2710, 61 L.Ed.2d 464 (1979)). Given that a substantial part of AstroMed’s claims involved Rhode Island and proceeding in Rhode Island would not thwart the underlying purpose of the venue statute, we conclude that the district court did not err in refusing to dismiss the claims pending against Nihon Kohden in Rhode Island for improper venue.

2. Transfer of Venue

Nihon Kohden also appeals the district court’s denial of its motion for change of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). “Section 1404(a) is intended to place discretion in the district court to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an ‘individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.’ ” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29, 108 S.Ct. 2239, 101 L.Ed.2d 22 (1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964)). Where the contract between the parties, here speaking of Astro-Med and Plant, contains a forum-selection clause, the clause “will be a significant factor that figures centrally in the District Court’s *13calculus.” Royal Bed & Spring Co. v. Famossul Industria e Comercio de Moveis Ltda., 906 F.2d 45, 51 (1st Cir.1990) (quoting Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29, 108 S.Ct. 2239). We review a “district court’s decision on transfer of venue for an abuse of discretion.” Coady v. Ashcraft & Gerel, 223 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir.2000); Cianbro Corp. v. Curran-Lavoie, Inc., 814 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir.1987). Not only does the burden of proof rest with the party seeking to transfer; there is a “strong presumption in favor of the plaintiffs choice of forum.” Coady, 223 F.3d at 11. In the circumstances of this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Nihon Kohden’s motion for transfer of venue.

C. The Verdict

Following the verdict, Nihon Kohden and Plant moved for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) and moved for new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 or in the alternative for remittitur. The district court denied each post-trial motion. Defendants object both to a number of the district court’s legal rulings and to the verdict, claiming that “the evidence strongly supported (almost mandated) a defense verdict.” We disagree.

1. Legal Standards

“We review the district court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, including legal decisions made therein, de novo.” Mass. Eye & Ear Infirmary v. QLT Phototherapeutics, Inc., 552 F.3d 47, 57 (1st Cir.2009). However, a jury’s verdict “must be upheld ‘unless the facts and inferences, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the movant that a reasonable jury could not have [returned the verdict].’ ” Borges Colon v. Romaiv-Abreu, 438 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir.2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Acevedo-Diaz v. Aponte, 1 F.3d 62, 66 (1st Cir.1993)). We must affirm “ ‘unless the evidence, together with all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict, could lead a reasonable person to only one conclusion, namely, that the moving party was entitled to judgment.’ ” N. Laminate Sales, 403 F.3d at 26 (quoting Shells Title Co. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 184 F.3d 10, 19 (1st Cir.1999)).

An appellant’s “hurdle is no lower on an appeal of a denial of a Rule 59 motion for a new trial.” Transamerica Premier Ins. Co. v. Ober, 107 F.3d 925, 929 (1st Cir.1997). The evidence is again viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Baron v. Suffolk County Sheriffs Dep’t, 402 F.3d 225, 245 (1st Cir.2005). A new trial is warranted “only if the verdict, though rationally based on the evidence, was so clearly against the weight of the evidence as to amount to a manifest miscarriage of justice.” Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 104 F.3d 472, 482 (1st Cir.1997) (internal quotation omitted). We reverse only if “the verdict is so seriously mistaken, so clearly against the law or the evidence, as to constitute a miscarriage of justice.” Levesque v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 832 F.2d 702, 703 (1st Cir.1987). Similarly, a district court’s denial of a motion for remittitur will be reversed only if “the jury’s verdict exceeds ‘any rational appraisal or estimate of the damages that could be based on the evidence before the jury.’ ” Smith v. Kmart Corp., 177 F.3d 19 (1st Cir.1999) (quoting Milone v. Moceri Family, Inc., 847 F.2d 35, 37 (1st Cir.1988)). The jury’s damage award must endure unless it is “ ‘grossly excessive, inordinate, shocking to the conscience of the court, or so high that it would be a denial of justice to permit it to stand.’ ” Correa v. Hosp. San Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1197 (1st Cir.1995) (quoting *14Segal v. Gilbert Color Sys., Inc., 746 F.2d 78, 81 (1st Cir.1984)). We review a denial of a motion for new trial or remittitur for an abuse of discretion. Mendez-Matos v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 557 F.3d 36, 46 (1st Cir.2009).

2. The Non-Competition Provision

Astro-Med’s Employee Agreement with Plant contained a one-year non-competition provision:

I recognize that [Astro-Med] sells its products throughout North America and Europe; as such, upon termination of my employment at the Company, for whatever reason, I shall not directly or indirectly enter into or engage in a business that competes with the Company, in a territory consisting of North America, and Europe, either as an individual, partner, joint venturer, employee, agent or salesman for any person, or as an officer, director or stockholder of a corporation or otherwise, for a period of one year thereafter.

Defendants argue that the non-com