900 N.E.2d 1095 (2008) 231 Ill.2d 593

The COUNTY OF DU PAGE et al., Appellees,
v.
The ILLINOIS LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al., Appellants.

No. 105395.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

December 18, 2008.

*1097 Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, Jerald S. Post, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, of counsel), and Joseph R. Mazzone, of Schenk Duffy Carey Ford Mazzone Phelan & Clemens Ltd., Joliet, for appellants.

Joseph E. Birkett, State's Attorney, Wheaton (Lisa Ann Hoffman, Assistant State's Attorney, of counsel), James Baird and James J. Powers, of Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Chicago, for appellees.

Gilbert Feldman, Chicago, for amici curiae Illinois State Federation of Labor et al.

Roger Huebner, Springfield, for amicus curiae Illinois Municipal League.

Michael I. Richardson, Terrence T. Creamer, Jennifer A. Niemiec, of Franczek Sullivan P.C., Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Public Employer Labor Relations Association.

OPINION

Chief Justice FITZGERALD delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

The Illinois Labor Relations Board, State Panel (the Board), and the Metropolitan Alliance of Police, Du Page County Sheriff's Police Chapter #126 (MAP or the Union) appeal from a judgment of the appellate court vacating the Board's certification of MAP as the exclusive bargaining representative for a unit of deputy sheriffs employed by the County of Du Page and the sheriff of Du Page County (collectively, the Employer) (375 Ill.App.3d 765, 314 Ill.Dec. 409, 874 N.E.2d 319). At issue is the proper interpretation of section 9(a-5) of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (5 ILCS 315/9(a-5) (West 2004)).

For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court, and remand to the appellate court for further review.

*1098 BACKGROUND

The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (the Act) grants public employees "full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing for the purposes of negotiating wages, hours and other conditions of employment." 5 ILCS 315/2 (West 2004). Prior to the adoption of section 9(a-5) of the Act (see Pub. Act 93-444, eff. August 5, 2003), unless a public employee was a member of a historically recognized bargaining unit, or the public employer voluntarily recognized a labor organization as the exclusive bargaining representative for a unit of employees, the only means available for public employees to exercise their collective-bargaining rights was through a secret ballot election. See 5 ILCS 315/3(f), 9(d), (f) (West 2002). When the legislature enacted section 9(a-5), it provided public employees and labor organizations an alternative to the election process. Section 9(a-5) states:

"The [Illinois Labor Relations] Board shall designate an exclusive representative for purposes of collective bargaining when the representative demonstrates a showing of majority interest by employees in the unit. If the parties to a dispute are without agreement on the means to ascertain the choice, if any, of employee organization as their representative, the Board shall ascertain the employees' choice of employee organization, on the basis of dues deduction authorization and other evidence, or, if necessary, by conducting an election. If either party provides to the Board, before the designation of a representative, clear and convincing evidence that the dues deduction authorizations, and other evidence upon which the Board would otherwise rely to ascertain the employees' choice of representative, are fraudulent or were obtained through coercion, the Board shall promptly thereafter conduct an election. The Board shall also investigate and consider a party's allegations that the dues deduction authorizations and other evidence submitted in support of a designation of representative without an election were subsequently changed, altered, withdrawn, or withheld as result of employer fraud, coercion, or any other unfair labor practice by the employer. If the Board determines that a labor organization would have had a majority interest but for an employer's fraud, coercion, or unfair labor practice, it shall designate the labor organization as an exclusive representative without conducting an election." (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 315/9(a-5) (West 2004).

A union seeking to be certified under section 9(a-5) must file with the Board a "majority interest petition," i.e., a representation petition "accompanied by a showing of interest evidencing that a majority of the employees in the petitioned-for bargaining unit wish to be represented by the labor organization." 80 Ill. Adm.Code § 1210.80(b) (as amended at 28 Ill. Reg. 4172, eff. February 19, 2004). Under the Board's rules, the showing of interest in support of such a petition "may consist of authorization cards, petitions, or any other evidence that demonstrates that a majority of the employees wish to be represented by the union for the purposes of collective bargaining." (Emphasis added.) 80 Ill. Adm.Code § 1210.80(d)(2)(A) (as amended at 28 Ill. Reg. 4172, eff. February 19, 2004). The evidence of majority support must contain original, legible, signatures, which do not predate the filing of the petition by more than six months. 80 Ill. Adm.Code §§ 1210.80(d)(2)(B), (d)(2)(C), (d)(2)(D) (as amended at 28 Ill. Reg. 4172, eff. February 19, 2004). In addition, the showing of interest "shall state that by signing the card the employee acknowledges that if a majority of his/her *1099 coworkers in an appropriate unit sign evidence of majority support, the card can be used by the petitioner to obtain certification as the employees' exclusive representative without an election." 80 Ill. Adm.Code § 1210.80(d)(2)(E) (as amended at 28 Ill. Reg. 4172, eff. February 19, 2004). Evidence of majority support is not furnished to any of the parties. 80 Ill. Adm.Code § 1210.80(e)(1) (as amended at 28 Ill. Reg. 4172, eff. February 19, 2004).

The employer is required to submit signature exemplars for the employees in the proposed bargaining unit and is permitted an opportunity to respond to the petition. 80 Ill. Adm.Code §§ 1210.100(b)(2), (b)(3) (as amended at 28 Ill. Reg. 4172, eff. February 19, 2004). In addition to providing "clear and convincing evidence of any alleged fraud or coercion in obtaining majority support," the employer must set forth its "position with respect to the matters asserted in the petition, including, but not limited to, the appropriateness of the bargaining unit and, to the extent known, whether any employees sought by petitioner to be included should be excluded from the unit." 80 Ill. Adm.Code § 1210.100(b)(3) (as amended at 28 Ill. Reg. 4172, eff. February 19, 2004). "Any person aggrieved" by an order of the Board certifying a labor organization "may apply for and obtain judicial review in accordance with provisions of the Administrative Review Law * * * directly in the Appellate Court for the district in which the aggrieved party resides or transacts business." 5 ILCS 315/9(i) (West 2004).

The present legal dispute arose out of a majority interest petition filed by MAP on June 15, 2005, in case number S-RC-05-153, in which MAP sought to be certified as the exclusive representative for a unit of Du Page County deputy sheriffs. The Employer objected to the petition on several grounds. One of its objections, relevant here, stemmed from the difference between the statutory language and the Board's rules. As set forth above, section 9(a-5) of the Act requires the Board to ascertain the employees' choice of representative "on the basis of dues deduction authorization and other evidence," whereas the Board's rules require "authorization cards, petitions, or any other evidence" demonstrating a majority interest. (Emphases added.) Compare 5 ILCS 315/9(a-5) (West 2004) with 80 Ill. Adm.Code § 1210.80(d)(2)(A) (as amended at 28 Ill. Reg. 4172, eff. February 19, 2004). The Employer argued that section 9(a-5) required the Union to submit both dues deduction authorization evidence and some other evidence of majority support, and that the Board's rules to the contrary were invalid. The Employer also argued that it was entitled to copies of the Union's evidence and that the requested bargaining unit was inappropriate.

The Board rejected the Employer's arguments and, on March 23, 2006, certified MAP as the exclusive bargaining representative for the requested employee unit. The Board's tally indicated that 189 employees were in the unit; 111 valid cards were signed in support of MAP; no cards were found, or even alleged, to have been obtained through the use of fraud or coercion; and 14 cards were found invalid for other reasons (e.g., the employee was not included in the unit, or the card was not signed or dated).

The Employer sought administrative review of the Board's decision, arguing that the word "and," as used in the statutory phrase "dues deduction authorization and other evidence" (5 ILCS 315/9(a-5) (West 2004)), should be read in its conjunctive sense, and that the Board's rules contradict the statute and are therefore invalid. The Employer also argued that the Board likely applied the invalid regulations and *1100 did not require the Union to supply both dues deduction authorization and other evidence in support of its petition. The Employer also renewed its challenge to the makeup of the bargaining unit.

The Board and the Union disagreed with the Employer's construction of section 9(a-5) and argued that the word "and," when construed in light of the entire section, should be read in its several, disjunctive sense. The Board and the Union also argued that the underlying evidence supporting a majority interest petition is confidential and that the employer does not have a right to review it. Finally, the Board and the Union maintained that the bargaining unit is appropriate.

While the case was being briefed in the appellate court, the Employer filed a motion seeking to have the record supplemented with the Union's evidence of majority support. The Board objected, and the appellate court denied the Employer's motion. Thus, the evidence of majority support was not made a part of the record on review.

The appellate court vacated the Board's decision and remanded the matter to the Board for further proceedings. 375 Ill. App.3d 765, 314 Ill.Dec. 409, 874 N.E.2d 319. The appellate court determined that both constructions of section 9(a-5) advanced by the parties were reasonable and that the statute was therefore ambiguous. 375 Ill.App.3d at 773-74, 314 Ill.Dec. 409, 874 N.E.2d 319. Ultimately, however, the appellate court agreed with the Employer: "[T]he majority interest provision requires that both dues deduction authorization and other evidence be submitted demonstrating that a majority of the employees support representation by the named organization." 375 Ill.App.3d at 776, 314 Ill.Dec. 409, 874 N.E.2d 319. The appellate court also held that because the Board's regulations only require one form of evidence to support a majority interest showing, and do not require dues deduction authorization evidence, the Board's regulations conflict with the requirements of section 9(a-5) and, therefore, are invalid. 375 Ill. App.3d at 777, 314 Ill.Dec. 409, 874 N.E.2d 319. The appellate court further held that the Board's decision on a majority interest petition is a final order, expressly subject to administrative review, and that meaningful review requires, at a minimum, that the reviewing court be able to ascertain that the evidence submitted to the Board was "the type and amount" sufficient to demonstrate a showing of interest by a majority of the eligible employees. 375 Ill.App.3d at 777-78, 314 Ill.Dec. 409, 874 N.E.2d 319. The appellate court noted that there was no evidence of record to support the Board's decision, and inferred that MAP submitted evidence in conformance with the Board's invalid regulations, rather than the requirements of section 9(a-5). Accordingly, the appellate court held that the Board's decision certifying MAP was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 375 Ill.App.3d at 778-79, 314 Ill.Dec. 409, 874 N.E.2d 319.

The appellate court also concluded that no reason existed to prohibit the Employer from reviewing the Union's evidence of majority interest, where the employees' identities are redacted. "Further, because the majority interest petition stands in lieu of an election, and to allow the meaningful review of the Board's decision, the Board must adopt some sort of regulation that provides for the submission of the evidence it relied upon to the reviewing court * * *." 375 Ill.App.3d at 779, 314 Ill.Dec. 409, 874 N.E.2d 319. The appellate court found it unnecessary to address the Employer's contention regarding the makeup of the bargaining unit. 375 Ill.App.3d at 779, 314 Ill.Dec. 409, 874 N.E.2d 319.

*1101 After entry of the appellate court opinion, the Employer filed a petition in the appellate court, pursuant to section 10-55(c) of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (5 ILCS 100/10-55(c) (West 2006)), seeking attorney fees of $47,254.50. While the fee petition was pending, the Board filed its petition for leave to appeal with this court, which we allowed. See 210 Ill.2d R. 315. Shortly thereafter, the appellate court granted the fee petition.

We allowed the Union, as an additional appellant in this court, to adopt the Board's briefs as its own. We also granted leave to the Illinois State Federation of Labor; Chicago Federation of Labor; American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31; Illinois Federation of Teachers; Services Employees International Union, Local 73, CTW, CLS; Associated Firefighters of Illinois; Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council; Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council; and Illinois Educational Association to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the Board and MAP. Finally, we granted leave to the Illinois Public Employer Labor Relations Association and Illinois Municipal League to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the Employer.

ANALYSIS

The Board identifies the following issues for review: (1) whether section 9(a-5) requires both dues deduction authorization evidence and another form of evidence in support of a majority interest petition; (2) whether an employer is entitled to review the evidence of majority support; (3) whether this court should consider the bargaining unit issues not addressed by the appellate court and, if so, how it should rule; and (4) whether the appellate court properly awarded the full amount of attorney fees requested by the Employer. We consider each in turn.

I. "Dues deduction authorization and other evidence"

The first issue raised by the Board is one of statutory interpretation, which is subject to de novo review. Harrisonville Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 212 Ill.2d 237, 247, 288 Ill.Dec. 121, 817 N.E.2d 479 (2004). Our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Harrisonville Telephone Co., 212 Ill.2d at 251, 288 Ill.Dec. 121, 817 N.E.2d 479; Alternate Fuels, Inc. v. Director of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, 215 Ill.2d 219, 237-38, 294 Ill.Dec. 32, 830 N.E.2d 444 (2004). The most reliable indicator of such intent is the language of the statute, which is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Harrisonville Telephone Co., 212 Ill.2d at 251, 288 Ill.Dec. 121, 817 N.E.2d 479; Alternate Fuels, 215 Ill.2d at 238, 294 Ill.Dec. 32, 830 N.E.2d 444. Words and phrases should not be considered in isolation; rather, they must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions and the statute as a whole. Williams v. Staples, 208 Ill.2d 480, 487, 281 Ill.Dec. 524, 804 N.E.2d 489 (2004); In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill.2d 300, 308, 267 Ill.Dec. 81, 776 N.E.2d 218 (2002). In addition to the statutory language, the court may consider the purpose behind the law and the evils sought to be remedied, as well as the consequences that would result from construing the law one way or the other. Williams, 208 Ill.2d at 487, 281 Ill.Dec. 524, 804 N.E.2d 489; Lieberman, 201 Ill.2d at 308, 267 Ill.Dec. 81, 776 N.E.2d 218. Where a statute is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation, the statute will be deemed ambiguous. General Motors Corp. v. State of Illinois Motor Vehicle Review Board, 224 Ill.2d 1, 13, 308 Ill.Dec. 611, 862 N.E.2d 209 (2007). In that event, the court may consider extrinsic aids to construction, such as legislative history. People v. Collins, 214 Ill.2d *1102 206, 214, 291 Ill.Dec. 686, 824 N.E.2d 262 (2005).

For ease of discussion, we repeat a portion of section 9(a-5):

"If the parties to a dispute are without agreement on the means to ascertain the choice, if any, of employee organization as their representative, the Board shall ascertain the employees' choice of employee organization, on the basis of dues deduction authorization and other evidence, or, if necessary, by conducting an election. If either party provides to the Board, before the designation of a representative, clear and convincing evidence that the dues deduction authorizations, and other evidence upon which the Board would otherwise rely to ascertain the employees' choice of representative, are fraudulent or were obtained through coercion, the Board shall promptly thereafter conduct an election." 5 ILCS 315/9(a-5) (West 2004).

The Board argues that the word "and," as used in the phrase "dues deduction authorization and other evidence," when considered in the context of section 9(a-5) as a whole, should be read in the disjunctive. Under this reading, "dues deduction authorization and other evidence" establishes a range or category of evidence which will support a majority interest petition, but it does not require that the petition be supported by all such evidence. Rather, dues deduction authorization or other evidence, similar in kind to dues deduction authorizations, is sufficient. This interpretation is reflected in the Board's rules, which state in relevant part: "The showing of interest in support of a majority interest petition may consist of authorization cards, petitions, or any other evidence that demonstrates that a majority of the employees wish to be represented by the union for the purposes of collective bargaining." (Emphasis added.) 80 Ill. Adm.Code § 1210.80(d)(2)(A) (as amended at 28 Ill. Reg. 4172, eff. February 19, 2004).

The Board also posits that reading "and" as "or" avoids creating an internal inconsistency in the statute. The Board explains that, if, in the second sentence quoted above, the Board could "otherwise" rely on "other evidence" to ascertain the employees' choice of representative, then the phrase "dues deduction authorization and other evidence" in the first sentence cannot require both forms of evidence.

The Employer argues that "and" typically "signifies and expresses the relation of addition" (People v. A Parcel of Property Commonly Known as 1945 North 31st Street, Decatur, Macon County, Illinois, 217 Ill.2d 481, 501, 299 Ill.Dec. 196, 841 N.E.2d 928 (2005)), and thus is generally read in the conjunctive. The Employer disputes that reading "and" in this fashion creates an inconsistency in the statute, and adopts the reasoning of the appellate court that the term "otherwise," when given its ordinary meaning, can be reconciled with reading "and" in the conjunctive. See 375 Ill.App.3d at 775, 314 Ill.Dec. 409, 874 N.E.2d 319.

In evaluating the parties' divergent interpretations, we note that use of the word "and" between two statutory elements generally indicates that both of the elements must be satisfied in order to comply with the statute. People v. A Parcel of Property Commonly Known as 1945 North 31st Street, Decatur, Macon County, Illinois, 217 Ill.2d 481, 501, 299 Ill.Dec. 196, 841 N.E.2d 928 (2005); Jarvis v. South Oak Dodge, Inc., 201 Ill.2d 81, 87-88, 265 Ill.Dec. 877, 773 N.E.2d 641 (2002). Nonetheless, this court has also recognized that "and" is often used interchangeably with "or," the meaning being determined by the context. Sturgeon Bay, Etc. Ship Canal & Harbor Co. v. Leatham, 164 Ill. *1103 239, 243, 45 N.E. 422 (1896). Webster's dictionary reflects this use of "and," providing the following secondary definition:

"2—used as a function word to express * * * reference to either or both of two alternatives esp. in legal language when also plainly intended to mean or ." (Emphasis in original.) Webster's Third New International Dictionary 80 (1993).

See also Black's Law Dictionary 86 (6th ed.1990) (stating that "and" is "[s]ometimes construed as `or'").

In construing statutes, the strict meaning of words like "and" "is more readily departed from than that of other words." John P. Moriarty, Inc. v. Murphy, 387 Ill. 119, 129, 55 N.E.2d 281 (1944). Thus, if reading "and" in its literal sense would create an inconsistency in the statute or "render[ ] the sense of a statutory enactment dubious," we will read "and" as "or." John P. Moriarty, Inc., 387 Ill. at 129-30, 55 N.E.2d 281; accord 1945 North 31st Street, 217 Ill.2d at 500-01, 299 Ill. Dec. 196, 841 N.E.2d 928; People ex rel. Department of Registration & Education v. D.R.G., Inc., 62 Ill.2d 401, 405, 342 N.E.2d 380 (1976).

We conclude that the basic premise underlying the Board's reading of the statute—that "and" does not necessarily mean "and"—and the basic premise underlying the Employer's reading of the statute— that "and" typically means "and"—both appear, at first blush, to be on solid ground. We conclude also that both interpretations can be harmonized, to a greater or lesser degree, with section 9(a-5) as a whole, including the "otherwise" clause. Accordingly, because section 9(a-5) is "`capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses,'" we deem the statute ambiguous. Wade v. City of North Chicago Police Pension Board, 226 Ill.2d 485, 511, 315 Ill.Dec. 772, 877 N.E.2d 1101 (2007), quoting People v. Jameson, 162 Ill.2d 282, 288, 205 Ill.Dec. 90, 642 N.E.2d 1207 (1994).

To resolve this ambiguity, we turn to the legislative history of section 9(a-5), which began its life as House Bill 3396. We find instructive the statements of Senator Martin Sandoval, who spoke in support of this bill:

"Under current law, workers must go through a difficult process to form a union. Workers must first sign union authorization cards stating that they want a union. Then, even though they've already said they want a union, they must file for a * * * Labor Board-run election. The election process can be lengthy and cumbersome, as we all know, during which time the employer has control of the employers [sic] and can interfere with the employees' decision. And, in fact, employers routinely use this time to scare workers into voting against a union even if the workers want a union. Solution to this problem for public employees is to allow them * * * to vote for a union through a process called card check." 93d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 21, 2003, at 12 (statements of Senator Sandoval).

The senator's statements indicate that the legislature intended, through its adoption of House Bill 3396, to provide an alternative to the "lengthy and cumbersome" statutory election procedure, namely, a simple "card check" procedure. We therefore cannot agree with the Employer that the legislature would have complicated the card check procedure by requiring two forms of evidence: a dues checkoff card and some other unspecified form of evidence.

*1104 Support for this conclusion is also found in the statements of Representative Larry McKeon:

"House Bill 3396 is modeled after a piece of legislation in New York that simplifies the manner in which elections may be held to certify a collective bargaining agent * * *." 93d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, March 31, 2003, at 50 (statements of Representative McKeon).

The New York legislation to which Representative McKeon referred is section 207 of New York's Public Employees' Fair Employment Act. The New York statute requires that for purposes of resolving disputes concerning representation status, the public employees' choice of representative shall be ascertained "on the basis of dues deduction authorization and other evidences." (Emphasis added.) N.Y. Civ. Serv. § 207 (Consol.2008). To implement the statute, New York's labor board adopted rules requiring a majority of the employees to indicate their choice of representative "by the execution of dues deduction authorization cards which are current or individual designation cards." (Emphasis added.) N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 4, § 201.9(g)(1) (2008). We presume that our legislature, having modeled House Bill 3396 on the New York statute, was also aware of the corresponding administrative regulations, which were then in effect. Having adopted language that mirrors in pertinent part the language of the New York statute, we also presume that the legislature intended a similar result. The Board's reading of section 9(a-5), as reflected in its regulations, achieves that result.

To the extent, however, that the legislative history fails to completely resolve any doubt as to the legislature's intent, we are guided by the principle that courts afford considerable deference to the interpretation of an ambiguous statute by the agency charged with its administration. Lauer v. American Family Life Insurance Co., 199 Ill.2d 384, 388, 264 Ill. Dec. 87, 769 N.E.2d 924 (2002); Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co. v. Pappas, 194 Ill.2d 99, 106, 251 Ill.Dec. 654, 741 N.E.2d 248 (2000). The reason for this deference is that the "agency can make informed judgments upon the issues, based on its experience and expertise." Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill.2d 391, 398, 199 Ill.Dec. 659, 634 N.E.2d 712 (1994), citing Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill.2d 76, 97-98, 180 Ill.Dec. 34, 606 N.E.2d 1111 (1992); see also Andrews v. Kowa Printing Corp., 217 Ill.2d 101, 116, 298 Ill.Dec. 1, 838 N.E.2d 894 (2005) ("the interpretation of a statute by involved administrative bodies constitutes `an informed source for guidance when seeking to ascertain the legislature's intention when the statute was enacted'"), quoting Johnson v. Marshall Field & Co., 57 Ill.2d 272, 278, 312 N.E.2d 271 (1974). For this additional reason, we would adopt the construction urged by the Board.

We hold that the word "and," as used in the phrase "dues deduction authorization and other evidence," was intended by the legislature to mean "or." The appellate court therefore erred in holding section 1210.80(d)(2)(A) of the Board's regulations, which do not require dues deduction authorization evidence, invalid. See 375 Ill. App.3d at 777, 314 Ill.Dec. 409, 874 N.E.2d 319.

The appellate court also erred when it held that the Board's decision certifying the union was against the manifest weight of the eviden